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Abstract 
ii 
ABSTRACT 
India’s North-West Frontier was the one area where the British Raj could suffer a 
knockout blow from either external Russian invasion or internal revolt.  Frontier 
defence was amongst the greatest burdens during India’s inter-War financial austerity.  
Despite the RAF’s operational and financial efficacy in 1920s Iraq, air control was 
never implemented on the Frontier and air power’s potential was never fully exploited.  
Instead, aircraft were employed to enhance the Army’s traditional battlefield 
capabilities, resulting in efficient tactical co-ordination during the 1930s Waziristan 
campaign - the RAF’s most operationally-active pre-War theatre.  
To address why air power was constrained on the Frontier, this Thesis examines the 
inter-War relationship between the Armies in India and the RAF and its impact on the 
development and application of RAF doctrine. 
It concludes that the conservatively-natured Indian Armies were slow to recognise the 
conceptual shift required to fully exploit air power.  This entrenchment was reinforced 
by inter-Service rivalry and the threat of aircraft replacing land forces with a 
concomitant loss of political standing.  The enduring high-level internecine conflict 
resulted in the squandering of both resources and the opportunity to test independent, 
‘strategic’ air power theory prior to the Second World War.  Its legacy impacted on 
Army-RAF relations into the War. 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
‘The North-west Frontier Province remains one of the most fascinating areas and 
memories of the British Empire. Myth, legend and reality overlap here and one is not 
sure where one stops and the other begins. The Frontier was where careers, including 
those of Indian Viceroys and British Prime Ministers, could be made and unmade'1 
INTRODUCTION 
The North-West Frontier (NWF) of India, described by India’s High Commissioner in 
1938 as ‘the most important land frontier in the Empire’, was an area of vital 
importance to the British Empire.2  It formed the border between British India and 
Afghanistan, the trade route historically taken by repetitive historical invasions from 
the north-west.  The British fixated on Frontier problems, be them the threat of 
conventional Russian invasion (the ‘major’ threat), or irregular warfare by the 
indigenous Pathan tribesmen of the mountainous, unadministered, Frontier zone (the 
‘minor’ threat).3  As Marsh observed in 2009: 
Generations of British officers believed that this was the one place in India 
where the British could suffer a “knockout blow” from either external invasion or 
internal revolt.4 
The Frontier mountains lacked natural resources, reducing the trans-border 
tribes to poverty and forcing them to raid the fertile Punjab plains.  This, combined 
with the tribes’ fiercely independent nature and the prevalence of rifles, led to 
outbursts of violence.  In the aftermath of the tribal uprisings following the 1919 Third 
Afghan War, the Indian Armies garrisoned the unadministered Frontier area and 
instigated a programme of road building into the tribal heartlands, at significant 
                                                
1 Akbar S Ahmed, "An Aspect of the Colonial Encounter in the North-West Frontier Province", 
Asian Affairs 9, no. 3  (1978): 320. 
2 CAB 21/1079, Major-General Sir Sydney Muspratt, India Defence Problems: Transcript of 
Broadcast by High Commissioner of India to the UK on 16 May 1938, prepared by Military 
Secretary, India Office, 25 April 1938. 
3 The archaic term ‘Pathan’, rather than ‘Pashtuns’ is used throughout this Thesis to describe 
the Pashto-speaking people of the region, as this is the term used in the primary sources of the 
period. 
4 Brandon D. Marsh, "Ramparts of Empire: India's North-West Frontier and British Imperialism, 
1919-1947" (University of Texas at Austin, 2009), vii. 
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financial expense, to subdue further violence.  
Following the end of the First World War (FWW), the fledgling Royal Air Force 
(RAF) was searching for an independent role to secure its autonomy and avoid 
potential re-absorption into its parent Services.  The Air Staff swiftly developed a 
scheme that would become known as ‘air control’ whereby the Air Ministry assumed 
responsibility for the internal security of a region.5  This involved troops being largely 
substituted by aircraft, with significant concomitant savings.  Following the 1921 Cairo 
Conference, air control was implemented in Iraq and, in 1922, all British and local 
forces were placed under the command of Air Vice-Marshal Sir John ‘Jack’ Salmond.6  
The Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) doubted that Iraq could be run by ‘Hot 
Air, Aeroplanes & Arabs’.7  Nevertheless, the cost of garrisoning Iraq dropped from 
£20-million in 1922 to under £2-million in 1928.8  Aden, Transjordan and Palestine 
followed this model thereafter.  With the exception of Palestine, air control was 
deemed largely successful in the inter-War period.9 
Despite the withdrawal of Indian Army units from Iraq, the post-War trade slump 
and exchange rate crash placed India in financial crisis.  Defence consumed over 51% 
of India’s 1920-21 budget, largely on the NWF, a trend that continued until the Second 
World War.10  Yet, despite the RAF’s apparent operational and financial efficacy in 
Iraq, air control was never implemented on the NWF, despite the Air Ministry’s 
                                                
5 This definition of the term ‘air control’ is used throughout this Thesis.  A list of definitions is 
provided at Annex 1.  
6 See H Montgomery Hyde, British Air Policy Between the Wars, 1918-1939 (London: William 
Heinemann, 1976), 91-95. 
7 Keith Jeffery, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: A Political Soldier (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), 251. 
8 D J P Waldie, "Relations Between the Army and the Royal Air Force, 1918-1939" 
(Unpublished PhD Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 1980), 205. 
9 The Air Ministry never claimed to be able to control Palestine from the air.  Air control was 
imposed as an convenience, piggy-backing on the RAF’s administrative structures already 
established to support air control in Transjordan, with the Air Ministry acting as the Colonial 
Office’s agent.  See the analysis in Chapter 5. 
10 B R Tomlinson, The Political Economy of the Raj, 1914-1947: The Economics of 
Decolonization in India (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1979), 109; Marsh, "Ramparts of 
Empire", 37-38. 
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persistent petitioning.  Furthermore, India’s Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C(India)) shied 
away from independent RAF action, preferring to use air power to support the Army. 
This study examines the nature of the inter-War relationship between the Armies 
of India and the RAF and its impact on the development and application of RAF 
doctrine.  It strives to answer the question of why, when air control in Iraq had resulted 
in demonstrable financial economies by the late 1920s, was air power’s maximum 
potential not implemented on the Frontier, given India’s extreme austere financial 
position? 
The ethics of Imperialism are addressed in their contemporary context and are 
not judged by today’s standards.  The interesting subject of ‘Indianisation’ and the 
formation of the Indian Air Force (IAF) are not addressed, as they fall outwith the core 
research question.  Similarly, irregular warfare and tactics are not described in great 
detail as these have recently been addressed by other doctoral studies; they are only 
examined where they generated inter-Service friction or impacted on doctrine.11     
LITERATURE REVIEW 
An overview of the extant research highlights the need for closer examination of the 
nature of inter-Service friction in India and its implications.  Looking first at the 
political-military interface, Montgomery Hyde’s expansive 1976 work examined the 
1928/9 Kabul evacuation and Trenchard’s 1929 Frontier air control scheme, but was 
otherwise ‘light’ on India.12  In 1980, Bond provided an overview of British and Indian 
military policy and the issues of late-1930s modernisation, although the air aspects 
were secondary and somewhat inaccurate.13  This, in conjunction with Tomlinson’s 
                                                
11 See, in particular, Coningham’s work, as discussed in the Literature Review (Simon 
Coningham, "Divided We Fall: Continuity or Discontinuity in Close Air Support, 1919-39" 
(Unpublished PhD Thesis, King's College London, 2009)). 
12 Hyde, British Air Policy Between the Wars. 
13 Brian Bond, British Military Policy between the Two World Wars (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1980). 
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1979 Political Economy of the Raj, exposed the financial constraints that shaped NWF 
policy.14  Unfortunately, while Powers’ bold 1976 study of inter-War air strategy 
examined air control, Indian references were almost absent.15  Smith’s 1984 work 
examined the external factors that influenced the Air Ministry between the Wars, but 
its high-level approach, again, largely circumvented India.16  Ferris’ 1989 study 
advanced that Britain could only afford to modernise one Service in the early 1920s 
and that the economy of air control in Iraq prevailed; this ultimately led to strategic 
bombing forces while Army modernisation remained largely unfunded.17  This was an 
interesting perspective in the context of this Thesis, given India’s financial austerity.  
While Biddle's 2002 Rhetoric and Reality did not mention India, it is nevertheless a 
critical work in collating the RAF’s development of strategic bombing as a coercive 
tool.18 
There are many popular NWF historical narratives, the more recent ones pitched 
from the Afghan perspective.  These paint a vivid picture of Frontier land conflict, but 
even D S Richards (an ex-RAF navigator) rarely mentioned air power.19  A few more 
analytical authors have used the NWF as case studies for wider themes such as 
insurgency.20 
                                                
14 Tomlinson, The Political Economy of the Raj. 
15 Barry D Powers, Strategy Without Slide-Rule: British Air Strategy, 1914-1939 (London: 
Holmes and Meiers, 1976). 
16 Malcom Smith, British Air Strategy Between the Wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). 
17 John Robert Ferris, The Evolution of British Strategic Policy, 1919-1926 (Basingstoke: 
MacMillan Press, 1989), 63-64. 
18 Tami Davis Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and 
American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2002). 
19 For example: Michael Barthorp, The North-West Frontier: British India and Afghanistan: A 
Pictorial History, 1839-1947 (Poole: Blandford Press, 1982); Gregory Fremont-Barnes, The 
Anglo-Afghan Wars, 1839-1919 (Oxford: Osprey, 2009); Matt M Matthews, An Ever Present 
Danger: A Concise History of British Military Operations on the North-West Frontier, 1849-1947 
(Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010); D S Richards, The Savage Frontier: 
A History of the Anglo-Afghan Wars (London: MacMillan, 1990); Victoria Schofield, Afghan 
Frontier: At the Crossroads of Conflict (London: Taurus, 2003); Jules Stewart, The Savage 
Border: The Story of the North-West Frontier (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2007). 
20 See, for example, Major Eric H Haas, Operations at the Border: Efforts to Disrupt Insurgent 
Safe-Havens, Art of War Papers (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2011); 
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Most Indian Army academic studies recognise air power’s Frontier role, at least 
within the confines of the battlefield.  In 1968, Major-General Elliott provided a 
soldier’s perspective on the causes of conflict which, although not recognising the 
coercive nature of air blockades, was well researched and objective about air power.21  
Moreman’s 1997 thesis and subsequent works set the scholarly benchmark which, 
while concentrating on land operations, increasingly described RAF Frontier warfare, 
focusing on tactical support for the Army.22  Johnson’s 2015 edited collation provided 
two germane NWF air power studies:23 Coningham’s discussion on air-ground 
cooperation in Waziristan during 1936-37; and Richards’ comprehensive analysis of 
early Indian aviation and the creation of the Indian Air Force, a subject he has 
published widely on.24   
                                                                                                                                           
David M Hart, Banditry in Islam: Case Studies from Morocco, Algeria and the Pakistan North 
West Frontier, Menas Studies in Continuity and Change in the Middle East & North Africa 
(Wisbech: Middle East & North African Studies Press, 1987). 
21 Major General J G Elliott, The Frontier, 1839-1947: The Story of the North-West Frontier of 
India (London: Cassell, 1968). 
22 T R Moreman, "'Passing it On': The Army in India and the Development of Frontier Warfare, 
1849-1947" (PhD Thesis, King's College, University of London, 1995); ———, "'Small Wars' 
and 'Imperial Policing': The British Army and the Theory and Practice of Colonial Warfare in the 
British Empire, 1919-1939", The Journal of Strategic Studies 19, no. 4  (1996); ———, The 
Army in India and the Development of Frontier Warfare, 1849-1947 (Basingstoke: MacMillan 
Press, 1998); ———, "'Watch and Ward': The Army in India and the North-West Frontier, 
1920-1939" in Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of the Colonial Powers, C. 1700-1964, 
ed. David Killingray and David Omissi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999); ——
—, ""The Greatest Training Ground in the World": The Army in India and the North-West 
Frontier, 1901-1947" in A Military History of India and South Asia: From the East India 
Company to the Nuclear Era, ed. Daniel P Marston and Chandar S Sundram (Westport: 
Praeger Security International, 2007); ———, "'Passing it On': The Army in India and Frontier 
Warfare, 1914-39" in War and Society in Colonial India, ed. Kaushik Roy (New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 2010); ———, "Development of Frontier Warfare 1914-39”, King-
Emperor.com, http://www.king-emperor.com/Frontier%20Warfare%201914-1939.html 
(accessed 9 May 1914). 
23 Rob Johnson, ed. The British Indian Army: Virtue and Necessity (Newcastle upon Tyne: 
Cambridge Scholars, 2014).  Robson’s previous Frontier book dedicated just a single page to 
the role of air power (see ———, The Afghan Way of War: Culture and Pragmatism: A Critical 
History (London: Hurst & Co, 2011), 199-200). 
24 Simon Coningham, "Air-Ground Cooperation between the RAF and the Indian Army in 
Waziristan 1936-37" in The British Indian Army: Virtue and Necessity, ed. Rob Johnson 
(Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2014); Clive Richards, "First Into the Indian 
Skies: The Indian Army, Military Aviation and the Creation of the Indian Air Force, 1910-1932" 
in The British Indian Army: Virtue and Necessity, ed. Rob Johnson (Newcastle upon Tyne: 
Cambridge Scholars, 2014).  Richards’ previous works include: ———, "Origins of Military 
Aviation in India and the Creation of the Indian Air Force, 1910-1932, Part One: The Origins of 
Military Aviation in India, 1901-1918", Royal Air Force Air Power Review 10, no. 3  (2007); ——
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Andrew Roe, an experienced British Army infantry officer, has published 
prolifically on the NWF, initially on Frontier governance and the Fakir of Ipi (FoI), but 
progressively focusing on air power.  His Air Power Review articles have examined 
Pink’s War, the Kabul airlift and the perils of air operations, as well as analyses of 
aviation’s role in guerrilla warfare and army co-operation (AC) in 1930s Waziristan; 
these were published as a compendium in 2015.25  His articles, which largely 
concerned tactical and theatre-level air power, demonstrated an incisive 
understanding of air-land operations.  These texts, by essentially land-centric authors, 
are invaluable in providing the soldier’s view of NWF air power, mitigating against a 
myopic air-centric approach to this study. 
The study of Imperialism exposes the broader context of this Thesis.  Headrick’s 
2010 Power Over Peoples analysed technology’s role in Western colonialism and the 
indigenous response.  He dedicated two chapters to air control, one proposing that 
aircraft kept the colonial dream alive at minimal cost, and the second, less convincing 
and simplistic, air control’s decline.  Headrick suggested that air power’s inability to 
discriminate between insurgents and civilians, and its faceless destruction, inspired 
sympathy and supporters for insurgencies.  While Headrick’s worldwide review 
                                                                                                                                           
—, "Origins of Military Aviation in India and the Creation of the Indian Air Force, 1910-1932, 
Part Two", Royal Air Force Air Power Review 11, no. 1  (2008); and ———, "Substitution or 
Subordination?  The Employment of Air Power over Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier, 
1910-1939", Journal of the Royal Air Force Historical Society, no. 48  (2010). 
25 Major Andrew M Roe, "British Governance of the North-West Frontier (1919-1947): A 
Blueprint for Contemporary Afghanistan?" (US Army Command and General Staff College, 
2005); Andrew M Roe, Waging War in Waziristan - The British Struggle in the Land of Bin 
Laden, 1849-1947 (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2010); ———, "‘Pink’s War’ – 
Applying the Principles of Air Control to Waziristan, 9 March to 1 May 1925", RAF Air Power 
Review 13, no. 3  (2010); Lieutenant Colonel Andrew M Roe, "Aviation and Guerrilla War: 
Proposals for ‘Air Control’ of the North-West Frontier of India", RAF Air Power Review 14, no. 1  
(2011); ———, "“Good God, Sir, Are You Hurt?”: The Realities and Perils of Operating over 
India’s Troublesome North-West Frontier", RAF Air Power Review 14, no. 3  (2011); ———, 
"Evacuation by Air: The All-But-Forgotten Kabul Airlift of 1928-29", RAF Air Power Review 15, 
no. 1  (2012); Colonel Andrew M Roe, "The Troublesome 1930s: General Unrest, Intense 
Activity and Close Cooperation", RAF Air Power Review 16, no. 2  (2013); Andrew M Roe, 
Brian Cloughley, and Lester W Grau, From Fabric Wings to Supersonic Fighters and Drones: A 
History of Military Aviation on Both Sides of the North-West Frontier (Solihull: Helion & 
Company Ltd, 2015). 
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circumvented India, it highlighted the question of why the Raj, all-but-crippled by the 
cost of maintaining its NWF armies, dismissed the economies of air control.  Roy’s 
2010 War and Society in Colonial India examined the dynamic between the military 
and Indian colonial society.26  Roy dismissed aerial warfare because the inter-War air 
forces were ‘miniscule’, highlighting a misconception of air power’s significance in the 
historiography.27  Simpson’s 2010 Human Rights and the End of Empire examined air 
power as a mechanism of repression and the blurring of martial law and aggressive 
policing.28  Despite this refreshing approach, Simpson’s argument assumed that all air 
action was punitive and unable to bring malefactors to trial, unaware that the Air 
Ministry's preferred method, the air blockade, was a minimum-force tactic to coerce 
belligerents into compliance.  Marsh’s 2009 thesis and 2015 book examined the inter-
War dynamic between the British and Pathans, set against the background of rising 
Indian nationalism.29 
Several books examine NWF campaigns.  Barthorp’s Afghan Wars was a 
popularist but pictorially enriching work.30  Robson’s scholarly narrative of the Third 
Afghan War and subsequent 1920 Waziristan campaign included a three-page 
reflection on air power.31  Warren’s 2000 book described air power’s involvement 
during the FoI’s 1936-37 revolt, but his detailed monograph was light on analysis.32  
Roe provided the most detailed analysis of air action in his 2010 Waging War in 
                                                
26 Kaushik Roy, ed. War and Society in Colonial India, Second ed., Themes in Indian History 
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press,2010). 
27 Ibid., 358. 
28 A W Brian Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the 
European Convention (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 71-75. 
29 Marsh, "Ramparts of Empire"  and Brandon D. Marsh, Ramparts of Empire: British 
Imperialism and India's Afghan Frontier, 1918-1948 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).  
See also ———, "The North-West Frontier and the Crisis of Empire: Post-War India and the 
Debate over Waziristan, 1919-1923", British Scholar 1 (2009). 
30 Michael Barthorp, Afghan Wars and the North-West Frontier, 1839-1947 (London: Cassell & 
Co, 2002). 
31 Brian Robson, Crisis on the Frontier: The Third Afghan War and the Campaign in Waziristan 
1919-20 (Stroud: Spellmount, 2007). 
32 Alan Warren, Waziristan, the Faqir of Ipi, and the Indian Army: The North West Frontier 
Revolt of 1936-37 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
8 
Waziristan and 2011 “Aviation and Guerrilla War”.33  However, covering the period 
1849-1947 left him insufficient space for a full examination of independent air 
operations or Army-RAF friction. 
The RAF tried, but failed, to implement air control on the NWF, so its study is 
germane.  The modern debate opened with Beaumont’s 1979 study of inter-War 
British air policing, proposing that asymmetric colonial operations distorted the RAF’s 
development of the necessary bombing doctrine for the subsequent conventional 
warfare against Germany.34  In 1981, Major-General Lunt provided a personal recount 
of how public opinion constrained air control in 1950/60s Aden.35  Cox’s 1985 
Splendid Training Ground emphasised how air control’s success in Iraq elevated the 
importance of bombing, concluding that ‘the extent to which this may have influenced 
strategic doctrine during the Second World War is perhaps worthy of further 
attention’.36  This was reinforced by Townsend’s excellently researched and insightful 
1986 essay on the strategic debate over air control.37  In 1989, Towle published a 
worldwide review of air power in unconventional warfare, including a summary of the 
NWF.38  Rising US Air force interest in policing generated Hoffman’s 1989 RAND 
study, British Air Power in Peripheral Conflict, which included a three-page synopsis of 
the NWF.  Hoffman highlighted the RAF’s strategic failure to gain responsibility for any 
region under threat of major conflict despite its economy and tactical successes.  
Furthermore, peripheral conflict stifled the development of air defence tactics and 
                                                
33 Roe, Waging War in Waziristan and ———, "Aviation and Guerrilla War". 
34 Roger A Beaumont, "A New Lease on Empire: Air Policing, 1919-1939", Aerospace Historian 
26, no. 2  (1979). 
35 Major General James D Lunt, "Air Control: Another Myth?", JRUSI 126, no. 4  (1981). 
36 Jafna L Cox, "A Splendid Training Ground: The Importance to the Royal Air Force of its Role 
in Iraq, 1919-32", The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 13, no. 2  (1985). 
37 Charles Townshend, "Civilization and 'Frightfulness': Air Control in the Middle East Between 
the Wars" in Warfare Diplomacy and Politics: Essays in Honour of A.J.P. Taylor, ed. Chris 
Wrigley (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1986). 
38 Philip A Towle, Pilots and Rebels: The Use of Aircraft in Unconventional Warfare, 1918-1988 
(London: Brassey's, 1989). 
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weapon and navigation techniques.39  Omissi’s comprehensive 1990 Air Power and 
Colonial Control remains the standard reference work.40  One of the few weak areas 
was his focus on the physical, rather than psychological, effect of bombing; another 
was his Imperial, rather than air power, focus.  Despite dedicating only three pages to 
India, he acknowledged the sub-continent’s central importance to Imperial defence.  
Omissi’s timing was perfect; the perceived success of air power in the 1991 Gulf War, 
Balkans crisis and associated no-fly zones generated a flourish of articles debating air 
policing, especially in the US.41  Corum, a US Army Reservist, has prolifically 
articulated the counter-arguments to air policing; his secondary-source reviews have 
                                                
39 Bruce Hoffman, British Air Power in Periferal Conflict, 1919-1976 (RAND, 1989), 21-24, 33-
35. 
40 David E Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force 1919-1939 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990).  Omissi focused a little more on India in his 
2004 presentation to the Lawrence Society: ———, "The Royal Air Force in Iraq and India in 
the 1920s", The Journal of the T E Lawrence Society XIII, no. 2  (2004).  
41 See, for example, in chronological order: Major Michael A Longoria, "A Historical View of Air 
Policing Doctrine: Lessons from the British Experience Between the Wars, 1919-1939" (School 
of Advanced Airpower Studies, USAF Air University, 1992); Wing Commander B M B 
Canavan, "The Development of Air Control Doctrine, 1918 to 1939" (USAF Air University, 
1993); Captain David W Parsons, "British Air Control: A Model for the Application of Air Power 
in Low-Intensity Conflict?", Airpower Journal  (1994); Major Tony R Mullis, "The Limits of Air 
Control: The RAF Experience in Aden, 1926-67" (USAF Air University, 1997); Major Michael E 
Tallent, "Air Occupation: An Environmental Impact Study" (USAF Air University, 1997); Major 
Michael J Petersen, "Wood, Fabric, and Wire: Insights from the Biplanes Era, 1919-1936 
Forward”, Chronicles Online Journal (1998?), 
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/coj/cc/biplane.html; Richard F Walker, "Facing 
the Future: A Doctrine for Air Control in Limited Conflicts" (School of Advanced Airpower 
Studies, USAF Air University, 1998); Air Marshal Sir Timothy Garden, "Air Power and the New 
Imperialism - 2002 Royal Aeronautical Society Sopwith Lecture”, The UK Defence Forum 
(2002), 
http://www.ukdf.org.uk/assets/downloads/assets/writings/articles/2002/020701raes.html; Wing 
Commander A J C Walters, "Air Control: Past, Present, Future?", RAF Air Power Review 8, no. 
4  (2011); ———, "Air Control: Past, Present, Future?", RAF Air Power Review 8, no. 4  
(2005); Major Robert O Cioppa, "Airpower in Small Wars: Back to the Future" (USAF Air 
University, 2006); Priya Satia, "The Defense of Inhumanity: Air Control and the British Idea of 
Arabia", The American Historical Review 111, no. 1  (2006); Wing Commander David F 
Haines, "British Airpower and Counterinsurgency - Learning from the Past, Fighting Today and 
Preparing for the Future" (USAF Air University, 2007); David Hall, "Ruling the Empire out of the 
Central Blue: The Royal Air Force and Counter-Insurgency (COIN) Operations in the Inter-War 
Period", RAF Air Power Review 10, no. 2  (2007); Air Chief Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy, "Counter-
Insurgency: Echoes from the Past", JRUSI 152, no. 5  (2007); Major John M Boehm, ""Air 
Policing": A Modern Interpretation: A Historical Perspective on Airpower's Role in the 
Transition Between War and Peace" (USAF Air University, 2008); Lieutenant Colonel John E 
Murphy, "Air Policing", Air University Monograph  (2009); Andrew Mumford, "Unnecessary or 
unsung? The utilisation of airpower in Britain's colonial counterinsurgencies", Small Wars & 
Insurgencies 20, no. 3  (2009). 
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included cursory Indian references.42  Corum claimed the proponents of independent 
air action have misread history, advocating instead air power’s role as a land-force 
multiplier.43  However, Hoffman, Omissi and Corum all overly-focused on offensive air 
power, rather than its wider application.  Gray provided a pragmatic sense of 
proportion in 2001, placing air control within its contemporary Imperial context and 
warning against dogmatic debate.  Importantly for this Thesis, he noted that the 
linkage between air control and the RAF’s subsequent strategic bombing policy had 
not been proven.44  The RAF Air Historical Branch’s 2011 pamphlet on inter-War RAF 
small wars drew some useful conclusions, but did not address India.45 
There are surprisingly few books on the RAF’s inter-War history.  Bowyer 
dedicated 42% of the theatre-specific chapters of his 1918-1938 review to the NWF, 
underlining the Frontier’s significance.  Descriptive and well-researched, Bowyer’s 
lack of references nevertheless frustrates corroboration and further research.46  
Nevertheless, being written in 1988, he probably benefitted from interviews with 
participants.  Renfrew’s 2015 Wings of Empire covered a similar landscape, with a 
broader social aspect.47  However, Renfrew’s journalistic approach lacked academic 
rigour, with shallow, misleading analysis and inaccurate referencing; disappointingly, 
                                                
42 Corum’s publications relevant to this Thesis include: James S Corum, "The Myth of Air 
Control: Reassessing the History", Aerospace Power Journal  (2000)/———, "Air Control: 
Reassessing the History", The RAF Air Power Review 4, no. 2  (2001); James S Corum and 
Wray R Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2003); James S Corum, "The RAF in Imperial Defence, 1919-
1956" in Imperial Defence: The Old World Order 1856-1956, ed. Greg Kennedy (London: 
Routledge, 2008). 
43 See Corum, "The Myth of Air Control": 74-75. 
44 Peter W Gray, "The Myths of Air Control and the Realities of Imperial Policing", Royal Air 
Force Air Power Review 4, no. 2  (2001), also published as ———, "The Myths of Air Control 
and the Realities of Imperial Policing", Aerospace Power Journal XV, no. 3  (2001). 
45 Sebastian Ritchie, The RAF, Small Wars and Insurgencies in the Middle East, 1919-1939 
(Air Historical Branch, 2011).  The Historical Branch’s subsequent pamphlet covering later 
colonial operations built on this inter-War review and is of background interest.  See ———, 
The RAF, Small Wars and Insurgencies: Later Colonial Operations, 1945-1975 (RAF Air 
Historical Branch, 2011). 
46 Chaz Bowyer, RAF Operations 1918-1938 (London: William Kimber, 1988). 
47 Barry Renfrew, Wings of Empire: The Forgotten Wars of the Royal Air Force, 1919-1939 
(Stroud: The History Press, 2015). 
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Renfrew added little to the debate.  
Several doctoral theses are relevant to this study.  Waldie’s 1980 study of inter-
War Army-RAF relations included an analysis of India; he blamed the Air Staff’s 
constant advocacy of substitution for poor RAF-Army relations.  He noted the 
incompatibility of air and land tactics but identified increasing air-land co-ordination 
during the late 1930s.48  Waldie concluded by highlighting the danger of doctrinal 
theories that were unsupported by practical evidence.49  Parton’s 2009 thesis remains 
the benchmark study on the evolution of inter-War RAF doctrine.  Although India fell 
outside Parton’s scope, the influence of air control is closely examined.50  
Coningham’s studies of inter-War close air support are also germane.51  Indeed, this 
Thesis’ scope was deliberately pitched at the theatre/strategic level to deconflict with, 
and compliment, Coningham’s thesis.  His work included several case studies, 
including Waziristan, where he concluded that the strategic differences between the 
RAF and Indian Army did not inhibit the development of ‘outstanding’ close support.52  
Coningham identified the key role of communication, but his selective examples did 
not fully expose the enduring tactical-level friction in Waziristan.  Furthermore, his 
scope precluded a full examination of the Service politics behind the NWF tactics.  
Powell’s 2014 thesis extended the air support theme into the Second World War with 
                                                
48 As described in later Chapters, air action tended to disperse tribesmen, whereas the Army 
required the enemy to amass to maximise their susceptibility to Western firepower. 
49 Waldie, "Relations Between the Army and RAF, 1918-39". 
50 Air Commodore Neville Parton, "The Evolution and Impact of Royal Air Force Doctrine: 
1919-1939" (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2009). 
51 Coningham, "Divided We Fall: Continuity or Discontinuity in Close Air Support, 1919-39"; 
Simon Coningham, "Air/ground cooperation in Iraqi Kurdistan in 1923", in British Commission 
for Military History Summer Conference 2011 - War in the Air in the 20th Century (British 
Commission for Military History, 2011); ———, "Air/Ground Cooperation between the RAF and 
the Indian Army in Waziristan 1936-37”, in British Commission for Military History Summer 
Conference 2012 - Indian Armies (Keble College Oxford: British Commission for Military 
History, 2012); ———, "The Battle of Amiens: Air-Ground Co-operation and its Implications for 
Imperial Policing" in Changing War: The British Army, the Hundred Days Campaign and the 
Birth of the Royal Air Force, 1918, ed. Gary Sheffield and Peter Gray (London: Bloomsbury, 
2013); Coningham, "Air-Ground Cooperation between the RAF and the Indian Army in 
Waziristan 1936-37". 
52 Coningham, "Air/Ground Cooperation between the RAF and the Indian Army in Waziristan 
1936-37”, 4, 7. 
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his analysis of the Battle of France and subsequent creation of Army Co-operation 
Command.53 
One theme that became evident during the research for this Thesis was India’s 
influence on RAF doctrine immediately prior to the Second World War.  There are 
several detailed accounts which deal with the development of the RAF’s inter-War 
bombing policy, including Webster and Frankland’s official history of the strategic air 
offensive against Germany, Terraine’s tour de force of the RAF’s role throughout the 
Second World War and Biddle’s more recent and wider-looking Rhetoric and Reality in 
Air Warfare.54  However, these books do not examine the influence of air control.  The 
same is true for descriptive studies of the strategic bombing campaign by Falconer, 
Longmate and Messenger.  Interestingly, revisionist authors have tended to look 
deeper at the root causes of Bomber Command’s pre-War predicament in an attempt 
to counter accepted norms; while their presentation of evidence can be selective, 
works such as ‘Dizzy’ Allen’s 1972 The Legacy of Lord Trenchard and Baughen’s 
more recent The Rise of the Bomber delve into areas passed over by other authors.55  
Reflective, analytical books such as Saundby’s Air Bombardment are also 
instructive.56  There have been several relatively recent studies of the psychological 
                                                
53 Matthew Lee Powell, "Army Co-operation Command and Tactical Air Power Development in 
Britain, 1940-1943: The Role of Army Co-operation Command in Army Air Support" 
(Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2013).   See also ———, "‘The RAF Must 
Fly the Flag’: The British Army’s Interpretation of Tactical Air Power during the Battle of 
France, 1940", University of Sussex Journal of Contemporary History, no. 16  (2015). 
54 Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 
1939-1945, 4 vols., vol. I: Preparation (Uckfield: Naval & Military Press, 1961); John Terraine, 
The Right of the Line: The Role of the RAF in World War Two (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 
2010); Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality.  Webster and Frankland’s excellent work is an embellished 
version of the RAF’s Air Historical Branch narrative, AIR 41-39, RAF Air Historical Branch, RAF 
Narrative: The RAF in the Bombing Offensive Against Germany: Volume I: Pre-War Evolution 
of Bomber Command, 1917 to 1939 1948 and AIR 41-40, ———, RAF Narrative: The RAF in 
the Bombing Offensive Against Germany: Volume II: Restrictive Bombing, September 1939 to 
May 1941 1948. 
55 Wing Commander Hubert R Allen, The Legacy of Lord Trenchard (London: Cassell, 1972).  
Allen’s work was republished more recently as ———, British Bombing Policy During the 
Second World War (Fonthill Media, 2016). 
56 Air Marshal Sir Robert Saundby, Air Bombardment: The Story of its Development (London: 
Chatto & Windus, 1961). 
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and societal impact of aerial bombardment of civilian populations by Grayzel, Holman 
and Saint-Amour which are of value in providing context of the anticipated  
effectiveness and concomitant fear of the bomber, with a US Army Air Force 
percspective having been previously provided by Davis in 1991.57  Additionally, 
Wakelam’s study of Bomber Command’s Operational Research Section reveals how 
Bomber Command developed into a learning organisation and overcame the 
challenges it faced through the application of science.58 
India was the most operationally active and contentious RAF theatre in the 
immediate pre-Second World War era.59  Nevertheless, despite the post-Gulf War air 
control debate, previous NWF studies have focused on the efficacy of tactical air 
support, largely sidelining the policy clashes that generated inter-Service friction.  
Similarly, independent air action on the Frontier has never been analysed with a 
practitioner’s professional understanding; the question of why air control, with its 
concomitant savings, was never implemented in a theatre suffering acute financial 
austerity has never been examined in detail.  Furthermore, there is a gap in the 
literature concerning the influence of the RAF’s NWF activity on subsequent RAF 
doctrine and bombing strategy. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
There are several subsidiary questions that need to be addressed to derive why air 
power’s maximum potential was not implemented on the Frontier.  The Thesis hinges 
                                                
57 Susan S Grayzel, At Home and Under Fire: Air Raids and Culture in Britain from the Great 
War to the Blitz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Brett Holman, The Next War 
in the Air: Britain's Fear of the Bomber, 1908–1941 (Abingdon: Ashgate Publishing, 2014); 
Paul K Saint-Amour, Tense Future: Modernism, Total War, Encyclopedic Form (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015); Richard G Davis, "Operation ‘Thunderclap’: The US Army Air Forces 
and the Bombing of Berlin", The Journal of Strategic Studies 14, no. 1  (1991). 
58 Randall Wakelam, The Science of Bombing: Operational Research in RAF Bomber 
Command (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009). 
59 See Annex 2 for a description of the weapon expenditure during the 1932-39 Waziristan 
campaign. 
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on understanding the nature of the relationship between the ‘Army’ and ‘RAF’ on the 
NWF.  However, the landscape was a mosaic of different stakeholder groups.  
Understanding the different objectives and perspectives of the India Office (IO), War 
Office (WO), Air Ministry and their Secretaries-of-State (SoS) in London, and, in India, 
the Viceroy, Indian Political Service (IPS) ‘Politicals’, C-in-C(India), Indian General 
Staff (GS(India)) and Air Staff(India), is key to revealing the dynamics between them.  
Service ethos, traditions, individual personalities and their previous experiences also 
contributed to different standpoints.  This needs to be underpinned by an awareness 
of the issues that generated Frontier policies. 
Doctrine is important because it articulates an organisation’s core beliefs.  So, 
what was the RAF’s capstone small wars doctrine and how did it develop?  Given 
RAF(India)’s insular command and control arrangements, was Air Ministry doctrine 
applied on the NWF, or was local air doctrine developed to support in-theatre tactics?  
Furthermore, given the scale of Frontier operations, which tactics worked and was this 
experience fed back into core RAF doctrine?  Several commentators, including The 
National Archives’ website, have asserted that air control formed the basis for 
elements of the RAF’s subsequent strategic bombing doctrine.60  But did Frontier air 
action support this hypothesis in light of Gray’s warning that this linkage is 
unproven?61  And did the ‘baggage’ of inter-Service conflict on the Frontier have 
implications outside India; if so, what were they?   
An important characteristic of a fighting Service is its ability to swiftly adjust to 
changing circumstances, so an analysis of the Army and RAF’s adaptability is 
revealing, as is an understanding of who generated the momentum for change.  
                                                
60 See, for example: Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality, 83; Renfrew, Wings of Empire, 253; The 
National Archives, "Imperial Defence and Inter-Service Rivalries”, 
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabinetpapers/themes/imperial-defence-inter-service-
rivalries.htm (accessed 12 April 2016). 
61 Gray, "The Myths of Air Control and the Realities of Imperial Policing", also published as —
——, "The Myths of Air Control". 
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Military action is normally constrained by various circumstantial factors which drive the 
characteristics of the conflict.  What were the constraints on Frontier warfare 
perceived by each stakeholder group and how applicable were these factors in other 
theatres? 
METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE 
This study is inevitably archival-based, given the historical subject matter.  However, 
the approach strives to follow Sir Michael Howard’s advice of ‘width’, ‘depth’ and 
‘context’.62  The separation of fact from Frontier myth is challenging: on one side was 
the airmen’s intuitive, ‘matter of faith’ belief in the effectiveness of air action’s morale 
effect;63 on the other, the Indian officer corps’ cautious, inflexible approach to novel 
technology during an enduring conflict.  As C-in-C(India) told AOC(India) privately in 
1931: ‘We shall naturally never agree on the degree to which you Air people think the 
Air Force are capable of assuming control of the North-West Frontier’.64  Some ‘myths’ 
were firmly-held and influential.  As Elliott noted in 1968, inter-Service rivalry 
‘invariably results in both sides over-stating their case and being reluctant to see much 
merit in the arguments of the other’.65  Omissi concurred: ‘Both sides in the debate 
tended to interpret the operational evidence to suit their prejudices’, while Powers 
expanded: ‘Both sides... argued from insufficient evidence’.66  The challenge is 
exacerbated by the airmen’s lack of previous experience to base their doctrine on, 
against the Army’s generations of Frontier experience; in contrast, as Robertson 
                                                
62 Professor Sir Michael Howard, "The Use and Abuse of Military History", JRUSI 138, no. 1  
(1993). 
63 See, for example, Marshal of the RAF Sir John Slessor, The Central Blue: Recollections and 
Reflections of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor (London: Cassell, 1956), 204. 
64 AIR 8/110, Field Marshal Sir Philip Chetwode, Letter from Commander-in-Chief, India, to Air 
Officer Commanding, India, 9 June 1931, 1. 
65 Elliott, The Frontier, 1839-1947: The Story of the North-West Frontier of India, 119. 
66 Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control, 47; Powers, Strategy Without Slide-Rule: British Air 
Strategy, 1914-1939, 174. 
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contended, the RAF merely had a policy supported by a theory.67  Overall, 
establishing the facts is challenging, especially when the Pathan archive is all-but 
nonexistent.  The subjective nature of the archival evidence can make discerning the 
true effectiveness of a tactic challenging.  However, this discord was symptomatic of 
inter-Service friction, so is of interest to this Thesis in itself.  Fortunately, identifying 
the facts of the inter-Service debates, and determining the connections of cause and 
effect, is more straightforward. 
Several potential approaches could be used to address the research questions.  
The chosen structure examines the development of RAF inter-War small wars and 
army co-operation doctrine and compares this with the application of air action on the 
NWF during the same period.  Comparing the theory with its implementation allows 
the challenges of applying effective air power on the Frontier to be distilled.  Following 
this, the wider implications are examined.  This methodology is delivered in seven 
subsequent chapters. 
Chapter 2 lays the Thesis’ bedrock by analysing the NWF’s political and cultural 
context.  It analyses India’s Imperial importance, the imposition of British 
administration, the regional topography and tribal culture, before describing the history 
of Frontier policy, Afghan-British relations and the causes of tribal violence.   
The next three Chapters analyse the inter-War development of RAF small war 
and army co-operation doctrine.  The three periods align with the publication of the 
RAF’s capstone doctrine manuals.  Chapter 3 describes the nature of doctrine before 
analysing the RAF’s doctrinal development from the FWW up to the publication of the 
RAF Operations Manual, ‘CD22’, in 1922.  Chapter 4 addresses the doctrinal debate 
in both Britain and India from 1922 to the publication of The RAF War Manual, 
‘AP1300’, in 1928.  Chapter 5 examines the continuing small wars debate up to 1939 
                                                
67 Scot Robertson, The Development of RAF Strategic Bombing Doctrine, 1919-1939 
(Westport: Praeger, 1995). 
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and the publication of the Combined Frontier Manual.  The second edition of AP1300, 
published in 1940, is beyond the scope of this Thesis as it was published after the end 
of the period under consideration; although of interest to subsequent warfare, this 
second edition had no influence on NWF air power during this period. 
Chapter 6 examines the implementation of NWF air power up to 1939.  Although 
not intended to be a comprehensive history, it is written as a chronological narrative to 
reveal the continuum’s ebb and flow and avoid the trap of ‘cherry-picking’ events to 
reinforce a particular viewpoint.  For example, while Coningham described late-1930s 
NWF air support as ‘outstanding’, the Air Staff described it in 1937 as ‘co-operation in 
the narrowest sense’.68 
Having examined theory and execution, Chapter 7 distils the points of friction, 
examining command and control, decision-making, inter-Service hierarchy and 
mistrust, moral issues, tribal resentment, the influence of peace movements, and 
diplomatic issues.  The development of the Combined Tactics Manual is used as a 
case study to illustrate some of the sources of friction. 
Chapter 8 extrapolates the themes and trends previously identified and 
examines the influence and implications of the NWF on inter-Service co-ordination, 
and the RAF’s bombing strategy, during the Second World War.  In particular, the 
claims of other commentators and accepted generalisations are examined in light of 
the previous Chapters’ detailed examination of events.  Some of these implications 
are subsidiary to the Thesis’ core themes and are worthy of further examination.  
Finally, the strings of this study’s various themes are pulled together in the conclusion. 
                                                
68 Compare Coningham, "Air/Ground Cooperation between the RAF and the Indian Army in 
Waziristan 1936-37”, 4, 7, with AIR 8/529, Air Staff, Untitled Paper, July 1937, 3. 
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SOURCES 
The National Archives are a primary source for this Thesis, especially the Air Ministry 
(AIR) and Cabinet Office (CAB) files.  The WO and other London-based defence 
committee archives are somewhat thin on Indian issues because India’s military 
responsibilities were largely vested with C-in-C(India), with India’s defence issues 
handled more akin to a self-governing dominion than a colony.  As a result, the IO 
papers, retained in the IO Records held in the British Library, are a rich source, the 
‘Military’ and ‘Political and Secret’ files being particularly relevant.  Nonetheless, 
discussions concerning Indian defence issues were occasionally raised to Cabinet 
level whose conclusions and papers are in CAB 23 and 24.  The Cabinet’s Committee 
on India and the India Round Table Conference, however, rarely touched on defence 
issues.69  The minutes of the full Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) mainly focused 
on India’s interaction with other Imperial theatres, such as Hong Kong, Singapore and 
the Middle East, as well as noting the conclusions of the CID’s subordinate 
committees which occasionally touched on Indian issues.70  Of more relevance to this 
Thesis are the D-series papers and memoranda on the defence of India prepared for 
the CID, archived in CAB 6.  In contrast, the remit of the CID’s Overseas Defence 
Committee (whose papers are in CAB 7 to 11) did not extend to India due to the sub-
continent’s constitutional position.  The CID’s Defence of India Sub-Committee was 
established in 1927 to consider the Russian threat to India rather than India’s internal 
defence issues; this London-based Sub-Committee’s papers in CAB 16/83 to 16/85 
reveal a useful perspective, since India generally developed its Afghan war plans 
                                                
69 The Cabinet’s Committee on India reports, meetings and memoranda are in CAB 27/519 to 
27/521, while the India Round Table Conference papers are in CAB 27/469 and 27/470. 
70 The full CID was chaired by the Prime Minister and its membership included Ministers and 
the Service Chiefs of Staff.  Their minutes are in CAB 2. 
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independently from the CID.71  The CID’s Chief of Staff Sub-Committee (COSC) 
papers in CAB 53 rarely covered Indian defence issues during the early era covered 
by this Thesis due to India’s largely independent position; the COSC did occasionally 
discuss the Defence of India Sub-Committee’s papers on Afghanistan and, from 1937, 
‘Indian defence questions’ became a recurrent agenda item from the perspective of 
India’s wider role in Imperial defence.  This led to the establishment of the Committee 
on the Defence of India in 1938 to consider India’s position against the background of 
looming world war; the Defence of India Committee papers are in CAB 27/653 and 
27/654.  Unsurprisingly, given the COSC’s skirting of Indian issues, the papers of the 
CID’s Joint Planning Committee (which supported the COSC) in CAB 55 only 
addressed the use of Indian military assets in other Imperial theatres and matters 
such as the protection of Indian sea routes.  Indeed, in the late 1930s the WO actively 
impeded the Joint Planning Committee involvement in Indian issues for fear of 
highlighting the Royal Indian Navy’s tiny allotment of India’s defence budget.72   
Doctrine manuals, their underpinning policy papers, and interim supporting 
publications, such as Air Staff Memoranda (ASMs), as well as implementing orders, all 
survive to varying degrees.  Unfortunately, the HQ RAF(India) internal files have not 
survived and were probably destroyed in what the Secretary of United Services 
Institute of India (USII)’s Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research described as 
‘the unsettled period of independence and partition’.73  The personal papers of 
protagonists reveal another perspective on the official files, although where copies 
exist in both archives, The National Archive references have been used.74   
                                                
71 The CID’s Defence of India Sub-Committee was suspended on the outbreak of World War II, 
although it appears to have stopped meeting in 1932, with most Indian issues being 
subsequently dealt with directly by papers submitted to the COSC. 
72 This is discussed in Chapter 7. 
73 Squadron Leader Rana T S Chhina, Chhina to author, Email, 14 June 2013. 
74 See, for example, the papers of Sir Hugh Trenchard, Sir John Salmond, Sir Norman 
Bottomley and Squadron Leader John Sowrey (held by the RAF Museum), Sir John Salmond’s 
papers (in The National Archives), and Sir Henry Rawlinson (dispersed across various 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
20 
The Army Staff College ‘Camberley Red’ lecture notes are a particularly rich 
source.  Written and delivered by experienced British officers recently returned from 
India, or by students who had served in India, they reveal the tactics taught to the 
rising officer corps (mostly senior captains and junior majors) prior to their deployment 
as company commanders.75  Produced for the consumption of the students alone, 
they are unencumbered by the requirements of wider acceptability and reflect how the 
Army was trained to operate on the Frontier.  The Directing Staff amplifying notes are 
a particularly valuable source.  
The NWF Official Histories provide a detailed account of tactical operations.76  
Other authors have downplayed their utility due to their limited political perspective, 
lack of analysis and because they were published before the unrest had been 
resolved.77  However, comparing the Official Histories with Air Officer Commanding, 
RAF India (AOC(India))’s Monthly Summaries reveals differing perspectives, as do the 
Air Staff’s comments appended to AOC(India)’s Summaries.  Overall, the Histories are 
inconsistent with their coverage of the RAF’s contribution, at times all-but ignoring 
RAF activity, whilst elsewhere appearing remarkably objective.  The authorship of the 
Histories is therefore key, but has hitherto been unclear.  The Indian Ministry of 
                                                                                                                                           
archives, but conveniently compiled by the Army Records Society in: Mark Jacobsen, 
Rawlinson in India (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2002)). 
75 Bertram H Matheson, for example, was a local-rank Lieutenant Colonel on the Staff College 
staff for two years from January 1928; he served as a 21-year-old second lieutenant in the 
Indian Army from 1911 in the 12th Frontier Force Regiment, deploying to Palestine with the 
1/54th Sikhs where he was awarded the Military Cross for leading his Company against a 
Turkish machine gun in 1918.  He served as an instructor in the Small Arms School at 
Rawalpindi before serving at Army HQ immediately before his posting to Camberley.  See 
Army Lists and Australian War Memorial, 2012, "Honours and Awards - Bertram Heylyn 
Matheson”, http://www.awm.gov.au/collection/records/awm28/2/awm28-2-430part2-0035.pdf 
(accessed 8 August 2012). 
76 See The Third Afghan War 1919: Official Account,  (Calcutta: General Staff Branch, Army 
Headquarters, India, 1926); Operations in Waziristan, 1919-1920,  (Delhi: General Staff 
Branch, Army Headquarters, India, 1923); "Official History of Operations on the N.W. Frontier 
of India 1920-35",  (Delhi: Manager of Publications Government of India Press, 1945); "Official 
History of Operations on the N. W. Frontier of India 1936-37",  (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 
1943). 
77 Roe, Waging War in Waziristan, 9; Warren, Waziristan, the Faqir of Ipi, and the Indian Army, 
xxvii-xxviii. 
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Defence (MOD) archives reveal that the GS(India) established an Official Historian in 
February 1939 to compile the Official Histories.78  Piecing together the evidence from 
the Indian Army Lists, the first Historian was almost certainly Lieutenant-Colonel H H 
R Deane, a retired Indian infantry officer who had served as a Political Agent in 1914 
and was the son of a NWFP Commissioner.79  He was replaced in December 1940 by 
Brigadier C M S Manners, another retired infantry officer who had commanded an 
Indian brigade area.80  Manners retired in February 1942 and was replaced by Colonel 
W E H Condon in August.81  Figure 1 maps the Official Historians against the Official 
Histories.  From this, and the textual analysis in subsequent Chapters, it becomes 
apparent that Condon was more objective and inclusive concerning the RAF’s 
contribution.  In July 1945, the Combined Inter-Services Historical Section (India) was 
formed with a staff of nine officers, including an RAF squadron leader and an IAF flight 
lieutenant, increasing to twenty-six officers by 1946.82 
Various RAF reference books and squadron histories provide invaluable 
compendia of archival data which bind together the mosaic of other works.83  The 
                                                
78 Indian MOD History Division File No. 6345/7/CIHS (2901/H), 1943-45, 'I B', Review of the 
Work of the Official Historian, General Staff, on Histories of Operations on the North West 
Frontier, 14 December 1943(?). 
79 Initially, the Official Historian was not directly identified in the Indian Army Lists, but is 
instead listed under the Department of Military Operations and Intelligence as being ‘On 
Special Duty’.  The Indian archives only name the subsequent incumbents (Manners and 
Condon), but the 1939 Indian Army List depicts Deane as a ‘Special Appointment’ from 31 
January 1939, so it is assumed he was the first incumbent.  Deane was an infantry officer in 
the 64th Pioneers/Madras Pioneers and his father was Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Harold Deane, 
Commissioner, NWFP, 1901-1908.  See: The Indian Army List, July 1939,  (Defence 
Department, Government of India, 1939); Lieutenant Colonel H F Murland, BAILLIE-KI-
PALTAN: Being a History of the 2nd Battalion, Madras Pioneers 1759-1930 (Naval & Military 
Press, 2015), 553. 
80 'I B', Review of the Work of the Official Historian, 1; The Indian Army List, July 1939, 12, 23, 
55-57, 473. 
81 'I B', Review of the Work of the Official Historian, 1. 
82 The Indian Army List, July 1946,  (Defence Department, Government of India, 1946), 30; 
The Indian Army List, October 1946,  (Defence Department, Government of India, 1946), 29-
30. 
83 Useful sources include: Wing Commander C G Jefford, RAF Squadrons: A Comprehensive 
Record of the Movement and Equipment of all RAF Squadrons and their Antecedents since 
1912 (Shrewsbury: Airlife); Philip J R Moyes, Bomber Squadrons of the R.A.F. and Their 
Aircraft (London: MacDonald, 1964); John D R Rawlings, Fighter Squadrons of the R.A.F. and 
Their Aircraft (Abingdon: Purnell Book Services, 1969); Henry Probert, High Commanders of 
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Volume Part Editor Published 
1920-35 
I 1920 to start of 1930 Red 
Shirt Movement Col W E H Condon 
1945 
II Red Shirt Rebellion; 
1933 Mohmand & Bajaur 
Operations 
Col W E H Condon 
III 1935 Loe Agra and 
Mohmand Campaigns 
Lt Col H H R Deane/ 
Brig S M S Manners 
1936-37 - Lt Col H H R Deane/ 
Brig S M S Manners 
1943 
1938-40 - Col W E H Condon Unpublished84 
Figure 1: Editors of NWF Official Histories, 1920-4085 
official dispatches published in the London Gazette are straightforward recounts of 
military activity.  However, disputes between the RAF and C-in-C(India) over whether 
air operations should be ‘Gazetted’ reveal further inter-Service friction. 
Much of the internecine inter-Service warfare was conducted on the pages of 
the USII Journal (JUSII); many Frontier practitioners held its pages as vital ground, 
making it a rich source of contemporary debate and tit-for-tat articles.86  
Unsurprisingly, opinions generally divided along Service lines and often challenged 
extant policy, something JUSII editors encouraged to promote ‘interesting 
discussion’.87  “Mouse” described the JUSII debates thus: 
                                                                                                                                           
the Royal Air Force (Norwich: The Stationery Office, 1991); Wing Commander Ian M Philpott, 
The Royal Air Force: An Encyclopedia of the Inter-War Years: Volume 1: 'The Trenchard 
Years', 1918-1929 (Barnsley: Pen and Sword Aviation, 2005); ———, The Royal Air Force: An 
Encyclopedia of the Inter-War Years: Volume II: Rearmament, 1930-39 (Barnsley: Pen and 
Sword Aviation, 2008); Squadron Leader Tony Fairbairn, Action Stations Overseas (Sparkford: 
Patrick Stephens, 1991). Squadron histories include: Norman L R Franks, First in the Indian 
Skies (Lincoln: Life Publications, 1981); The History of No 31 Squadron Royal Flying Corps 
and Royal Air Force in the East from its Formation in 1915 to 1950,  (Uckfield and London: 
Naval and Military Press and The Imperial War Museum, 2004). 
84 The 1938-40 Official History was written and approved, but then kept back from printing by 
the Director of Military Operations, Major-General Mallaby, as the campaign had not 
concluded.  However, there is no evidence that it was ever published.  See 'I B', Review of the 
Work of the Official Historian, 2. 
85 Derived from: Ibid.; The Indian Army List, July 1939, 6. 
86 For example, one of Slessor’s first publications was his rebuttal of Major Cherry’s 1925 
article that recommended AC squadrons be manned by gunners and the squadrons ‘penny 
packeted’ to individual artillery units.  See: Major R G Cherry, "The Royal Air Force and Army 
Co-operation", JUSII LV, no. 241  (1925); Squadron Leader J C Slessor, "RAF and Army Co-
operation - The Other Point of View", JUSII LVI, no. 243  (1926).  
87 See Cherry, "The RAF and Army Co-operation": 32; "Editorial", JUSII LV, no. 241  (1925). 
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In this welter of wise and foolish opinions there is tremendous collision of 
thought, and arguments are put forward by one side categorically in opposition 
to equally well-sustained arguments by another side.88 
The authors’ backgrounds are important in understanding their perspectives.  
However, controversial JUSII authors often hid behind pseudonyms.89  Although the 
records of the authors’ identities have not survived, their pseudonyms sometimes 
provide some intimation of their background.90  The use of pseudonyms in itself is 
interesting.  It may not just have been that the individual authors were protecting their 
careers; the Services may also have been using individuals to publish contentious 
narratives that could not be voiced officially.91  As a controversial subject, air power, 
and army co-operation in particular, featured frequently.92  Other common topics 
included: NWF policy;93 mountain warfare;94 Army modernisation; and accounts of 
                                                
88 "Mouse", "Babu Tactics", JUSII LXI, no. 262  (1931): 60. 
89 Examples include: ‘Adastral’, ‘AILO’, ‘Constabeel’, ‘Light infantry’, ‘Mouse’, ‘Rational View’, 
‘Shpagwishtama’ and ‘Spingirai’. 
90 Squadron Leader Rana T S Chhina, Chhina to Author, Email, 12 January 2015. 
91 For example, in 1938 Colonel Francis Tuker wrote an article in JUSII under the pseudonym 
‘Aispex’ on the direct request of Deputy CGS(India).  See Moreman, The Army in India, 170-
171.  
92 Army Co-operation articles included: "Adastral", "The Royal Air Force and Army Co-
operation", JUSII LVI, no. 242  (1926); "A.I.L.O", "Close Support by Aircraft on the North West 
Frontier", JUSII LXX, no. 298  (1940); Cherry, "The RAF and Army Co-operation"; Squadron 
Leader E J Hodsoll, "The Development of Co-operation Between Aircraft and Tanks", JUSII 
LV, no. 241  (1925); ———, "Royal Air Force Co-operation with the Army: A Lecture Delivered 
at the Army Headquarters Staff College Course, 1926", JUSII LVII, no. 247  (1927); Captain D 
McK Kennely, "Close Support of Infantry.  An Infantry Officer's Point of View", JUSII LXI, no. 
265  (1931); 'Mouldy', "Co-operation Between the Army and the RAF", JUSII LXIV, no. 276  
(1934); Slessor, "RAF and Army Co-operation - The Other Point of View"; Flight Lieutenenant 
R L Stevenson, "The Army Co-operation Squadron", JUSII LV, no. 240  (1925); Major E J 
Strover, "An Army Air Arm", JRUSI LVIII, no. 251  (1928). 
Other relevant JUSII air power articles include: "Constabeel", "Aircraft and Internal Security in 
India", JUSII LXI, no. 263  (1931); Flight Lieutenant W F Dickson, "The Development of the 
Heavy Transport Aeroplane", JUSII  (1930); Squadron Leader E J Hodsoll, "Aircraft and Anti-
Aircraft Defence", JUSII LVI, no. 243  (1926); ———, "Some Notes on Air Matters Affecting 
India", JUSII LVIII, no. 252  (1928); and its response, Major R J Wilkinson, "Some Notes on Air 
Matters Affecting India", JUSII LIX, no. 254  (1929). 
93 For example: B Bromhead, "The Future of the Tribal Areas", JUSII LXIX, no. 301  (1940); 
Major W E Maxwell, "North-West Frontier Policies", JUSII LXIX, no. 297  (1939); "Mouse", "The 
So-Called Forward Policy", JUSII LXIII, no. 272  (1933); Lieutenant-Colonel F C Simpson, 
"Review of N W Frontier Policy from 1849 to 1939", JUSII LXXIV, no. 314  (1944); ———, 
"Review of N W Frontier Policy from 1849 to 1939: 1900-1923", JUSII LXXIV, no. 316  (1944); 
———, "Review of N W Frontier Policy from 1849 to 1939: 1938-1939", JUSII LXXIV, no. 317  
(1944). 
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operations. 
The Air Ministry, IO and WO used the Royal United Service Institution (RUSI) in 
London as a public venue to air their opinions throughout the period.95  Their lectures, 
recorded in the Institute’s Journal (JRUSI), are another rich source; the post-lecture 
questioning by the audience could be especially revealing.96  From 1920, JRUSI 
contained ‘RAF Notes’ which described events in each overseas Command, including 
India.  These Notes illustrated the ebb and flow of NWF operations, but their exact 
provenance is unclear.  However, RUSI’s 1924 Journal Committee minutes record 
that the Air Ministry had ‘kindly promised the co-operation of their staff’, while the 1926 
minutes record the Air Ministry’s continued ‘active support’.97  Nonetheless, the late-
1930s Air Ministry minutes commenting on AOC(India)’s Monthly General Summaries 
were stamped ‘Extracts made to Air Power notes’.98  Therefore, it appears that the Air 
Staff were using JRUSI as a conduit to publicise their standpoint via both selective 
lectures and the RAF Notes.   
The RAF Staff College’s annual journal, The Hawk, launched in 1928, contained 
only a single article on the NWF.99  The RAF Quarterly (RAFQ), marketed by a private 
                                                                                                                                           
94 Articles included: Major L V S Blacker, "Modernized Mountain Warfare", JUSII LXI, no. 262  
(1931); and Major C M H Wingfield, "Mountain Warfare", JUSII LXIX, no. 297  (1939).  
95 See, for example, the context of Bottomley’s November 1939 RUSI presentation on the NWF 
described in Chapter 5.  
96 Pertinent lectures and articles included, in chronological order: Group Captain Amyas E 
Borton, "The Use of Aircraft in Small Wars", JRUSI LXV (1920); Wing Commander John A 
Chamier, "The Use of the Air Force for Replacing Military Garrisons", JRUSI LXVI, no. 462  
(1921); Air Marshal Sir John Salmond, "The Air Force in Iraq", JRUSI LXX, no. 479  (1925); 
Captain John Bagot Glubb, "Air and Ground Forces in Punitive Expeditions", JRUSI LXXI, no. 
484  (1926); Wing Commander R H Peck, "Aircraft in Small Wars", JRUSI LXXIII, no. 491  
(1928); Major-General Sir Sydney Muspratt, "The North-West Frontier of India", JRUSI LXXVII, 
no. 507  (1932); Field Marshal Sir Philip Chetwode, "The Army in India", JRUSI LXXXII, no. 
525  (1937); Air Commodore C F A Portal, "Air Force Co-operation in Policing the Empire", 
JRUSI LXXXII, no. 526  (1937); Sir Ralph Griffith, "The Frontier Policy of the Government of 
India", JRUSI LXXXIII, no. 531  (1938); Air Commodore Norman H Bottomley, "The Work of 
the Royal Air Force on the North-West Frontier", JRUSI LXXXIV, no. 535  (1939). 
97 Tony Pilmer, RUSI Librarian to Author, Email, 10 May 2013. 
98 See, for example, the minute covering: AIR 5/1337, AOC RAF India, RAF India Monthly 
General Summary of Work No 250: September 1939. 
99 Flight Lieutenant Moore described his experience during 1920 on 31 Squadron supporting 
the Army against the Mahsuds.  See Flight Lieutenant M Moore, "The Mahsud Operations, 
1920 (No. 31 Squadron)", The Hawk 1, no. 1  (1928).  
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company from 1930 with the Air Ministry’s semi-official sanction, is slightly more 
useful.100  It published a wide variety of articles, an increasing proportion by Staff 
College graduates during the 1930s.  From its first edition, it contained ‘Air Notes’ 
similar to the JRUSI RAF Notes.  Indeed, although the two publications were 
published at different intervals, both sets of Notes are almost identical and clearly 
derived from the same source.  Aviation publications such as Flight and Aeroplane 
also published useful NWF articles. 
This study demonstrates the pivotal importance of personality.  As such, 
biographies and memoirs provide an invaluable insight into the core beliefs of key 
characters and their inter-personal relationships.  Autobiographies and hagiographies 
can reflect embellished perspectives, but are nevertheless useful in providing context 
if treated with care.101  For example, in his solemn Bomber Offensive, Harris succinctly 
summed up the RAF’s Frontier frustrations as: 
a bitter reminder of what happens when air forces... are put under the control of 
another and older service and subordinated to the uses of previously existing 
weapons.102 
Even light-hearted memoires can be revealing; David Lee described his Pathan 
bearer’s sporting pastime of shooting at aircraft, but not their pilots, when on leave.103  
Biographies are useful in understanding the officers that designed inter-War policies 
and doctrine.104  RAF operations in undeveloped countries featured in the formative 
                                                
100 An excellent analysis of the RAFQ is provided by Parton, "RAF Doctrine".  Burge, who had 
been Trenchard’s Personal Assistant (as described in Chapter 4), became the editor on 
retirement. 
101 The following autobiographies are valuable in this respect: Air Chief Marshal Sir Basil 
Embry, Mission Completed (London: Methuen & Co, 1957); Marshal of the RAF Sir Arthur 
Harris, Bomber Offensive (London: Collins, 1947); David Lee, Never Stop the Engine when it's 
Hot (London: Thomas Harmsworth Publishing, 1983); Saundby, Air Bombardment ; Slessor, 
The Central Blue ; Viscount Templewood, Empire of the Air: The Advent of the Air Age 1922-
1929 (London: Collins, 1957). 
102 Harris, Bomber Offensive, 19. 
103 Lee, Never Stop the Engine when it's Hot, 313-314. 
104 For example, Anne Baker, From Biplane to Spitfire: The Life of Air Chief Marshal Sir 
Geoffrey Salmond KCB KCMG DSO (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2003); Andrew Boyle, Trenchard: 
Man of Vision (London: Collins, 1962); John Laffin, Swifter than Eagles: a biography of Marshal 
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careers of many key RAF officers, including every post-Trenchard Chief of the Air 
Staff (CAS), (bar Tedder), until 1955, and every AOC-in-C Bomber Command until 
1947, so India probably influenced their subsequent policies.105  IPS officers rarely 
made public speeches, but memoires, biographies and private papers partially 
mitigate these hiatuses;106 several retired into academia or authored Frontier 
histories.107  Lieutenant-Colonel C E Bruce published prolifically on specific inter-War 
Frontier policy dilemmas.108  Mallam’s memoires describing his still-born 1940s NWF 
development plan provide an insight into what might have been.109  More recent 
analyses of NWF policy include: Chenevix Trench’s tale of the IPS; Beattie’s 2002 
thesis on Waziristan’s segmentary tribal systems and how religion shaped their 
relations with the GoI; and Tripodi’s 2011 comprehensive analysis on the Politicals 
                                                                                                                                           
of the R.A.F. Sir John Salmond (Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons, 1964); Norman 
Macmillan, Sir Sefton Brancker (William Heinemann, 1935). 
105 See Annexes 19 and 20.  The following biographies are useful in understanding key 
Second World War air power personalities: Vincent Orange, Slessor: Bomber Champion.  The 
Life of Marshal of the RAF Sir John Slessor, GCB, DSO, MC (London: Grub Street, 2006); —
——, Churchill and His Airmen: Relationships, Intrigue and Policy Making 1914-1945 (London: 
Grub Street, 2013); Henry Probert, Bomber Harris: His Life and Times (London: Greenhill 
Books, 2001); Denis Richards, Portal of Hungerford: The Life of Marshal of the Royal Air Force 
Viscount Portal of Hungerford KG, GCB, OM, DSO, MC (London: Heinemann, 1977); Dudley 
Saward, 'Bomber' Harris (London: Sphere Books, 1984). 
106 For example: Lord George Curzon, Lord Curzon in India: Being a Selection from his 
Speeches as Viceroy & Governor-General of India 1898-1905 (London: Macmillan and Co, 
1906); David Dilks, Curzon in India, vol. 2. Frustration (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1970); P 
Woodruff, The Men who Ruled India, vol. 2, The Guardians (London: Jonathan Cape, 1954).  
Allen’s Plain Tales from the Raj, a collection of interviews from the BBC radio series of the 
same name, provided everyday perspectives from the last British survivors of the Raj, from 
nurses to Field Marshal Auchinleck and ‘Spike’ Milligan to Sir Olaf Caroe.  See Charles Allen, 
Plain Tales from the Raj: Images of British India in the Twentieth Century (London: Andre 
Deutsch, 1975). 
107 For example: William Barton, India's North-West Frontier (London: John Murray, 1939)); R I 
Bruce, The Forward Policy and its Results: or Thirty-Five Years' Work amongst the Tribes on 
our North-West Frontier of India (London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1900); Olaf K Caroe, The 
Pathans - 550 BC - AD 1957 (London: MacMillan & Co Ltd, 1958); Colonel Sir Robert 
Warburton, Eighteen Years in the Khyber, 1879-1898 (London: John Murray, 1900). 
108 C E Bruce (Richard Bruce’s son) published widely, including: Lieutenant Colonel Charles E 
Bruce, "The Sandeman Policy as Applied to Tribal Problems of To-day", Journal of The Royal 
Central Asian Society 19, no. 1  (1932); ———, Waziristan, 1936-1937: The Problems of the 
North-West Frontiers of India and their Solutions (Aldershot: Gale & Polden Ltd, 1938); ———, 
"The Indian Frontier Problem", Asiatic Review 35 (1939). 
109 Leslie Mallam and Diana Day, Frogs in the Well (Kinloss: Librario, 2010).  Mallam’s 
development plan was previously published in 1946: see Lieutenant Colonel G L Mallam, "The 
N-W Frontier Problem", JUSII LXXVI, no. 324  (1946). 
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and their mechanisms of tribal control.110  These sources pay little more than lip 
service to air power’s role, but they are nonetheless important as the RAF strove to be 
a politically, rather than Army-controlled, instrument of tribal control.  
Unsurprising, given the number of troops deployed on the NWF, a rich array of 
autobiographies provide the soldier’s view of the RAF’s utility and their relationship 
with airmen.111  The challenges of Frontier land warfare are well illustrated in 
autobiographies such as Baines’ Officer Boy, Chenevix Trench’s Frontier Scouts and 
Prendergast’s Prender’s Progress.112  Overviews are provided in ‘popular’ narratives 
such as Allen’s Soldier Sahibs, Holmes’ Sahib and Stewart’s The Khyber Rifles, while 
Heathcoate’s The Military in British India places the conflicts associated with British 
rule in a local context.113 
Analysing the influence of India on the RAF’s subsequent doctrine, and in 
particular the strategic bombing campaign, requires a broad set of sources.  At the 
political-military interface are the Prime Minister’s (PREM) papers in the National 
Archives, supplemented by the personal papers of Portal and Harris at Christ Church 
College and the RAF Museum respectively, while Hansard’s records of Parliamentary 
                                                
110 Charles Chenevix Trench, Viceroy's Agent (London: Jonathan Cape, 1987); Hugh  Beattie, 
Imperial Frontier: Tribe and State in Waziristan (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2002); Christian 
Tripodi, Edge of Empire: The British Political Officer and the Tribal Administration of the North-
West Frontier, 1877-1947 (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2011). 
111 See, for example, Frank Leeson, Frontier Legion: With the Khassadars of North Waziristan 
(Ferring: The Leeson Archive, 2003); John Masters, Bugles and a Tiger: A Personal Adventure 
(London: Michael Joseph, 1956); G Moore, Just as Good as the Rest: a British Battalion in the 
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112 Frank Baines, Officer Boy (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1971); Charles Chenevix Trench, 
The Frontier Scouts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). Chenevix Trench also published 
a book on the Indian Army based partially on his experience; see: ———, The Indian Army 
and the King's Enemies, 1900-1947 (Thame and Hudson, 1988); John Prendergast, Prender's 
Progress: A Soldier in India, 1931-1947 (London: Cassell, 1979).  
113 Charles Allen, Soldier Sahibs: The Men Who Made the North-West Frontier (London: 
Abacus, 2001); Richard Holmes, Sahib: the British Soldier in India, 1750-1914 (London: Harper 
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British Land Forces in South Asia, 1600-1947 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
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debates provides context.114  Although Harris’ own account passes fleetingly over his 
own pre-Bomber Command career, Saward and Probert reveal a little more of his 
professional development.115  The RAF Air Historical Branch’s narrative of the 
bombing offensive against Germany provides an authoritative account of the conduct 
of the campaign (the first two volumes being most relevant to this Thesis), while the 
US Air Force Historical Research Agency archives reveals the subsequent North 
American military perspective.116  The RAF Historical Society seminars on the history 
of RAF navigation (1996), training (1999) and unguided weapons (2009) provide 
compendia concerning several of the factors that contributed to Bomber Command’s 
predicament in 1939.117  Jefford’s detailed study of  RAF observers and navigators, 
combined with Richardson’s autobiography, provide rich material covering the 
development of the RAF’s navigational capability.118  The Air Historical Branch’s 1952 
narrative on RAF armament and Black’s articles (originally written for the Bomber 
Command Association newsletters), combined with the RAF Museum’s archive of 
aircraft manuals, give good technical descriptions of the development of RAF bomb 
sights.119  NWF aircrew training and standard bombing techniques are more difficult to 
                                                
114 At the time of writing, the Portal Papers were being re-indexed using a new naming 
convention.  In this Thesis, the files containing the Prime Minister’s minutes from October 1940 
to December 1941 use the new naming reference, while all other papers use the original 
nomenclature. 
115 Harris, Bomber Offensive ; Saward, 'Bomber' Harris ; Probert, Bomber Harris: His Life and 
Times. 
116 The five volumes of the Air Historical Branch narratives are in AIR 41/39 to AIR 41/43. 
117 Wing Commander C G Jefford, ed. A History of Navigation in the Royal Air Force: RAF 
Historical Seminar at the RAF Museum, Hendon, 21 October 1996, vol. 17A (RAF Historical 
Society,1996); ———, ed. Training in Peace for War - The Offensive, vol. 20 (RAF Historical 
Society,1999); ———, ed. Unguided Weapons: RAF Museum, Hendon, 22 October 2008, vol. 
45 (RAF Historical Society, 2008); AIR 10/7477 RAF Air Historical Branch, Armament: Volume 
1: Bombs and Bombing Equipment (SD719) 1952. 
118 Wing Commander C G Jefford, Observers and Navigators and other Non-Pilot Aircrew in 
the RFC, RNAS and RAF, Revised 2nd ed. (London: Grub Street, 2014); Group Captain F C 
'Dickie' Richardson, Man is Not Lost: The Log of a Pioneer RAF Pilot/Navigator 1933-1946 
(Shrewsbury: Airlife, 1997). 
119 RAF Air Historical Branch, SD719; Henry Black, 2001, "Major Bomb Sights Used in WW2 
By RAF Bomber Command”, The Lancaster & Manchester Bomber Archive, 
http://www.lancaster-archive.com/bc_maiorbombsights.htm (accessed 17 December 2016); —
——, 2001, "The T1-Bomb Sight Story”, The Lancaster & Manchester Bomber Archive, 
http://www.lancaster-archive.com/bc_t1bombsight.htm (accessed 17 December 2016). 
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discern, but a picture can be built from AOC(India)’s monthly summaries and 
biographies.  MacBean and Hogben’s comprehensive book, Bombs Gone, based on 
the Air Historical Branch’s armament narrative, are helpful in understanding the RAF’s 
inter-War weapon development, enriched by Huskinson’s autobiography.120  The 
Thesis supplements these sources with interviews with Bomber Command veterans to 
provide the practitioner’s perspective. 
The Pathan viewpoint is challenging to discern.  Warren warned that tribal 
folklore, handed down through the generations, despite near illiteracy, becomes 
inaccurate.121  The FoI’s reported use of persuasive hyperbole to unite the tribes 
generated folklore that emphasised unity, which is misrepresentative given 
Waziristan’s segmentary tribal system.122  Omissi analysed the indigenous reaction to 
air policing, highlighting that the archive records indigenous reaction as it was 
perceived by Europeans.123  Notwithstanding this, the current inaccessibility of the 
NWF severely limits examining the Pathan narrative.  Interviews compiled for a 1996 
TV production are one of the few examples of Pathan primary evidence.124 
Finally, the business world provides some interesting theories about 
simultaneous cooperation and competition between an organisation’s functional 
areas.  For example, Luo, Slotegraff and Pan coined the term ‘coopetition’ to describe 
cross-departmental rivalry over scarce resources combined with concurrent 
collaboration over common interests, often at multiple organisational levels.  They 
concluded that competition is not always harmful and can promote overall 
performance.  Importantly, inter-departmental rivalry is normal, especially when 
                                                
120 Wing Commander John A MacBean and Major Arthur S Hogben, Bombs Gone: The 
Development and Use of British Air-Dropped Weapons from 1912 to the Present Day 
(Wellingborough: Patrick Stephens, 1990); Air Commodore P Huskinson, Vision Ahead 
(London: Werner Laurie, 1949). 
121 Warren, Waziristan, the Faqir of Ipi, and the Indian Army, xxix-xxx. 
122 Ibid., xxx.  Some examples of the FoI’s exaggerations are provided in Chapter 2. 
123 Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control, 108. 
124 George Case, "Birds of Death”, (UK: Channel 4, 1996).  Excerpts from NWF tribesmen are 
at Annex 3. 
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budgets are lean.125 
                                                
125 Xueming Luo, Rebecca J Slotegraaf, and Xing Pan, "Cross-Functional “Coopetition”: The 
Simultaneous Role of Cooperation and Competition Within Firms", Journal of Marketing 70, no. 
2  (2006). 
Chapter 2 – Political and Cultural Context 
31 
CHAPTER 2 – POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CONTEXT 
INTRODUCTION 
The NWF represented a natural geographic boundary to the British Raj.  A barren, 
mountainous chain rising up from the fertile Indus plain, it also marked a cultural, 
political and economic boundary.  This discontinuity generated long-lasting unrest that 
erupted in pulses of extreme violence.  As a frontier, it was of critical strategic 
importance to those wary of external aggression, described as ‘Britain’s “dominating 
problem” in South Asia’.1  However, as a remote buffer zone, it was sometimes a 
peripheral issue to be tolerated at minimum cost, despite being ‘India’s only vulnerable 
frontier’.2  Nonetheless, some have attributed the unrest to Imperial overreach and 
weakness, indicative that the British Empire’s ‘territorial sweep failed to translate into 
actual strength’.3  This Chapter aims to explain the factors that caused and sustained 
the irregular warfare along the Frontier. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF INDIA 
The 1933 Army Staff College notes described India as the ‘vital cornerstone of the 
British Empire’.  The sub-continent was a major source of raw materials and the 
world’s largest importer of British goods.4  It was also an Imperial status symbol and a 
vital line of communication to the Far East.5  Its large population was a source of 
bureaucrats for administrating the Empire.   
                                                
1 Brandon D. Marsh, "Ramparts of Empire: India's North-West Frontier and British Imperialism, 
1919-1947" (University of Texas at Austin, 2009), 1. 
2 C C Davies, The Problem of the North-West Frontier, 1890-1908: With a Survey of Policy 
since 1849 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1932), 2. 
3 Marsh, "The North-West Frontier and the Crisis of Empire: Post-War India and the Debate 
over Waziristan, 1919-1923": 197. 
4 In 1925, India was the fifth largest trading nation in the world. 
5  Army Staff College, Camberley, "India I - Country and People", Senior Division Directing 
Staff Lecture Notes Vol II (1933). 
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Imperial values of ‘Christianity and commerce’ collided on the Frontier.6  Taxing 
NWF tribesmen was of little benefit due to their low income and the Frontier’s lack of 
natural resources.  Nor were the tribesmen a significant source of conscripts for the 
Indian Army.7  As a result, the Frontier tribes were tolerated rather than embraced, 
and British policy attempted to contain unrest at minimal cost.  Nonetheless, Victorian 
Imperialist benevolent values remained a factor.  The Viceroy remarked in 1939 that 
‘our policy of gradual and peaceful penetration... should steadily continue in order that 
we may help these fine people to become more humanized and civilized’.8 
BRITISH GRAND STRATEGY 
The NWF signified the Raj’s high tide mark during the ‘Great Game’ between the 
expanding empires of St Petersburg and London over the domination of Central Asia.  
Wary of potential confrontation along a shared common border, these expanding 
empires purposefully left a buffer zone between them – a hiatus that became 
Afghanistan.  An old Afghan legend illustrates the point: 
When Allah had made the rest of the world, He saw that there was a lot of 
rubbish left over...  He collected them all together and threw them down on the 
earth.  That was Afghanistan.9 
The Frontier’s mountain passes remained strategically important, not just as India’s 
main supply routes from the west, but also to allow the rapid passage of troops to 
                                                
6 The evangelical African missionary David Livingstone used the term ‘Christianity and 
commerce’ to describe the Victorians’ Imperial purpose.  See Fidelis Nkomazana, 
"Livingstone's ideas of Christianity, commerse and civiliization", Pula: Botswana Journal of 
African Studies 12, no. 1 & 2  (1998). 
7 In 1933 there were only 5600 NWF tribesmen in the 158,200-strong Indian Army. See Army 
Staff College, Camberley, "India Il - The Army in India", Senior Division Directing Staff Lecture 
Notes Vol II (1933). 
8 Preface to Barton, India's North-West Frontier, xii. 
9 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warloards (London: Pan Macmillan, 2001), 
7. 
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counter any Russian advance.10 
Frontier strategy balanced three interconnected issues: the Great Game with 
Russia; Afghan intrigue; and tribal unrest.  Imperial grand strategy was periodically 
preoccupied with potential Russian advances against India via Afghanistan.11  Britain 
went to extreme lengths to ensure that Afghanistan remained within its sphere of 
influence (and outside Russia’s), including the 1838 First Afghan War and the 1878 
Second Afghan War; the latter is germane to this thesis as it set the context for the 
1919 Third Afghan War.  Unlike the First, the Second Afghan War ended in the 
attainment of all British objectives.  The Treaty of Gandamak ensured a pro-British 
Amir and British control of Afghan foreign policy, trans-border districts and strategic 
mountain passes.  In return for ‘perpetual peace and friendship’, the Amir received 
guaranteed British support against foreign invasion and an annual stipend.12  As late 
as 1926, Russia’s forcible occupation of an Afghan island on the Russian-Afghan 
border generated Cabinet concern over Russia’s expansionalist intent, during which 
the UK Government observed that ‘The Air forces[sic] in India are dangerously 
small’.13  However, by 1937, Slessor, then Air Staff’s Deputy Director of Plans, wrote 
that although India’s defence plans were ‘absolutely grotesque... I see no chance of 
any war with either Afghanistan or Russia in Central Asia for years to come’.14 
Preoccupation with the Great Game was periodically overshadowed by Afghan 
                                                
10 Army Staff College, Camberley, "Mountain Warfare I - The North-West Frontier of India and 
its Problems", Senior Division Directing Staff Lecture Notes Vol II (1933). 
11 Not everyone recognised the Russian threat; in 1877, Perry observed: ‘A Russian statesman 
would laugh at one in the face if the possibility was suggested of their occupying Afghanistan’ 
(see IOR/L/PS/18/A17, Sir E Perry, Memo commenting on 'Political Despatch to India No 119', 
1 August 1877). 
12 Khyber.ORG, "Treaty of Gandamak, 1879”, 
http://www.khyber.org/pashtohistory/treaties/gandamaktreaty.shtml (accessed 5 January 
2012). 
13 CAB 23/53/19, Cabinet Conclusion 49 (26) 8: Afghanistan, 30 July 1926, 10.  See also: CAB 
24/180/15, Earl of Birkenhead, Cabinet Peper 246(26): Afghanistan, 17 June 1926, CAB 6/5, 
———, Afghanistan (CID 142-D), 17 June 1926, CAB 6/5, CID Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee, 
Afghanistan (CID 143-D), 12 July 1926; and CAB 6/5, ———, Afghanistan - Second (Interim) 
Report (CID 145-D), 29 July 1926, 8. 
14 AIR 2/2627, Group Captain J C Slessor, Minute, Deputy Director Plans to Squadron Leader 
L Darvall, 1 July 1937. 
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intrigues to destabilise British administration by encouraging cross-border tribal 
unrest.15  The GoI endeavoured to minimise the Amir’s influence over what was once 
his domain - the NWF.  The view that the Afghan Government encouraged tribal 
unrest was an enduring theme.16  The importance of tribal control, described as ‘the 
greatest small war problem in the British Empire’, was summed up at a RUSI lecture 
in 1928: ‘[the tribes] are always giving us trouble in peace-time, and... we want to 
secure our communications behind us if we go to war beyond the Indian Frontier’.17  
Mindful of the 1857 Indian Mutiny, Frontier tribal dissent was an unwelcome 
distraction of both men and money.  The appetite of successive Governments for 
balancing risk against cost defined Frontier policy.  According to Tripodi, the Indian 
Government secured ‘its strategic priorities despite a frequently dysfunctional Frontier 
policy that nonetheless served to provide a relatively effective response to the 
problem of the tribes and the wider complexities associated with the preservation of 
British rule in India’.18 
The Armies of the Raj faced a range of diverse roles.  Their primary purpose 
was to defend against external aggression by Russia and to help maintain internal 
peace.  However, there was considerable contemporary debate over their competing 
tasks.19  A controversial subsidiary role was to despatch expeditionary forces (paid for 
by the GoI) for use anywhere in the Empire.20  In peacetime, the Army’s NWF 
                                                
15 Roe, Waging War in Waziristan, 2; Tripodi, Edge of Empire, 19; Marsh, "Ramparts of 
Empire", 45. 
16 The Governor, NWFP, wrote in 1933 that ‘These tribes were heavily subsidized by the 
Afghan Government who regarded them as their first line of offence or defence in the event of 
major trouble with us’.  See IOR/L/PS/12/3171, His Excellency Sir Ralph Griffith, Note by His 
Excellency Sir Ralph Griffith, KCSI, CIE, Governor of the North-West Frontier Province, 28 
June 1933. 
17 Colonel Rowan Robinson, commenting in Peck, "Aircraft in Small Wars": 546. 
18 Tripodi, Edge of Empire, 20. 
19  For example, on arrival as Commander-in-Chief in 1902, Kitchener recommended that the 
Armies should be deployed to counter the Russian threat rather than internal unrest, 
something which the Viceroy had to counter and ‘steer him into more orthodox channels’.  See 
Dilks, Curzon in India, 20. 
20 As late as 1936, Slessor described the British Army’s two biggest commitments as ‘the 
defence of India and the provision of a field force for a major war in Europe’ (see Wing 
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‘covering troops’ protected the Frontier while bolstering the internal security forces 
when required.  This broad remit resulted in conflicting priorities and a lack of focus, 
described at the time as a ‘problem without parallel in the Dominions’.21 
NWF ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 
Before the British arrived, the Sikhs had crossed the River Indus and occupied the 
territory up to the Afghan mountains, subjugating the tribes on the plains.  Sikh rule 
involved collecting revenue by military force with no attempt to administer, 
engendering a culture of suppression and hatred of outsiders while reinforcing Pathan 
nationalism.22  The British were generally welcomed when they succeeded the Sikhs 
and annexed the Punjab in 1849.  The Sikhs had never occupied the mountains, and 
the Pathan tribesmen maintained an aggressively independent stance.  British 
advances halted short of the mountains along the ‘Old Sikh Line’ which was renamed 
the ‘Administrative Border’.  Prior to the Treaty of Gandamak, the Afghan Amir, who 
claimed suzerainty over the mountain tribesmen, held advanced posts almost on this 
border, holding the vital ground of the Khyber Pass and Kurrum Valley.23  
Nonetheless, tribes regularly crossed the Administrative Border to raid the agricultural 
                                                                                                                                           
Commander J C Slessor, "Gold Medal Essay (Military), 1936", JRUSI LXXXIII, no. 527  (1937): 
463).  In 1922, a sub-committee of the Committee for Imperial Defence had expressed the 
view that, except in the gravest emergency, the Indian Army should only be employed outside 
India after consultation with the GoI, and then at London’s expense.  However, during the 
1930s, India’s financial crisis led the GoI to progressively accepted joint responsibility for 
Imperial defence from Egypt to Malaya in return for British funding to modernise the Indian 
Army (see Tomlinson, The Political Economy of the Raj, 116-117, 138-141).   For a summary 
of the prolonged inter-War struggle between the British and Indian governments over the 
duties of the Indian Army, see: Elisabeth Mariko Leake, "British India versus the British Empire: 
The Indian Army and an Impasse in Imperial Defence, circa 1919–39", Modern Asian Studies 
48, no. 1  (2014).  See also CAB 16/83, Earl of Birkenhead, Committee of Imperial Defence: 
Defence of India: First Report of Sub-Committee (CID 158-D), 12 December 1927, 15 and 
CAB 16/6, War Office, Committee of Imperial Defence: Defence of India: Questions of 
Maintaining Reserves in England (CID 190-D), 31 May 1935. 
21 Army Staff College, "India Il - The Army in India". 
22 Barton, India's North-West Frontier, 56. 
23 William Barton, "The Problems of Law and Order under a Responsible Government in the 
North-West Frontier Province", Journal of The Royal Central Asian Society 19, no. I  (1932): 9.  
The Amir’s true influence over the mountain tribesmen is a matter of debate (see Roe, Waging 
War in Waziristan, 3). 
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Punjab plains.24  Afghan attempts to impose authority over the tribes antagonised the 
IO, who frequently responded militarily; between 1857 and 1895 there were 35 
punitive expeditions across the Administrative Border.25 
The successes of the Second Afghan War allowed the British to gradually 
project their influence into the mountains after 1879.  The ‘trans-border’ territory was 
progressively annexed into the political agencies of Malakand, Khyber, the Kurram 
Valley, North and South Waziristan.  The need for a strategy that simultaneously 
maintained Britain’s influence over Afghanistan, whilst limiting Afghan meddling 
across the Administrative Border, required the British to formally delineate the 
respective spheres of influence in the trans-border region.26 
Several frontier lines were considered.  Those wary of the 1842 retreat from 
Kabul favoured a withdrawal to the River Indus.  Despite the support of the Viceroy, 
this was rejected because of the potential loss of prestige, and because the Indus 
plain was unsuitable for basing European troops.27  The second line was the ‘Old Sikh 
Line’ which corresponded to the Administrative Boundary.  However, this was deemed 
indefensible by C-in-C(India), Lord Roberts, being over a thousand miles long, 
requiring enormous road building, and facing a mountain range inhabited by 
‘thousands of warlike men’.  A third option, never seriously considered, was the 
‘scientific border’ which ran on the Afghan side of the mountains and was designed to 
meet a Russian invasion on the most favourable terrain.28  The final decision was 
based on tribal control, rather than countering a Russian threat.  The tribal area was 
divided in half to bring the raiding tribes formally under British jurisdiction.  The 
                                                
24 One contemporary commentator compared the NWF with the Welsh March during Romano-
British times in terms of geography as well as economic and cultural contrast.  See Major J G 
O Whitehead, "The Welsh March and the N-W.F.P.", JUSII LXIV, no. 277. 
25  Quoted in IOR/L/PS/18/A130, W Lee-Warner, Memorandum on Frontier Affairs, 11th 
October 1897. 
26 Christian Tripodi, Tripodi to Author, Email, 16 June 2011. 
27 Lord Lawrence was Viceroy of India from 1864 to 1869. 
28 For an in-depth discussion, see Davies, The Problem of the North-West Frontier, 1890-1908, 
3-17. 
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resulting Durand Line was begrudgingly signed by the Amir in 1893 who agreed to 
cease interference in Swat, Bajaur, Chitral, Wazir and Daur; the British similarly 
withdrew from Birmal on the Afghan side of the Line.29  As a result, 2.5 million 
tribesmen became nominal Crown citizens.30  The Durand Line followed topographic 
watersheds and, despite being accused of disregarded ethnic considerations, 
generally follows Pathan tribal boundaries.31  One notable exception was the 
Mohmands where the Line, unlike elsewhere, was not physically demarcated on the 
ground due to the extreme terrain, leading to subsequent difficulties.32  Barton 
described this ‘storm centre’ of unrest as being ‘open to political penetration from 
Afghanistan’ and making ‘any real control of the tribe almost impossible’.33  
Conversely, the Amir was able to criticise the British for being unable to control their 
tribes, who raided Afghanistan from British territory.34  Initially, the trans-border region 
fell under the jurisdiction of the Punjab, where it was considered a peripheral issue.35  
In 1901 the Viceroy, Lord Curzon, created the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) 
between the River Indus and the Durand Line.36  The new province was headed by a 
Chief Commissioner who reported directly to the GoI without an elected assembly.  
The agricultural plain between the Indus and the Administrative Border was divided 
into five settled ‘districts’, each run by a Commissioner.37  These districts were fully 
administrated, with taxes, courts and police forces. 
                                                
29 Caroe, The Pathans, 463. 
30 Roe, Waging War in Waziristan, 3. 
31 See Figure 2.  For examples of accusations, see: Ibid. and Army Staff College, "Mountain 
Warfare I - The North-West Frontier of India and its Problems".  Likewise, the GoI stated that 
'Neither the international frontier between India and Afghanistan nor the administrative border 
of British India are, in any sense, racial or tribal boundaries' (AIR 23/5370, India Defence 
Department, Frontier Warfare - India (Army and Royal Air Force) 1938, 6). 
32 Caroe, The Pathans, 463-464. 
33 Barton, India's North-West Frontier, 65-66. 
34 Tripodi, Edge of Empire, 74. 
35 Davies, The Problem of the North-West Frontier, 1890-1908, 107-109. 
36 See Figure 3. 
37 Dera Ismail Khan, Bannu, Kohat, Peshawar and Hazara. 
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Figure 2: Tribal Locations of the Pathans 
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The mountainous area between the Administrative Border and the Durand Line was 
divided into seven loosely-controlled ‘agencies’, namely Wana and Tochi (formally 
South and North Waziristan respectively), Kurram, Khyber, Chitral, Swat and Dir.  
Each agency was headed by a Resident, supported by a Political Agent.  These 
agencies were unadministered; there was no police force and little attempt to enforce 
law and order outside the Army cantonments and along the roads.  Instead, the 
Political Agent acted as a referee, settling disputes between the tribes. 
The 1879 Treaty of Gandamak resulted in almost 40 years of relatively good relations 
between India and Afghanistan.  However, in 1919, the concatenation of Turco- 
German pressure, perceived post-war British weakness, rising Indian civil unrest and 
nationalism following the Amritsar massacre, and the need for a distraction during an 
Afghan succession power struggle, caused the new Amir, Amanullah, to invade 
India.38  The Afghan Army, supported by Frontier tribesmen, occupied the Khyber 
Pass at the beginning of May.  Despite the Indian Army’s depletion and war weariness 
following the FWW, the Afghan forces were swiftly ejected and parts of Afghanistan 
temporarily occupied.  Despite this tactical success, the Treaty of Rawalpindi granted 
Afghanistan control over its own foreign policy and, thereby, independence from 
Britain.  However, the Bolshevik revolution and the Red/White civil war meant that the 
Russian threat to India was ebbing. 
In 1931, a re-organisation of the NWFP resulted in the Chief Commissioner 
being replaced by a Governor with an elected legislative council lead by a Chief 
Minister.39  This construct endured until partition in 1947. 
 
                                                
38 See Robson, Crisis on the Frontier, 9-18 for an overview of the Afghan reasoning for going 
to war. 
39 IOR/L/MIL/7/16944, Collection 403/118, Enclosure 4, Annual summaries of chief events on 
North West Frontier tribal territory 1919-1932, 1933, 1. 
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TOPOGRAPHY 
The NWF forms the transition between Central Asia’s highlands and Indian’s plains.  
The 408-mile-long Frontier of inaccessible mountains forms the Hindu Kush’s eastern 
foothills.  To the north lie the Himalayan foothills; to the south, Baluchistan’s arid 
plains.  The wide, fertile Indus plains bound the Frontier’s eastern boundary.40 
Deep-cut valleys dominate the Frontier, their watersheds demarcating the British 
political boundaries.41  East-west rivers form the strategic mountain passes that link 
India with Central Asia – the Khyber, Kurram, Tochi and Gomal Passes.42 
Aridness dominated the region.43  Although Bruce described Waziristan as 
‘forest clad, with green "mergs" and mountain glens’, the region suffered acute 
deforestation and overgrazing, creating barren, waterless expanses.44  Deforestation 
resulted from the demand for firewood by tribes and troops, and its use in constructing 
tribal roofs.  Wood became invaluable and roof timbers were highly prized.45  The dry, 
continental climate generated a wide diurnal and annual temperature variation from 
38oC in May to sub-freezing temperatures in winter.46 
CULTURAL ASPECTS 
As Davies noted, ‘Environment has definitely shaped the national character of the 
frontier tribesman.  It has produced a race of men who are the most expert guerrilla 
fighters in the world’.47  In winter, snowfall often incarcerated the tribes within their 
own valleys, resulting in distinct localised tribal characteristics and independence from  
                                                
40 David Dichter, The North-West Frontier of West Pakistan: A Study in Regional Geography 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 7. 
41 See Figure 4. 
42 See Figure 9. 
43 Dichter, The North-West Frontier of West Pakistan, 10-12. 
44 Bruce, "The Sandeman Policy as Applied to Tribal Problems of To-day": 46. 
45 Camberley Army Staff College, "Mountain Staff Tour, DS Notes on Exercise No 3", Senior 
Division Directing Staff Lecture Notes  (1923). 
46 Dichter, The North-West Frontier of West Pakistan, 10-14. 
47 Davies, The Problem of the North-West Frontier, 1890-1908, 179. 
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 each other; the Waziris and Afridis in particular were strongly democratic and their leaders had 
only limited control over them.48  Individual tribes cherished autonomy and defied any external 
authority.49 
Outwith a few cultivable areas, the Frontier was harsh and unforgiving.50  The 
tribes survived on a near subsistence diet.51  Livestock ownership exceeded what the 
barren land could support, contributing to deforestation.  Due to the lack of resources, 
hill tribes habitually raided the caravans transiting the passes and plundered the fertile 
agricultural plains across the Administrative Border for money, livestock, goods and 
hostages.52 
Tribal diversity was apparent at several levels.  The hill, or nang, tribesmen were 
distinct from the qalang tribes of the plains.  Nang tribes lacked structure or central 
leadership and survived on subsistence agriculture.  Qalang, or taxed, tribesmen were 
more hierarchical and organised, producing surplus agricultural products which could 
be traded.53  The latter submitted more readily to external administration, while the 
former strongly resisted it.  On a larger scale, there was contrast between the 
hierarchical Baluchis to the south and the tribes of the NWF, which led to the need for 
diverse policies in different areas, as explained later.54 
Pashtunwali (Pathan honour) formed an important aspect of nang tribal 
culture.55  This drove tribal reaction to the British and endures today.56  This pre-
                                                
48 Bruce, The Forward Policy and its Results, 168. 
49 Dichter, The North-West Frontier of West Pakistan, 1-3. 
50 Moore, Just as Good as the Rest, 39. 
51 Roe, Waging War in Waziristan, 19. 
52 Ibid., 20-21. 
53 A Pathan proverb says: ‘Honour (nang) ate up the mountains; taxes (qalang) ate up the 
plains’.  See Barnett R Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and 
Collapse in the International System (Yale University Press, 2002), 28. 
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Islamic tradition compelled Pathans to adhere to three specific behaviours: hospitality 
(melmastia); sanctuary for renegades (nanawatai); and retribution (badal) for any 
affront to the family, no matter how long it took.57  Rivalry between patrilateral parallel 
male cousins (tarburwali) often resulted in enduring intra-tribal tension.58  Other 
elements of Pashtunwali were the autonomy of tribal men and the temporary nature of 
the headmen (maliks).  Breaking Pashtunwali would bring shame (sharm) onto the 
individual and his associates.  Whilst open to local interpretation, the code applied at 
every level of society, both within and between tribes, and played a role in decision-
making, justice and tolerance.  Whilst it was largely responsible for enduring inter-
tribal conflict, it was also the Pathan-wide set of rules which governed and moderated 
behaviour.  Pashtunwali is of particular importance to this thesis: in Western 
civilisations, the population’s behaviour is constrained and influenced by laws passed 
by the government and enforced by the police; on the NWF, Pashtunwali provided a 
similar effect on the behaviour of the fiercely independent and disparate tribes.  As will 
be described later, RAF doctrine during this period was largely based on generating 
‘moral effect’ to coerce the population to change its behaviour.  Controlling tribal 
behaviour was a contest between two coercive effects: the RAF’s moral effect on one 
hand; and a mixture of Pashtunwali and religion on the other.  Therefore, any lessons 
about moral effect learnt on the NWF could only be reliably applied to other regions 
and cultures if the constraining influence of Pashtunwali was broadly similar to the 
governing mechanisms of the enemy leadership.  To pose a germane example, did 
Pashtunwali control the NWF tribes to the same degree as the Nazi regime controlled 
the German population? 
The British took care not to dishonour a particular tribe to avoid their long-term 
resentment as well as unrest in adjacent tribes from a sense of shared humiliation.  
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This explains why, for example, the British rarely tried to capture renegades, such as 
the FoI, while being sheltered under the principle of nanawatai by tribes within British 
territory.59  Similarly, ‘outlaws’ who fled into tribal areas often became the ‘hamsaya’ 
(guest) of the headman; the outlaw would often be compelled to conduct raiding on 
behalf of the tribe in return.60  The headman, if confronted by the authorities, could 
excuse himself by claiming that Pashtunwali compelled him to offer sanctuary. 
Nang tribal structure, or its absence, was problematic for the British.  Violence 
tended to be orchestrated at a low level, resulting in a mosaic of behaviours.  Unlike 
the Baluchi tribes to the south, there was little institutionalised, hereditary leadership 
amongst the central NWF tribes.  Tribal maliks had to demonstrate their continued 
worthiness and could be democratically replaced at short notice, their authority being 
dependent on the continued support of their tribesmen; overall, the maliks ‘influenced’ 
rather than ‘controlled’ their tribesmen.  In many tribes the malik’s main role was to 
orchestrate public assemblies (jirgas).  Jirgas were used to resolve intra and inter-
tribal disputes and were very democratic, the assembled tribesmen being seated in a 
circle to demonstrate equality.  Small jirgas were often conducted without a leader.  At 
larger multi-clan jirgas, the maliks (sometimes numbering over a hundred) would be 
seated at the front while their tribesmen sat behind.  Voting was rare; instead, issues 
were discussed and negotiated until agreement was reached, the final consensus 
being binding and final.  In an attempt to administer nang tribes, the British tried to 
influence both the maliks and jirgas.61 
However, Pathans often paid more heed to religious leaders than their maliks; 
the maliks were elected by egalitarian vote, whereas the religious leaders were 
deemed to be ordained by God.  Pathans were all Islamic, one of the few unifying 
cultural factors.  This endowed religious leaders with pan-tribal influence.  In 
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Waziristan there were several types of Islamic clerics who competed against the 
maliks (and GoI), for tribal influence, although they acquired authority in different 
ways.  Mullahs were routine domestic tribal preachers who ran the local mosques; 
they could preach jihad against outsiders, albeit not always successfully, and 
occasionally organised armed tribal forces called lashkars.  Fakirs (charismatic, 
wandering mullahs viewed as miracle workers) were perhaps the most influential 
religious leaders, living austere lives and often moving between tribes under the 
unified protection of Pashtunwali.62  One initially professed that aircraft could be 
brought down by flashing mirrors at them.63  The FoI, understanding that leaflets were 
normally dropped before bombing raids, cunningly convinced his followers that he 
could turn bombs into paper.64  Temple provided a contemporary British perspective of 
the ‘priest ridden’ tribes and their religious leaders, describing that they were: ‘as 
ignorant as they are bigoted; and use their influence simply for preaching crusades 
against unbelievers, and inculcate the doctrine of rapine and bloodshed against the 
defenceless people of the plain’.65  The GoI had little success in influencing these 
clerics. 
Tribal villages, or kots, usually consisted of square houses of unbaked bricks, 
earth and straw huddled in flat areas and surrounded by cultivable ground.  These 
buildings were often surrounded by thick, high walls to protect the inhabitants and 
their livestock, who lived in close proximity.  Houses were normally single-roomed, 
small and squalid, with inadequate sanitation.  Their highly sought-after timber roof 
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beams were specifically targeted by punitive Army expeditions.66  The only furniture 
was normally beds made of rough wood.  Tents and caves were also used as 
dwellings.  The larger villages were normally surrounded by thirty-foot fortified watch 
towers, the number of which reflected the village’s status.67 
Rifles were a significant status symbol within the tribesmen’s warrior ethos and 
the ability to muster significant numbers secured a village’s independence.  Some 
were locally manufactured, but higher quality weapons were illegally imported from 
Afghanistan or stolen from the British.  The GoI often imposed fines in the form of 
rifles.  Modern rifles and smokeless ammunition allowed tribesmen to employ long-
ranged harassing fire and ambushes, frustrating Imperial troops who were often 
unable to close with the tribesmen and inflict a decisive traditional victory.68 
Cross-Cultural Communication 
The failure of effective communication between the supposedly governed and the 
would-be governors of the NWF has received relatively little academic scrutiny.  
Examining the self-image of the belligerents is complicated by the overlap between 
myth, legend and reality; as Terraine warned: 
legend and war are inseparable and little harm results; whereas myth, 
embodying some popular idea, may have some mischievous motive which by 
concealing the truth may lead to false conclusions.69 
Authors like Kipling popularised Pathan characters such as Mahboob Ali in Kim.  The 
Victorian epitome of daring colonial agents and soldiers on the fringes of Pax 
Britannica, often making the ultimate sacrifice for Queen and country, was not without 
grounding in reality.  British national culture was imbued with images such as the sole 
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survivor of the First Afghan War disaster entering the gates of Jalalabad, immortalised 
by Lady Butler.70  Thornton posited that public schools and juvenile literature of the 
era entrenched values that the ruling elite deemed worthy, with a particular emphasis 
on encouraging young men to serve the Empire, not just Britain.71  Historically, 
Parliament, fearing the potential political power of the Army, had populated the Army’s 
officer corps with gentlemen from their own social strata to secure their empathy.  
Sport was the class’s natural pastime and so military ethos became aligned with sport 
and ‘fairness’.  Indeed, British cinema was unusual in that, rather than demonising the 
enemy, they were instead portrayed as sporting opponents; as, for example, 
demonstrated by the tribesmen ‘saluting’ their British opponents at the end of the film 
Zulu.72  As the British Army was largely successful, there was little incentive to 
change, and these norms became ‘sticky’ and endured, all the more so since the 
Army attracted men who bought into this ethos and perpetuated the behaviour.73  
Thornton remarked that gentlemanly behaviour percolated down the Army’s social 
strata, although Mockaitis caveated that when oversight by the officers was absent, 
the rank and file, recruited from the lowest levels of British society, could act 
savagely.74 
The British developed the concept of the ‘noble Pathan savage’, possibly due to 
their respect for the tribesmen’s martial skill and the British desire to project their own 
social norms on their enemy.  An air power example of this was Biggles author, W E 
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Remnants of an Army by Lady Elizabeth Butler 
A depiction of Dr William Brydon, an assistant surgeon in the Bengal Army, arriving 
at the gates of Jalalabad.  He was originally thought to be the sole survivor of the 
16,000-strong army and followers who retreated from Kabul during the First Afghan 
War. 
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Figure 7 
 
Qualities of an Army Officer 
An officer should be comely, spritely and above all else, confident in his own dress 
and bearing. He should, where possible, eat a small piece of meat each morning 
with molasses and beans. He should air himself gracefully when under fire and 
never place himself in a position of difficulty when being shot at. He should eat his 
meals comfortably and ahead of his soldiers, for it is he whom is more important 
tactically on the battlefield and therefore he who should be well nourished. His hair 
should be well groomed and if possible he should adorn a moustache or similar 
facial adornment.  When speaking to his soldiers he should appear unnerved and 
aloof and give direction without in any way involving himself personally in the 
execution of arduous or un-officerlike duties. He should smoke thin panatelas 
except when in the company of ladies where he should take only a small gin mixed 
with lemon tea. He should be an ardent and erudite gentleman and woo the ladies 
both in the formal environment and in the bedroom where he should excel himself 
beyond the ordinary soldier with his virulent love making prowess. 
 
Lieutenant General Hubert Worthington 
Commander-in-Chief 
5th Royal Indian Mountain Division Bombay 
12 December 1907 
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Figure 8 - Flying magazine front cover, 1938 
Johns’, 1938 boys’ aviation magazine article on the NWF, which described recalcitrant 
hill tribesmen as ‘dusky gentlemen’ for whom conflict offered ‘both business and 
pleasure’ - ‘very good fellows’ who ‘have occasionally expressed their displeasure with 
their knives on sundry prisoners’ but whom also displayed ‘a degree of chivalry 
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 seldom encountered in countries so-called civilised’.  Johns concluded that ‘hillsmen 
are, and have always been, better men than plainsmen’.75  In one of the few cultural 
studies of the region, Ahmed remarked that the bearing of the tall, blond, blue-eyed 
Afridis 'helped create and perpetuate romantic theories of Greek origin.’76  However, 
the somewhat subjective nature of Ahmed’s study is revealed by comments such as: 
‘Even the sordid business of bombing tribesmen was cast in a "sportsman-like" mould 
and a proper "warning notice" issued before air-raids.  Otherwise it simply would not 
be cricket’.77  Woodruff provided another viewpoint: ‘although there was always the 
chance of a bullet and often a great deal of discomfort... everyone liked the Pathan, 
his courage and his sense of humour’.78 
The Pathan record is far sparser.79  Ahmed claims that the Pathans did not 
share the romanticised British view of conflict.80  Nonetheless, many sources mention 
the tribesmen’s view of harassing the British for ‘sport’; this is unsurprising given the 
status of rifle ownership in Pathan society.  Bowyer provided some insight when 
describing how, following a 1920s campaign, tribesmen applied to the GoI for the 
award of the British India General Service Medal for their role in training the ‘King-
Emperor’s army’, only to be bemused when this was refused.81  Tripodi noted that the 
term tarburwali (‘cousin rivalry’) also means ‘enemy’, while Allen recorded how a 
Political Agent was sniped at by Mahsud tribesmen the night after he had dined with 
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them.82  This illustrates the Pathan cultural dynamic between bonding and 
belligerence.  The Tribal Analysis Center concluded that ‘these aggressive tribes 
developed cultural characteristics that valued courage, manly vigor, and warlike 
attitudes that combined with religious piety to create a hierarchy’.83  Overall, it is 
apparent that the British and Pathans conceptualised ‘sport’ differently. 
Despite the supposedly ‘sporting’ nature of the Pathan-British relationship, the 
British concept of ethics was in its infancy at the turn of the century.  During an early 
discussion on ethics, Herbert expounded in 1898 that ‘a code of ethics in warfare 
could obtain only between nations of an equal, or tolerably equal, state of 
civilization’.84  However, Herbert’s concept of a ‘code’ revolved around a mutual 
agreed set of standards.  This required interaction to agree upon the code, which was 
largely absent on the NWF; the Close Border policy of non-interference resulted in 
minimal interaction and communication with the tribes, despite the GoI’s use of 
Political Agents to indirectly administer them.  Ahmed argued that the British allowed 
the tribal areas to function largely uninterrupted and left the tribes largely untouched.85  
Overall, the policy of non-interference led to a lack of communication and 
understanding between the cultures which was ultimately unhelpful. 
BRITISH NWF POLICY 
Frontier policy is important to this Thesis, as some approaches nested more 
comfortably with air power than others.  The problems on the NWF stemmed from the 
conflict between the tribes’ intrinsic lack of utility to the GoI and the region’s strategic 
geographic importance.  This manifested itself by the existence of two borders – the 
international Durand Line and the self-imposed ‘Administrative Border’ delineating 
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‘British India’ from the tribal areas.  Grand strategy dictated the ebb and flow of British 
Frontier policy which, in turn, dictated the method of tribal administration.86 
The historiography of the NWF has tended to focus on Waziristan, the storm 
centre of resistance against British authority and the focus of much of British efforts, 
especially in the late 1930s.  It more recently became the centre of attention as the 
refuge of terrorists such as Osama bin Laden.  However, Waziristan constituted only a 
small part of the NWF; outside this region, despite equally demanding topography and 
hardened tribes, comparatively little unrest occurred, as Tripodi pointed out:  
The systems designed to facilitate interactions, the political arrangements, the 
financial inducements, the forging of common interests and the threat of military 
action – all combined to generate a largely stable environment.87 
Even in Waziristan, the weekly intelligence reports and annual summaries indicate a 
generally stable situation interrupted by sporadic violent events.88  Despite its 
reputation, it is largely incorrect to view the NWF as an area of continuous unrest and 
policy failure. 
British NWF policy was not uniform or monolithic, but rather a patchwork 
designed to address the context of particular tribes.  Davies opined that ‘Owing to 
geographical, ethological, and political reasons, a policy, which was completely 
successful on one part of the frontier, was entirely unsuited to another area’.89  
Nonetheless, Lord Curzon, as Viceroy in 1901, considered ‘the creation and pursuit of 
a ‘sound Frontier Policy... from Chitral on the North to the Gomul Valley on the South’’ 
to be his most important reform.90  British policy-makers were not consistently in 
accord; Ledwidge highlighted the frequent ‘fierce controversies concerning policy and 
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strategy’ within the 120-odd ‘Politicals’ of the GoI’s Foreign and Political Department.91  
According to Mallam, viewpoints were often aligned between the IPS’s 30% ‘Heaven 
Born’ Indian Civil Servants and the 70% ex-military Politicals.92  Furthermore, the IPS 
had to deal with an often ‘surly if not actively hostile military’, some of whom viewed 
the Politicals as ‘traitors’.93  One of the themes of this study is to analyse the context 
of the NWF to discern which policy worked, on whom and why, and the effectiveness 
of air power’s contribution. 
The Close Border Policy – 1838 to 1879: ‘Burn and Scuttle’, ‘Butcher and Bolt’, 
or ‘Harry and Hurry’ 
British policy varied between two extremes: the Close Border and Forward policies.  
The Close Border policy involved minimal interference with the tribes, while the 
Forward policy meant garrisoning and administrating the area.  The East India’s initial 
expansionist policy was, de facto, a Forward policy.  However, as a result of the 
disastrous 1838-42 First Afghan War, a Close Border policy was adopted between the 
1849 annexation of the Punjab and the 1878 Second Afghan War.  The rule of British 
law was used to consolidate the land east of the Administrative Border, but the tribal 
areas to the west were largely left to themselves.  In reality, there were few other 
options due to the combination of a lack of both British resources and political will.  
The regular tribal raids across the Administrative Border required frequent brigade-
strength punitive expeditions to exact retribution.  The Punjab Irregular Force (PIF), 
consisting of British-led Indian infantry and cavalry regiments, was created in 1849 to 
secure the local border.  The ‘Piffers’ fell under the control of the Board of 
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Administration of the Punjab, allowing the Board to swiftly react against local tribal 
violence without having to consult the Indian Army authorities.94  The PIF proved to be 
more effective on the Frontier than the regular Indian Army.95  
The Close Border policy was heavily condemned for treating the symptoms of 
unrest rather than the cause.  Richard Bruce was particularly critical because, 
although the border was ‘closed’ and impervious to the British, with no troops being 
allowed to cross it except during ‘burn and scuttle’ expeditions, it was ‘open’ to 
tribesmen who raided the settled districts.96  His son, Charles, agreed, commenting on 
tribal control techniques thus: 
 Fines, which, if paid at all, were generally paid by the most respectable 
and law-abiding section of the tribe. 
Blockades, which kept the laborious, hard-working portion of the 
tribesmen from going about their lawful occasions. 
Expeditions, where the villages of the wretched people were burnt to the 
ground, their women, children, and flocks turned out on to the hillside.  
Eventually the troops retired, leaving behind them a legacy of hatred and 
contempt. A policy which made a desert and called it peace. A policy "neither 
dignified, becoming to a Great Power, humane, nor even economical".97 
Rawlinson, writing in 1877, took a wider view on the Close Border policy:  
the senseless and irritating policy that we have [ ] pursued in holding aloof from 
all connection with the mountain tribes, has been one series of mischievous and 
even dangerous blundering’ [and if we had been] 'arbitrating in cases of disputes 
between the clans, employing the tribesmen as patrols, introducing agricultural 
improvements, encouraging trade, and generally pushing the arts of industry into 
the mountains, we should I believe, at the present day, have had a settled and 
contented peasantry along the whole Punjab border, instead of hungry and 
restless marauders.98 
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The Forward Policy – 1879 to 1901 
Disraeli’s 1874 Conservative government reappraised the Russian threat and adopted 
a Forward Policy towards Afghanistan, Baluchistan and the tribal areas.  Although the 
ensuing military intervention to secure Afghanistan – the 1878 Second Afghan War – 
was temporary, Indian rule of law was progressively established over the tribal areas 
between 1879 and 1901.99  This was achieved by garrisoning 10,000 troops and 
associated road-building to allow them to rapidly deploy forward to counter Russian 
aggression.100  Nonetheless, physical occupation was limited to specific ‘protected 
areas’.  The strategically important Khyber Pass was occupied from the outset and 
approachable tribal leaders paid allowances to maintain jazailchis (which became the 
Khyber Rifles) to protect the Pass.101 
Under the Forward Policy, Waziristan was administered via the ‘maliki system’.  
Tribal leaders, or maliks, were paid allowances in return for raising tribal levies and 
regulating tribal behaviour.  This approach had been successfully implemented in 
Baluchistan to the south by Sandeman, who leveraged existing tribal leadership 
structures, binding the tribes to the Government by way of paid service, backed up by 
the threat of force.102  It translated less well, however, when applied by Sandeman’s 
protégé, Richard Bruce, in Waziristan.  The Baluchis were highly hierarchical prior to 
the British arrival, giving Sandeman a functioning framework upon which to apply his 
tenets of occupation, authority and latent violence.  The Wazirs were more democratic 
and anarchic; their strong commitment to nikat (tribal division) left them unwilling to 
succumb to outside control.103  The British had to identify local influential maliks and, 
at times, invented them.  As Caroe mocked: ‘'Let there be maliks... and maliks there 
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were’.104  Allowances were paid to individual maliks, rather than the tribe, who the 
democratic majority of the tribe often ignored.  Additionally, Bruce was constrained by 
a lack of British physical presence outside the protected areas, which some tribesmen 
interpreted as a lack of commitment to their welfare, undermining British legitimacy.105  
Local deference to this ‘indirect rule’ was symbolised by the murder of four arbitrarily-
assigned pro-British maliks in 1893.106  Caroe summed up aptly: ‘no empire of which 
we have any record has ever succeeded in making subjects of the tribes of 
Waziristan’.107 
1897 Uprisings 
While Richard Bruce struggled to control Waziristan, fears of Russian encroachment 
through the Pamir mountains resulted in the Forward Policy being expanded across 
Chitral, Dir and Swat, coalescing into the Malakand political agency in 1895.  
Nonetheless, in 1897, the tribes from Malakand in the north through to Quetta in the 
south rose against the British.  Barton attributed the cause to an ‘unprovoked attack 
on a British force’ by a Mahsud clan;108 Davies suggested that the intrusive Forward 
Policy itself, especially the building of roads deep into tribal territory, combined with 
religious fanaticism and Afghan intrigues, were causal factors.109  Johnson offered that 
the tribes feared permanent British occupation and the loss of their way of life, along 
with increased Islamic confidence after Turks defeated the Greek Christians.110  
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Tripodi concluded that the uprisings were unco-ordinated and motivated by 
opportunism.111  The uprisings took two years to subdue by punitive columns, raising 
several concerns: tribal dissent had continued despite military action; the cost of 
military action was crippling; the misconception that only individual tribes would cause 
trouble at any one time was shattered; fanatical religious ‘mullahs’ could rapidly 
spread dissent; and the uprising highlighted policy differences between the Armies in 
India and the IPS.  In short, establishing fortified garrisons in tribal areas had proven 
antagonistic while providing fixed targets for the tribes to vent their anger.  Their 
presence had not maintained law and order without substantial reinforcement.  The 
Forward Policy required re-evaluation.112 
The Modified Close Border Policy – 1899 to 1919 
On appointment as Viceroy in 1899, Lord Curzon instigated a ‘Modified Close Border 
Policy’ to address military, administrative and financial issues.  He summed this up in 
1904 thus: 
Withdrawal of British forces from advanced positions, employment of tribal 
forces in defence of tribal territory, concentration of British forces in British 
territory behind them as a safeguard and a support, improvement of 
communications in the rear.113 
Curzon subsequently explained his logic: 
abandoning old and stale controversies, we have hit upon a policy in India that is 
both forward and backward - forward in so far as we hold up to our treaty 
frontier, neither minimising nor shirking our obligations; backward in so far as we 
do not court a policy of expansion or adventure, but depend rather on a policy of 
co-operation and conciliation than one of coercion or subjugation of the tribes.114 
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According to Tripodi, Curzon sympathised with Sandeman’s Baluchistan policy and 
distrusted Frontier militarisation.  Troops were replaced with Government-funded tribal 
levies to buy the tribes’ allegiance.115  The tribal Agencies between the Administrative 
Border and the Durand Line were left unadministered, bar strategic passes, leaving 
Political Agents to liaise with the tribes.116  Curzon recognised the tribal areas’ special 
circumstances and the Punjab Government’s inability to manage them.  Curzon 
reflected in 1907:  
My own policy in India was to respect the internal independence of these tribes, 
and to find in their self-interest and employment as Frontier Militia a guarantee 
both for the security of our inner or administrative borders and also for the 
tranquillity of the border zone itself.117 
His establishment of the NWFP in 1901 resulted in widespread peace and wide 
acclaim;118 during Curzon’s time as Viceroy there were no major expeditions and only 
£248,000 was spent on punitive frontier measures.119  This was in no small part due to 
the neutral stance taken by the Afghan Amir, Habibullah. 
In 1919, the three-month-long Third Afghan War ended Curzon’s peace.  In 
sympathy with the new Afghan Amir’s incursion across the Durand Line, the Khyber 
Rifles and most Waziristan Militias largely deserted, partially because their British 
officers were ordered to abandon their men, while the Tochi Wazir tribesmen 
revolted.120  Control of Waziristan was briefly lost, but regained. 
                                                
115 Tripodi, Edge of Empire, 94-95.  Tribal levies included the North Waziristan, South 
Waziristan and Kurram Militias. 
116 Curzon’s ideas appear to be based on Lord Hamilton’s 1898 appreciation to his 
predecessor as Viceroy (IOR/L/PS/10/46, Military Operations on the North-West Frontier of 
India, No C8713, March 1898). 
117 Lord Curzon of Kedleston, 1907, "Text of the 1907 Romanes Lecture on the subject of 
Frontiers", www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibru/resources/links/curzon.pdf (accessed 30 November 
2011). 
118 The Rt Hon The Earl of Ronaldshay, The Life of Lord Curzon: Being the Authorized 
Biography of George Nathaniel Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., vol. 2: Viceroy of India 
(London: Ernest Benn Ltd, 1928), 132-136.  Following Curzon’s retirement and 1919, there 
were only two, brief, punitive expeditions (‘Wilcox’s Weekend Wars’ in 1908).   
119 Barton, India's North-West Frontier, 72. 
120 Tripodi, Edge of Empire, 133. 
Chapter 2 – Political and Cultural Context 
61 
A new NWF policy was required that balanced the need for security within 
British territory (especially Waziristan) with the maintenance of a mutually-agreeable 
Anglo-Afghan relationship, including limiting the border tribes’ interference in Afghan 
politics.121  The latter was complicated by diplomatic uncertainty over Afghanistan’s 
new sovereign status following the Third Afghan War.  Marsh contended that, 
confronted by this surging nationalism, the GoI sealed off the NWF from the rest of 
India until partition.122 
Modified Forward Policy – 1923-47: ‘Watch and Ward’ or ‘Razmak Policy’ 
‘Afghan wars become serious only when they are over; ...they were apt to produce an 
after-crop of tribal unrest, sedulously fostered by a Kabul government’; so wrote the 
penultimate Governor of the NWFP.123  The tribal uprisings that followed the Third 
Afghan War lasted, on and off, until 1921.  The Viceroy telegraphed that ‘with the 
improved aeroplanes now at our disposal, [an] aerial campaign will have considerable 
effect and may possibly ensure submission’.124  However, the tribes were ultimately 
subdued by garrisoning two brigade groups across the Administrative Border (one at 
Wana in South Waziristan and one at Razmak in North Waziristan) and two more just 
east of the Administrative Border at Bannu and Tank.125  Tripodi illustrated the 
questions that confronted the British: 
how had it been so easy to mobilize tribal opinion against the British?  Did the 
government’s influence and the relationships built over decades between 
                                                
121 Ibid., 131. 
122 Marsh, "Ramparts of Empire", vii. 
123 Caroe, The Pathans, 397.  This is an enduring regional theme, judging by the aftermath of 
the 1979 Russian and 2003 US invasions.  Given the de-centralised, patchwork nature of 
Afghan’s feudal society and the fiercely independent nature of individual tribes, it is perhaps 
not surprising that state-wide strategic matters are not settled by conventional force-on-force 
combat operations focused predominantly on major cities.  As a result, the imposition of new 
forms of central governance are unlikely to be widely accepted due to the region’s de-
centralised character. 
124 CAB 6/4, Lord Chelmsford, Telegram, Viceroy to India Office (Appendix in CID 116-D), 6 
October 1919, 3. 
125 Tripodi, Edge of Empire, 133.   
Chapter 2 – Political and Cultural Context 
62 
Politicals and tribes count for nothing?  And how had the system of tribal 
defence – the militias – which had comprised the basis of British policy for so 
long and which had been implemented in the face of widespread doubts as to 
the loyalty of the tribesmen, collapse so quickly and so comprehensively in the 
face of the attack?  Furthermore, if the tribes could not be trusted, what form 
should any new policy take[?].126 
The solution – the Modified Forward Policy - was a contentious compromise; those 
who called for the evacuation of Waziristan were over-ruled.  Although expensive, it 
was hoped that future economies could be made by using the RAF.127  Direct rule 
would not be applied over the tribes and regular Army patrols into tribal territory would 
be avoided.  However, the centrally-positioned Razmak garrison could quickly switch 
from ‘watching’ to deploying an all-arms mobile column (‘Razcol’) for any length of 
time, enabled by a new, costly network of roads.128  Primary schools were built 
adjacent to military posts and healthcare was introduced.  However, hospitals were 
often overcrowded, and Barton highlighted the dearth of jobs for educated young 
tribesmen, who became disaffected and vulnerable to political agitators.129  Roads 
were very much a double edged sword; while they enabled trade and were ‘the great 
carriers of civilisation’ for some, Charles Bruce opined that the tribes perceived them 
as facilitating the movement of troops; as such, roads increased tribal unrest: ‘if we 
stand content with the roads and fail to develop the country and its resources for the 
benefit of the tribes, we shall be failing in our mission’.130  Barthorp more recently 
acknowledged that the policy, supported by air power, gradually constrained the 
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Mahsud and Wazir tribesmen, but was ultimately preventative rather than curative.131   
Despite initial concerns that the Razmak garrison gave the Army undue influence in 
NWF policy decision-making, control of Waziristan was handed back to the Resident 
by 1924. 
The disagreement over ‘Forward’ versus ‘Close Border’ policy is well illustrated 
by the conflicting ideas of two Chief Commissioners of the NWFP, Sir George Roos-
Keppel (1918-19) and Sir John Maffey (1921-23).  Roos-Keppel was a supporter of 
complete occupation and administration to the Durand Line.132  Maffey, in contrast, 
was incensed by the imposition of the ‘Razmak policy’, opining that the garrison was 
both antagonistic and vulnerable, while the roads would need protecting.133  He 
emphasised that Afghanistan, rather than the NWF, should be the focus of attention 
and that the Army should be banned from the tribal areas, the Administrative Border 
defended, and the RAF employed to control the tribes and punish any incursions.134  
Maffey’s paper was even more reliant on air power than Salmond’s simultaneously- 
published Report on the RAF in India;135 the two had toured the NWF together and 
probably exchanged ideas.136  It is likely that those favouring a ‘close border’ policy 
would be receptive to leveraging air power’s characteristic of reach and speed of 
response to control the tribes, while ‘forward’ policy proponents would be more likely 
to employ air power in a supporting role to ground forces.  ‘Pink’s War’, when the RAF 
was permitted to counter a 1925 Mahsud uprising independently from Army support, 
will be examined later.  However, within the context of examining extreme  
                                                
131 Barthorp, The North-West Frontier: British India and Afghanistan: A Pictorial History, 1839-
1947, 162. 
132 10 August 1919 Roos-Keppel to Viceroy, "Papers of Field Marshal Sir Arthur Barrett", 
quoted in Robson, Crisis on the Frontier, 237-238. 
133 Roe, Waging War in Waziristan, 96  See also Tripodi, Edge of Empire, 138-140. 
134 Sir John Maffey, "Unsolicited views on an unsolved Problem, 2 August 1922", Salmond 
Papers, RAF Museum, B2609  (1922). 
135 AIR 8/46, E1, Air Vice-Marshal Sir J M Salmond, Report by Air Vice Marshal Sir John 
Salmond on the Royal Air Force in India, August 1922.  See Chapter 6.  Salmond’s biography 
is at Annex 7. 
136 Robson, Crisis on the Frontier, 239-240. 
Chapter 2 – Political and Cultural Context 
64 
Figure 9 
Chapter 2 – Political and Cultural Context 
65 
‘forward’ and ‘close border’ policies, it is germane to note that Robson considered 
Pink’s War to have been ‘entirely successful’ and that ‘a policy of air control in 
Waziristan stood a substantial chance of being effective’.137 
The new Modified Forward Policy also required a new method of enforcement: 
‘control from within’.138  To compliment the Army’s ‘watch and ward’ garrisons, Armed 
Civil Forces (ACFs) were established under the political officers.  Charles Bruce 
described the policy as being ‘built on the foundations of the Sandeman policy... 
supporting the tribal headmen in carrying out their primary duties of maintaining law 
and order within their own tribes’.139  In 1920, the hiatus left by the deserting Khyber 
Rifles was filled by the Khassadar system.  This was a relatively well-paid, but ragged, 
non-uniformed tribal police force, equipped by the local tribes.  Its aim was to remove 
the burden of day-to-day policing from the Army and instil self-responsibility on 
tribes.140  However, the Khassadars were not trusted by the Army (and, lacking 
uniforms, were often indistinguishable from the protagonists).  As Woodruff recorded: 
'The Khassadars were servants of the tribe, not of the Government’.141  Furthermore, 
the fear of starting personal blood feuds made many Khassadars avoid conflict with 
other tribesmen.  Nevertheless, Pettigrew summed up that the system: 
removed some of the poverty from the tribes, and gave them something to lose 
and thereby some incentive to keep out of trouble, and to keep trouble out of 
their areas.142 
The final element of the ACF was the Transfrontier Corps, which comprised the Tochi, 
South Waziristan and Kurram Scouts.  These were formed in 1922 from the North and 
South Waziristan Militias (who had been disbanded following their desertion during the 
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Third Afghan War) and the Kurram Militia (which had remained loyal).143  Officered by 
the Indian Army, recruits were drawn predominantly from the settled districts to guard 
against future desertions.  One of the Scouts’ main roles was to supervise the 
Khassadars.144 
The British had to avoid applying so much force that it escalated the situation.  
Under certain circumstances, the tribes were able to muster large numbers of fighting 
men and Scouts could become rapidly outnumbered.  Withdrawal risked loss of 
credibility, while standing their ground would require reinforcement by the regular 
Army.  However, the relief columns could be interpreted as punitive expeditions, 
resulting in the rapid mustering of even larger numbers of tribesmen.  This could result 
in a relatively minor issue escalating out of proportion and becoming 
disproportionately expensive.  Furthermore, tribesmen often deliberately provoked the 
British by employing terrorist techniques and desecrating casualties to induce an 
emotive over-reaction that, again, would undermine the GoI’s legitimacy and reinforce 
Pathan nationalism.145  Attempts to arrest individual agitators, such as the FoI, risked 
a similar dilemma.  At times during 1936-37, 61,000 troops and six RAF squadrons 
were involved in countering his lashkars.146  Yet, when identified as sheltering with a 
tribe, intelligence on his whereabouts was often not actioned due to risk of insulting 
the host tribe’s sense of nanawatai; this dishonour would require the tribe to resist and 
protect the renegade, if only to avoid loss of prestige in the eyes of other tribes.  
Again, Army columns risked generating a violent reaction from the surrounding tribes 
who, despite not necessarily supporting the renegade, objected to the intrusion of 
‘foreign’ troops.  This played into the Fakir’s hands, who could publicise that he had 
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united disparate tribes against the British.147  Overall, the cost of punitive action (and 
the concomitant escalation of violence) could outweigh the benefits, and the British 
often had to ‘take it on the chin’.  However, during the later 1930s, the bomber’s 
speed, reach and relative invulnerability were harnessed to harass the Fakir, coercing 
him to relocate and exposing his vulnerability to his hosts.  This was not always 
willingly accepted by the Army who would feel compelled into a show of force to avoid 
a loss of credibility.  Nonetheless, the RAF’s constant engagement with Ipi gradually 
eroded his influence.148 
Later commentators have reflected that, throughout the period, there was little 
British appetite to amalgamate the tribal agencies and settled districts and that 
institutional paralysis and military brutality fed tribal nationalism.149  In 1944, Mallam, 
the NWFP’s Chief Secretary, opined that road-building and garrisoning was causing 
the breakdown of the tribal system, resulting in anarchy rather than civilisation.  He 
promoted just, progressive tribal self-government under indirect rule.150  This was 
rejected by the Governor, Caroe.151  Instead, he developed a £7-million, five-year 
NWFP economic and educational development plan to establish uniform living 
standards throughout the Province.152  This was approved six months before Indian 
partition but not progressed by the Pakistan Government.153  Instead, Pakistan 
adopted the recommendations of Tuker’s 1944 Frontier Commission, withdrawing all 
regular forces from the tribal agencies under the aptly-named Operation CURZON.154  
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Maffey wrote: ‘It has taken a long time for sense to prevail’.155  Thereafter, security 
was provided by irregular forces backed by the Pakistan Air Force until the events of 
9/11 changed the paradigm.156 
Anglo-Afghan Relations 
British grand strategy towards Afghanistan centred on balancing the requirement to 
maintain Afghanistan within Britain’s sphere of influence (in order to counter the 
perceived Russian threat) while minimising the Amir’s influence in British territory.  
This was complicated by the trans-border tribes’ relations with both Afghan and Indian 
Governments.  The policy element of strategy has received relatively little scholarly 
attention. 
It is widely accepted that the Afghan Amir was reluctant to recognise the 
demarcation of British and Afghan territory, but was persuaded by Sir Mortimer 
Durand’s protracted negotiations and the promise of increased subsidies and the right 
to freely import weapons.157  While Richard Bruce simply recorded that the 
negotiations ‘proceeded successfully’, Tripodi commented that the extension of British 
control up to the Durand Line raised the possibility of ‘collisions’ with the Amir who 
considered all Pathans to be Afghan, even if they lived in British territory.158  However, 
contemporary sources indicate that some tribes ‘wished to have no connection 
whatsoever with Kabul, but that all their relations should be with the British 
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Government’, whilst others welcomed the British.159  Nonetheless, the British had to 
avoid an overbearing attitude and restrain the application of force towards the tribes; 
although not actively pro-British, the Afghan Government could have fallen and been 
replaced by a pro-Russian opposition if the Afghan population perceived their 
Government to have abandoned responsibility for the Pathans within British 
demarcated territory.  For example, King Amanullah’s 1920s European reforms were 
rejected by the mullahs, resulting in widespread rebellion that required the evacuation 
of the British legation from Kabul by the RAF in 1929.160  Furthermore, the Afghans 
recognised as early as the 1930s that the British would eventually leave India and did 
not want to secede Islamic Pathan tribes to Hindu India.161  Thus, as Beattie 
highlighted: 
the perception of British tribal policy in this period as involving direct dealings 
with the tribes without any reference to Kabul needs to be revised.  On several 
occasions the GOI did actually co-operate with the Amir in an attempt to deal 
with frontier problems.162  
Overall, in pursuing grand strategy, British policy had to balance the conflicting 
requirements of minimising Afghan influence within British territory without 
undermining the authority of the Afghan Government. 
THE CAUSES OF VIOLENCE 
Many of the NWF’s political agencies acquiesced, prima facie, to British rule, as 
demonstrated in Figure 10.  Nonetheless, understanding the causes of violence is key 
to understanding the effectiveness of the strategy used to control it.  In 1939, the GoI 
stated that the main causes of the need for military operations against the tribesmen 
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were fourfold: first, 
‘The tribesmen’s desire for loot and their addiction to inter-tribal feuds [which] 
have made it habitual ... to raid their neighbours on both sides of the 
administrative border’;  
second, 
the failure of the tribesmen to fulfil an obligation given to the political authorities, 
such as... not to harbour outlaws or to refrain from interference with the traffic on 
a recognised route; 
third, ‘transgression by the tribes either as a result of religious fervour or of a desire to 
profit by a disturbed situation in the settled districts’; and fourth, ‘the need for 
establishing in persistently disaffected tracts permanent military garrisons’.163 
Competition for limited resources and the ensuing warrior ethos meant that conflict 
was a normal part of Pathan conflict resolution.  As such, violence was used by a 
variety of distinct groups, manifesting itself in a number of ways, and caused by a 
variety of factors: actors ranged from foreign governments, through the various tribal 
levels, to individuals; manifestations ranged from inter-state wars, through uprisings 
and lashkars, to low-level crime; and causes ranged from political (e.g., Afghanistan’s 
desire to control its own foreign policy), to religion, culture, competition over 
resources, and individual greed.  It is therefore useful to broadly examine the complex 
causes and motivators of violence. 
One intangible is the extent to which opportunistic tribesmen turned to violence 
because it was ‘accepted practice’, or because individuals or tribal groups felt 
compelled to act violently due to group dynamics or peer pressure, exaggerated by 
local cultural factors such as Pashtunwali.  Similarly, many of the tribes regarded the 
Afghan Amir as their spiritual leader, leaving the trans-border tribes, in particular, 
vulnerable to his influence. 
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Figure 10 – Letter from Nawab of Dir to Group Captain Bottomley following the 
Nawab’s assistance to the injured crew of an aircraft forced down after encountering 
severe snow storms which had frozen-up its air intake164 
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The rallying call of jihad in ‘the fanatical preachings of the mullahs’ could unify 
otherwise disparate tribes.165  Warburton recorded his questioning of rebellious Afridi 
tribesmen during the 1897 ‘Khyber Debacle’: 
what made you come down?’ ‘The Mullahs brought us down.’ ‘Why did you obey 
the Mullahs, and why did you not turn them out of your country?’ ‘They were too 
powerful for us.’ ‘Had you any real grievance against the British Government?’ 
‘No, we had not.’ ‘Then why did you attack the posts?’ ‘The Mullahs forced us.166 
However, it would be simplistic to view this in isolation; as Tripodi pointed out, there 
was often a variety of underlying latent motives for discontent amongst various tribes 
that could be catalysed by religious rhetoric.167  Conversely, tribes often stood aside 
from neighbouring conflict with the GoI if it was against their best interest.  Idris 
recently argued that mullahs used Islam as a common rallying cause to raise lashkars 
against real or perceived occupation by un-Islamic regimes.  The influence, status and 
wealth of the mullahs increased during conflicts, but they were generally incapable of 
restoring peace afterwards.  Conversely, while the influence of the tribal elites 
expanded in peacetime, they became sidelined during decision-making when a mullah 
united a tribe for a religious cause.168 
Competition for limited resources in the tribal areas, and the relatively bountiful 
lands across the Administrative Border, have commonly been quoted as a cause of 
criminal violence.  As Charles Bruce recorded of his interview with the raider Khonia 
Khel:  
“Sahib,” he said, “I have three wives and five strapping sons like myself, and 
several sisters with large families. You have stopped me raiding...  There has 
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been no rain and so no grazing for my flocks.  How, then, am I to live?”.169   
The British focused on poverty as the cause of raiding, possibly because of its 
resonance with their self-image of altruism.  However, Dichter described many of the 
Agencies as being relatively fertile.  Additionally, a 1945 Frontier Committee Report 
analysed the significant amount of money spent by the tribesmen on fortifying their 
kots and on acquiring rifles.170  Therefore, it is not clear that poverty was the most 
significant cause of violence.   
Raiding also took place for political reasons and to settle tribal disputes.  Beattie 
stated that some factional indigenous leaders of the British administration encouraged 
tribesmen into raiding to discredit their opponents, adding that the tribes’ independent 
ethos and martial values also played a part.171  Tripodi observed that tribal leaders 
were often adept at currying favour and playing one side off against another: 
A malik might encourage hostile elements in his area to open fire on the PA or 
local troops, and then promise to resolve the situation.  In this way, he would 
bolster his reputation as a dependable pillar of the community.  It might also pay 
powerful maliks to turn hostile to the British for a period.  Although a malik might 
lose his allowances from the PA he could no doubt secure some of 
remuneration from the Afghans...  If able to create enough trouble, the British 
would no doubt bribe him to come back into the political fold.172 
According to Marsh, supporters of the Close Border policy held that violence often 
stemmed from the antagonistic garrisoning of tribal territory and ‘soldiers looking for 
glory or a spot of action’ to further their professional ambitions.173  
So, overall, the causes of violence were rarely simple or mono-causal.  The 
British faced a considerable challenge in understanding the complexity of the NWF 
and its opportunistic hill tribes, and in deriving policies that both secured the border 
from external threats and contained local unrest at minimum expenditure. 
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CHAPTER 3 – RAF TACTICS AND DOCTRINE, 1918-1922 
INTRODUCTION 
Inter-War RAF tactics and doctrine were influenced by a variety of often contradictory 
factors to serve the requirements of diverse interest groups.  From 1922, the Air 
Ministry controlled both the doctrine and the units required to support ‘air control’ in 
Iraq, Aden and Transjordan.  In contrast, RAF units in India fell constitutionally under 
the direct command and financial control of C-in-C(India), the de facto Minister of 
Defence, who could implement air power as he wished.1  This was a ramification of 
Churchill’s 1919 decision that India, rather than Britain, should pay for its squadrons.2  
As a result, the Air Ministry had no direct control and relatively little influence over 
India.  Thus, while the Air Ministry was developing air control doctrine to maximise air 
power’s utility, in India, some C-in-C(India)s actively campaigned to minimise the 
employment of independent air power.  The conflicting interests of the Air Ministry, 
WO, IO, IPS Politicals, C-in-C(India) and AOC(India) affected the development of 
appropriate in-theatre doctrine, with disagreements often leading to stalemate.3  A 
frequently-articulated reservation of the Armies in India about the expansion of air 
power was that it was ‘untested’.4  Therefore, although air control was never imposed 
in India, its development and effectiveness in other theatres is important.  However, in 
many regions under air control, Britain’s mandate was limited in time; air power 
formed part of a low-cost exit strategy intended to progressively handover 
responsibility to indigenous forces.  In contrast, the ‘peaceful penetration’ of the 
                                                
1 Even as late as 1939, the British Cabinet could not resolve this issue. See CAB 23/100, 
Cabinet Conclusion 34 (39) 3: INDIA: The Defence of, 28 June 1939, 11.  The constitutional 
position of the forces in India is described in: CAB 24/278/22, Committee of Imperial Defence 
Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee Report 737: The Defence of India, Appendix B to Annex No. 2: 
Memorandum on the Constitutional Position of the Defence Forces in India,  1938. 
2 See Chapter 3.  India also paid for most of the costs of British Army units in India. 
3 This is examined in Chapter 7. 
4 See, for example, IOR/L/MIL/PS/12/3171, Field Marshal Sir Philip Chetwode, Letter from His 
Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to the Secretary to the Government of India, 1 July 1931, 
1. 
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NWF’s Modified Forward Policy required an increase, rather than decrease, in contact 
with, and commitment to, the local population.  Thus, the strategic contexts were 
different. 
THE NATURE OF DOCTRINE 
‘Doctrine suffers from being a term that may be loaded with many meanings 
depending on the background and views of the reader’.5  So wrote Neville Parton in 
his thesis on the evolution of inter-War RAF doctrine.  Doctrine’s role has developed 
over time.  Early Army ‘doctrine’, such as Hamley’s The Operations of War,6 simply 
described military engagements, leaving the reader to distil his own conclusions.  By 
the time the first RAF doctrine was published, military doctrine had become more 
prescriptive.  Doctrine’s oft-quoted dictionary definition of ‘that which is taught’ may 
seem trite, but rings true: doctrine formed the basis of much of the military staff 
colleges’ syllabi and suggests a prescriptive approach.  NATO’s current definition 
describes doctrine as ‘fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their 
actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in 
application’.7  Thus, doctrine encapsulates the core beliefs and principles with which 
the majority of the organisation would concur.  The second theme of NATO’s definition 
is equally important; doctrine provides guidance rather than rules, requiring the 
commander to assess the circumstances prior to selecting the most appropriate 
advice from the doctrine.  The theme of core principles is enduring.  The British Army 
Staff College’s Chief Instructor wrote in the 1920s that ‘the central idea of an army is 
known as doctrine’.8  Latawski highlighted doctrine’s inherent tensions in providing a 
cohesive, common approach to the enduring nature of a military organisation while 
                                                
5 Parton, "RAF Doctrine", 6. 
6 Sir Edward B Hamley, The Operations of War: Explained and Illustrated, Fifth ed. (Edinburgh: 
Blackwood and Sons, 1900). 
7 NATO Standardization Agency, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, AAP-6 (2012). 
8 J F C Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War (London: Hutchinson, 1926), 254. 
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remaining broad enough to deal with its changing characteristics over time and 
topography: 9  
the danger of a doctrine is that it is apt to ossify into a dogma, and be seized 
upon by mental emasculates who lack virility of judgement, and who are only too 
grateful to rest assured that their actions, however inept, find justification in a 
book...10 
Understanding the purpose and context within which doctrine develops is key to 
understanding its role.  One way of analysing doctrine is to examine who wrote it and 
who were the intended readers; as Carr observed, ‘Study the historian before you 
begin to study the facts’.11  Doctrine is aimed at particular audiences for specific, and 
often discrete, reasons.  The most obvious group is the relevant servicemen, where 
doctrine articulates the endorsed method of applying military force, providing 
members of the organisation with an approved ‘party line’ to communicate to 
‘outsiders’.  For a junior armed Service facing the threat of re-absorption by its parent 
forces, the consistent articulation of a well-reasoned doctrinal justification for the 
RAF’s continued independence was vital.  For other Services, doctrine provided a 
vehicle to exchange methodologies and gain a common understanding to enable 
interoperability.  Another important external audience is the politicians.12  Once 
officially endorsed, doctrine can be used to justify specific military roles and the force 
structures necessary to deliver them.  It was via this route that air control became 
accepted in Iraq, Aden, Palestine and Transjordan in the 1920s – a doctrinal view 
generated by the Air Ministry, accepted by the politicians (for largely financial motives) 
and whose implementation required an increased number of squadrons, thereby 
bolstering the status of the RAF. 
                                                
9 P Latawski, The Inherent Tensions in Military Doctrine, Sandhurst Occasional Paper No 5 
(Camberley: Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 2011), 12. 
10 Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War. 
11 E H Carr, What is History?, Second ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1986), 17. 
12 For a germane discussion of the tensions between the theory and implementation of 
warfare, see: Sir Julian Stafford Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Naval Institute 
Press, 1988). 
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Doctrine can also be viewed in terms of the levels of war.  Strategic doctrine, at 
the interface between the politicians and the military, is now viewed as encompassing 
a collaborative, joint approach between the Armed Services.13  At the other extreme 
are single-Service ‘tactics, techniques and procedures’.  In the period under 
consideration, however, politicians interfaced with each Service separately.  Doctrine 
was articulated independently by each Service.  These Service capstone publications 
were not designed to focus solely at the strategic level and often delved down into 
tactical detail.  Theatre-specific doctrine, describing how joint campaigns were to be 
conducted, was published in India in several publications.  While the Army published 
single-Service tactical publications such as the Drill Book, evidence of RAF tactical 
doctrine in India is somewhat sparser.  However, as the internal files of HQ RAF(India) 
have not survived, it is possible that more formal aerial doctrine was produced than is 
now apparent.14 
Parton described the linking between doctrine and time as ‘a nexus between the 
past, present and future’, with doctrine codifying lessons from the past and placing 
them in a contemporary framework while allowing the principles to develop as a result 
of technological improvements or societal expectations.15  This highlights the doctrinal 
challenges faced by any fledgling force, including the early RAF, emerging from the 
FWW while searching for a future role in a period of military downsizing.  Doctrine can 
also reflect the political aspirations of an armed force, skewing the analysis and 
interpretation of past experiences.  Traditionally, doctrine should develop from the 
analysis of a Service’s past experiences, i.e. an ‘upwards’ feedback through the 
tactical, operational and strategic levels.  However, emotion and political aspirations 
                                                
13 Chief of the Defence Staff, British Defence Doctrine (Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01), 4th ed. 
(Swindon: The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 2011). 
14 The HQ RAF(India) files were probably destroyed in what the Secretary of USII’s Centre for 
Armed Forces Historical Research has described as ‘the unsettled period of independence and 
partition’(see Chhina, Chhina to Walters, 14 June 2013). 
15 Parton, "RAF Doctrine", 6. 
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can bias this analysis.  Additionally, without significant previous aerial warfare to 
analyse, early RAF doctrine had to rely on fragile, untested theories.  Extrapolating 
these unverified doctrinal theories to predict future developments could result in 
increasingly risky conclusions.  Conversely, reliance on purely historical evidence can, 
according to Alderson, result in ‘perfect but rearward-looking analysis’.16  Further 
tensions can exist in the development of doctrine between this ‘bottom up’ evidence-
based approach and the ‘top down’ emphasis on political aspirations.  These tensions 
reflected the varying roles of doctrine at the strategic and tactical levels during the 
period under examination.  At the lower levels, field commanders needed tactics to 
address immediate local problems.  At the strategic level, however, the day-to-day 
issues were different.  The Air Staff had to wrestle with broad problems such as 
maintaining public opinion, managing inter-Service accord, and justifying force 
structures.  Thus, while the RAF at times found itself in conflict with the Army over 
conceptual and force structure issues, at other times, both AOC(India) and C-in-
C(India) found themselves in accord over local issues, but at odds with the Air Ministry 
and IO’s more theoretical, political approach to doctrine, as will be discussed later.  
Further tensions were generated by the conflict between a higher HQ’s desire for 
conformity and standardisation across a world-wide force, and the local commander’s 
desire to employ his initiative to swiftly address the varying requirements resulting 
from local conditions.  Thus, as will be examined later, the RAF at times struggled to 
apply a consistent doctrine across the various Commands in Aden, Iraq, Transjordan 
and India.  Command and control arrangements also produced doctrinal tensions.  
From the outset, RAF(India) units were funded by the GoI and fell under the 
constitutional control of the Viceroy and the IO, removing the Air Ministry from any 
                                                
16 Alexander Alderson, "The British Approach to COIN and Stabilisation: A Retrospective on 
Developments since 2001", JRUSI 157, no. 4  (2012): 66. 
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direct control and leading to two decades of inter-Service conflict.17  Thus, RAF 
officers in India found themselves employing in-theatre tactics that often contradicted 
the Air Ministry’s doctrine, as described later.  This generated significant tensions 
which tested the officers’ loyalty to both their Indian (Army) command chain and their 
parent Service.  Furthermore, the Air Staff in London were reticent to endorse theatre-
specific tactics from India if this unnecessarily constrained their worldwide core 
doctrine.  All these factors will be examined later. 
For these aforementioned reasons, doctrinal publications cannot be used as an 
unquestionable representation of the way a Service applied military force in the field.  
Its analysis can, however, provide a very useful contextual insight into some of the 
tensions that these forces operated under. 
Since armed forces exist within a dynamic environment, it is vital that their 
doctrine evolves to match the changing situation.  Therefore, an organisation must be 
able to recognise the current contextual environment and adapt its doctrinal methods 
to achieve the current policy aims.  This is a vital process both in peacetime (to 
prepare for, and deter, possible conflict) and in wartime (to adapt to rapidly changing 
circumstances).  During conflict, the ability to learn and adapt more swiftly than the 
opponent can be critical to success.  In 1995, Robertson published a neo-
Clausewitzian analysis of the RAF’s inter-War strategic bombing doctrine, concluding 
that the RAF took a subjective approach rather than employ critical analysis of its 
previous and ongoing experiences.  Robertson devised the model at Figure 11 to 
describe how this process should have worked.18  Although his framework is dated (in 
that it depicts a linear, rather than iterative, process, and the terminology does not 
nest comfortably with current practice, for example), it is useful in illustrating the utility 
of an objective, defined learning methodology. 
                                                
17 House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, Pay of the Air Force, Vol. 123, 15 December 
1919, col 131. 
18 Robertson, The Development of RAF Strategic Bombing Doctrine. 
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Figure 11 – Robertson’s neo-Clausewitzian framework of inter-War doctrinal development 
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replaced in 1928 by The RAF War Manual (‘AP1300’).  The second edition of AP1300 
was written in 1938 and published in 1940.  These major publications were supported 
and modified by more frequently published ASMs; none were released to the public.  
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onwards, the RAFQ.  These discursive articles ranged from articulations of 
contemporary doctrine, through presentations by AOCs from around the Empire 
describing ‘current practice’, to speculative predictions of future development, 
sometimes sponsored by RUSI competitions.  Some authors were prolific, publishing 
compendia of their articles as books.19  The contribution by retired officers, such as 
Liddell Hart, both in newspaper articles and books, was also significant.  These 
unofficial publications were a form of ‘derived doctrine’, based on the core beliefs 
enshrined in the higher doctrinal manuals, but modified by experience in the field or by 
personal opinion, often describing how air power could be implemented in the future.20  
The RAF Staff College, Andover, also played a significant role in the development and 
dissemination of aerial doctrine, not only by educating RAF (and some Royal Navy 
and British Army) officers and providing them with a coherent ‘party line’, but also by 
publishing the best students’ lectures in Air Publications and, from 1928 onwards, in 
the College’s annual journal, The Hawk.21 
Indian-specific aerial doctrine seems to have developed slowly, probably due to 
the tensions between the Air Ministry and the Armies in India.  One of the first 
surviving documents was Employment of Aircraft on the North-West Frontier of India, 
published with the approval of the GoI in 1924.22   Although not strictly ‘doctrine’, from 
1928 onwards the GoI’s Army Department regulated the application of air power via 
the pamphlet Instructions Regarding the Employment of Aeroplanes on the North-
                                                
19 For example, Edgar Kingston-McCloughry published eight of his articles (including ‘Policing 
by Air’ and ‘Wings Over India’) as a book, namely Squadron Leader Edgar J Kingston-
McCloughry, Winged Warfare: Air Problems of Peace and War (London: Jonathan Cape, 
1937).  This trend endures.  Andrew Roe published five articles on NWF air power in the RAF’s 
Air Power Review journal between 2008 and 2013, which later formed the mainstay of his 
book, Roe, Cloughley, and Grau, From Fabric Wings to Supersonic Fighters and Drones. 
20 The roots of the term “derived doctrine” lie in theology.  See, for example, "The Trap of 
'Derived Doctrine', Not Found in Scripture”, 2009, BibleForums.org, 
http://bibleforums.org/showthread.php/158097-The-trap-of-derived-doctrine-not-found-in-
scripture (accessed 6 January 2014).  
21 The part played by the RAF Staff College is examined at the end of this Chapter. 
22 AIR 5/1328, Air Staff, Employment of Aircraft on the North-West Frontier of India, 1 March 
1924.  This is discussed in Chapter 4. 
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West Frontier of India (and its subsequent permutations23) which replaced the 
previous system of Army HQ letters.  These ‘rules of engagement’ were anecdotally 
known as the ‘Grey Book’.24  It is not clear how long the 1924 Instructions remained 
extant, but they were probably usurped by the Grey Book.  One of the only 
subsequent in-theatre RAF publications was a single Air Staff (India) Memo.25  
However, this was only published as late as 1935 and replaced in 1938 by a draft 
version of the joint Army-RAF ‘Combined Frontier Operations Manual’, which also 
replaced the Grey Book.26 
EARLY RAF DOCTRINE 
On the verge of its founding, the RAF inherited the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) ‘formal’ 
doctrine, namely the 1916 Training Manual, Royal Flying Corps, Part II.27  This 
contained chapters on reconnaissance, artillery co-operation, fighting in the air, attack 
of ground targets and photography.  Although not officially withdrawn, this Training 
Manual appears to have been rapidly superseded by a series of publications, the most 
significant of which from a NWF perspective was Fighting in the Air, first published in 
1917.28  This stressed that ‘the aeroplane is essentially a weapon of attack and not of 
defence’, and emphasised aggressive air patrolling and bombing to force the enemy 
onto the defensive.29  It formally introduced what would become an enduring doctrinal 
                                                
23 See Chapter 7 – The Control of Airpower. 
24 IOR/L/PS/12/3260, India Office Political (External) Department, Use of Aeroplanes for Tribal 
Control (Grey Book). 
25 AIR 9/12 Enclosure 104, Air Staff (India) Memo No. 1: Tactical Methods of Conducting Air 
Operations Against Tribes on the North-West Frontier of India, April 1935. 
26 See AIR 9/12 E106, Group Captain J C Slessor, Letter - D D Plans to Private Secretary to 
Secretary of State for Air (Notes on Police Bombing on the N W Frontier), 18 June 1938.  The 
‘Combined Frontier Operations Manual’ was the local name for: AIR 23/5370, India 
Defence Department, Frontier Warfare - India (Army and Royal Air Force) 1939.  Its gestation 
is described in Chapter 7. 
27 AIR 1/530/16/12/84, General Headquarters, Training Manual, Royal Flying Corps, Part I 
1916. 
28 General Staff, Fighting in the Air (1918). 
29 Ibid., 2. 
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theme: ‘The moral effect produced by an aeroplane is out of all proportion to the 
material damage which it can inflict’, drawing an analogy with cavalry action.30  
Trenchard had first introduced this concept in his 1919 despatch on the Independent 
Air Force.31  In his thesis, Parton highlighted that Fighting in the Air placed relatively 
little emphasis on army co-operation: 
Almost as important as the content was what was excluded; virtually no mention 
was made of either artillery spotting or reconnaissance, which had been the 
backbone of the Corps’ work for the preceding three years.32 
Indeed, its title is somewhat revealing – “Fighting in the Air” rather than “Fighting from 
the Air”.  There was little of tactical relevance to NWF operations, although this is 
hardly surprising given the context of 1918.  Thus, there was a consistent reduction of 
emphasis on support of the Army from the 1916 RFC Training Manual, through the 
1917 first edition of Fighting in the Air to the 1918 second edition.  At the RAF’s birth, 
all doctrine was focused on major conflict rather than ‘small wars’. 
The context surrounding the RAF’s emergence from the FWW is important in 
understanding subsequent doctrinal development.  While all three Services faced a 
rapid post-war downsizing and severe financial austerity, the fledgling RAF faced 
additional challenges.  The most significant of these was that the Royal Navy and 
Army viewed the 1918 amalgamation of the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) and RFC 
into the RAF as a wartime expedient that was neither necessary nor affordable in the 
financially impoverished peacetime environment.  Thus, the RAF had to demonstrate 
its utility and cost effectiveness as an independent Service to ensure its continued 
existence.  Churchill, the first Secretary of State for the Air Force, left Parliament in no 
                                                
30 Ibid., 1. 
31 ‘the moral effect of bombing stands undoubtedly to the material effect in a proportion of 20 to 
1’.  Major-General H Trenchard, "Despatch from Commander, Independent Force, Royal Air 
Force”, Tenth Supplement to The London Gazette, 31 December 1918, 135.  For further 
extrapolation of this concept, see Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality, 79-80. 
32 Parton, "RAF Doctrine", 45. 
Chapter 3 – RAF Tactics and Doctrine, 1918-1922 
 84 
doubt of his intentions during the 1919 Air Estimate debate;33 when questioned if he 
could foresee a return to a small RFC and a small RNAS over and above a separate 
Air Force, Churchill simply replied ‘No’.34  Cognisant of the need for the RAF to remain 
relevant and to provide a cost-effective solution to contemporary issues, Churchill 
announced that ‘The first duty of the Royal Air Force is to garrison the British Empire’.  
Of the twenty-four-and-a-half fighting squadrons which Trenchard proposed, nineteen 
would be abroad, with the cost of the eight Indian squadrons borne by India.35  
Churchill continued: ‘we have to find the necessary air garrisons to defend the British 
Empire, to create a permanent independent Air Force’.36  Nonetheless, he was aware 
of the need for the RAF to cooperate with the Royal Navy and British Army, adding 
that: 
if the Air Force is to be independent of the other two Services it must also be 
interdependent upon them.  It must be so organised as to fit naturally and easily 
in peace or war into a combined organisation of defence. It must be that for its 
own sake, in the interests of the other Services and in the general interests.37 
Given the fragile circumstances that the RAF found itself in following the end of 
the FWW, there was an urgent need for a clear, widely-understood doctrine to explain 
the advantages of an independent air force.  The hiatus resulting from the time 
required to develop a major doctrinal publication was filled by a series of minor 
Confidential Documents (CDs).  CD19, produced in September 1920, covered four 
discrete but connected subjects, namely: ‘obligations of the Air Force; the value of 
Egypt to the RAF; air defence and suggested lines of development for Dominion Air 
Forces; and arguments for and against a separate Air Force’. 38  It described the 
                                                
33 The title that only lasted a year before becoming ‘Secretary of State for Air’. 
34 House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, Pay of the Air Force, Vol. 123, 15 December 
1919, col 102. 
35 Ibid., col 137, 131. 
36 Pay of the Air Force, col 139. 
37 Pay of the Air Force, col 140. 
38 AIR 5/166, Air Ministry, CD 19: Memoranda: Obligations of the Air Force; Value of Egypt to 
the R.A.F; Air defence and suggested lines of development for Dominion Air Forces; Some 
arguments for and against a separate Air Force, June 1921. 
Chapter 3 – RAF Tactics and Doctrine, 1918-1922 
 85 
RAF’s short term obligations as being to co-operate ‘intimately’ with the Navy and 
Army as a priority over ‘independent Air Force obligations’, albeit with the caveat that, 
in the event of a threat from a Continental power, an independent air force would be 
required to defend the UK.39  In contrast, however, the second theme in CD19 
emphasised that the main role of the RAF was air defence, with naval and army co-
operation as an auxiliary task.40  CD18, published in March 1921, was aimed at ‘all 
officers of and above the rank of Squadron Leader’, articulating the substitution of 
naval and land forces by air power.  Interestingly, given the difficulties in developing 
doctrine for new technologies discussed previously, CD18 recognised that the RAF 
had had ‘little opportunity for testing the efficacy and comparative cheapness of the Air 
Force’ but posited that Mesopotamia could offer the opportunity to test the theory.41   
Like CD19, CD21, published in July 1921, was a compendium of several themes, the 
third of which advocated the efficacy of air power to police Mesopotamia.42  Thus, in 
terms of trends, over the space of a few months, the Air Staff’s views of the RAF’s 
responsibilities had developed from a role of predominantly supporting the naval and 
land forces to aspiring to replacing them.  Indeed, CD21 explained that: 
Great as was the development of air power in the war on the western front, it 
was mainly concerned with aerial action against enemy aircraft and co-operation 
with other air arms in action in which land and sea forces were the predominant 
partner.  In more distant theatres, however, such as Palestine, Mesopotamia 
and East Africa the war has proved that the air has capabilities of its own.43 
In fact, the Air Staff had previously presented CD21’s Mesopotamian article, The 
Power of the Air Force and the Application of this Power to Hold and Police 
                                                
39 Ibid., 3. 
40 Ibid., 6. 
41 AIR 5/165, ———, CD 18: The Future of the Air Force in National and Imperial Defence, 
March 1921. 
42 AIR 5/168, ———, CD 21: Memoranda: The Co-operation by Aircraft with Coastal Batteries; 
The Power of the Air Force and the Application of this Power to Hold and Police Mesopotamia; 
Aircraft and the Army, June 1921. 
43 Ibid., 3.  This is an important, revealing statement, as the orthodoxy reads that it was FWW 
European air power demonstrations which led air power advocates to champion independent 
action.  See also: Daniel R Headrick, Power over Peoples: Technology, Environments, and 
Western Imperialism, 1400 to the Present (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2012), 313.  
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Mesopotamia, to the Cabinet in March 1920.44  So, rather than a developing trend, it 
would appear that by 1920 the Air Staff had already formulated a range of concepts 
which it then published to various audiences at various times to support themes it 
perceived would reinforce the RAF’s continued existence as an independent Service.  
Nonetheless, this early doctrinal development was fast by current standards, probably 
because there were less stakeholders to deliberate over its formulation. 
There were also two lectures by experienced RAF pilots published in the JRUSI 
worthy of note during this period.  The first was Group Captain Borton’s “The Use of 
Aircraft in Small Wars” in February 1920.45  In his introduction, Borton ascerted that 
the capability of aircraft was increasing rapidly and that ‘if I should venture to forecast 
future and as yet unproven possibilities, it must be remembered that the accomplished 
fact of to-day would have been regarded by the majority six years ago as the ravings 
of a monomaniac’.46  This hints that he recognised the challenge of developing 
doctrine without the advantage of experience and that at least some influencial and 
experienced RAF officers were confident that the rapid development of aircraft 
technology during the FWW would continue in the austere post-War years and bridge 
the gap between aspiration and reality.47  Borton stated, for example, that the Army’s 
objection that air operations could never be decisive without occupying the enemy’s 
territory ‘will be undoubtably overcome’.48  He described how, in large, sparsely 
populated areas, the primary duty of aircraft was to locate enemy concentrations deep 
inside hostile territory.  Aerial photography and surveying in poorly mapped theatres 
were also essential enablers.  The bombing and machine-gunning of the enemy’s 
                                                
44 AIR 1/426/15/260/3, Mesopotamia: Preliminary Scheme for RAF Control,  1920. 
45 Borton, "The Use of Aircraft in Small Wars".  Borton was a former Black Watch officer who 
joined the RFC in 1913, commanding the RFC’s Palestine Brigade during the First World War 
and becoming Officer Commanding RAF, Iraq, in 1921 prior to Sir John Salmond. 
46 Ibid.: 311. 
47 This philosophy was not unique to the RAF.  Italo Balbo, the ‘father’ of the Italian Reggia 
Aeronautica, noted in his diary in 1922: ‘idealistic and realistic. Aviation is the synthesis of 
these elements’ (quoted in Peter Haining, The Chianti Raiders: The Extraordinary Story of the 
Italian Air Force in the Battle of Britain (London: Robson Books 2005), 35). 
48 Borton, "The Use of Aircraft in Small Wars": 316. 
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lines of communications in narrow valleys, and the bombing of wells, was 
emphasised.  Borton disputed that the moral effect of aircraft diminished with 
exposure, claiming that, in fact, it increased as the enemy gained experience in the 
capabilities of air power.  Borton also cited evidence from Africa, Mesopotamia and 
the Indian Frontier, that fortified villages and crops could be destroyed far more swiftly, 
and with far less casualties, than a military expedition.49  The ability of aircaft to 
resupply isolated troops, by either using landing grounds or by dropping supplies, was 
also mentioned, along with the employment of aircraft in assisting local authorites to 
prevent outbreaks of violence before the need for active operations.  Borton also 
mentioned the possibility of employing aircraft as ambulances.  By coincidence, in the 
post-lecture question period, an ex-Indian cavalry officer in the audience extolled ‘the 
immense benefit of aerial reconnaissance on the north-west frontier of India’, 
recounting his experience of ‘blindfold’ operations where ‘we did not know what was 
going on around the corner; we did not know whether the next view would reveal an 
immense valley or an impasssable obstacle of hills and cliffs’.50  Many of Borton’s 
themes and phrases would be reflected in the Air Staff’s Mesopotamia paper 
presented to the Cabinet a month after his RUSI presentation, which indicates that he 
may have been associated with the development of this doctrine, despite being on the 
staff of the Technical School at RAF Halton at the time.51 
The second RUSI lecture was Chamier’s January 1921 “The Use of the Air 
Force for Replacing Military Garrisons”.  Chamier was a stalwart of the Air Staff’s 
Directorate of Operations and Intelligence (the Directorate responsible for producing 
doctrine), having been posted there in 1919 and promoted to Deputy Director in 
                                                
49 When examining historical themes within this Thesis, the term ‘military’ is used in its 
historical context to denote soldiery or land forces, rather than its more recent definition 
referring to all armed forces. 
50 Borton, "The Use of Aircraft in Small Wars": 318. 
51 Mesopotamia: Preliminary Scheme for RAF Control; The Monthly Air Force List,  (London: 
HMSO, 1920), 58. 
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1921.52  He would therefore have been intimately involved with the development of 
RAF doctrine.  The lecture was set against the background of financial austerity and 
the savings that the RAF could achieve, drawing on recent experiences from 
Waziristan, Somaliland and Mesopotamia.  It was also one of the first times that the 
term ‘air control’ was mentioned in a public forum.  Chamier compared the Army 
method of garrisoning overseas territories with how the RAF could attain the same 
ends, but at lower cost in casualties and funding.  For example, by virtue of their 
ubiquity, aircraft could ‘fly the flag’ over vast areas so that ‘the native, in his 
ignorance... thinks that he alone is being observed, and this adds to the moral 
effect’.53  Aircraft could also be used to support the civil administration, rapidly 
transporting officials to remote areas to ‘nip disturbance in the bud’, or be swiftly 
summoned by wireless during face-to-face negotiations to demonstrate the power 
available to the political officers.  Chamier explained that Mesopotamian military 
garrisons could be halved in number and cost, but reinforced when necessary by a 
central reserve of troops deployed by air.  He continued that Army commanders only 
partially appreciated the potential of air power and shied away from new capabilities 
that they did not fully understand.  He noted that the Army ‘naturally will want things 
done their own way, and in so thinking will consequently decide upon what they know 
about and what is, incidentally, the more expensive method’.54  In particular, Chamier 
warned against the Army’s propensity to divide air power into ‘penny packets’ for two 
significant reasons: firstly, diverse airfields induced logistical inefficiencies by 
increasing the number of skilled technicians, workshops and supply chains required; 
and more importantly, because air power produced the most pronounced moral effect 
                                                
52 Chamier, "The Use of the Air Force for Replacing Military Garrisons"; The Monthly Air Force 
List,  (London: HMSO, 1919), 14; The Monthly Air Force List,  (London: HMSO, 1921), 14.  
Chamier had been an officer in the 33rd Punjabi Regiment before joining the RFC.  In February 
1923, Chamier became Chief of Staff at HQ RAF India.  In retirement, he became a prolific 
contributor to the letters pages of various newspapers.  His full biography is at Annex 7. 
53 Chamier, "The Use of the Air Force for Replacing Military Garrisons": 207. 
54 Ibid.: 209. 
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when concentrated, rather than spread thinly over a number of objectives.  Chamier 
emphasised the need for an ‘air minded’ approach to air power which should be 
controlled by a single commander: ‘The root idea of the employment of aircraft is to 
maintain a concentrated Central Air Force’.55  These tenets of ‘centralised control’, 
articulated so early in the life of the RAF, would be familiar to any current air strategist 
and continue to be a point of debate, especially in the context of COIN, between the 
Services.56  Chamier also addressed the way in which air power could achieve the 
same reputation (or ‘tradition of prestige’, in his vernacular) as the Army within the 
native community to ‘impress them with awe’:   
the Air Force must, if called upon to administer punishment, do it with all its 
might and in the proper manner.  One objective must be selected – preferably 
the most inaccessible village of the most prominent tribe which it is desired to 
punish... The attack with bombs and machine guns must be relentless and 
unremitting and carried on continuously by day and night, on houses, 
inhabitants, crops and cattle...  No news travels like bad news.57 
Chamier acknowledged the apparent brutality (described by an Army officer in the 
audience as ‘rather the hun method’), but offered that the short, sharp application of 
lethal force would rapidly achieve tribal submission, generating a rapidly-spread 
reputation which would deter future transgression and would be economical in terms 
of money and lives in comparison to similar puishment delivered by military 
expeditions.58  Nonetheless, the lecture accepted the limitations of air power, noting 
that, in highly-civilized countries, ‘aircraft can be of little use in reducing the number of 
troops that can be employed.  They can merely be used for purposes of close co-
operation with the military forces’.59  Thus, airmen recognised as early as 1921 that air 
power would have to support land forces in developed societies. 
                                                
55 Ibid.: 211. 
56 See, for example: Torpy, "Counter-Insurgency: Echoes from the Past". 
57 Chamier, "The Use of the Air Force for Replacing Military Garrisons": 209-210. 
58 Ibid.: 213. 
59 Ibid.: 211. 
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These two RUSI presentations are equally important, yet approach air power 
from different perspectives.  Borton focused largely on how aircraft could deliver local, 
tactical, physical effect more efficiently than the Army (perhaps not surprisingly for a 
seasoned aviator).  In contrast, Chamier’s perspective nested predominantly at the 
theatre level, using air power to deliver regional, rather than local, cognitive ‘moral’ 
effect, and reflecting the Air Ministry policy aspirations for substituting aircraft for 
troops on economic grounds.  Even at this early stage of doctrinal development, both 
presentations displayed kernels of enduring themes: the optimistic belief that doctrine 
could be developed ahead of current practicalities on the assumption that continued 
technological development would provide an answer; the use of long-range air power 
to shape the battlefield ahead of land forces; the efficiency of aircraft at delivering 
overwhelming firepower for coercive effect; the use of aerial resupply and medical 
evacuation; the importance of aerial reconnaissance; the need to control air power 
centrally for theatre-level effect; air power’s dependence on logistical support; and its 
inappropriateness in built-up areas.  One theme that would prove to be transcient, 
however, was Chamier’s willingness to openly state that lethal force could be 
employed indiscriminantly against civilian targets to achieve coercive effects, as will 
be examined later.   
CD22 – OPERATIONS MANUAL 
The RAF’s first significant doctrinal publication, CD22, Operations Manual, was 
published in July 1922 after a year’s gestation by the Air Staff.60  However, of its 
eleven chapters, the first six were adapted from the Army’s Field Service Regulations, 
while Chapter VIII (Co-operation of Aircraft with the Royal Navy) was similarly based 
                                                
60 Air Council, CD 22: Operations Manual, Royal Air Force (London: Air Ministry, 1922).  The 
two officers responsible for drafting the publication were Flight Lieutenant C J Mackay and, to a 
lesser extent, Squadron Leader E L Tomkinson.  See Parton, "RAF Doctrine", 70-71, for more 
detail. 
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on RN Confidential Air Orders and Chapter X (Combined Operations) appears to have 
been based on an early draft of the Manual of Combined Naval, Military and Air 
Operations.  This left only Chapter VII (Aerial Operations and Aerial Fighting), Chapter 
IX (Co-operation of Aircraft with the Army) and Chapter XI (Aircraft in Warfare Against 
an Uncivilised Enemy) as reflecting RAF-derived doctrine.61 
At first glance, a reader might assume that the main chapter of relevance to the 
NWF would be Chapter XI (Aircraft in Warfare Against an Uncivilised Enemy).  
However, in the mid-1930s, India planned to dedicate 75% of the available squadrons 
to an independent striking force against Kabul if war broke out with Afghanistan, with 
the remaining 25% being allocated to army co-operation duties.62  In this context, the 
chapters on Aerial Operations and Aerial Fighting and Co-operation of Aircraft with the 
Army become more relevant.   
CD22’s Chapter VII – ‘Aerial Operations and Aerial Fighting’ started by 
categorising all aerial operations into either ‘independent operations’ or ‘operations of 
units attached to other services’.  Independent operations comprised either the 
destruction of the enemy aerial forces or attacks on ground targets which would 
influence the course of the war, but with the main objective being the destruction of 
the enemy air force on the ground.63  There was a strong emphasis on the need for a 
ruthless and unremitting offensive to gain the initiative and generate a moral effect ‘out 
of all proportion to the damage, in itself considerable, which it can inflict’.64  The 
chapter provided a detailed description of the most effective type of bombs to use 
                                                
61 The Air Council acknowledged that CD22’s first six chapters were from Field Service 
Regulations (General Staff, Field Service Regulations 1914, Part II: Organization and 
Administration (London: War Office, 1914)).  See: Air Council, CD 22, 1.  The borrowed 
chapters were: Ch I - Principles of War; Ch II - Policy and Plans; Ch III - Fighting Troops and 
their Characteristics; Ch IV - Movement by Sea, Land and Air; Ch V - Quarters; and Ch VI - 
Operation-Orders and Reports in the Field. 
62 IOR/L/MIL/17/14/21/4, Air Staff (India), Pink Plan - Plan of Operations in the Event of War 
with Afghanistan: Part XI - Royal Air Force 1933, 5.  See also Chapter 8. 
63 Air Council, CD 22, 54. 
64 Ibid., 62-63. 
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against a variety of targets and the required fuse settings.65  Several themes from the 
1918 Fighting in the Air pamphlet survived almost unchanged, such as ‘The duty of 
bombing aircraft is to reach their objective, to drop their bombs on it, and only to fight 
in the execution of their duty’.66 
CD22’s Chapter IX – ‘Co-operation of Aircraft with the Army’ – opened with the 
statement that ‘Generous co-operation is one of the foundations of success in war’, 
followed by the caveat that: 
All other Royal Air Force formations, however engaged, should realise that they 
have a very definite connection with those of the co-operating units in the field, 
the efforts of all being co-ordinated towards one object, namely, the defeat of the 
enemy's armed forces.67 
Thus, the importance of supporting the Army was viewed within the shared higher 
objective of victory, thereby avoiding a statement of RAF subservience.  According to 
Parton, there was considerable disagreement between the Air Staff and Army Council.  
Whilst agreement over tactical detail was readily reached, accord over higher policy, 
strategy and command relationships was only attained by avoiding reference to it.68  
This theme was also reflected in India.69  Chapter IX classified the duties of Air Force 
units allotted to the army in the field as: protection; reconnaissance; artillery co-
operation; bombing; pursuit; fighting in the air and against ground targets; tank co-
operation; and ‘other assistance to troops’.  Several of the tactics described were 
germane to the NWF.  For example, in the ‘protection’ role, aircraft could be employed 
to co-operate with troops covering the advance of a mobile force, or assist a rear-
guard during a retirement by attacking the enemy with bombs and machine gun fire, 
although ‘Their primary duty is to locate any impending attack, and report its position 
                                                
65 Ibid., 58-59. 
66 See General Staff, Fighting in the Air, 15 and Air Council, CD 22, 56. 
67 Air Council, CD 22, 87. 
68 Parton, "RAF Doctrine", 88-89. 
69 This is described in Chapter 7. 
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by wireless’.70  ‘Co-operation with Artillery’ emphasised that accurate artillery fire was 
dependent on good observation which in many instances can only be obtained from 
the air.  However, although the doctrine covered artillery co-operation in stationary, 
semi-stationary and moving warfare, the emphasis was on locating and reporting 
hostile batteries and is of little relevance to the NWF.71  More germane was the 
acknowledgement in the ‘bombing’ paragraphs that the Air Force units placed at the 
disposal of the C-in-C might contain long-range bombing squadrons to support friendly 
offensives or target enemy communications during hostile offensives.  This is 
important, as C-in-Cs could expect to determine the objectives for air attack, leaving 
the Air Force commander to decide on the size of the force and the weight and type of 
bombs to be used.  Additionally, it was acknowledged that sustained day and night 
bombing not only inflicted material damage, but had a marked effect on the morale of 
enemy troops.72  The section on ‘pursuit’ recognised the utility of air power in 
preventing a defeated enemy from re-organising his force by means of vigorous air 
attack against already wearied enemy troops.73  The doctrine also recognised that 
supremacy in the air not only enabled the other army co-operation roles to achieve a 
high degree of efficiency by minimising enemy interference, but also played an 
important part in maintaining a high standard of friendly morale while adversely 
affecting the enemy to a corresponding degree.74  Under ‘other assistance to troops’, 
CD22 described how aircraft could be used to resupply isolated troops with food, 
ammunition and water, although it warned that the large number of aircraft required 
would detract from the resources available for other roles.75  Aerial resupply of 
punitive ground expeditions would become a subject of considerable debate on the 
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72 Ibid., 103-104. 
73 Ibid., 104-105. 
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NWF as the increasing deployment of modern, ammunition-intensive weapons, such 
as machine guns, increased the Army’s logistic burden, as described later. 
CD22’s Chapter XI – ‘Aircraft in Warfare against an Uncivilised Enemy’ – would 
at first glance appear to be the articulation of a completely new role for the RAF.  In 
fact, many of the sentiments already had lineage, being traceable back through CD21 
to the previously-mentioned 1920 Cabinet paper and the early RUSI presentations.76  
Indeed, the same phrases can be found in almost all this clutch of publications.  Thus, 
the chapter was written primarily within the context of the aspiration of the RAF to 
replace the army in the Imperial policing of Iraq, and the need to demonstrate that the 
RAF had a recognised, endorsed doctrine to support this role.  Nonetheless, there 
was much of relevance to the NWF.  The chapter’s opening words are revealing:  
‘The role of aircraft in operations of this nature will be a major one, though it is 
unlikely that they will be in a position to undertake a campaign entirely 
independent of military assistance’. 
Thus, it forecasted the importance of this form of aerial warfare without offering a 
single Service ‘silver bullet’ solution and nesting it within the context of joint 
operations.  Nevertheless, the inference was that land forces would support the RAF, 
rather than vice versa.  The chapter also addressed the sceptics’ argument that there 
was no practical experience to base this role on by stating that the nature of 
campaigns against ‘savages’ demands that ‘the normal application of the principles of 
regular warfare be considerably modified... as experience has shown to be 
necessary’.  By 1922, this ‘experience’ included RAF operations against the Abu Salih 
tribe in Mesopotamia in 1919, the ‘Mad Mullah’ in British Somaliland in 1920 and the 
Third Afghan War with its subsequent tribal uprisings.  The chapter analysed the 
characteristics of traditional military operations against uncivilised enemies as being 
invariably limited in time, the aim being to defeat the enemy as rapidly as possible and 
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then withdraw the force (resonating with the NWF Close Border policy).  It warned, 
however, that the punishment could be rapidly forgotten and that lasting results would 
often only be achieved by occupying the country for a considerable period.  
Nevertheless, the advantages of air power were emphasised.  The aircraft’s reach 
over large areas of operations could be used to locate the enemy in ample time to 
concentrate friendly forces against them.  In ‘wild country’, aircraft could also map the 
line of advance of friendly ground forces.  According to the doctrine, the chief 
advantage of ‘savages’  – their mobility and inconspicuous clothing which allowed 
them to concentrate and execute surprise raids on the Army’s vulnerable lines of 
communications – was unable to compete with aircraft.  Tribesmen would be unable 
to concentrate unseen; instead, aircraft would inflict considerable casualties and 
material damage, against which the tribesmen had no redress.  Controversially, CD22 
stated that military forces should be employed solely to protect advanced landing 
grounds – the only potentially vulnerable friendly targets, obviating the need for 
vulnerable, extended lines of communication.  Not only would expeditions by ground 
troops be unnecessary, but the doctrine warned that the following-up of the brief aerial 
attacks by ground action only played into the hands of the tribesmen by providing a 
vulnerable target to focus on.   
According to CD22’s Chapter XI, the nature of the objective in uncivilised 
warfare would vary according to the circumstances.  In the case of settled 
governments (such as Afghanistan), the doctrine described how the fielded forces 
should be destroyed first, followed by continuous bombing of the capital and, 
subsequently, the surrounding villages, crops and livestock.  Indeed, it is almost 
possible to hear the tones of Jock Halley’s bomb-laden Handley Page V/1500 droning 
its way to Kabul in these words.77  Against tribes of the nature found on the NWF, the 
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doctrine acknowledged the difficulty in locating scattered forces and the need for them 
to be engaged by ground troops acting on the defensive.  Meanwhile, aircraft should 
attack the tribesmen’s villages, so that the fighting men returned to find them in ruins.  
However, even at this early stage of doctrinal development, the requirement for 
humanity was displayed by a requirement to spare the women and children ‘as far as 
possible’ by issuing warnings ‘whenever practicable’.78  Advice was also provided on 
weapon-to-target matching: delayed action, as well as instantaneously-fused, bombs 
should be dropped to extend the period of unease, while livestock could be machine-
gunned and crops could be burnt using incendiary bombs.  The need for unremitting 
and relentless attack was emphasised, with a progressive shift during a campaign 
from targeting the enemy’s fielded forces to objectives in their home territory.  The 
need for a vigorous offensive to leverage the susceptibility of “savages” to moral 
influences was described as ‘a most important factor in the campaign’, with hesitation 
or retrograde movement likely to be interpreted as signs of weakness.  The targeting 
of wells and water supplies ‘throughout day and night’ was also recommended, along 
with reconnaissance and photography to determine the topography, habits and 
characteristics of the enemy such that, against an independent-minded and easily-
dispersed foe, the necessary decisive, crushing blow could be delivered.  
Interestingly, CD22 did not contain any guidance on targets that should be ‘out of 
bounds’ for humanitarian reasons (other than women and children), although it did 
direct that all attacks should have a ‘definite objective’.  Air power’s dependence on 
technical support, such as workshops and spare parts, was acknowledged, with a 
recommendation to concentrate air forces in the largest possible ground units to avoid 
logistical inefficiencies, although temporary landing grounds might be necessary to 
bring targets within easy reach.  The doctrine showed respect for the enemy’s 
acumen, warning that secrecy should not be relaxed because the enemy was 
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uncivilised; many races were adept at obtaining and using information and CD22 
recommended that meetings with informants or enemy messengers should be 
conducted well away from landing grounds and aerodromes to ensure that their 
interiors remained terra incognita to the enemy.79  These themes directly reflected 
those presented by Chamier to RUSI just prior to CD22’s publication.80 
Three of Chapter XI’s eight pages described the ‘use of aircraft in occupation of 
a country’.  Given the political importance of substitution to the Air Ministry, this was a 
key subject.  However, the doctrine’s claims fell short of completely replacing ground 
forces, venturing only that ‘the Air Force can undertake a considerable portion of the 
work of the occupation of a country’.  When the country was too big to be patrolled 
from permanent aerodromes, advanced landing grounds would need to be prepared.  
These would be based adjacent to the local civil administration, equipped with 
workshops, defendable for a month without reinforcement by a local garrison and 
equipped with a corresponding supply of consumables.  They could also be reinforced 
and resupplied by air, with the AOC maintaining a central reserve of troops and 
aircraft under his immediate control.  The need for air-minded force protection was 
articulated in the need for posts to protect the landing and departure approaches from 
hostile rifle fire.  Centralised control by the AOC was cited as being key, with orders 
and reports being passed between the advanced landing grounds and Air HQ by 
wireless.  Aircraft would enforce peace by patrolling continuously over the occupied 
area, dropping propaganda leaflets ‘disseminating the correct news’, thereby 
establishing an impression within the native population that all their movements were 
being watched and reported on: ‘It must be remembered that from the ground every 
inhabitant of a native village is under the impression that the occupant of an aeroplane 
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is actually looking at him’.81  One enduring myth perpetuated by various critics and 
examined throughout this Thesis was that air power’s application against uncivilised 
enemies was purely kinetic.  However, even at this early stage of doctrinal 
development prior to air control being adopted, CD22 emphasised that force should 
only be resorted to when peaceful measures had failed.  Authority to take offensive 
action should be vested with the AOC alone because the speed of response, reach 
and relative immunity of aircraft ‘combine to encourage their use more often than the 
occasion warrants’.  Thus, in contrast to Chamier’s 1921 presentation, the prime tactic 
pushed by the Air Staff for controlling an occupied area was based on the moral effect 
of constant aerial surveillance backed by the inherent, but measured, threat of lethal 
force.82  This counters the myth that air power in this period was predominantly based 
on kinetic effects. 
Overall, CD22’s basic theme of air operations against uncivilised enemies was 
the replacement of conventional artillery by aerial bombing and the punitive 
bombardment of enemy forces.  Although the doctrine recognised that lasting results 
could normally only be obtained by occupation, there was no attempt to describe how 
air power could achieve this level of control.  This was perhaps understandable given 
the aim of substituting punitive expeditions with aircraft – the replacement of one 
method of firepower (pack artillery) by bomber aircraft.  The lack of consideration of a 
long-term air-focused strategy is perhaps the greatest criticism of what would become 
air control.  Although this doctrine was not written solely for the NWF, CD22 was 
nevertheless written during the ongoing tribal aftermath of the Third Afghan War and 
the teetering of strategies between the pre-1919 Close Border and post-1923 Modified 
Forward policy on the Frontier.83  The tribal areas across the Administrative Border 
were of no economic value and had only been annexed as a British buffer zone to 
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83 See Chapter 2. 
Chapter 3 – RAF Tactics and Doctrine, 1918-1922 
 99 
protect the fertile plains of the Indus from Afghan-sponsored armed criminal activity.  
Air power’s characteristics of speed and reach nested comfortably with the Close 
Border policy of local militias, general non-interference and punitive action against 
unrest.  The same characteristics also lent themselves as a coercive deterrent against 
Kabul to keep Afghanistan within the British sphere of influence and out of Russia’s, 
as demonstrated by the significant, previously-described proportion of air power that 
the British planned to apportion against Kabul in the event of war with Afghanistan.84  
Thus, independent air power and the Close Border policy were well matched and the 
RAF’s focus on punitive action was perhaps understandable.  The Modified Forward 
policy, and the concomitant ‘watch and ward’ garrisoning of the tribal area, would 
naturally require troops, but the size of these isolated garrisons could be reduced by 
the support of aerial-delivered firepower and logistical support. 
RAF STAFF COLLEGE 
The influence of the RAF Staff College on the development of early RAF small wars 
doctrine is worthy of examination.  Formed at Andover in April 1922, the Staff College 
was one of the three training establishments founded by Trenchard to allow the RAF 
to expand if necessary in the future.85  In his opening address to the first course, 
Trenchard expressed a vision that, from the brains of the staff and students ‘will 
emanate new and brilliant ideas for the development of the Air and its power’, adding 
a caveat about the importance of austerity-induced economy.86   
Allan English’s 1993 thesis posited that the RAF’s unproven strategic bombing 
                                                
84 Air Staff (India), Pink Plan. 
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86 Air Marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard, "RAF Staff College Opening Address to First Course”, 
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doctrine was fully evolved by 1929 and that students were institutionally trained to 
conform to, rather than question, official doctrine.87  English drew this conclusion 
because the entrance exam tested prospective students against extant doctrine 
(which resulted in “conformists” being selected) and were subsequently assessed 
against the same benchmark during the course.  Certainly, the Staff College entrance 
exam served to select officers of an appropriate intellectual capability and provide 
them with a uniform knowledge-base to start the course.  But this base was quite 
wide; by 1933, the essential reading included Hamley’s Operations of War and 
Caldwell’s Small Wars.88   
In contrast, Parton’s 2009 thesis countered that the theory that the Air Staff had 
a monolithic, unthinking adherence to ‘Trenchardian’ strategic bombing doctrine was 
fallacious and that the main area of doctrinal development during the 1920s related to 
air policing.  This emphasis was due to Trenchard’s desire to counter the Army and 
Navy’s attempts to re-absorb the RAF by providing doctrinally-supported evidence of 
what the RAF could achieve on its own.89   
Certainly, the CD22 Operations Manual played an important role in the College 
syllabus.  Although CD22 was published in time for the first course and formed its 
intellectual foundation (indeed, Parton suggested that the advent of Staff College may 
have been the initial impetus for publishing CD22) , it was immediately dissected by 
the students who were reported in the Daily Telegraph to be ‘amending it sentence by 
sentence in the light of experience in the field’.90  The College Commandant, Air 
                                                
87 English, "The RAF Staff College and the Evolution of British Strategic Bombing Policy, 1922-
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88 The reading list is reproduced at  Annex 4. 
89 Parton, "RAF Doctrine", 231. 
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Commodore Brooke-Popham, submitted these revisions to the Air Ministry in 1923, 
although CD22 was not updated during the first six Staff College courses.91  
Nonetheless, it is clear that Andover took a proactive role in influencing doctrine.  
Additionally, since the students of this first course, such as Portal, rose to the very 
highest ranks of the RAF during the Second World War, the course may well have 
been of particular influence on later events.  Apart from a close examination of CD22, 
the first course covered other pertinent subjects, including ‘organisation of the Army in 
India’, ‘small wars’, ‘British policy in India’, ‘Palestine’, ‘topography & meteorology of 
the N W Frontier of India and Afghanistan’, ‘Imperial strategy’, ‘Iraq’ and ‘the RAF in 
Palestine, 1918’.  Interestingly, the term ‘small wars’ was officially used in the first 19 
courses, despite its absence from official RAF doctrine, only disappearing in 1941.92  
The NWF was a significant element of the syllabus: the last two full days of the first 
course were spent studying ‘fighting on the N W Frontier of India’;93 the penultimate 
lecture of the second course was ‘The RAF in India’; subsequent to which the last 
lectures became ‘Imperial Strategy’, presented by the Commandant.  The lectures 
were normally given by members of the Directing Staff (DS), but some involved 
external presenters.94  Unfortunately, few of the notes from the 1920s lectures survive 
in the archive, one exception being the personal notes of a 1927 student on ‘aircraft in 
small wars’, which record for example that ‘As long as the enemy is dependent upon 
                                                                                                                                           
There were several of these conferences in the syllabus, each of which examined between one 
and three of CD22’s chapters.  See AIR 69/19, RAF Staff College, Programme of Work - 1st 
Course 1922. 
91 See AIR 2/1059, Air Commodore R Brooke-Popham, Letter: Revised Manual of Combined 
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Aspects of Small Wars’.  See AIR 69/409. 
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- 1st Course. 
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69/30, ———, Programme of Work - 2nd Course 1923).  Game’s biography is at Annex 7. 
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settled activities or activities that are vulnerable to air attack... air power unaided can 
achieve a decision’.95  So, it appears that the staff lectures generally reflected Air Staff 
doctrine.  Presentations by the students based on their operational experience formed 
an important element of the course, a selection of which were officially published each 
year until The Hawk took over in 1928;96 of the two or three Army students on the 
course, one was always from the Indian Army and their presentations often focused 
on the NWF.97  Later, NWF presentations were often given by external experts.  For 
example, the 1938 NWF air operations lecture was given by Group Captain 
Bottomley, who had just returned from commanding No 1(Indian) Group.98  Thus, 
students were briefed not only on Air Ministry doctrine, but also Indian ‘in-theatre’ 
tactics, which were not always identical, as described later.   
Overall, it appears clear that, in the early 1920s, the Staff College took an active 
role in analysing official doctrine and offering revisions based on the students’ wartime 
experience, and that the students were exposed to both official RAF doctrine and 
local, in-theatre practice.  Furthermore, student presentations were widely published 
within RAF circles where they could influence the formulation of future doctrine.  A 
detailed assessment of individual officers and the correlation between Andover’s 
educational themes and their subsequent beliefs concerning the most effective way to 
employ air power is outwith the scope of this Thesis.  However, the students of the 
initial Staff College courses rose to key leadership positions during the Second World 
                                                
95 X005-6545-002-006 (RAF Museum, Hendon), Wing Commander D S C Evill, Aircraft in 
Small Wars - personal notes of Squadron Leader John Sowrey, 9 May 1927, 4. 
96 The presentations were published in: AP 956 (1922/23 course, AIR 10/973 and 10/5544); AP 
1097 (1923/24, AIR 10/1109 ); AP 1152 (1924/25, AIR 10/1159); AP 1233 (1925/26, AIR 
10/1269); and AP 1308 (1926/27, AIR 10/1703).  Each student was required to give a lecture 
based on their personal experience.  Students submitted a list of three possible subjects, one 
of which was selected by the DS.  See note from Commandant on ‘Student Lectures’ in AIR 
69/33, RAF Staff College, Programme of Work - 3rd Course 1924. 
97 The small wars elements of the syllabi of the inter-war courses are at Annex 5. 
98 AIR 69/179, Group Captain Norman H Bottomley, Small Wars - India: Air Operations on the 
N W Frontier of India, 6 June 1938.  Bottomley’s presentation was almost identical to his 1939 
JRUSI article (Bottomley, "The Work of the RAF on the NWF") which, itself, conforms closely to 
the 1939 Combined Frontier Manual published by the Indian Defence Department.  These 
relationships are explored in Chapter 5.  Bottomley’s biography is at Annex 7. 
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War, so any ‘sticky’ ideas accumulated during their College education would have 
been particularly crucial to the development of future policy, at least to the extent of 
‘how’ to think, if not ‘what’ to think.99  This latter point about the development of critical 
analysis is important, as illustrated by the manner in which CD22 was dissected by the 
students.  However, to put Andover’s influence on future doctrine in perspective, 
Harris, possibly the most adherent disciple of the ‘Trenchardian offensive’, attended 
Army Staff College at Camberley, rather than Andover, something on which Gray in 
2012 commented that Portal probably regretted.100  Harris commented that ‘I came in 
for a good deal of attack’ during the Course, so it may have been that, given his 
resolute character and (as Messenger observed) his ‘tendency to see but one side of 
the argument’, the Army environment entrenched Harris’ single-Service beliefs and he 
missed out on the opportunity of analysing the finer points of RAF doctrine in 
Andover’s relatively open environment.101  Overall, the extent to which the RAF Staff 
College education of individual senior officers influenced future doctrine is worthy of 
further analysis which is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
CONCLUSION 
RAF doctrine applicable to the NWF prior to 1922 developed within the context of the 
RAF emerging from the FWW and needing a single-Service role to justify its continued 
existence in a time of austerity.  Air control was seen as an ideal vehicle, although it 
had not yet been imposed anywhere.  This required aircraft to substitute British troops, 
                                                
99 Subsequently important students on early course included: Portal and Peirse (1922); 
Bottomley and Slessor (1924); Cochrane (1925); and Saundby (1927).  Interestingly, Ludlow-
Hewitt attended Royal Naval Staff College in 1925, while Peck attended Camberley in 1926. 
100 See Probert, Bomber Harris: His Life and Times, 58-61; Saward, 'Bomber' Harris, 45-46; 
Peter W Gray, The Leadership, Direction and Legitimacy of the RAF Bomber Offensive from 
Inception to 1945, ed. Gary Sheffield, Birmingham War Studies (New York: Bloomsbury, 2012), 
43.  Harris replaced Peck as the RAF student at Camberley. 
101 Saward, 'Bomber' Harris, 45; Probert, Bomber Harris: His Life and Times, 59; Charles 
Messenger, 'Bomber' Harris and the Strategic Bombing Offensive, 1939-1945 (London: Arms 
and Armour Press, 1984), 195. 
Chapter 3 – RAF Tactics and Doctrine, 1918-1922 
 104 
so it is unsurprising that the early doctrine focused on the replacement of punitive 
expeditions with punitive bombing carried out relentlessly until the aim was achieved 
(albeit viewed by 1922 as a last resort); whilst apparently brutal and not addressing 
the root cause of tribal unrest, the RAF opined that its reputation would act as a future 
deterrent.  This nested well with the NWF’s Close Border policy, but less so with the 
Modified Forward policy.  The RAF thought aircraft had a significant morale effect on 
tribes unaccustomed to aircraft, while inflicting less casualties and costing less than 
land operations, a Trenchardian theme that would endure.  From the outset, the 
 aeroplane’s limited ability in built-up areas was acknowledged.  Even at this early 
stage, the roles of transporting local authorities, the aerial resupply of isolated troops 
and medical evacuation had already been suggested.  The RAF countered the Army’s 
perceived lack of ‘air-mindedness’ and their desire to ‘penny packet’ air power with the 
concept of centralised control under an Air commander.  Nonetheless, tactics were 
developed for co-operating with ground troops (predominantly reconnaissance), 
although punitive expeditions were deemed unnecessary.  Where undeveloped 
countries had a degree of centralised governance, the bombing of strategic targets 
was advocated.  CD22, a somewhat rushed publication produced against a 
background of rapid doctrinal development, provided the necessary endorsed doctrine 
which underpinned the RAF’s political aspirations, aided by early Staff College 
graduates educated in critical analysis.
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CHAPTER 4 – RAF TACTICS AND DOCTRINE, 1922-28 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 3 discussed the evolution of the RAF’s first formal doctrine publication, CD22, 
(with its simple, punitive approach to substitution in semi-civilised theatres) and its 
immediate reception and critical analysis by the RAF Staff College.  This Chapter will 
demonstrate how the Air Staff developed air doctrine against a backdrop of 
experience gained from air control in Iraq and Transjordan.  It will show a trend 
towards the application of minimum force to maintain air power’s legitimacy in 
response to increasing pressure for a more humane approach to semi-civilised 
cultures.  This resulted in the evolution of non-kinetic techniques such as ‘air 
demonstrations’ and a broadening of techniques which catered for morale, as well as 
material, effects, leading up to the publication of AP1300 in 1928.  Local techniques 
also had to cater for the tribal reaction to the new air weapon. 
MINOR DOCTRINAL PUBLICATIONS 
CD22 was rapidly overtaken by developing doctrine, although its replacement, RAF 
War Manual, AP1300, was not published until 1928.  By mid-1923, the Deputy CAS 
(DCAS) noted that CD22 was ‘out of date’ and ‘liable to mislead, rather than inform’ 
while, from 1924, all copies of CD22 had a note stating ‘This manual is not at all points 
in accordance with the present views of the air staff and will shortly be revised’.1  The 
doctrinal hiatus between the publication of CD22 and AP1300 was filled by ‘derived 
doctrine’, i.e., doctrinal ideas that are supported by official doctrine, but are not directly 
stated therein.  These ‘derived’ ideas could influence and shape the high-level 
                                                
1 AIR 5/299, DCAS, CD 22 Printing and Publication, Minute 137, 20 July 1923; AIR 5/299, Air 
Ministry, CD 22 Printing and Publication, Enclosure 141A, 20 July 1923. 
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doctrine as it evolved, but could also be sidelined if they failed to find the necessary 
level of consensus. 
Chronologically, the first post CD22 publication was Flight Lieutenant Mackay’s 
“The Influence in the Future of Aircraft upon Problems of Imperial Defence”, which 
won RUSI’s 1921 Gold Medal (RAF) Prize.2  Mackay, the principal author of CD22, 
worked under Chamier in the Directorate of Operations and Intelligence, which 
explains why his essay’s themes resonated with Chamier’s 1921 RUSI presentation.3  
Indeed, Mackay’s article was, in many ways, a non-confidential version of CD22, 
albeit viewed from the wider perspective of Imperial defence.  Mackay’s pretext was 
that the financial burden of garrisoning the Empire could be reduced by the extensive 
employment of aircraft and a corresponding reduction in ‘other methods of garrison’.4  
He described tactics for ‘the Colonies’ and ‘small wars’ separately, but almost 
identically.  The NWF was used as an example of where small ground forces, 
deployed to punish marauders or rebellious villages, attracted large numbers of hostile 
tribesmen which required large, expensive relief expeditions, with concomitant 
vulnerable lines of communication, to relieve them.  Mackay contrasted this with the 
secrecy and speed of aircraft in delivering a similar level of punishment while 
depriving the tribesmen of loot (‘his first joy’), an opponent to fight (‘his second joy’) 
and the opportunity to capture rifles (‘his third joy’).  Ground units would still be 
required to protect the aerodromes and to be held as a reserve.  Squadrons should 
not be split up into detachments for logistical reasons, and should only be used as a 
last resort at the request of the civil authority and under the control of the AOC.  But, 
when required, aircraft should be used with ‘vigour’ and ‘bombing must be continuous 
by day and by night’ until the objective is achieved using ‘Not a moderate, but a 
                                                
2 Flight Lieutenent C J Mackay, "The Influence in the Future of Aircraft upon Problems of 
Imperial Defence", JRUSI LXVII, no. 466  (1922). 
3 See Chamier, "The Use of the Air Force for Replacing Military Garrisons", and Chapter 3. 
4 Mackay, "The Influence in the Future of Aircraft upon Problems of Imperial Defence": 277. 
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maximum weight of bombs’.  Subsequently, ‘the mere threat of bombing should bring 
about the required result’.5  Thus, Mackay’s proposed methodology was to deter future 
transgression by the moral effect generated by an initial overawing demonstration. 
1924 saw a flurry of ASMs published which expanded and modified the rapidly-
produced and increasingly outdated CD22.  The first, ASM16, was a statement by 
Jack Salmond, five months into his tour as AOC Iraq, on the principles of air power in 
Iraq.6  However, parallels between Iraq and the NWF need careful analysis before the 
applicability of tactics is automatically read across from one theatre to the other.  Not 
only were the topographies (and the resulting nature of the populations) generally 
quite different, but Britain’s strategic aim in Iraq was to build up the Iraqi Army to allow 
the withdrawal of British forces (similar to British policy during the 2001-2014 Afghan 
conflict).7  Indeed, Harris’ notes for his 1929 Army Staff College student presentation 
stated that British policy in Iraq was to: ‘Raise an Iraqi Army, and progressively lighten 
our commitment by handing over control to the Iraqi Govt. and their own Army’.8  
There was a similar contrast in the civil situation; Iraq was largely fully administrated 
and Salmond emphasised that he used the Iraq Army, Levies, Mounted Police and 
RAF armoured cars, with or without air co-operation, as well as aircraft in isolation, 
when requested by the executive administration in cases too dangerous for the police.  
Even then, no action would be taken unless the British civilian Advisor on the spot 
requested it and it had been approved by the Iraqi Minister of the Interior, his British 
Advisor, and the High Commissioner, with advice supplied by the AOC and his local 
Intelligence Officers.  In contrast to Mackay and Chamier, Salmond described how he 
                                                
5 Ibid.: 298-300. 
6 AIR 9/28, Air Marshal Sir John Salmond, Air Staff Memorandum 16: Statement by Air 
Marshal Sir J M Salmond KCB, CMG, CVO, DSO, of his Views upon the Principles Governing 
the Use of Air Power in Iraq, January 1924. 
7 Ibid., 1. 
8 Wing Commander A T Harris, "Air Control in Iraq, and Elsewhere", Army Staff College, Senior 
Division, Student Lecture  (1929).  In the same paper, Harris made reference to a pre-air 
control Iraqi problem that also had relevance to the garrisoned unadministered areas of the 
NWF when he stated that: ‘a very large garrison finds itself very weak at every point when 
trouble breaks out simultaneously in widely separated areas’. 
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tried to achieve the desired political result with the minimum action and that air action 
had never been used where it would not have otherwise been necessary to send out a 
column.  Salmond extolled that not only was air action ‘less severe and yet a more 
powerful corrective action than the visit of a column of troops’ but that it also avoided 
the rallying of neighbouring tribes against ground forces which tended to magnify the 
trouble, as Mackay had previously described.9  ASM16 also made the first mention of 
the use of ‘demonstration flights’ and the dropping of leaflets which had achieved the 
necessary effect without bloodshed (although the effect of the dropping of 
‘educational’ leaflets over a wide area was besmirched due to the illiteracy of the 
tribesmen, while educational leaflets targeted at misbehaving tribes ‘would be 
interpreted as a sign that the Government did not intend to take any sterner 
measures’).10  Salmond emphasised that aircraft ‘achieve their result by their effect on 
morale, and by the material damage they do, and by the interference they cause to 
the daily routine of life and not through the infliction of casualties’: 
It can knock the roofs of huts about and prevent their repair, a considerable 
inconvenience in winter-time.  It can seriously interfere with ploughing or 
harvesting – a vital matter; or burn up the stores of fuel laboriously piled up and 
garnered for the winter; by attack on livestock, which is the main form of capital 
and source of wealth to the less settled tribes, it can impose in effect a 
considerable fine, or seriously interfere with the actual food source of the tribe – 
and in the end the tribesman finds it is much the best to obey Government.11 
ASM16 displayed an understanding of the need to restrain the number of ‘flag-flying’ 
demonstration flights along remote lines of communication to avoid de-sensitising the 
enemy and nullified their value, the exact balance being determined by an 
understanding of the prevailing local conditions derived from intelligence collection.  
Overall, this early communication by the first AOC under the ‘air control’ system where 
doctrine was exposed to real world realities shows an interesting divergence from 
                                                
9 Salmond, ASM 16, 4. 
10 Ibid., 5-6. 
11 Ibid., 4. 
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CD22 and the Air Staff’s articulation of vigorous and unrelenting firepower, towards a 
much more constrained and measured range of action appropriate to the local 
situation, including leafleting, along with a willingness to use any combination of 
ground and air units at the AOC’s disposal. 
Mackay and Salmond’s publications strike a stark contrast than is worthy of 
unpacking.  Mackay, as the principle author of CD22, was simply repeating extant 
doctrine.  Part of the aims of this doctrine was to highlight the advantages of 
independent air action to underpin the requirement for an independent air force.  In 
contrast, Salmond was recording how he had conducted an actual operation which 
had been shaped by the constraints of various local factors.  Salmond showed a 
marked divergence from doctrine in employing a strategy of minimum, rather than 
maximum, force.  This raises several observations.  Firstly, senior commanders felt 
they had the freedom to  diverge from doctrine and possessed the flexibility to exploit 
this space.  Secondly, as will be seen later, the RAF adapted both its implementation 
and doctrine to reflect these realities.  So, this broadening of subsequent small wars 
doctrine demonstrates that the RAF was able feed back experience from actual 
combat and incorporate it into its doctrine, learning from its experiences. 
ASM19, Memorandum by the Air Staff on the Psychological Effects of Air 
Bombardment on Semi-Civilised Peoples, published in February 1924, appears to be 
a counterpoint to criticism (probably from the Army, although the records are unclear) 
about the collateral damage inflicted on tribal women and children by bombing.  The 
Air Staff did not deny that such casualties did occur on occasion, but opined that: ‘It is 
difficult to follow the reasoning which can accept as legitimate against civilised 
peoples methods of the type outlined and yet hesitate to apply equal or even less 
drastic methods to the semi-civilised tribes of the East’.  Furthermore, ‘The Air Staff 
are convinced that it is not the idea of brutality... which offends certain principles but 
rather the novelty of a method which disturbs conservative prejudices’.  The Air Staff 
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emphasised that Army tactics, such as blockading an enemy’s food and water supply, 
effected civilians as well as combatants, whereas swift air action in Iraq had 
demonstrably nipped tribal disturbances in the bud while causing fewer enemy and 
friendly casualties which was ‘not without its effect on our own womenfolk’.  In short, 
air power was ‘not brutal, but novel’.  ASM19 reiterated the tactics from CD22, adding 
that aerial bombardment could interfere with normal life, thereby demoralising the 
enemy and forcing their compliance.12  A clear link was made between each of these 
tactics and the desired effect , as shown in Figure 12.  The table resonates with more 
‘modern’ concepts and has parallels with what would later be described as ‘Effects 
Based Operations’. 
Effect Air Method Existing Military Method 
Persuade a people that 
their government is wrong 
and that steps must be 
taken to rectify it 
Dropping leaflets Propaganda 
To enforce surrender by 
insidious moral effect 
i.  Regular attacks at 
definite intervals, 
increasing to: 
ii.  Intensive, continuous 
bombardment 
i.  Long range 
bombardment 
 
ii.  Close bombardment 
Reduce food supplies with 
resulting diminution of 
fighting spirit 
Incendiary bombs against 
crops 
Burning crops 
Small bombs and machine 
gun fire against livestock 
Killing or removing 
livestock 
Punishment & produce 
antipathy to leadership 
Bombing to coerce 
surrender of rifles 
Imposition of fines 
Eliminate /reduce ability to 
wage war 
Bombing Surrender of rifles 
Maintenance of order Threat of repetition of 
bombing (occupation 
unnecessary) 
Occupation 
Figure 12 - ASM19 comparison of Air and Army tactics and their intended effect 
                                                
12 AIR 9/28, Air Staff, Air Staff Memorandum 19: Memorandum by the Air Staff on the 
Psychological Effects of Air Bombardment on Semi-Civilised Peoples, February 1924, 1, 4.  
Britain had a long history of employing blockades (including the use of the Royal Navy to 
blockade Germany during the FWW, a key element of the final victory), so the Air Staff’s 
comment would have had particular traction in 1924. 
Chapter 4 – RAF Tactics and Doctrine, 1922-28 
111 
ASM20 is of interest, as it is an early doctrinal publication recording the lessons 
from an actual campaign in Northern Iraq, rather than unsupported theory.  
Furthermore, the Kurdish topography was similar to the NWF.  It is the transcript of a 
lecture by Salmond, until recently AOC Iraq, to the Staff College, Quetta, describing 
his employment of ground and air forces to deter the Turkish Army from re-occupying 
their lost provinces of Mosul and Kurdistan while containing unrest within the local 
Iraqi tribes.13  In his presentation to the predominantly Army audience, Salmond 
described how, contrary to the advice from the Air Ministry, his aggressive forward 
defence of the vilayet by a combined force (comprising British, Indian and Iraqi Army 
units, RAF squadrons and Armoured Car Companies, and Iraqi  Levies) deterred 
Turkish aggression.  In 1923, Salmond had deployed two offensive columns to restore 
British prestige following the forced withdrawal of the ‘RANICOL’ column from 
Kurdistan in September 1922.  Following this withdrawal, six months of aerial action 
had checked any further deterioration.  In March 1923, ‘KOICOL’ column (composed 
of British and Indian Army units who had experience against the Mahsuds, Wazirs and 
Afridi) and ‘FRONTIERCOL’ (made up of Iraqi units) entered the Kurdish mountains, 
both accompanied by a political officer, an Air Liaison Officer, and RAF W/T units.  
Salmond used aircraft to drop messages to the columns, and even flew over them 
himself, landing to meet with OC KOICOL on several occasions.  Salmond 
emphasised the importance of air power in reducing the risk to these columns: 
Throughout the operation the Air Forces were continuously engaged in bombing 
in close and distant support of the advancing Columns, in carrying orders and 
information from Headquarters, in inter-communication between Columns giving 
                                                
13 AIR 9-28, Air Marshal Sir John Salmond, Air Staff Memorandum 20: Lecture by Air Marshal 
Sir J M Salmond KCB, CMG, CVO, DSO, to the Students of Staff College, Quetta.  Salmond’s 
official despatch of the operation, which gives more detail than the ASM, is recorded in The 
London Gazette (Air Vice-Marshal Sir J M Salmond, "Despatch describing the operations of 
certain of the Forces under my Command in Kurdistan”, Supplement to The London Gazette, 
11 June 1924).  The despatch was described as ‘One of the most fascinating official 
documents to be published in many years’ by the founder of Flight magazine (Stanley 
Spooner, "Editorial Comment”, Flight: The Aircraft Engineer & Airships, 19 June 1924). 
Chapter 4 – RAF Tactics and Doctrine, 1922-28 
112 
each its position, in message delivering and picking up and in reconnaissance 
over the whole front.14 
Aircraft also dropped supplies to the columns, initially without parachutes (with 
variable success), but subsequent experimentation with cheap parachutes led 
Salmond to state that ‘I feel satisfied that there are no serious difficulties to the supply 
of emergency requirements to a column by these means’.15  Delicate wireless 
transmitters, telephones and accumulators were successfully dropped by parachute, 
and 246 sick were evacuated, including 200 dysentery and diarrhoea cases which 
developed during the return march and were evacuated by Vickers Vernons.16  This 
avoided a six-day donkey journey – a great relief, no doubt, to both soldier and 
donkey alike.17  Salmond used aircraft to target the local pro-Turk Governor, Shaikh 
Mahmoud, by dropping leaflets on the Kurdish capital, Sulaimania, and bombing his 
HQ and occupied villages as KOICOL advanced, which was itself supported by 
continuous contact patrols.18  Contingency plans were drawn up for heavy bombing 
raids, low flying attacks and pursuit patrols when the column traversed two vulnerable 
passes, which air reconnaissance later confirmed were not required.  Salmond drew 
three significant lessons concerning air-land operations in this environment.  First, 
aircraft were invaluable in facilitating communications over long ranges:  
at no time and I may say not for a single hour was touch lost with Column 
Commanders... communications would be absolutely impossible without the 
means of rapid communication which air transport offers...  in one day I was able 
to visit Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk and to be in my Advanced Headquarters [in Irbil] 
in the evening of the same day. 
                                                
14 Salmond, ASM 20, 10. 
15 The supplies dropped included 900 pairs of boots, 7500 pairs of socks, 190 sets of horse 
and mule shoes, 400 lbs of Dubbin and a whole day’s supply of barley. 
16 Salmond, ASM 20, 10-11.  A more detailed account of the use of No 45 Squadron’s Vickers 
Vernons in its bomber-transport role was provided by its Commanding Officer in the first issue 
of The Hawk magazine; see Squadron Leader R H M S Saundby, "No 45 Squadron in Iraq, 
1922", The Hawk 1, no. 1  (1928), (later reproduced in the 1993 edition of The Hawk). 
17 Salmond, "Despatch on Operations in Kurdistan”, 4659. 
18 Spellings for Sulaimania vary, even between the ASM and Salmond’s despatch.  The ASM 
spelling is used here. 
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Second, the 187 tons of bombs and 72,000 rounds of ammunition expended ahead 
and in direct support of the columns ‘had a very considerable effect on the amount of 
resistance offered’.19  Third, Column commanders reported that aircraft saved them: 
much hill-climbing to picquet the heights’, which allowed rapid marches through 
difficult country, while wireless and message dropping/picking up allowed the 
columns to maintain situational awareness, not only of the enemy’s disposition, 
but also of their own lines of communication.20 
Having laid out his military credentials to his Army audience, Salmond then addressed 
his use of ‘independent air operations, by which I mean those contemplated to bring 
about a desired result without the aid of ground forces’.21  He offered that it was 
impossible to garrison countries such as Iraq adequately and that isolated bodies of 
troops in insufficient numbers ‘spells danger – and has in it the seeds of disaster’.22  
As an alternative, ground forces could be garrisoned centrally and tribal disturbances 
nipped in the bud without the need for isolated bodies of troops ‘on which the 
disaffected tribesmen can wreak their vengenance [sic]’.  An effective intelligence 
service was essential in providing the necessary forewarning of growing unrest, 
facilitated by a very close liaison with political and police officers.  When required, 
action had to be swift and drastic and followed through without hesitation.  Salmond 
acknowledged that these tactics had been accused of being brutal; a complete 
occupation of the country by ground forces sufficient to discourage resistance would 
be less brutal, but unaffordable.  The dispatch of punitive columns to burn entire 
villages with the loss of many lives on both sides was ‘brutality on the grand scale’.23  
In contrast, swiftly-applied air action denied the tribesman (i) a ‘profitable and pleasant 
                                                
19 Salmond, ASM 20, 12-13. 
20 Ibid., 13; ———, "Despatch on Operations in Kurdistan”, 4659. 
21 Salmond, ASM 20, 13. 
22 Ibid., 14.  This is similar to the ‘oil spot’ strategy attempted in Afghanistan in 2009.  See Karl 
A Slaikeu, "Winning the War in Afghanistan: An Oil Spot Plus Strategy for Coalition Forces”, 
Small Wars Journal (2009), http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/227-
slaikeu.pdf?q=mag/docs-temp/227-slaikeu.pdf. 
23 Salmond, ASM 20, 14. 
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period of lawlessness’, (ii) any chance of loot and a normal lifestyle for an indefinite 
period and (iii) offered no chance of retaliation.  Facing this, the tribesman would 
quickly stop defying the authorities.  Each outbreak showed less tendency to spread 
to neighbouring tribes and became less frequent.  Salmond concluded that ‘Air control 
is therefore both merciful in operation and deterrent in effect’ and had reduced the 
total numbers of casualties.24  Overall, what shines through is Salmond’s 
understanding of combined land and air operations and his ability to employ them 
synergistically to maximise their effect.25  He used air power to mitigate the risk to the 
columns (‘had it not been for... rapid intercommunication... I should have hesitated to 
undertake this operation at all’) and avoid the 1922 ‘reverses’.26  This helped bolster 
the British reputation more widely in Iraq, thereby reducing the risk of a general 
uprising against ‘weak’ British governance.  It is apparent that the Air Staff did not 
believe that the Army employed land and air forces in this joint manner, as their 1921 
plea in CD21 revealed: ‘we ask the Army to assist us by thinking “aerially” and utilising 
us to the full in relief of military responsibilities’.27  Additionally, Salmond was using 
aircraft to facilitate effective communication which allowed him to orchestrate his 
forces centrally - an early example of centralised control.  This contrasts with the 
Army’s reliance on ‘mission command’ which allowed formations to comply with the 
commander’s intent in the absence of communications.  Indeed, his official despatch 
concluded: 
It is not too much to say that in a “small war” no Commander has ever before 
been so closely in touch with his Columns, and at the same time with the 
general situation throughout the country.28 
                                                
24 Ibid., 15. 
25 This was, no doubt, aided by his eleven years spent as an infantry officer in The King's Own 
(Royal Lancaster Regiment) before being seconded to the RFC.  See Annex 7. 
26 Salmond, "Despatch on Operations in Kurdistan”, 5659. 
27AIR 5/168, Air Council, CD 21: Memoranda: Aircraft and the Army, June 1921, 11. 
28 Salmond, "Despatch on Operations in Kurdistan”, 4658. 
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Some elements of Salmond’s version of the 1923 Kurdistan campaign were 
challenged in 1927 by Lieutenant Colonel MacClellan (who commanded a KOICOL 
battery) in his article “Air Co-operation in Hill Fighting: Kurdistan, 1923”.29  MacClellan, 
writing just after the first independent use of aircraft on the NWF (‘Pink’s War’) and 
possibly inspired by recent energetic advocates of ‘the advantages of employing 
aeroplanes in uncivilised hill warfare to do the work hitherto performed by the Army’, 
highlighted some of the tactical problems he had witnessed concerning aircraft 
working with his column.30  These were germane to the NWF because, as MacClellan 
stated, the Kurds were ‘in every way inferior to the tribesmen of the North West 
Frontier of India’.31  Pre-planned offensive action had been difficult to co-ordinate 
because of the lack of opportunities for face-to-face contact; W/T (i.e., Morse) was 
deemed the only practical means.  From the air, troops were difficult to distinguish 
from the enemy in mountainous terrain which could result in the ‘grave risk of 
detachments being mistaken for enemies’.  MacClellan opined that ‘the man fighting 
on the ground will often feel happier if he knows that the man fighting from the air will 
confine his attention to his more distant enemies’.32  The ability of aircraft to protect 
the column by substituting for picquets was also challenged due to their lack of 
permanent overhead presence (a characteristic known as ‘impermanence’ by airmen) 
and the ability of tribesmen to conceal themselves.  Concealment also reduced air 
power’s ability to locate the enemy in the vicinity of the column, with MacClellan citing 
that no targets were indicated to his artillery from the air.  He also revealed that only a 
‘negligible’ quantity of the supplies dropped landed in the designated drop zone and 
that, of these, a ‘very high proportion’ was rendered useless due to sacks splitting on 
impact.  Furthermore, some air-dropped supplies damaged camp infrastructure, 
                                                
29 Lieutenant Colonel G P MacClellan, "Air Co-operation in Hill Fighting: Kurdistan, 1923", 
JRUSI LXXII, no. 486  (1927). 
30 Ibid.: 318. 
31 Ibid.: 325. 
32 Ibid.: 320-321. 
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resulting in further planned consignments being cancelled.33  Salmond had not been 
blind to these issues, pointing out that the country was unsuitable for air drop and that 
there had been insufficient time to make the necessary preparations, but that he was 
‘confident that when this method of emergency resupply has been more fully 
investigated... it will prove a valuable asset’.34  Although MacClellan recognised the 
‘very fine performance’ of the RAF in evacuating the wounded and infirmed, he 
highlighted that aircraft were unable to assist for eight days due to the terrain.  That 
said, this was the first joint use of air and land power in mountainous terrain, and 
tactics would naturally require development and refinement.  Nonetheless, 
MacClellan’s perspective provided a germane reminder that official accounts, such as 
Salmond’s ASM20, could be very subjective and reflect a perspective influenced by 
political (and perhaps personal) motives (i.e., slanted to show air power, and perhaps 
the Commander, in a positive light).  Notwithstanding this, MacClellan’s perspective is 
itself quite limited, being that of a local battery commander.  Additionally, MacClellan 
articulated a mixture of personal experiences, hearsay and personal conjecture, and it 
is not always easy to clearly separate these three levels of evidence (a problem also 
associated with some contemporary RAF articles).  Responding to this article six 
months later in 1927, Flight Lieutenant Hampton criticised MacClellan for assuming 
that the tactics employed in 1923 would always be employed in small wars, regardless 
of the circumstances (inferring that the techniques had already been refined) and for 
under-emphasising the morale effect of air power on the tribesmen.35  He reminded 
that the previous 1922 British column that had not been provided with air support had 
                                                
33 In fact, when KOICOL found itself in urgent need of boots and barley, a Vernon was loaded 
with the supplies at Baghdad and flown to Kirkuk at 24-hours’ notice where the cargo was 
transferred to the bomb racks of Army Co-operation aircraft and dropped without any prior 
experimentation.  More robust methods were developed by 1927 (see Flight Lieutenant H N 
Hampton, "Co-operation of Land and Air Forces in Kurdistan, 1923: A Reply to 'Air Co-
operation in Hill Fighting: Kurdistan, 1923'", JRUSI LXXII, no. 488  (1927): 827). 
34 Salmond, "Despatch on Operations in Kurdistan”, 4659. 
35 Hampton, "A Reply to 'Air Co-operation in Hill Fighting'". 
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been defeated by the Turks.  Hampton’s main point was that aircraft mitigated the risk 
to the two 1923 British columns, allowing Salmond to use them more audaciously than 
he would otherwise have dared.  Hampton concluded that the perspective of the 
soldier was often limited to his local situation, whereas air power’s characteristics of 
reach and height, naturally provided the airman with a much broader situational 
appreciation ranging days ahead of the column. 
ASM21, published some time after January 1924, covered The Civilising 
Influence of Medical Services Advanced by Aid from the Air.  Using evidential 
examples from Iraq, the ASM advertised air power’s use of speed and reach to rapidly 
transport medical aid and doctors to remote areas and to convey both civil and military 
patients rapidly back to better surgical facilities.  This, the ASM ventured, assisted the 
civil administration’s cause by ‘the spread of British influence and the fostering of 
friendly feeling amongst the tribes in remote regions that appeals [sic] for help in 
sickness’.36  Militarily, the aerial transport of invalids was more effective than ‘the old 
and slower methods’ and also reduced the burden on the lines of communication.  
However, ASM21 lacked any tactical detail and contained no information at all about 
how to implement the tactics, unlike the later ASM32 and 55 on air transport.  Indeed, 
2½ of the ASM’s 3½ pages are examples.  Given the nature of ASM21, its aim seems 
to be to educate agencies outwith the RAF about the growing abilities of air power.  
Another interesting feature was that, although medical evacuation had utility in most 
theatres, ASM21 focused solely on tribal scenarios, possibly because of the RAF’s 
experience in Iraq, but perhaps also because of the other potential regions where the 
doctrine could be applied, thereby growing the RAF’s role and bolstering its continued 
existence as a independent Service. 
                                                
36 AIR 9/28, Air Staff, Air Staff Memorandum 21: The Civilising Influence of Medical Service 
Advanced by Aid from the Air. 
Chapter 4 – RAF Tactics and Doctrine, 1922-28 
118 
ASM32, Transport of Troops by Air, was the last of the flurry of early-1920s 
ASMs and described the transport of a company of Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers from 
Baghdad to Kirkuk in the Vernons and Victorias of Squadron Leader Arthur Harris’ 
45(Bombing) Squadron in May 1924.37  This ASM combined an evidence-based 
description of an operation with detailed annexes covering what would now be termed 
‘techniques and procedures’.  The purpose of the Memo was stated as being ‘to draw 
particular attention to the value of the use of aircraft for transporting troops in quelling 
disturbances’ and, given the inclusion of both a generic description and detailed 
techniques, the target audience was presumably both Army and Air Force 
personnel.38  The example used concerned a disturbance between Assyrian 
(Christian) levies and local Muslim townsfolk, where very swift intervention was 
required.  ASM32 emphasised air power’s speed, which avoided a twelve-hour railway 
journey and a four-day march, allowing the initial platoon to arrive on the same day as 
the disturbances commenced.  In August, a relief-in-place was also affected by air, 
during ‘the worst month of the year to move troops by train’.39  The three detailed 
annexes covered: an emplaning proforma; a report by OC 1st Battalion Inniskilling 
Fusiliers describing the August relief, giving details down to the contents of each 
haversack; and a single-page instruction on ‘Movement by Aeroplane’ aimed at Army 
personnel. 
One of the first surviving documents expounding specific aerial tactics for the 
NWF was Employment of Aircraft on the North-West Frontier of India, published as a 
secret pamphlet with the approval of the GoI in 1924, apparently by the Air 
Staff(India).40  This detailed, fourteen-page document covered most aspects of ‘direct 
action’ by aircraft, rather than co-operation with ground troops.  It bridged the gap 
                                                
37 AIR 9/28, ———, Air Staff Memorandum 32: Transport of Troops by Air, February 1925. 
38 Ibid., 1. 
39 Ibid., 2. 
40 ———, Employment of Aircraft on the NWFI. 
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between strategy, tactics, ‘command & control’ and rules of engagement; as such, it 
was a ‘one-stop-shop’ guide to the use of aircraft in demonstrations and ‘the attack of 
tribesmen, their flocks, crops, and villages by bombing and machine gun fire’.41  
Structured in three sections, the pamphlet recognised that the use of aircraft for tribal 
control was new and that data and experience were incomplete.42 
The pamphlet’s first, ‘General Principles’ section warned that concentration of 
effort was vital, so squadrons involved in ‘direct action’ had to be distinct from army 
co-operation units.  Similarly, squadrons should be grouped to facilitate easy logistical 
support and supervision, the minimum autonomous unit being a squadron.  The 
pamphlet also discussed the advantages and disadvantages of air power: hesitation 
or delay were ‘invariably interpreted as signs of weakness’, so air power’s rapidity of 
action offered ‘great advantages’ at the early stages of unrest, when even the threat of 
action could be pivotal; however, tribesmen and their flocks could readily take refuge 
in caves or were nomadic, so enforced temporary tribal migrations were not a ‘very 
serious undertaking’.  Surprise attacks were necessary to inflict severe casualties; 
furthermore, air power was less advantageous in the latter stages of an operation, as 
tribes could seek sanctuary in Afghanistan, generating political issues, if pursued.  
Finally, while air operations were cheap and involved minimum friendly loss of life, 
aircrew could be taken prisoner, complicating the military and political situation.43  
Turning to legitimacy, the pamphlet noted that, although tribesmen did not conform to 
‘codes of civilised warfare’ and therefore bombing was not constrained ‘in its methods 
or objectives by rules agreed upon in international law’, air operations should 
nonetheless be conducted ‘with due regard to the principles of ordinary humanity’.44  
                                                
41 Ibid., 1. 
42 The sections were: ‘General Principles’; ‘Preparation for and Execution of Offensive Air 
Action’; and ‘Procedures to be Adopted in the Event of Forced Landings in Enemy Territory’. 
43 Air Staff, Employment of Aircraft on the NWFI, 1-2. 
44 Ibid., 2.  This source has been widely abused.  Chandler quoted ‘In warfare against savage 
tribes who do not conform to codes of civilized warfare[,] aerial bombardment is not necessarily 
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Proportionality’ was also addressed, whereby punishment had to match the 
seriousness of the offence.45  Additionally, civil-military distinction was also 
recognised; while stating that ‘bombing is inherently no more indiscriminate than shell 
fire’, the pamphlet stated that it was important to avoid embittering feelings by 
wantonly endangering women and children.  Importantly, these early statements 
counter the opinion that the concepts of humanity, proportionality and civil-military 
distinction are relatively modern.  The pamphlet continued that, although close 
consultation with the political and military authorities was vital, neither local 
commanders nor political officers could authorise bombing due to the potential 
ramifications of unduly hasty action.  Instead, they had to refer to Air HQ.  Before 
sanctioning bombing, it was vital to determine whether the aim was (i) to punish 
offenders or (ii) to secure submission to Governmental demands.  Intelligence was 
recognised as being vital in order to understand tribal structure, the nature of the 
environment and the proximity of the Afghan border; RAF personnel were encouraged 
to become familiar with both accessible and ‘closed’ tribal areas.  Nevertheless, a 6-
mile zone along the Afghan border had been established which aircraft required 
special Governmental permission to enter.  The pamphlet modified CD22’s guidance 
that warnings should be issued ‘whenever practicable’;46 instead, no warning was 
required against ‘definitely hostile’ tribes in contact with troops or to disperse hostile 
lashkars.  However, when possible, warning should be given prior to bombing the 
                                                                                                                                           
limited in its methods or objectives by rules agreed upon in international law’, omitting the all-
important next sentence that ‘The only test is that air operations should be carried out with due 
regard to the principles of ordinary humanity’, thereby changing the original legal but 
humanistic meaning into a chilling statement.  Omissi mis-quoted this in the same fashion, 
something which has been subsequently repeated in many books and websites, such as: 
Renfrew, Wings of Empire, 154 and http://activist1.wordpress.com/2012/11/10/drones-setting-
up-a-register-the-power-of-tribunal-and-disaster-preparedness/.  See Graham Chandler, "The 
Bombing of Waziristan”, Air & Space Magazine(2011), http://www.airspacemag.com/military-
aviation/The-Bombing-of-Waziristan.html and David E Omissi, "The Hendon Pageant, 1920-
37" in Popular Imperialism and the Military: 1850-1950, ed. John M MacKenzie (Manchester 
University Press, 1992), 213. 
45 Later ensconced in Protocol II of customary international humanitarian law.  See 
http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter4_rule14.  
46 Air Council, CD 22, 128. 
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lashkar’s village of origin.  In contrast, warnings were always to be given before 
engaging tribes not known to be definitely hostile.  Such warnings should be 
accompanied by demonstrations.  Delayed action bombs were viewed as ‘a 
particularly severe form of offensive action’ which invariably required warning of their 
use.47  Once the decision to use lethal force was taken and the warning period 
expired, surprise and sustained concentration of effort were necessary to attain 
material results and inflict casualties via ‘man killing’ anti-personnel bombs and 
machine gun attacks, preferably at dawn or dusk to ensure the greatest concentration 
of men and animals around the village.  Incendiary bombs against villages and crops 
could also be effective.  However, as an operation progressed it was noted that 
tribesmen learnt to conceal themselves, their animals and possessions, and air action 
had to rely on its effect on tribal morale via the threat of constant attack and the 
consequent dislocation of daily life as men hid in caves and grazed their flocks in 
small groups, unable to till their fields.  To avoid predictability, subsequent, lighter 
attacks should be made at irregular interval and with heavy bombs to destroy houses, 
towers, irrigation channels, ‘bunds’ and terraces.  If sanctioned by the political 
authorities, long delay bombs of up to 36 hours could amount to a ‘close blockade’ by 
day and night.48  Despite the physical destruction, the pamphlet noted that moral 
effect ‘is at all times greater than the material in air operations’.49  If the tribesmen and 
their animals migrated to neighbouring tribes under the protection of Pashtunwali, 
patrols could prevent their return while the Political Authorities warned their hosts that 
harbouring enemies of the Government rendered them liable to attack.  After due 
warning and demonstrations, the offenders would be pursued in their neighbours’ 
village, enforcing collective tribal responsibility.  If aircrew were captured, a standard, 
non-negotiable reward would be offered and any ill-treatment severely avenged to 
                                                
47 Air Staff, Employment of Aircraft on the NWFI, 4. 
48 Ibid., 6. 
49 Ibid., 5. 
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deter such behaviour. 
The second part of Employment of Aircraft on the NWF contained detailed 
tactical guidance for the RAF formation commander (normally a wing commander), 
and his squadron and flight commanders on the ‘Preparation and Execution of 
Offensive Air Action’.  The pamphlet offered technical advice for testing engines and 
W/T (where carried) as well as advice on the type of bombs to carry  and formation 
flying.50  To enhance the awe of demonstration flights, Very pistols or smoke signals 
were used and propaganda was scattered.51  Where the exact location of a village 
was uncertain, the local political officer could fly in the leading aircraft to identify the 
target.  The pamphlet also provided detailed tactical guidance on co-ordinating the 
initial massed bombing and machine gun attack.52  Following the initial heavy bombing 
phase, the pamphlet describes how ‘a species of aerial blockade’ could be imposed to 
‘dislocate the life of the hostile tribe’ by irregular patrols and attacks by day and 
night.53 
The third, final part of Employment of Aircraft on the NWF was a single page 
describing the ‘Procedure to be Adopted in the Event of Forced Landings in Enemy 
Territory’.54  Overall, the aim of the air operations expounded in the pamphlet was to 
generate morale effect by inflicting casualties, although the importance of legitimacy, 
legality, humanity, proportionality and civil-military distinction were recognised as key 
themes, as was the conflict between the sanctuary of Afghanistan and the need to 
                                                
50 20-lb bombs were deemed most effective ‘to cause casualties’ but would only make a small 
hole in the roof of huts, whereas 112-lb bombs could be expected to blow roofs off and 230-lb 
and larger bombs would destroy the whole house.  See Ibid., 10. 
51 In recent RAF operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, aircraft have routinely deployed infra-red 
flares during ‘shows of force’. 
52 The pamphlet authorised DH9As to descend to 2-3,000 feet during precision attacks on 
small targets, while Bristol Fighters, if flown fast and erratically, could descend to about 800 
feet without undue risk. 
53 Air Staff, Employment of Aircraft on the NWFI, 11-13. 
54 The pamphlet directed crews to disable their Lewis Gun and burn the aircraft.  If surrounded, 
the crew were advised to surrender with ‘as much good grace as possible and a bold 
demeanour, and preferably to the older and more important-looking men’ and subsequently be 
careful to do nothing to aggravate the situation or complicate the political officer’s task in 
securing their release.  See Ibid., 14. 
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respect the border to prevent an international incident.  Nonetheless, at this early 
stage, the RAF did not shy from destroying men and material to achieve its aims.  
However, it recognised that tribesmen could adapt to minimise the physical 
destruction caused by aircraft by dispersing, which meant that morale effect had to be 
generated by the more time consuming (and less tangible) process of dislocating day-
to-day tribal life.  Indeed, the pamphlet was amongst the first documents to articulate 
the notion of an ‘aerial blockade’.  Importantly, it is clear that the switch of 
methodology from material destruction to tribal dislocation was not by choice, but 
rather the RAF’s reaction to tribal adaptation. 
As the surge in classified small wars ASMs which modified CD22 in the early 
1920s started to ebb, the momentum was transferred to publications in the public 
forum.  These generally covered similar themes to the ASMs.  There are several 
possibilities why the open forum could have been deemed an important ‘battlespace’.  
Some authors were clearly sponsored by the Services in an attempt to garner the 
support of politicians and the public in the competition for the largest share of the 
defence budget.  The open forum was also a conduit to advertise emerging ideas to 
the public, politicians and other Services that would take time to be incorporated into 
more official publications.  Additionally, even if sponsored by the Services, authors 
could publish controversial or critical comments and claim they were their own and not 
officially sanctioned.  And, of course, some zealots simply wanted to publish their 
ideas and experiences.  What is not clear is the degree to which the various journals 
actively solicited relevant or controversial articles to bolster their circulations and 
status. 
 Flight magazine published a Parliamentary note from the Minister for Air in June 
1924 which contained the same themes as Salmond’s secret ASM16;55 in the same 
                                                
55 Lord Thomson, "Note on the Method of Employment of the Air Arm in Iraq”, Flight: The 
Aircraft Engineer & Airships, 14 August 1924. 
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month, a more detailed account of Salmond’s secret ASM20 was reproduced in his 
despatch in the unclassified London Gazette.56  But the main forum used to expose 
developing doctrine was the RUSI lectures.  The in-theatre equivalent for officers in 
India was the USII.  Salmond presented an unclassified paper to RUSI on the same 
subject as his ASM20 in March 1925, the most notable point being the complete lack 
of questioning from the audience, with the Chairman (the ex-High Commissioner of 
Iraq) concluding that he was ‘quite ready to be persuaded that the Air Force could do 
the trick, and I think he has successfully proved that it can’.57 
One of the first post-CD22 RUSI lectures was Wing Commander Edmonds’ 
December 1923 “Air Strategy”.58  Emphasising that the ideas were his own and not 
necessarily the Air Staff’s opinion, he used two themes, those of ‘imperialism’ and 
economy, to analyse ‘the strategical problems of this empire’ from the perspective of 
‘the seat of an aeroplane’, using two scenarios – ‘small wars’ and ‘continental wars’.59  
Admitting that most of his themes were not new, Edmonds opined that the challenge 
for air strategy was ‘to learn how to apply old principles in a new sphere’ which was 
challenging given that the flying age ‘has come upon us so quickly that our habits of 
mind have not fully changed’.60  He noted that the most important characteristic of air 
strategy was its ability to prevent small wars, advocating demonstration flights over 
intransigent tribes, followed up if necessary by flying in the local political officer to 
reason with the leaders while aircraft continued to circle overhead as ‘proof of the 
white man’s power’.61  Failing this, or if it was unsafe for a political officer to visit, 
                                                
56 Salmond, "Despatch on Operations in Kurdistan".  The lack of questioning may be been 
because the audience were overawed by the 3-star presenter and Chairman, Major-General 
Sir Percy Cox. 
57 ———, "The Air Force in Iraq": 498. 
58 Wing Commander C H K Edmonds, "Air Strategy", JRUSI LXIX, no. 474  (1924), published 
in May 1924.  Edmonds was an ex-Naval aviator who attended Army Staff College at 
Camberley in 1921 and was a member of the initial RAF Staff College DS at Andover from 
1922 to 1925. 
59 Ibid.: 192. 
60 Ibid.: 208. 
61 Ibid.: 193. 
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leaflets would be dropped.  Edmonds repeated Mackay’s sentiments that air power’s 
greatest advantage in small wars was that it denied the tribesman loot and a fair fight, 
while making him expend valuable ammunition against an elusive target.  This was 
achieved by another characteristic of air power, its asymmetry when employed against 
ground forces.  In cases where these peaceful methods failed, Edmonds recognised 
that it could be difficult for aircraft to inflict material damage against dispersed 
tribesmen, but that the main effect on ‘ground enemies’ was that it targeted their 
morale.62  As this was not always achieved instantaneously: 
The air commander has merely got to ensure that his resources can outlast the 
tribe’s morale’ and maintain his objective by continuous bombing as the enemy 
passed through three phases, namely: fear and panic; followed by indifference 
‘when the smallness of the material damage is realised’; which developed into 
weariness, as normal life becomes increasingly impossible.63   
Edmonds recognised the issue of ‘sanctuaries’, ‘leaky borders’ and external 
sponsorship that allowed a ‘subsidised agitator’ to slip over the border and subvert 
local tribes against the British.  This could require a column of troops to be deployed, 
with which aircraft would work in close co-operation.  Prior to the column’s arrival, 
aircraft would use their speed of response to continuously bomb villages harbouring 
the agitators, harassing and hindering them from completing defensive precautions 
against the column, coercing nearby tribes to remain neutral.  Once contact was made 
on the ground, air power would support the troops by providing warning of impending 
flank attacks, revealing and bombing enemy strong points, and enabling 
communication between column commanders and higher command.  Thus, unlike 
RAF India’s Employment of Aircraft on the NWFI, Edmonds covered both ‘direct 
action’ and Army co-operation.  Overall, Edmonds concluded that air power helped 
render small wars ‘less dangerous, less costly and more localised’.64  This early 
                                                
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid.: 194. 
64 Ibid.: 194-195. 
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treatise is important for several reasons.  Firstly, it highlighted air power’s flexibility in 
being able to conduct independent operations and then adapt to support other 
Services as a dynamic situation changed.  In this way, it was rounded and relatively 
non-partisan.  Secondly, although the morale effect of air power was a well 
established concept by 1923, it was the first to articulate that continuous air action 
would result in the enemy cycling through fear to indifference and finally weariness, at 
which point they would concede to British demands.  Although Edmonds suggested 
that this should be achieved by directly targeting the tribesmen, this psychological 
impact would become the basis of the ‘inverted blockade’, as discussed later. 
Amongst the first significant JUSII air power articles was Flight Lieutenant 
Stevenson’s July 1925 “The Army Co-operation Squadron”.65  This was essentially a 
repetition of ASM25 aimed to educate Army officers in India and build mutual 
understanding of the role of army co-operation squadrons.  Stevenson offered addition 
detail, noting that the Divisional HQ should be located as near as possible to the 
aerodrome.  The squadron was viewed as a self-contained, mobile fighting unit of 
three flights, each established with four aircraft, allowing a flight to maintain one 
aircraft airborne throughout daylight hours.66  Night attacks were possible, but the 
squadrons were not established for continuous 24-hour operations.  The main role of 
the army co-operation aircraft was reconnaissance of two types - ‘close 
reconnaissance’ and ‘artillery reconnaissance’.  The role of ‘close reconnaissance’ 
was to reconnoitre enemy positions and pass details to the ground unit’s HQ.67  In 
                                                
65 Stevenson, "The Army Co-operation Squadron". 
66 However, flights would need to be augmented to six aircraft for a major war. 
67 Air-to-ground communication was achieved by dropping primitive message bags on the 
formation HQ (rather than dealing directly with the artillery), although short-range, two-way R/T 
(i.e. voice) was being deployed to communicate with infantry units as equipment became 
available.  To identify themselves to ground troops, these aircraft carried black stripes and 
trailed banners and coloured streamers and fired white lights or a Klaxon to stimulate friendly 
troops to indicate their positions. 
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contrast, ‘artillery reconnaissance’ aircraft liaised directly with their assigned battery.68   
An Army Branch Intelligence Officer and a Squadron Artillery Officer were attached to 
each army co-operation squadron, with the Intelligence Officer dealing with general 
intelligence and the Artillery Officer furnishing information on artillery positions.  Both 
of these officers flew frequently as observers to gain an understanding of the 
environment and to generate mutual understanding between the Services.  Each 
squadron had a mobile reception station consisting of a tender with R/T and W/T 
capability which would collocate itself with the formation HQ with which the squadron 
was working.  While offensive action was not a normal role for army co-operation 
squadrons, they could be used in a pursuit or retreat.69  In an emergency, the 
squadron could also drop water, rations and ammunition by parachute to troops.  
Stevenson predicted that aircraft would force the enemy to operate predominantly by 
night.  While Stevenson’s article did not focus specifically on the NWF, it indicated 
how Indian-based army co-operation squadrons were expected to operate in 1925, 
both in small wars against a generic tribal threat and in larger-scale warfare against 
Afghanistan and, potentially, a Russian sponsor.  That this first JUSII article was on 
army co-operation may also provide an insight into the priorities for Indian-based RAF 
units at this time.   
The next significant RUSI article was Captain John Glubb’s November 1926 “Air 
and Ground Forces in Punitive Expeditions”.  Whilst based on his experience in Iraq, it 
was germane to the NWF.70  This was an important paper, published just as ‘Glubb 
                                                
68 Longer-range W/T (i.e., Morse) was used to communicate from the aircraft to the battery, 
with the battery responding to the aircraft via a ground strip code.  Every air-to-ground W/T 
message was an invitation to fire and an offer to observe for fire, but the battery commander 
(or Commander Royal Artillery for important targets) would decide whether to engage or not.  
According to Slessor, R/T equipment was delicate and prone to jamming from other R/T 
transmitters which restricted the number of concurrent users in a given area.  Additionally, 
voice transmissions could be unintelligible.  In contrast, W/T was fast, clear, could be encoded 
and allowed many operators to transmit simultaneously.  See Slessor, "RAF and Army Co-
operation - The Other Point of View": 126-127. 
69 The aircraft‘s normal armament in this role was two 112lb bombs or twelve 20lb bombs. 
70 Glubb, "Air and Ground Forces in Punitive Expeditions". 
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Pasha’ retired from the Army in Iraq and became a political officer for the Government 
of Iraq, and was written from the perspective of a soldier, rather than an airman.  
Although starting from the standpoint that punitive expeditions were an effective and 
necessary tool, Glubb’s article compared the relative effectiveness of punitive 
expeditions in ‘semi-civilised’ countries conducted by ground troops with punitive 
operations carried out mainly by air forces under an Air Force Commander, assisted 
by ground units (i.e., air control).  Several of his themes were not new.  Thus, the 
ubiquity resulting from air power’s speed, reach and its ability to use height to overfly 
all but the highest mountains, allowed aircraft to deliver summary punishment within a 
few hours, nipping unrest in the bud and deterring neighbouring tribes from joining the 
rebellion.  These same characteristics allowed aircraft to be based in easily-defended, 
centrally-located aerodromes.  In contrast, ground forces’ relatively slow reaction and 
limited reach required garrisons to be spread throughout the region where they were 
liable to be cut off and besieged, frequently being ‘overwhelmed before the arrival of 
relief, thus giving rise to a “regrettable incident”’.71  Glubb reiterated Edmonds’ theme 
about denying the tribes time to procrastinate by rapidly conveying officials or, if too 
dangerous, dropping leaflets.  He also warned that aircraft were limited by the need 
for regular maintenance.  Intelligence was also vital, and success could depend on the 
availability of personnel with a thorough knowledge of the tribes and country and 
experience as an air observer.  Glubb recommended that pilots build up this 
knowledge themselves, as friendly or neutral tribes had been mistakenly attacked with 
‘unfortunate’ consequences.  Although stating that ‘in open country, heavy casualties 
can be inflicted by both bombing and, perhaps still more, by machine gun fire’, Glubb 
noted that indirect physical effects could coerce the tribesmen to surrender.  Stone 
dwellings could be damaged by high explosive bombs, thatch or reed huts could be 
burnt using incendiary projectiles, and sheep were easy targets because they flocked 
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together.  However, mud huts could be quickly repaired, crops were difficult to 
damage unless dry enough to fire with incendiaries, and camels and horses tended to 
scatter when attacked.  Of importance to operations on the NWF, Glubb warned that 
mountainous or wooded areas were challenging for air power, as tribesmen could take 
refuge in woods or caves which were relatively comfortable and inaccessible to direct 
air action.  He also provided another early articulation of the concept of the ‘inverted 
blockade’ (albeit without using the term), stating that, by bombing villages at irregular 
intervals:  
even though such attacks may not inflict heavy casualties, the enemy can be 
almost entirely denied access to his towns and villages, and be compelled to lie 
in concealment in the open country.  Exposed to the inclemencies of the 
weather, he may soon find life becoming unbearable.72 
Glubb followed this with an interesting statement: 
Very often the utmost that can be done is to deny them the use of their villages 
by bombing the latter at irregular intervals...  The only manner of bringing such 
peoples to surrender is by upsetting their daily lives, cutting off communications 
and preventing them from cultivating their crops or grazing their flocks.73 
Glubb noted that these air operations had often been stigmatised as ‘barbarous’ 
because they were liable to inflict casualties on the guilty and innocent alike, but 
challenged the assertion as being ‘usually made without a true knowledge of the 
facts’.  Rather, according to Glubb, air power was a less lethal approach which was 
advantageous because ‘the infliction of human casualties as tending to embitter the 
people against Government, is not only unnecessary but undesirable’.74  In his 
experience, given air power’s reputation, a show of force over a village followed by 
leaflet dropping often sufficed to bring about surrender but, if not, women and children 
were given time to leave.  One or two aircraft dropping two or three small bombs on 
the village usually caused the remaining inhabitants to bolt and scatter in the open 
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where the fugitives could be engaged by machine or Lewis guns, preferably by low-
flying aircraft who ‘should be able to distinguish men from women and children’.  Only 
in the case where the enemy had committed atrocities against Europeans or peaceful 
inhabitants would heavy bombing, without a warning, be justified and, even then, 
Glubb doubted that the resulting heavy casualties were any worse than long-range 
shelling.75  A clue to the pragmatic and unpartisan nature of Glubb’s view of the utility 
of air power is given by his warning that, against a deeply motivated tribesman, such 
as a religious fanatic supported by foreign propaganda or money, aircraft alone may 
not be sufficient and that ‘Against a determined and well disciplined enemy, the rifle 
and bayonet are, at present, the only finally decisive weapons’.76  Overall, Glubb’s 
paper is important, as it provided what is possibly the least partisan view of air power’s 
utility and also demonstrated the first signs of acknowledgement of the advantages of 
less lethal means, despite being bounded by the context of punitive expeditions. 
In 1927, Squadron Leader Hodsoll published the transcript of a USII lecture that 
he had given to the 1926 Army Staff College Course which repeated most of the 
themes from both ASM25 and Stevenson’s 1925 article.  He referenced them to Field 
Service Regulations, thereby providing officers in India with a consistent doctrine from 
both Army and RAF camps.77 
One of the last publications before CD22 was replaced by AP1300 was 
Squadron Leader Cyril Burge’s 1927 book, Basic Principles of Air Warfare, published 
                                                
75 Ibid.: 782. 
76 Ibid.: 783. 
77 Hodsoll, "Royal Air Force Co-operation with the Army: A Lecture Delivered at the Army 
Headquarters Staff College Course, 1926".  One additional emphasis from Hodsoll was that 
army co-operation squadrons should not be tasked with bombing raids and that requests for 
such strikes should be addressed to higher formations who would allocate special, 
independent, squadrons.  Hodsoll was a prolific contributor to the JUSII, having published an 
article on The Development of Co-operation between Aircraft and Tanks in 1925, Aircraft and 
Anti-Aircraft Defence in 1926 and, as will be discussed later, Some Notes on Air Matters 
Affecting India in 1928. 
Chapter 4 – RAF Tactics and Doctrine, 1922-28 
131 
under the pseudonym ‘Squadron Leader’.78  While the book does not address small 
wars, what nevertheless makes it particularly interesting is that Burge had been 
Trenchard’s Personal Assistant since August 1926, lending it an apparent semi-official 
status.  Burge’s views leaned more towards CD22 than the impending AP1300.  For 
example, he downplayed the efficacy of morale effect and air power’s ability to win 
wars independently, instead stating that the surest and quickest method of winning a 
war is to defeat the enemy’s armed forces.  These themes would seem to be at odds 
with the Air Staff’s championing of independent air operations and the importance 
consistently placed on morale effect.  Parton’s research revealed that, in fact, 
Trenchard had tried to ban the book from being published and did not want any 
officers to publish for fear of offending the other Services.79  So, the relevance of 
Basic Principles of Air Warfare to this Thesis is that, firstly, although there was not 
complete doctrinal homogeneity across the Air Ministry, any failure to ‘tow the party 
line’ was discouraged and, secondly, Trenchard’s sensitivity to inter-Service 
relationships.     
The last RUSI lecture before the publication of AP1300 was Wing Commander 
Richard Peck’s February 1928 “Aircraft in Small Wars”, given when he had been 
serving in the Air Ministry’s Directorate of Operations and Intelligence since November 
1927.80  Peck had experience of ‘small wars’, having served on the HQ RAF Iraq staff 
in 1922-24, and his position in the Ministry would have given him a detailed 
appreciation of developing doctrinal thinking within the Air Staff.  Despite his 
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disclaimer that his thoughts were ‘my own unaided handiwork’, they almost certainly 
reflected Trenchard’s thinking, especially given Burge’s recent publication.81  Peck’s 
presentation opened by highlighting that the subject had been marked by prolonged 
controversy.  Given that air control had by this time been established in Iraq, 
Transjordan, Palestine and Aden for some time, Peck focused on theatres where the 
primacy of air power had not been established, such as the NWF.  His presentation 
discussed how Western powers traditionally used superior equipment to counter the 
tribesmen’s local, irregular, advantages, but how this had been recently offset by the 
‘wild enemies’ obtaining long-range, accurate, rapid-firing rifles.  Of recent 
technological advances, ‘none is so admirably suited to warfare against wild men and 
in wild countries, as the aircraft – provided, of course, it is correctly employed’.82    
Aircraft could be employed in small wars in four broad ways: first, independently, with 
land forces relegated to protecting air bases; second, as the primary arm to break the 
enemy’s resistance (akin to a preliminary bombardment) with land forces clinching the 
victory; third, co-operating in a secondary role with expeditionary columns; and finally, 
in ancillary roles, such as communications, casualty evacuation and emergency 
resupply.83  Peck explained the embitterment generated by a punitive expedition 
whose aim was to bring the tribesmen to battle and to: 
take away from the poor, from the poorest men in the world, even that which 
they have... We must burn from his home and his goods and chattels and 
destroy his roof-tree in order to force him to fight.84   
Showing a significant understanding of the cause of the violence, Peck described that 
‘the cure for the trouble lay in making the country somehow self-supporting on the one 
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hand, and the process of raiding a less attractive pastime than trading’.85  However, 
the high cost of punitive columns limited the budget available for investing in social 
infrastructure.86  In contrast, ‘Air action does most definitely neither seek its effects nor 
secure them by the casualties it inflicts’ but rather by the moral effect of inducing 
‘intolerable inconvenience and hardship’ by driving livestock away and denying the 
use of tribal villages, forcing the villagers into caves, thereby disrupting normal life. 
Peck contended that the tribesman ‘endures it for a while, but as he sees little result 
for his shooting, he gets unendurably bored with the inconvenience out of which he 
gets no compensation... and after a while he is prepared to ask for terms’.87  Peck 
compares this moral pressure to ‘a blockade’, revealing that the Air Staff, again whilst 
not yet having adopted the term ‘inverted blockade’, were thinking in these terms.  He 
categorised the characteristics of air power in small wars as follows: it did not seek to 
cause casualties, but rather intolerable and unprofitable inconvenience; its swiftness 
could rapidly nip discontent in the bud and prevent it spreading; it was selective and 
could single out offending villages or tribes - bomb sights had improved and bombing 
was now a precision weapon; wholesale destruction could be avoided, unless it was 
essential (normally, small bombs were used, as the aim was to keep inhabitants out of 
the villages, but larger bombs were more powerful than artillery shells and could 
produce utter destruction); often, demonstration flights were sufficient to coerce the 
tribes into compliance; the lack of physical damage meant that animosity amongst the 
tribesmen was minimised; air power could be applied progressively and cheaply; and 
Air action involved no commitment and no risk of tactical defeat.  However, it took time 
to produce an effect, but was nevertheless effective and had an enduring effect 
because the tribesmen knew it could be swiftly re-applied.  To back up these claims, 
                                                
85 Ibid.: 541. 
86 £475,000 in 1916-17; £1,134,000 in 1917-18; and £16,000,000 in the 1920 Third  Afghan 
War.  See Ibid.: 540. 
87 Ibid.: 542. 
Chapter 4 – RAF Tactics and Doctrine, 1922-28 
134 
Peck cited ‘its astonishing success in Iraq’, ‘Pink’s War’ of 1925 and operations 
against the Mohmands in 1927.  The post-lecture ‘question and answer’ session was 
as interesting as Peck’s presentation.  The Chairman, Jack Salmond, thought that 
there was broad accord that the solution to unrest on the NWF was to bring 
‘civilisation’: while the employment of sufficient aircraft could stop tribesmen raiding 
the administrated plains, they could not bring civilisation alone; in contrast, the 
combination of land forces and road building (i.e., the Razmak policy) could bring 
civilisation, but was unaffordable.  Perhaps surprisingly, the Army officers in the 
audience largely supported Peck’s perspective; describing the NWF as ‘the greatest 
small war problem in the British Empire’, Colonel Robinson noted that all officers had 
‘a tremendous admiration for the achievements of the Royal Air Force in India’ and 
supported Peck’s view that military control merely addressed the symptoms and that 
an economic solution for the cause of unrest was necessary.88  Colonel Howard 
challenged Peck’s contention that the aircraft was undervalued in small wars: ‘I think 
there he is wrong.  In the Army it is very much appreciated’.89  Howard also noted that 
aircraft terrified and dispersed hostile tribesmen, making air attack an unsuitable 
opening tactic if the aim was to bring the enemy to battle against ground troops.   
Howard concluded: 
If aircraft can do the work entirely on their own and produce decisive results, 
which they can in many cases, let them do so; but if it is thought they cannot by 
themselves produce decisive results, it is, in my opinion, wrong to take air action 
(except of course reconnaissance) before attacking with ground troops.90 
This discourse is important and revealing on several levels.  Peck was clearly 
expecting a hostile Army audience (his opening remarks include the statement that ‘I 
do not think that good co-operation and the solution of important imperial problems 
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are to be attained by the primrose path of mutual admiration’).91  This may have been 
because, as an Air Ministry staff officer, he would have been well aware of the political 
animosity between the Imperial General Staff (IGS) and the Air Staff over the subject.  
Yet, the Indian-experienced middle-ranking Army officers in the audience were 
surprisingly receptive and readily acknowledged air power’s virtues, both as an 
independent role and in co-operation with the Army.  From this, it appears probable 
that good inter-Service co-operation was already de rigueur at the tactical, formation 
level in India.  Additionally, Howard’s observation about aircraft causing tribesmen to 
disperse raises the question of whether the RAF’s doctrinal shift away from inflicting 
casualties and towards what would become the ‘inverted blockade’ was the result of 
aircraft’s inability to cause casualties or the Air Staff’s desire to become (and be seen 
as becoming) more humane.  It may well have been a mixture of both. 
It would be misleading to paint a picture that there was complete tactical-level 
accord over RAF co-operation with the Army.  There was widespread feeling within 
the Army in the late 1920s that it should possess its own Air Arm, effectively 
subsuming the RAF’s army co-operation squadrons.  This was no doubt emboldened 
by similar aspirations by the Royal Navy over control of the Fleet Air Arm.  The 
controversy was ably summarised by Major Strover of the 3/20th Burma Rifles in his 
April 1928 JRUSI article, “An Army Air Arm”.92  Strover explained that an Army Air 
Arm, piloted by Army officers, would be advantageous because Army commanders 
could exercise ‘better’ control over it and that the Army pilots would work better with 
Army officers.  However, Strover acknowledged that the same ends could be largely 
achieved if the RAF placed its army co-operation squadrons under Army command at 
the outbreak of war.  There were, however, significant challenges: the Army was 
unlikely to be able to recruit sufficient pilots (as aspiring aviators would be attracted to 
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Cranwell rather than Sandhurst); the RAF’s goodwill would likely be compromised; 
and co-operation was not a natural trait of Army officers, having been nurtured by the 
public school system to be ‘loyal to his own particular crowd while regarding the other 
crowd with tolerant and good natured contempt’.93  Overall, Strover concluded that it 
was ‘most unwise to attempt to establish an Army Air Arm’.  Nonetheless, the Air Staff 
would, no doubt, have been wary of these Army aspirations and the potential 
concomitant loss of control over a substantial element of its squadrons.  Indeed, part 
of the RAF’s enthusiasm for detailed army co-operation doctrine may well have been 
generated by the desire to demonstrate that it could ably support the Army, thereby 
countering the arguments that the Army could implement the role any more effectively. 
One of the last publicly published articles prior to the issue of AP1300 was 
Squadron Leader Hodsoll’s wide-ranging JUSII paper, “Some Notes on Air Matters 
Affecting India”.94  One part of his article focused on the NWF, noting that the RAF 
could potentially assume the major responsibility for the defence of the 
unadministered agencies following the ‘highly successful’ implementation of air control 
in Iraq and Aden.  Hodsoll acknowledged that the aim was ‘to introduce civilisation 
where none exists’ by building roads, but claimed that air power could conduct 
punitive operations relatively economically and, as civilisation encroached as the road 
network expanded, garrisons could be withdrawn, replaced by an expanded 
Khassadar force backed by the RAF conducting extended patrols, operating via a 
network of landing grounds.  For the first time, air power was described as being used 
to ‘police’ the unadministered agencies.  Hodsoll’s article was not universally 
accepted; Major Wilkinson of the 2nd Bombay Pioneers wrote to the USII expressing 
doubt that aircraft alone could repel foreign aggression or subdue a widespread 
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uprising.95  Countering this claim later in 1930, ASM48 would emphasise how even 
the British Army’s 60,000 troops required reinforcements from India during the 1920 
insurrection in the lower Euphrates.96  While acknowledging air power’s efficacy in 
punitive operations, Wilkinson claimed that this role had not proved to be the quickest 
or most economical method of dealing with disturbances which were disappearing as 
road-building pacified the NWF tribesmen.97  Interestingly, Wilkinson focused 
predominantly on air power’s kinetic effect, which may be a reflection of the Army’s 
perspective on the main use of the RAF on the Frontier. 
AP1300 – ROYAL AIR FORCE WAR MANUAL, 1928 
As described earlier, the doctrine articulated in the hastily prepared CD22 had been 
swiftly overtaken by developing doctrine.  Despite becoming outdated, it remained 
extant until withdrawn in 1926 because, Parton posed, it had rapidly ceased to reflect 
the views of the Air Staff.98  However, its replacement, AP1300, The RAF War 
Manual, was not published until July 1928, the hiatus between these two major 
doctrines being filled by the derived doctrinal publications discussed above.   
AP1300 was significantly different to CD22 and reflected the rapid development 
in aerial doctrine.  Not only was the new War Manual considerably larger than its 
predecessor, but its content was far more air-focused.99  AP1300 contained new, air-
centric chapters on Air Warfare, Air Bombardment, Air Fighting, Air Attacks on 
Aerodromes, and Air Operations in Undeveloped and Semi-civilised Countries, 
reflecting significant doctrinal changes.  Previous themes such as the main objective 
of an air force being the destruction of the enemy air force were replaced by 
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statements such as ‘The bomb is the chief weapon of an air force and the principal 
means by which it may attain its aim in war’.100  Indeed, three months after AP1300 
was published, Trenchard explained the reasons for this policy to the Imperial 
Defence College, emphasising that the Air Force’s main offensive would be against 
centres essential for the continuance of the enemy’s resistance and not against his air 
forces – a policy with which all three Service Chiefs agreed.101  Moreover, this subject 
was apparently very much ‘in the spotlight’ as, two months later in December 1928, 
Group Captain MacNeece Foster gave a similar, but unclassified, lecture at RUSI.102  
AP1300 categorised RAF duties as bombing, fighting, co-operation with the Navy and 
Army, and transportation.  Air superiority was now viewed as an enabling function to 
allow sustained air operations and provide the other Services with immunity from air 
attack, supported by statements such as ‘Security can be assured by the complete 
destruction of the enemy air forces’.103  The offensive use of air power was a prime 
theme, with the prime vehicle being the bomber.  Targets were grouped roughly into 
five classes according to their susceptibility to different types of bomb.104  AP1300 was 
littered with phrases advocating the offence, such as: 
The maxim that offence is the best defence applies even more truly to air 
warfare than any other operation of war...  maintaining the initiative in offence 
with all its strategical and tactical advantages.105 
the strategical offensive is mainly conducted by the bomber aircraft about whom 
most of the fighting will centre.106 
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The principal aim of bomber aircraft in all air bombardment operations, is to 
deliver the bomb at the decisive point in the most efficient manner possible.107 
the bombardment of the most vital and vulnerable ... centres may be more 
effective and decisive than the direct attack on naval and military forces.108 
Although the bombardment of suitable objectives should result in considerable 
material damage and loss, the most important and far-reaching effect of air 
bombardment is its moral effect.109 
Against all objectives where moral effect is the main aim, air bombardment 
should be as sustained as possible.110 
Compared with CD22, a clear shift in the RAF’s strategic culture away from air 
superiority and towards the independent application of strategic air power for 
cognitive, morale effect can be detected.  Against this, it is not difficult to imagine the 
likely tensions between the RAF and the Army on the NWF, when the Army expected 
the RAF to deliver local, tactical, material effect. 
AP1300’s Chapter XII on ‘Aircraft in Co-operation with the Army’ reflected the 
forerunning ‘derived doctrine’ expounded by ASM25, Stevenson and Gossage.  This 
illustrates that some ASMs, such as ASM25, were being used to modify existing 
doctrine (in this example, CD22) which was subsequently subsumed into the next 
issue of the high-level doctrine (i.e., AP1300).  Unfortunately, the archive does not 
record when ASM25 was withdrawn, so it is not possible to analyse how closely the 
issue of new high-level doctrine was co-ordinated with the withdrawal of less formal, 
derived doctrinal publications.  Chapter XII explained that aircraft allotted to an Army 
formation were placed under the orders of the Army C-in-C and could consist of (i) 
bomber and fighter squadrons and (ii) army co-operation squadrons.  The principal 
task of the bomber and fighter squadrons, operating under the direct control of GHQ, 
and ‘the most valuable contribution that the air forces can make to the success of the 
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military operations’ was to gain air superiority and therefore prevent the enemy’s 
aircraft from impacting upon friendly forces’ freedom of action.111  Additionally, 
bombers could be employed as long-range artillery, while fighters could be used for 
low-flying attacks against ground targets.  In contrast, the army co-operation 
squadrons would provide direct assistance to troops by means of reconnaissance and 
observation, and could be allotted to subordinate formations, especially during rapidly 
moving operations.  The dropping of supplies was briefly mentioned, probably 
reflecting the recommendation that army co-operation aircraft should only be used in 
this role ‘in very exceptional circumstances’.112  Overall, this chapter, with all its 
caveats, conveys a very realistic and measured view of army co-operation which 
would indicate a close liaison between the General and Air Staff during its production. 
Chapter XIV on ‘Air Operations in Undeveloped and Semi-civilised Countries’, 
like Chapter XII, reflected many of the themes of the post-CD22 minor doctrinal 
publications.  However, in looking at these operations more holistically, it provided a 
fresh overview of the RAF’s approach to this subject.  The chapter is AP1300’s 
largest, making up 13% of the publication (excluding appendices).  If recent RAF 
doctrine can be used as a benchmark, the length of these chapters reflected the 
importance attached to the role by the Air Staff.113  Although the temptation to 
transpose current sensitivities about socially or institutionally offensive language onto 
historical situations is best avoided, it is nevertheless interesting that the use of the 
term ‘enemy’ is consistently used in this chapter to describe members of the 
population (who in most situations would also be crown citizens) who did not comply 
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with civil law.  Indeed, the term is used sixty-two times in the chapter’s sixteen pages, 
although it was, no doubt, being used as a relativist term for an adversary.  As with 
CD22, the term ‘small war’ is notable by its absence, despite its common use in the 
contemporary lexicon.  The chapter remained generic and did not focus on ‘air control’ 
(a command relationship, rather than a tactic), although the doctrine would have been 
applicable to such situations.  The chapter covered air operations against an enemy 
who had little or no industrial organisation and a comparatively primitive political 
system but who were operating in country familiar to themselves and ill-suited to 
modern arms.  The chapter was divided into several sections covering: ‘The 
Characteristics of Operations against a Semi-Civilised Enemy’; ‘General Effect of the 
Employment of Aircraft’; ‘The Selection of Objectives in Air Operations’; ‘Methods of 
Air Attack’; ‘Aircraft in Co-operation with Land Forces’; ‘Air Operations in Support of 
Land Operations’; and ‘Employment of Air Forces in Support of Civil Administration’.  
The doctrine emphasised that the principles described in the rest of AP1300 held true, 
but that their application needed to be largely modified.  One of the most significant 
new themes was the categorisation of air operations against a semi-civilised enemy 
into two distinct aims: subduing a turbulent or troublesome people on or beyond a 
country’s frontiers; and creating or restoring law and order within a country’s borders.  
AP1300 recognised that the main challenges of this form of warfare were, for the 
Army, the natural difficulties of movement and communications (noting that ‘The most 
determined foes are generally those who inhabit the least accessible localities’) and, 
for the Air Force, the lack of vulnerable objectives.114  Indeed, the normal absence of 
targets was the reason for focusing on morale effect via the interruption of normal life; 
where ‘proper’ targets were present, the strategy would differ little from major wars.115  
The chapter set these operations in a wider context by pointing out that the aim was to 
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‘induce the enemy to submit, with the minimum destruction of life and property and 
with due regard to economy in time money and energy’.116  Efficient intelligence was 
described as ‘essential’ (but with little further elucidation), and firm, immediate action 
could stop unrest from spreading.117  As in several of the previous minor doctrinal 
publications, semi-civilised ‘enemies’ were characterised as regarding war ‘rather in 
the light of a game’ which involved inflicting casualties, capturing loot and outwitting 
their opponents, while it was claimed that aircraft could place these inducements out 
of reach.  Although aircraft could react quickly, AP1300 warned that the temptation to 
act quickly should be avoided until political means had been exhausted.118  While 
timely airborne demonstrations could prevent the outbreak of hostilities, AP1300 took 
a more brutal approach than Glubb; lethal force could be applied with as much or little 
warning as required.  Similarly, surprise attacks against a concentrated enemy could 
inflict effective casualties.119  While this might be necessary in punitive operations, it 
could be counter-productive if the district was to be re-settled and could create the 
conditions for continued lawlessness.120  Nonetheless, AP1300 offered that the most 
effective tactic was to drop warnings to disperse the enemy from their villages and 
fields, indefinitely interrupting normal tribal life by persistent aerial harassment.  Crops 
were described as difficult to destroy effectively from the air, leaving the inhabitants 
and their possessions as the primary air objectives.  The enemy fighting force seldom 
presented a suitable objective for attack unless forced to converge on ‘focal points’ 
such as mountain passes.121  Because the success of air operations was dependent 
on moral effect, any suspension of attacks would reduce air power’s effectiveness.122  
Overall, AP1300 stated that, where the ‘enemy’ was dependent on settled activities 
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and possessions, the independent use of air power could achieve the aim unaided.  
However, some conditions were challenging for air power, such as close or broken 
country, an opponent with few territorial ties or possessions, or where friendly and 
hostile tribes were intermixed.  In these conditions, AP1300 recommended that it was 
best to combine the mobility of aircraft with the direct action of troops, with the Air 
Force either co-operating with, or indirectly supporting, ground forces.  Thus, the 
chapter contains some inconsistencies, as the acknowledged general lack of material 
objectives would indicate that the independent use of air power would not be as 
effective as joint air-land operations, except perhaps in purely punitive operations.123   
Chapter XIV’s section on the ‘Methods of Air Attack’ included relatively little new 
material.  The need for accurate weapon delivery was emphasised, along with the 
complications caused by the lack of accurate maps and featureless terrain, which 
could be mitigated by airmen developing local knowledge of the country.  Night 
bombardment was important in denying tribesmen respite and could be of particularly 
high moral value; when impractical, long-delay fuzes could, as in CD22, achieve 
similar results.  Advice on weapon-to-target matching was provided in marginally more 
detail than CD22, but much less than in ASM19. 
‘Air Co-operation with land forces’ in undeveloped and semi-civilised countries 
was also covered in Chapter XIV, which opened with a statement that the principles 
remain the same as in Chapter XII, but that their application varied due to the 
differences in the nature of the operations, the topography and the opponents’ 
weapons.  Significantly, the lack of aerial opposition would allow aircraft to conduct 
direct co-operation unhampered.  The main duties of aircraft in this role were to locate 
the enemy, support friendly troops and observe artillery fire, duties which, in close, 
mountainous or unmapped country, presented challenges not encountered in major 
wars.  By using aircraft to search reverse slopes, the Army commander might be able 
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to reduce the number of picquetting troops and aerial support could be particularly 
effective in stiffening the resolve of irregular or inexperienced native troops.  However, 
using aircraft to observe artillery fire could be challenging due to the steep slopes.  As 
the opportunities for directly attacking the enemy could be fleeting due to their use of 
terrain and the difficulty in differentiating between the enemy and the local population, 
all aircraft, irrespective of their primary role, should engage the enemy with bombs or 
machine-gun fire when the opportunity presented itself.  Advanced aerodromes should 
be established as near as possible to the fighting troops to balance the competing 
requirements of security and logistics afforded by centralised airfields against the 
need for close liaison and consultation with Army personnel.  An Air Force liaison 
officer should accompany an advancing column to advise the Army commander, 
select advanced aerodromes and maintain W/T contact with both the nearest 
aerodrome and airborne aircraft.124  The issue of how to deal with captured personnel 
was addressed.  AP1300 strongly recommended that this should not be allowed to 
influence the conduct of any operation, a policy which, it offered, would be the best 
protection for captured prisoners.125  In contrast, the Army had a history of appearing 
embarrassed by the ramifications of captured aircrew to the extent, at times, of 
appearing to prefer to accept friendly casualties rather than air support.126    
AP1300’s Chapter XIV also described ‘Air operations in support of land 
operations’, which it defined as any of a multitude of indirect methods to facilitate the 
progress of land operations.  These could range from direct attacks to reduce the 
strength or morale of enemy forces, through the swift support of isolated army 
                                                
124 Nonetheless, two-way W/T contact with aircraft was not always possible in mountainous 
terrain, so aircraft might have to communicate with troops by message-dropping, although the 
picking up of messages by aircraft was often impracticable and AP1300 recommended that 
visual signalling should always be available. 
125 Air Ministry, AP 1300, Ch XIV, para 37-46. 
126 For example, two aircraft force landed during operations against the Mahsud in 1923; ‘Their 
capture caused much embarrassment to the GOC the Waziristan Force in his conduct of the 
operations’.  See IOR/L/MIL/7/16930, General Lord Rawlinson, Despatch by His Excellency 
General Lord Rawlinson of Trent, Commander-in-Chief in India on the Operations of the 
Waziristan Force for the period 1st January 1922 to 20th April 1923, 25 July 1923, 3. 
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garrisons, to communications and emergency resupply by parachute.  Air patrols over 
lines of communication could deter attacks on convoys and, the chapter offered, 
repeated appearances could influence neighbouring tribes to remain neutral.  
‘Ancillary’ services, such as rapid troop transportation, could be decisive while 
casualty evacuation could avoid the embarrassment associated with a ‘modern’ 
suffering significant casualties against a semi-civilised opponent.  From the duties 
listed, it appears that the main differentiation between the ‘co-operating’ and ‘support’ 
roles was the command relationship, with co-operating aircraft being controlled by the 
Army commander, while the ‘supporting’ aircraft were tasked independently, although 
this is not explicitly stated.  Interestingly, all these support roles have been used in the 
recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Chapter XIV’s section on the ‘Employment of Air Forces in support of Civil 
Administration’ was one of the first direct articulations of this role.  Although only five 
paragraphs long, it conveyed an uncompromising approach with no recognition of the 
dilemma of using force to maintain civil order.  Instead, law and order in an 
‘uncivilized’ country required sound and ‘strong administration’; the native would judge 
the authorities by ‘its capacity to mete out suitable and adequate punishment without 
delay’.127  The approach was not completely brutal, however, and AP1300 underlined 
that air bombardment could have a high moral effect without excessive material 
damage. Indeed, it recommended that casualties within women and children should 
be avoided by dropping warnings.  Furthermore, the limitations of the use of air power 
were recognised, such as its inability to identify insurgents in ‘close country’ or to 
distinguish them from friendly civilians in towns, with the statement that, in these 
circumstances, ‘air bombardment is less suitable than military action’.128  Nonetheless, 
it was caveated that, in normal circumstances, air action was effective without being 
                                                
127 Air Ministry, AP 1300, para 51. 
128 Ibid., 52. 
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too severe.  This first attempt at the articulation of doctrine for maintaining civil order 
was not only brief, but also focused purely on the effect of bombardment, which was 
arguably the least appropriate air capability. 
It would appear that many of the tactics outlined in AP1300 reflected 
contemporary practice in India, although there is little evidence of its hard line over 
casualties; indeed, evidence suggests that the main effect intended was the 
dislocation of everyday life.  According to Bowyer, the diary of an RAF officer in India 
from the late 1920s recorded: 
the Political Agent (PA) would summon the tribal leaders to a jirga (meeting) at 
which he would tax them with their sins and pronounce government penalty – 
usually a fine of rifles and/or rupees...  The PA would then issue his ultimatum 
which normally gave the tribes another week in which to get to their caves in the 
nearby hills habitable. The day before this ultimatum expired squadrons would 
demonstrate over the village and drop leaflets tied to small pieces of rock and 
containing a reminder that all women and children should be removed.  The fact 
that nobody could read was immaterial – everyone knew the rules.  The war 
would last anything up to a fortnight before the tribesmen would indicate their 
willingness to try and raise the necessary (fines).  It was generally accepted that 
the surrender was not brought about by the bombing, most of which made little 
impression on the strongly-built forts and towers, but by the myriad vermin which 
infested the hill caves!129 
Overall, AP1300’s chapter on Undeveloped and Semi-civilised Countries was 
evolutionary rather than revolutionary.  Whilst more detailed and embellished than the 
equivalent CD22 chapter (having sixteen pages versus CD22’s nine), it had a less 
idealistic tone, with a willingness to note the limitations of air power in this role.  This 
was largely gained from experience from areas under air control during the six years 
since CD22 had been published.  There were a limited number of new themes, such 
as the use of air power to support the civil administration, but the doctrine still 
advocated the infliction of mass casualties, when appropriate and achievable, with the 
onus for avoiding casualties amongst women and children being placed on the tribes 
                                                
129 Bowyer, RAF Operations 1918-1938, 213-214.  Frustratingly, Bowyer’s book is of a genre 
and era that did not use accurate references.  It is possible that Bowyer used personal 
interviews and had access to individuals’ diaries that are not accessible in the archives.  
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willingness to heed warning notices.  Where casualties or physical destruction could 
not be achieved due to the lack of vulnerable targets, coercive effect was 
administered through the dislocation of normal life, although it appears that the main 
driver for this latter, less lethal, application of air power was the inability to inflict 
casualties once tribes had dispersed rather than a desire to avoid them.  Perhaps 
understandably, AP1300 lagged behind the cutting edge ideas, as articulated by 
Glubb and Peck, for example, and failed to fully recognise the growing influence of 
public demand for the humane application of air power.  AP1300’s absence of the 
themes elucidated by Peck probably reflects the latency in the process of producing 
publications when doctrine was developing rapidly.  Nonetheless, it is clear that the 
tone of RAF doctrine had been subtly changed by its practical experience since CD22 
had been published.  
CONCLUSION 
CD22 was rapidly overtaken by developing doctrine.  Air control in Iraq and 
Transjordan provided the RAF with evidence to counter Army claims that air power 
was ‘untested’.  Air Staff doctrine began by calling for substitution of land forces, with 
the Army relegated to protecting aerodromes and a focus on the relative invulnerability 
of aircraft and their ability to swiftly nip unrest in the bud.  However, in practice, AOCs 
often made good use of joint forces, mitigating the risk to ground expeditions by their 
use of aircraft, allowing audacious operations.  The practice of demonstration flights 
developed (with an appreciation of avoiding their over-use) along with the use of 
leaflets to communicate intent to the tribes.130  It became clear that bombing made 
tribesmen disperse and caused limited material damage, and doctrine rapidly 
developed to use this initial disadvantage to good effect by focusing on the dislocation 
                                                
130 Currently known as ‘Shows of Force’ in the current military lexicon. 
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of normal tribal life, thereby reinforcing the importance of morale effect.  This led to a 
lack of focus on precision bombing, with aircraft releasing from a safe (inaccurate) 
height.  A highly developed intelligence service was required to support this coercive 
strategy by judging the offending tribe’s mood during these ‘blockade’ operations, 
although it was acknowledged that religious fanatics were challenging.  Accusations of 
the brutality of bombing, especially towards women and children, resulted in an 
increasingly political emphasis on the use of minimum force, legitimacy and civil-
military distinction, which nested comfortably with ‘dislocation’ rather than destruction.  
Nonetheless, morale effect remained the key theme.  This relied on the tribes’ 
understanding of the potency of air power and their lack of opportunity for loot and 
sport.  To support this, RAF doctrine did not shy from the sudden use of lethal force, 
including delayed-action bombs and incendiaries.  The RAF countered the threat of 
the Army ‘penny packeting’ by calling for close political control of the use of aircraft via 
the AOC, thereby circumventing Army control to some extent.  By the end of the 
period, in-theatre airmen were expressing an understanding that air power could not 
address the root cause of the NWF ‘problem’, but could support the policy of road 
building and reduce the requirement for expensive military garrisons.  
Joint operations were not without issues.  Tribesmen became adept at 
concealment and aircraft had difficulty in differentiating friend from foe.  This required 
army co-operation aircraft to conduct low-altitude, precision attacks and risked the 
embarrassment of capturing aircrew.  Additionally, aircraft had limited loiter time and 
air-ground communications were challenging.  However, aerial reconnaissance, 
limited troop transportation and casualty evacuation had become demonstrated 
capabilities, as had the ability for limited aerial resupply. 
It is also clear that, while there was significant disagreement between the Air 
Staff and the IO, in-theatre units co-operated effectively, with army co-operation 
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squadrons falling under the direction of their associated Army formation, although the 
need for an Army air arm was occasionally voiced. 
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CHAPTER 5 – RAF TACTICS AND DOCTRINE, 1928-39 
INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter examines the factors that shaped the evolution of RAF small wars 
doctrine following the publication of AP1300.  The discussion over substitution was re-
ignited by Trenchard as he left office in 1929, resulting in a Manichean response from 
some Army quarters and even calls for the re-absorption of the RAF into its parent 
Services, with India being at the centre of this storm.  The Geneva Conferences also 
raised the debate over the humanity of air power.  These factors, combined with in-
theatre opportunities, resulted in a further broadening and deepening of air power 
small war doctrine: a broadening to encompass less kinetic, ethically justifiable roles; 
and a deepening to underpin existing and evolving roles with critically-examined 
examples.  However, towards the end of the 1930s, a combination of needs and 
adaptable personalities resulted in doctrinal convergence in India with the publication 
of the Combined Frontier Manual. 
MINOR DOCTRINAL PUBLICATIONS 
In late 1928, the CID distributed an Air Staff memorandum concerning the regulation 
of air control in undeveloped countries.  Over 160 copies were distributed, including 
fifty ‘for information’ copies to India.1  The two-page document discussed the primacy 
of air power’s moral effect , explaining that it could be intangible and difficult to 
                                                
1 AIR 9/12, E20; IOR/L/PS/12/1957, Air Staff, Notes by the Air Staff on the Regulation of Air 
Control in Undeveloped Countries, 21 November 1928, 133; IOR/L/PS/12/1957, J C Walton, 
Memo, India Office to Secretary of the Government of India, Foreign & Political Department, 18 
June 1929; IOR/L/PS/12/1957, Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, Distribution List 
of the Memorandum Prepared by the Air Staff on the Regulation of Air Control in Undeveloped 
Countries, 19 December 1929; IOR/L/PS/12/1957, J G Laithewaite, Memo, India Office to 
Secretary, Committee for Imperial Defence, 16 January 1930.  The Memo appears to have 
been well received by the GoI, as they distributed their copies to all Residents, Chief 
Commissioners, Political Agents, consuls, the GS(India) and GOCs and their deputies (but not 
RAF(India)) and subsequently asked for an additional twenty copies. 
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understand compared to land operations, because it often lacked attributes such as 
defined phases, columns of troops, friendly casualties and close-quarter combat.  The 
application of the desired moral effect depended on intimate co-operation between the 
RAF commander and the local political authorities.  Indeed, the Air Staff drew a 
parallel between air power and diplomacy, claiming that their coercive natures were 
very similar, depending on the opponent being unsure as to the lengths the British 
were prepared to go to in order to achieve their aims, or what the next steps would be.  
Departing from the previous doctrine, the Air Staff now recommended a cessation of 
hostilities when the moral effect was deemed to be affecting the tribesmen’s normal 
mode of life to allow negotiations to take place, thereby avoiding unnecessary 
prolongation of the offensive – a theme which would prove controversial.  Additionally, 
the AOC’s dependency on the Intelligence Service to achieve a quick, economical and 
humane outcome was mentioned, along with the need for rapid political decision-
making.  The aim was to be able to deliver ‘retribution’ at a range of 200 to 300 miles 
within 12 to 24 hours of its sanction, thereby avoiding the long delays normally 
associated with punitive columns.  The need to avoid limiting air power’s potential by 
constraining it to tactical defensive actions in confined geographic areas was 
highlighted, with a recommendation that it be allowed the necessary freedom of 
manoeuvre and used as an offensive tool. 
Despite being published in July 1928, it is apparent that AP1300’s Chapter XIV 
on Undeveloped and Semi-civilized Countries was rapidly deemed to be in need of 
modification.  Someone was at work in the Air Ministry on New Year’s Day 1929 to 
publish ASM41: Some Points on the Administration of Air Control in Undeveloped 
Countries.2  This confidential document was written to be read in conjunction with 
AP1300 and described ‘certain basic principles which have emerged as a result of 
                                                
2 The author was possibly Wing Commander Peck or Squadron Leader Slessor.  See The 
Monthly Air Force List,  (London: HMSO, 1929). 
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recent experience’.  Despite AP1300 mentioning the morale effect of air power fifteen 
times in Chapter XIV, ASM41 started by repeating this now familiar theme, possibly 
due to continued comment about the limited physical effects of air bombardment: 
The aim of air action is the moral attack upon the nerves, the habits, and the 
means of livelihood of the peoples... it inflicts neither great nor permanent 
suffering.3 
ASM41’s second theme, mentioned in less detail in AP1300, was the need for the 
closest relationship between the RAF Commander and the political (rather than 
military) authority.  Because the moral impact of air action upon the ‘enemy’ was less 
physically apparent and tangible than the normal objectives of the Army or Navy, the 
political authority’s intimate knowledge of the enemy’s habits and characteristics was 
essential in judging when air action should be ‘imposed, extended or suspended’ while 
keeping the enemy uncertain of how the authorities were prepared to go to achieve 
their objectives.  The third theme was more novel.  Previously, intelligence had only 
been mentioned in passing (although AP1300 acknowledged it was ‘essential’).4  
However, ASM41 emphasised the role of intelligence in understanding the enemy and 
in judging his changing state of morale as a coercive air campaign progressed.  
Additionally, when necessary, swift air action could achieve a significant moral effect 
but was dependent on ‘a corresponding rapidity in the service of information’.5  But 
swift intelligence was not in itself enough; the fourth theme was the need for a rapid 
decision-making process to match the speed and tempo of air operations, something 
that was, again, dependent on an intimate relationship between the RAF Commander 
and the civil authorities.  ASM41’s final theme was that aircraft were inherently 
offensive; when used defensively, they required room for manoeuvre to break up 
enemy formations in a manner akin to offensive action.  Importantly, there was also a 
                                                
3 AIR 9/28, Air Staff, Air Staff Memorandum 41: Some Points on the Administration of Air 
Control in Undeveloped Countries, 1 January 1929, 1. 
4 Air Ministry, AP 1300, Ch XIV, para 7. 
5 Air Staff, ASM 41, 3. 
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forthright statement that it could not restore order in cities (any more than artillery 
could) due to the collateral damage resulting from bombardment in densely populated 
areas.  Published just five months after AP1300, ASM41 demonstrated how the Air 
Staff was rapidly adapting and evolving RAF doctrine to be more widely acceptable, 
while not shying away from clearly stating the limits of the aeroplane.  Perhaps most 
importantly, it is clear that the RAF wanted its squadrons in undeveloped countries to 
be directly accountable to the political authorities, rather than being subordinated to 
the Army – something that was at times a distinct point of friction on the NWF, as 
discussed later. 
ASM41 was superseded in March 1930 by Slessor’s similarly-named ASM46: 
Notes on Air Control of Undeveloped Countries.6  Like its predecessor, its aim was to 
supplement Chapter XIV of AP1300 and make all RAF officers aware of the theory 
and development of air control policy.  This was something the Air Staff appeared to 
want all its officers to be able to clearly articulate, no doubt to counter criticism from 
the other Services.  Indeed, the ASM’s tone is adversarial, consistently highlighting 
the disadvantages of land operations and the advantages of air power while 
countering contemporary criticisms of air control.  Like its predecessor, its title was 
slightly misleading, in that it focused neither exclusively on air control nor 
‘undeveloped’ countries; the general principles applied to the NWF and semi-civilised 
societies and there were several direct references to the Indian Frontier.  It was, 
however, significantly longer and more detailed than ASM41 (12½ versus 3½ pages). 
Unsurprisingly, all the main themes from ASM41 persisted into ASM46.  
However, ASM46 expanded upon them.  Air Commanders needed to be familiar with 
any conflict’s political dimensions to judge when the ‘moral end’ had been reached 
                                                
6 AIR 9/28, ———, Air Staff Memorandum 46: Notes on Air Control of Undeveloped Countries, 
24 March 1930; AIR 75/29, Wing Commander J C Slessor, Letter, Officer Commanding 
3(Indian) Wing to Air Commodore Bertie Sutton, Senior Air Staff Officer, HQ RAF India, 15 
April 1935, 2.  Slessor’s biography is at Annex 7. 
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and offensive operations should be suspended.  The ASM noted that the expression 
‘moral effect’ was frequently misunderstood and referred not to the immediate reaction 
to high explosives but to the cumulative effect of fear, boredom, acute discomfort, 
material loss and feeling of impotence as a result of the complete dislocation of 
normal life.  Claims that air control was ‘an impersonal mechanical system which is 
lacking in the important elements of sympathy and understanding of tribal politics and 
conditions’ were ‘a complete misapprehension of air methods’;7 instead, intelligence 
endowed the Air Commander and political officers with ‘an intimate understanding of 
the habits and mentality of the tribes’.8   
ASM46 contained additional themes to those of ASM41 (although several of 
these were not new), such as: ‘control without occupation’ (the substitution of 
antagonistic garrisons by aircraft); and economy (whereby the aeroplane’s speed and 
range allowed it to rapidly project effects over a wide area with a small force from 
secure airfields or advanced landing grounds, avoiding vulnerable lines of 
communication).  Additionally, in punitive operations, it was vital to decide whether the 
air or land forces would have ‘primacy’.  The aim of ground operations was to compel 
the tribesmen to concentrate (by threatening that which they treasured) so decisive 
casualties could be inflicted.  In contrast, air power’s moral effect was achieved by 
forcing the tribesmen to disperse from their villages.  Therefore, if land forces had 
primacy, air action should conform with the military tactical plan and not be applied too 
early, lest the enemy disperse.  The ASM recommended that tribal ‘outrages’ should 
be sharply punished without negotiation.  However, in most cases, the escalatory 
methods of negotiation, leaflet dropping, demonstration flights, and bombing carefully 
selected objectives, all judged against the changing morale of the tribe, were effective.  
Leaflets could also be used to deter neighbouring tribes from harbouring offenders.  
                                                
7 Air Staff, ASM 46, 8-9. 
8 Ibid., 9. 
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ASM46 highlighted that the relative invulnerability of aircraft denied the tribesmen the 
‘sport’ and ‘loot’ of conflict, thereby removing much of the inducement for neighbouring 
tribes to become involved and localising any unrest.9  It rejected the criticism that air 
bombardment was unjustifiably brutal.  Loss of life was ‘very much less than in military 
operations on the ground’ on both sides and ‘there is no doubt that the control of 
turbulent tribesmen from the air is more merciful’ than garrisoning; all warlike 
operations inevitably inflicted casualties on women, children and non-combatants, 
including punitive expeditions and naval blockades.  However, the aim of air 
operations was not to inflict casualties, and invariably warning notices were dropped 
instructing women and children to be removed.  The increasing accuracy of bombing 
had dispelled the accusation that bombing was indiscriminate or alienated the tribes.  
Indeed, witnesses had testified to the exact contrary: air action ‘leaves no special 
legacy of hate, and causes no personal rancour or retaliation on women or other 
individuals’.10  Another theme was that, whilst a ‘salutary and lasting lesson’ might 
occasionally be required, the tribesmen had to be governed subsequently.  To achieve 
this, air operations should be confined ‘to the minimum consistent with the object’ and, 
once terms had been accepted, medical assistance should be rendered whenever 
‘necessary and possible’.11  ASM46’s final theme was important and concerned aerial 
communications.  Aircraft improved political contact with the tribes which increased 
the personal influence of the political officers, allowing disputes to be resolved without 
resorting to armed force.  Similarly, aerial reconnaissance of roads and police posts 
facilitated inter-unit communication while simultaneously deterring offenders from 
interfering with traffic. 
                                                
9  Ibid., 13-14.  Harris had articulated this theme as ‘no honour, glory, or loot, to be obtained 
from opposing the air’ in his 1929 individual student essay while at Army Staff College.  See 
Harris, "Air Control in Iraq, and Elsewhere": 4. 
10 Air Staff, ASM 46, 12-13. 
11 Ibid., 14. 
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Overall, ASM46 demonstrated the continued progressive development of RAF 
doctrine.  The interweaving of NWF examples in a publication ostensibly about air 
control hints at RAF ambitions to further air control.  Indeed, four months earlier, just 
prior to his retirement, Trenchard had published his ‘swansong’, The Fuller 
Employment of Air Power in Imperial Defence, in which he proposed, amongst other 
suggestions, that air control be adopted on the NWF and that the Army’s covering 
troops be replaced by five or six new squadrons.12  Thus, ASM46 was probably 
published to provide tactical detail and evidence to support the contentions in 
Trenchard’s Cabinet Paper.  It also reveals that the Air Staff were thinking more widely 
about the use of  air power than just a purely punitive instrument, and were starting to 
recognise the political significance of ethics in the application of air power. 
In anticipation of the 1930 Imperial Conference (the periodic gathering of 
Government leaders from around the Empire), the Air Staff published ASM47: Air 
Power and Imperial Defence, in May 1930.13  It described the principal developments 
in the employment of air forces since the 1926 Imperial Conference, presumably to 
inform the delegates about current air power capabilities.  Interestingly, in listing the 
responsibilities of Imperial Defence devolved to the RAF, the ASM failed to mention 
air power’s role in supporting the Army, even in India, although examples from the 
NWF pervaded the document.14   
Within the context of this Thesis, ASM47 is useful in providing a snapshot of the 
                                                
12 CAB 24/207, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Hugh Trenchard, Cabinet Paper 332 (29): 
The Fuller Employment of Air Power in Imperial Defence, November 1929.  The phrase 
‘swansong’ was coined by Hankey; see Trenchard Papers, RAF Museum, MFC 78/23/1, 
Colonel Sir Maurice Hankey, Personal letter to Viscount Trenchard, 16 December 1935.  The 
episode is discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. 
13 AIR 5/171, Air Staff, Air Staff Memorandum 47: Air Power and Imperial Defence, November 
1930.  Although written in May 1930, it was not published as an ASM until November 1930.  
The Imperial Conference began in late September 1930. 
14 Ibid., 1.  The RAF’s responsibilities in Imperial Defence were listed as: air defence of the UK; 
the provision of the Admiralty requirements for the Fleet Air Arm; RAF contingents to the 
Expeditionary Force; control of Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan and Aden; assistance in the 
maintenance of sea communications in narrow waters and the defence of fuelling bases; and 
assistance in the development of Imperial air routes. 
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principal attributes, developments and roles of air power deemed worthy of being 
brought to the attention of the delegates.  It emphasised the aircraft’s increased 
striking power resulting from improving ground-to-air communications, range, 
navigation and bombing precision.15  Air power was efficient, humane and economic 
when used promptly in restoring and maintaining order in undeveloped countries 
where suitable conditions existed.16  The use of ‘heavy transport’ aircraft to rapidly 
concentrate troops or armed police in internal security emergencies (particularly 
towns, where direct air action was not appropriate) was gaining rapid recognition with 
governing authorities.  Airborne casualty evacuation during minor operations was now 
becoming ‘the accepted method’.17  Air transport was also becoming increasingly 
capable of resupplying remote garrisons;18 air transport could even drop fragile 
supplies to columns in the field.19  The aerial conveyance of Governors or political 
officers to outlying provinces was become a normal task in India, Iraq, Persia and 
Afghanistan.  Aerial photographic mapping had been used in frontier delineation and 
archaeological sites.   Additionally, examples of the rapid provision of medical aid 
were ‘too numerous to mention’.  Aircraft had also been used to support the local 
population following natural disasters such as floods and anti-locust campaigns.20  
Given that ASM47 was produced to inform the Heads of Government from around the 
Empire, the memo probably reflected the roles that the Air Staff considered were of 
                                                
15 Bombing accuracy was defined as the radius of the circle within which 50% of bombs would 
fall.  Bombing accuracy at this time was quoted as being 53 yards for normal attacks and 26 
yards for low-altitude attacks  Ibid., 2-3. 
16 Examples quoted of the increased use of air power included Aden (which had adopted air 
control in 1928) and the NWF, where two additional squadrons (No 11 and 39(Bomber) 
Squadrons) had been deployed in late 1928 as the nucleus of a flying reserve for defending 
Singapore (see Boyle, Trenchard, 573). 
17 The 1928/29 evacuation of the British legation from Kabul was quoted as an example of the 
use of air power to transport large numbers of personnel.  Since 1923, more than 1000 
casualties had been evacuated by air.  See Air Staff, ASM 47, 5. 
18 The ASM described how one heavy transport squadron had transported 490 tons in South 
Iraq during a four-month operation in 1928/29 and impending aircraft undergoing trials could 
transport a ton of stores almost a thousand miles or convey 25 troops 500 miles.   
19 Air Staff, ASM 47, 5. 
20 Ibid., 7-8. 
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strategic interest at the time.  There was relatively little emphasis on offensive action; 
instead, the ASM focused on the various air transportation roles.  This resonates with 
subsequent air discussion at the 1933 Geneva Disarmament Conference.21 
At first glance, it might appear coincidental that the next significant doctrinal 
publication after ASM47 described “The Development of the Heavy Transport 
Aeroplane”, published in the October 1930 JUSII.22  However, closer examination 
reveals that the author, Flight Lieutenant Dickson, was at the time of publication, the 
Personal Assistant to AOC(India), Sir Geoffrey Salmond.23  Thus, it is likely that ‘heavy 
transport’ was a theme of growing importance to the RAF in Imperial defence, and 
Dickson’s article may have reflected Salmond’s views.  At this time, the only heavy 
transport aircraft in the Middle East were 216 Squadron’s Victorias in Egypt and 
70(Bomber) Squadron in Iraq.  Dickson explained that logistical constraints precluded 
the deployment of additional aircraft types to India and that specialised, single-role 
transport aircraft were ‘an expensive, although sometimes essential, luxury’.24   
However, 70(Bomber) Squadron had already demonstrated its utility in India by 
deploying seven 22-seat Victorias to the NWF during the 1928/29 evacuation of 
Kabul.25  The main justification for these aircraft was strategic mobility: 
No garrison in the Empire can be expected to deal with every contingency which 
may threaten it without assistance.  The Air Force units overseas are 
accordingly linked by air routes and organised so that reinforcing squadrons 
may be flown to any theatre of operation.26 
Dickson described the need for squadrons to be able to deploy as autonomous units; 
three heavy transport aircraft could transport sufficient bomber squadron personnel 
                                                
21 See Chapter 7. 
22 Dickson, "The Development of the Heavy Transport Aeroplane". 
23 The Monthly Air Force List,  (London: HMSO, 1930), 76. 
24 ———, "The Development of the Heavy Transport Aeroplane": 456. 
25 AIR 5/1321, Air Marshal Sir Geoffrey Salmond, Command 3400: Report on the Air 
Operations in Afghanistan Between December 12th, 1928, and February 25th, 1929, 
September 1929, 9-11. 
26 Dickson, "The Development of the Heavy Transport Aeroplane": 455-456. 
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and equipment to allow the bomber squadron to operate from a ‘wing station’ until 
reinforced by surface transport.   
Dickson explained that the new Vickers Valentia was a multi-role aircraft.27  In its 
primarily role as a fast troop carrier and ambulance, it could fly a platoon immediately 
into a danger area, nipping serious trouble in the bud, and avoiding the necessity of 
despatching large punitive columns at a later date’.28  It could be adapted to carry 
aircraft engines, petrol tanks and up to 2.5 tons of bulk stores, allowing the provision 
or re-ammunition of outlying or beleaguered garrisons.  Dickson noted that heavy 
transports were stable bombing platforms able to carry six times the bomb load of day 
bombers over much greater distances.  India was well aware of the strategic effect 
that such aircraft could deliver following the pivotal V/1500 raid on Kabul during the 
1919 Third Afghan War.  On Frontier control duties, the heavy transport’s long 
endurance allowed it to loiter at height for long periods with a large payload of small 
bombs, influencing hostile tribesmen over a large area and for far longer than the 
fleeting attacks of day bombers.  If punitive action was required against recalcitrant 
tribes, the heavy transport could achieve the objective more quickly than the day 
bomber aircraft.  Dickson concluded that the heavy transport’s multi-role capability 
was no longer supplemental to conventional bombers and that ‘For India in particular, 
with its long external and weak internal communications, possibilities of internal 
unrest, its tribal territory to control and a frontier to defend, it appears to be peculiarly 
well adapted’.29 
                                                
27 The Valentia was an up-engined Victoria. 
28 Dickson, "The Development of the Heavy Transport Aeroplane": 457. 
29 Ibid.: 459.  The same enduring characteristics of endurance and payload are shared by both 
the 1930s heavy transport and the USAF’s current B1 bomber, so it is not surprising that the 
Frontier role envisaged by Dickson is strikingly similar to the use of the B1 in Operation 
ENDURING FREEDOM where it delivered over 60% of the weapons dropped in Afghanistan.  
See Tom Vanden Brook, "B-1 bomber mission shifts from Afghanistan to China, Pacific”, USA 
Today (2012), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/military/story/2012-05-11/b-1-bomber-
obama-new-strategy/56097706/1. 
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ASM48: Notes on the History of the Employment of Air Power was published as 
a ‘companion’ to ASM46 later in 1930.30  It consisted of a survey of the employment of 
air power in Somaliland, Iraq, Aden and India since 1920.  Its main focus is clear; 
thirty-six percent of the main body systematically described NWF operations, 
recording each operation’s aim, a narrative, the results and costs (in human and 
financial terms).  All the examples involved coercive action, in contrast to the wider 
roles described in ASMs 46 and 47.   Despite its usefulness as an operational 
compendium, ASM46’s main relevance to this Thesis lies in the reason it was written.  
The preface makes the purpose clear: 
In view of the present currency, in ill-informed circles, of many depreciatory 
statements regarding the efficacy or air power, it is hoped that the present 
memorandum will be of interest and value to Royal Air Force officers.31 
The ASM is important because it highlights the RAF’s sensitivity to criticism and that it 
took steps to educate all officers so they could rebut any disparaging comments from 
an informed perspective.  Given that its purpose was to provide RAF officers with 
evidence to counter criticism of the employment of air power in undeveloped 
countries, and the ASM’s emphasis on India, it is likely that the criticism mentioned 
was a reaction to Trenchard’s recently-published swansong.32  However, its focus on 
bombing alone would indicate that it was this RAF role that was being disparaged.  
ASM48 was deemed sufficiently important to be revised and re-published in August 
1935. 
ASM49: Air Policy in Imperial Defence – Some Current Problems, is worthy of a 
brief mention.33  This ASM is the transcript of a confidential address by CAS, Jack 
Salmond, to the Imperial Defence College in 1930.  Salmond argued for ‘active co-
                                                
30 Air Staff, ASM 48. 
31 Ibid., 1. 
32 Trenchard, CP 332 (29).  Trenchard’s swansong and its impact are discussed in Chapters 6 
and 7. 
33 AIR 9/8, Air Staff, Air Staff Memorandum 49: Air Policy in Imperial Defence - Some Current 
Problems 1930. 
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operation’ between all three Services to discern how much common ground could be 
found, noting that disagreements were often over ‘method’, with each Service 
pressing its own claims, but that the College presented the opportunity to nurture co-
operation.  He also noted the importance of the strategic mobility endowed by heavy 
transport aircraft.  Although two Handley Page Clives had recently been deployed to 
India, Salmond noted that, if a whole squadron was available, Singapore could be 
reinforced with combat ready squadrons within five days.  Although CAS’s vision of 
strategic mobility was subsequently supported by a Tribal Control and Defence 
Committee set up in 1931 which recommended an immediate increase in air strength 
by one heavy transport squadron (to be followed by a second a year later), this was 
refused by the Viceroy, C-in-C(India) and senior GoI members, with the curt response 
that they were ‘unable to contemplate at present any increase in Air Strength’.34  This 
illustrated the difference between the Air Staff’s strategic vision and the in-theatre 
Army view.  As all RAF India units were funded by India under the direct command of 
C-in-C(India), the heavy transport issue also demonstrated how the Air Staff’s 
strategic aspirations could be impeded by parochial decisions inside India. 
An important new line of discursive articles sprouted with the launch of the 
RAFQ in January 1930.  This unclassified publication gave the RAF a semi-official 
public and internal mouthpiece.  However, with a predominantly sympathetic Air Force 
readership, the tone of these articles was generally less defensive and more 
persuasive in nature than the JRUSI and JUSII articles.  Thus, they reveal less about 
inter-Service relations than their predecessors, being subjected generally to peer, 
                                                
34 IOR/L/PS/12/3171, Willingdon et al., Letter to Secretary of State for India: Frontier Tribal 
Control and Defence Against Incursions, 15 September 1931, 5 (also published as CAB 16/87, 
Evelyn B Howell et al., Committee of Imperial Defence: Defence of India Sub-Committee 
(Enquiry into the Extended Use of Air Power) - Report of the Tribal Control and Defence 
Committee, 1931 (DI(AP) 12), 26 March 1931).  The Tribal Control Committee was chaired by 
Sir Evelyn Howell (Resident, Waziristan, 1924-26, while the other members were AOC(India), 
Sir John Salmond’s brother, Sir Geoffrey Salmond, Deputy CGS(India), Major-General Sir 
Sydney Muspratt, and the finance member, Mr A C Badenoch.  The Committee is sometimes 
referred to as the ‘Howell Committee’. 
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rather than inter-Service, review.  Early RAFQ articles of relevance included Wing 
Commander McClaughry’s prize-winning essay on the role of armoured cars in air 
control (in which he advocated that armoured cars were an essential complement to 
aircraft, and that the closest co-operation between air and ground forces, enabled by 
efficient communications, was required) and extracts from AOC(India)’s report on the 
1928/29 evacuation of Kabul.35   Of greater relevance was Hannay’s article on “Empire 
Air Policy”.36  Hannay, a Cameron Highlander, summarised the popular perception of 
air power thus: 
The very name of aeroplane seems to conjure up in many peoples [sic] minds, 
even in these enlightened days, visions of wild and indiscriminate bombing, 
machine gunning, and consequent wholesale butchering of innocent women and 
children.  This, in fact, is almost invariably the underlying tone whenever air 
operations or extension of the policy of “air control” are mentioned.37   
Hannay’s article focused predominantly on the NWF and, like Hodsoll’s JUSII article, 
used the phrase ‘policing’ in the context of aircraft.  Hannay refuted the claim that 
‘personal touch’ normally provided by the Army was lost under air control, as ‘the 
people who really maintain that personal touch are the local administrators’; he also 
claimed that aircrew knew more about the tribes and their individual customs than the 
‘constantly changing regiments’, although he emphasised that air control did not spell 
the complete disbandment of ground forces, but rather their concentration, with 
concomitant reductions in troop numbers.38  Hannay did not sit on the fence 
concerning India: ‘I advocate India as a country where air control can by degrees be 
                                                
35 Wing Commander W A McClaughry, "The "Gordon-Sheppard" Memorial Prize Essay, 1929: 
Discuss the Part which Armoured and/or Armed but Unarmoured Vehicles Should Take in the 
Air Control of an Undeveloped Country; their Tactical Employment, the Types of Vehicle and 
Equipment which should be Developed for this Duty, and the Training of the Unit", RAFQ I, no. 
3  (1930); Air Marshal Sir Geoffrey Salmond, "Report on the Air Operations in Afghanistan 
Between December 12th, 1928, and February 25th, 1929", RAFQ 1, no. 1  (1930).  Wilfred 
McClaughry was the brother of Edgar Kingston-McCloughry; they both became air vice-
marshals.  Kingston-McCloughry’s biography is at Annex 7.  See also: Alan Fraser, 1986, 
"McCloughry, Edgar James (1896–1972)”, Australian National University, 
http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/mccloughry-edgar-james-7788 10). 
36 Captain A P C Hannay, "Empire Air Policy", RAFQ 1, no. 4  (1930). 
37 Ibid.: 643. 
38 Ibid.: 645. 
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entirely substituted for ground occupation’.39  At first glance, it appears strange that, at 
a time of such tension between the Army and RAF following Trenchard’s swansong, 
an Army officer would advocate substitution by air power so fervently (although no 
doubt the RAF was happy to publish such an article in RAFQ).  However, Hannay had 
served as a pilot on 20 Squadron at Quetta and the School of Army Co-operation.40  
Thus, he provided a very useful perspective from ‘both sides of the fence’.  As has 
been noted earlier, many Army practitioners supported the use of air power at the 
tactical level.41  Disagreement was normally at a higher level where competition over 
budgets and political influence occurred.  Nonetheless, Hannay was unusual in 
advocating substitution, something that was most probably the result of his previous 
Air Force experience.  His atypical career background gave him an unusual, 
unpartisan and informed perspective, so his calls for substitution on the NWF are 
particularly interesting for the weight they carried.  
The expanding ideas on the potential role of aircraft generated a certain amount 
of reaction in military journals, and in particular in the JRUSI and JUSII.  In January 
1930, Major Blacker of the Guides Infantry published “Modernized Mountain Warfare”, 
strongly advocating aerial resupply.42  Blacker wrote that punitive columns could be 
reduced by two-thirds by replacing mule trains and their picquets with supply aircraft.  
The resulting force would be highly mobile, moving at the speed of soldiers, rather 
than heavily-laden mules, allowing ‘an undreamed-of freedom of manoeuvre’.43  
Cumbersome mountain artillery could be replaced by more powerful bombs.  He also 
advocated the use of auto-gyros to replace field ambulances in hill warfare.  The 
                                                
39 Ibid.: 647. 
40 Hannay was re-seconded to the RAF over the period 1934 to 1939, rising to become the first 
post-FWW Army officer to command an RAF Squadron.  At the time his article was published, 
he was serving in the Colonial Office. 
41 See, for example, the unexpected support Peck received from the Army audience of his 
1928 presentation to RUSI described in Chapter 4. 
42 Blacker, "Modernized Mountain Warfare". 
43 Ibid.: 90, 92. 
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provision of ammunition by parachute would remove the soldiers’ constraint of twenty 
rounds a day and allow the use of sub-machine guns and rifle grenades, which were 
more effective in mountain warfare than the flat-trajectory .303 bullet ‘which merely 
splashes on the rocks’.44  Small formations could be inserted, supplied, extracted, and 
any casualties evacuated, by air deep in hostile territory, ‘making any enemy of the 
King feel insecure, however remote’.45  Blacker’s perspective was probably coloured 
by his professional background.  The Guides had a long history as highly mobile 
frontier infantry focused on local, mountain tactics, rather than large-scale warfare.  
Nevertheless, his suggestions bear a striking similarity to more recent operations in 
Afghanistan, although his suggestion that aerially-delivered non-lethal persistent 
chemical sprays were more valuable than high explosives, and would avoid female 
and child casualties, did not endured.  Blacker’s views were not solitary, being 
reinforced by ‘Light Infantry’ a year later in the JUSII, although his nom de plume 
would suggest a similar regimental background.46 
Blacker and ‘Light Infantry’’s enthusiasm for air power was not shared by all their 
colleagues.  Major Fink published a critical JRUSI article in February 1931 entitled 
“Regional Control and the Co-ordination of Air and Land Forces” in which he claimed 
that the aircraft’s capabilities had been exaggerated beyond justification over the 
preceding decade.47  Fink used, for comparative purposes, the purest doctrinal model 
of air control, in which aircraft completely substituted ground troops.  In his 
examination of Iraq, Fink noted that, although the cost of maintaining the RAF units 
and 20,000 Iraqi Levies and police was ‘comparatively small’, the cost of King Faisal’s 
18,000 troops (which were not paid for by the Middle East Vote of the RAF budget) 
should also be taken into account, ignoring the context that Britain was actively trying 
                                                
44 Ibid.: 91, 94. 
45 Ibid.: 92. 
46 See 'Light Infantry', "Mobility", JUSII LXII, no. 266  (1932). 
47 Major R H L Fink, "Regional Control and the Co-ordination of Air and Land Forces", JRUSI 
LXXVL, no. 501  (1898). 
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to transfer responsibility to Faisal’s forces.48  He also opined that these forces would 
need significant reinforcement to quell any widespread insurrection, something that 
the RAF widely acknowledged and was the justification for the Middle East heavy 
transport squadrons.49  Fink acknowledged that the RAF had never claimed that 
aircraft were suitable for maintaining order in towns, as had been proven in Palestine, 
but that ‘this is the very task which our military forces are so often called upon to 
perform in other parts of the Empire, especially in India’.50  Notwithstanding this, 
Trenchard’s1929 swansong had specifically stated that ‘Internal Security Forces 
would remain unchanged’.51  Turning to the NWF, Fink noted that air action had been 
most successful against ‘localized minor tribal gatherings out of reach of the ground 
garrisons’, but had not achieved notable results against widespread disaffection and 
determined opposition as, he stated, had been demonstrated in the Afridi assault on 
Peshawar in August 1930.  He also criticised AOC(India)’s right of direct access to the 
Viceroy, which divided responsibility and made co-ordination difficult; 52 indeed, Fink 
suggested that the RAF and Army be rationalised into a single ministry under a 
combined Army and Air Council.53  Overall, although aircraft were ‘of great value as an 
economical auxiliary to military forces’, the restraining effect of air policing was not 
great and air control was dependent on strong mobile ground forces.54  Fink’s article 
reflected a view from some Army practitioners to employ air power purely as a tactical 
supporting tool, and illustrated some of the pressures that the Air Staff were under in 
justifying the continued existence of the RAF as an independent Service.  However, 
as explained later, Fink’s view reflected that of the IGS, who had reacted to 
Trenchard’s 1929 swansong by calling for ‘an examination, in conjunction with the 
                                                
48 Salmond, ASM 16, 1. 
49 See Air Staff, ASM 49, 8. 
50 Fink, "Regional Control": 21. 
51 Trenchard, CP 332 (29), 7. 
52 Fink, "Regional Control": 21-22. 
53 Ibid.: 25. 
54 Ibid.: 22. 
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Treasury, of the question of the present constitution of the Royal Air Force as a 
separate service’.55 
February 1931’s JRUSI also published a similar, but less extreme, article to 
Fink’s Regional Control.  Inspired by the planned end of the British Iraqi mandate in 
1932, Jundi’s “Eight Years of British Control in Iraq” examined the success of air 
control in Iraq, focusing almost solely on frontier defence (rather than internal 
security).56  Jundi, like Fink, highlighted the significant number of ground troops and 
police involved in air control.  He also highlighted the challenges posed by trans-
border Bedawin raiders on the south-western and Kuwaiti frontiers between 1927 and 
1929.  Despite the terrain being eminently suited to air action and the employment of 
three bomber squadrons, six armoured car sections and an Iraqi Army machine gun 
company, Jundi considered that the operations were not completely successful.  He 
attributed this to the lengthy frontier, the lack of intelligence, an inability to identify 
small raiding parties in the featureless desert and distinguish them from non-
combatants, combined with the transitory nature of aircraft and the raiders’ ability to 
rapidly disperse.  Unlike Fink, Jundi offered no conclusions, nor did he assess how 
land forces alone would have fared.  These points were raised in a rebuke published 
in the subsequent JRUSI by ‘Taiyari’ who countered much of Jundi’s tactical detail, 
pointing out the deliberate British policy of maximising the involvement of the Iraqi 
forces to increase their experience prior to the planned British withdrawal.57  Of 
particular relevance to the NWF, Taiyari highlighted the reliance of both the Army and 
Air Force on the local police to maintain order.  He tried to manage Jundi’s 
expectation that air control could completely control permeable frontiers, pointing out 
                                                
55 CAB 24/207, Thomas Shaw, Cabinet Paper 356(29): The Fuller Employment of Air Power in 
Imperial Defence: Note by the Secretary of State for War, 7 December 1929. 
56 "Jundi", "Eight Years of British Control in Iraq", JRUSI LXXVI, no. 501  (1931).  ‘Jundi’ is 
Arabic for ‘soldier’. 
57 ‘Taiyari’ is Hindi for ‘prepared’. 
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that the NWF battalions had been no more successful in policing the Administrative 
Border.58 
In April 1931’s JUSII, “Constabeel” provided a balanced analysis of “Aircraft and 
Internal Security in India”.59  This considered reconnaissance, communication, moral 
effect, offensive action and transportation, concluding that, given the ethical constraint 
on the use of force against Crown subjects, the difficulty in discriminating between the 
guilty and innocent from the air, and the potential outrage of the non-proportional use 
of air power, the most appropriate internal security role for aircraft was to use heavy 
transports and impressed civil aircraft to rapidly convey police or soldiers at the initial 
stages of a disturbance to restore order.  This article probably presented a police 
practitioner’s critique to the RAF’s expanding ideas for the employment of air power in 
India. 
 What is interesting about these Army articles is their lack of acknowledgement 
of the synergistic virtues of air and land forces or the need for a fundamental 
understanding of how to employ joint forces, something which Salmond had ably 
articulated in ASM20.  This is brought into greater relief by their lack of any 
comparative analysis between the capabilities of land and air forces (i.e., independent 
air operations are criticised for deficiencies that they shared with land forces).  It is 
interesting to compare the Army’s focus on substitution with AP1300, written only two 
years before these JRUSI articles, which did not mention independent air operations 
in its chapter on undeveloped and semi-civilised countries, illustrating the continued 
pace of air strategy and the Army’s instinctive resistance to it.  
Slessor wrote a seminal summary in May 1931, entitled “Air Control: the Other 
Point of View”.60  At the time, Slessor was attending Army Staff College at Camberley 
                                                
58 "Taiyari", "Eight Years of British Control in Iraq: A Reply", JRUSI LXXVI, no. 502 (1931). 
59 "Constabeel", "Aircraft and Internal Security in India".  ‘Constabeel’ was local slang for 
‘constable’, indicating the author’s profession. 
60 AIR 69/9, Squadron Leader J C Slessor, Air Control: The Other Point of View, May 1931. 
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(having also attended the second Andover course in 1924)  and had accumulated 
considerable experience, having commanded a flight on the NWF during 1921-22, 
generated doctrine under Trenchard’s direction on the Directorate of Operations and 
Intelligence during 1928-1930 and served on the staff of the School of Army Co-
operation.61  This unpublished paper was probably Slessor’s Staff College ‘student 
lecture’ but was also distributed to all students at the RAF Staff College.62  He 
described his motive for writing the article: 
There are at present few subjects more controversial or on which there is more 
general misunderstanding than that of the share which air forces can take in the 
ordinary peace time responsibilities of Imperial security overseas.63 
His monograph aimed to: 
set out in informal terms the answers to some of the commonest criticisms, to 
dispose of some of the most frequent quoted fallacies on the subject of air 
control, with particular reference to a number of articles which have recently 
appeared in Service journals.64 
Despite the article’s title mentioning ‘air control’, the NWF was a repetitive theme, 
indicating that India was very much in Slessor’s mind.  He explained that air control 
enhanced the mobility and ubiquity of the civil administration, with aircraft being used 
as a steadying influence to ‘preserve’ order when a delicate situation threatened to 
escalate into disorder, but could, as a last resort, apply lethal force with the required 
degree of severity at a few hours’ notice to ‘restore’ order.  He emphasised that: 
Air control does not mean the complete elimination of land forces; there are 
many important functions which can only be effectively discharged by the armed 
man on the ground.  Nor of course does it imply the substitution of the heavy 
high-explosive bomb for the baton of the policeman.65 
                                                
61 Slessor’s biography is at Annex 7. 
62 A copy appears to have been passed to Group Captain Tedder, the Assistant Commandant, 
who then distributed it to all students.  Unfortunately, the 1931 Army Staff College records 
were destroyed in 1940.  However, on a similar theme, Arthur Harris had written ‘Air Control in 
Iraq, and Elsewhere’ whilst a student at Camberley in 1929.  See Harris, "Air Control in Iraq, 
and Elsewhere". 
63 Slessor, The Other Point of View, 1. 
64 Ibid., 1-2. 
65 Ibid., 2. 
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He also stressed that it was the political officer that controlled the population and that 
aircraft could not themselves achieve this any more than ‘the business end of an 18 
pounder or a service rifle’.66  His paper was ‘a reply to those forms of criticism which 
are most commonly directed against air control in undeveloped countries’.67  To that 
end, he addressed several issues: 
Firstly, Slessor addressed the accusation that ‘air action caused resentment and 
was particularly immoral in striking at women and children’.  All forms of force caused 
resentment and suffering and there were no grounds for the argument that, ‘if you 
stick a Pathan in the stomach with a bayonet or blow out his brains with a bullet he 
regards it as a perfectly “fair do” and all in a day’s work’; indeed all evidence was to 
the contrary.  Precision bombing was as accurate as artillery and was only used as a 
last resort after all other means had failed; its aim was not to kill in large numbers and 
casualties were very few on both sides.68  Indeed, the Tribal Control and Defence 
Committee, having elicited opinion from Pathan and Indian witnesses, concluded in 
the same year that: 
it has not been proved that air action does cause greater resentment than the 
use of other forms of force.  Experience has shown that, if due warning is given, 
air action against villages ordinarily causes very insignificant loss of life.69 
This was the GoI’s consistent official opinion, with the Viceroy having reported in 1925 
that ‘There is no evidence to support this theory’ of tribal resentment.70 
                                                
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid., 33. 
68 Ibid., 5-11. 
69 IOR/L/PS/12/3171, Tribal Control and Defence Committee, Report of the Tribal Control and 
Defence Committee 1931, March 26 1931, 32.  In contrast, the report also recommended that 
aircrew carry ‘gooley chits’ (see ———, Report of the Tribal Control and Defence Committee 
1931, 51).  
70 Despatch from the Viceroy in Council, 1925, quoted in: Slessor, The Central Blue, 67.  
Slessor was probably referring to: CAB 6/5, Earl of Reading, Priciples to be Adopted in Flying 
on the Frontier: Despatch from the Government of India (Foreign and Political 
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The second accusation was that ‘air action was ineffective because tribesmen 
scattered and took refuge in caves’.  Aircraft had to be allowed to engage lashkars 
while the enemy was concentrated and moving in the open, rather than wait until they 
ensconced themselves in caves.  Against villagers, the aim was to interrupt normal life 
until a continuance of hostilities became intolerable, rather than to inflict casualties.  
Compelling tribesmen to shelter in caves ‘among the fleas’ achieved this aim.71 
Thirdly, ‘air effects were transitory and left no permanent solution’.  All forms of 
military force, other than complete, overwhelming military occupation, were transitory.  
Between 1895 and 1925, military operations on the NWF had cost some £50 million, 
illustrating that the effects of neither garrisons nor punitive columns were enduring.  
Indeed, there had recently been multiple uprisings within 20 miles of the Razmak 
garrison.72  However, unlike punitive columns, air power could be rapidly and cheaply 
re-applied if necessary. 73 
Another accusation was that ‘on the NWF in particular, air action did not provide 
an alternative means of livelihood’.  Slessor agreed that the policy of road construction 
was sound.  However, a combination of aircraft, armoured cars, irregular corps, militia 
and tribal levies would be effective.  This would avoid an expensive military 
occupation, leaving more funds for road building.74 
Slessor agreed that ‘aircraft alone could not defend against invasion or preserve 
internal order’ and needed the support of land forces, just as armies required effective 
air co-operation.  Slessor’s subsequent description of command relationships would 
now be termed as ‘supported’ and ‘supporting’, and his description of combined 
operations under a single commander mirrors the current military concept of 
‘componency’.  He postulated that the imposition of air control on the NWF would 
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73 Slessor, The Other Point of View, 14-18. 
74 Ibid., 19. 
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involve the eventual withdrawal of regular land forces from remote tribal areas and 
their redeployment as close defence of administrative conurbations, such as 
Peshawar, Kohat and Bannu, to support the local police.  Additionally, air striking 
forces would replace ‘costly punitive expeditions’.75 
Although ‘air control had not been uniformly successful’,  Slessor noted that ‘the 
critics for some reason appear to expect or demand of [aircraft] a far higher standard 
of success than has ever been achieved by any other form of force’.76  Addressing the 
RAF’s inability to prevent the 1929 Palestine disorders, Slessor pointed out that the 
Air Staff had only assumed control of Palestine as an administrative convenience; with 
Iraq and Transjordan under an AOC, efficiencies had been made by administering 
Palestine in a similar fashion, with the Air Ministry acting as the Colonial Office’s 
agent.  Slessor continued: 
... no one knows better than the Air Staff that the preservation of internal order in 
more settled countries where the security problem is largely an urban one, such 
as in Palestine and British India, is a task for which the methods of air control 
are entirely unsuited.77 
Slessor’s informed perspective had probably been shaped by correspondence he had 
seen (and possibly even drafted) the previous year between CAS and Churchill during 
his time on the Air Staff; Churchill had been the main instrument in transferring control 
of Palestine from the WO to the Air Ministry but had caveated in 1922 that ‘This does 
not imply that Palestine is to be controlled from the air, but merely as a matter of 
convenience in administrative channels’.  Salmond wrote to Churchill in 1930 that: 
The Air Ministry, of course, have never claimed to control Palestine from the air, 
as it is and always has been obviously impossible to quell disturbances in large 
and civilised cities such as Jerusalem, etc., by air bombardment.78 
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78 AIR 8/110, Air Chief Marshal Sir John Salmond, Letter, Chief of the Air Staff to Rt Hon 
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Chapter 5 – RAF Tactics and Doctrine, 1928-39 
172 
Air power’s inappropriateness had been made apparent in, for example, the Wailing 
Wall incident in 1929, where the narrow streets had also rendered armoured cars 
impotent, precipitating the dispatch of a battalion from each of Egypt and Malta to 
suppress the rising.79 
The final accusation was that ‘Air Forces maintained in the Middle East were 
insufficient to cope with significant emergencies, and would have to be reinforced in 
the event of serious attack, probably by land forces’.  Slessor highlighted the necessity 
of balancing ‘absolute’ and ‘practical’ (i.e., affordable) security; the RAF had never 
claimed to be able to defend Iraq unaided against large scale invasion (as the Army 
could not defend India alone).  However, air routes would enable the rapid 
reinforcement from strategic Imperial garrisons.80  Slessor concluded with a pragmatic, 
conciliatory and ‘joint’ statement worthy of a future CAS: 
Let the airman realise that his arm in which he has such faith has its limitations 
as well as its possibilities; and let us hear less about the Air Force doing things 
alone.  Let the soldier realise that it is no good his talking of co-ordination when 
the word he really means is subordination – of the airman or the soldier...  There 
are some circumstances in which the air force must be purely auxiliary to the 
army; others when the reverse will be necessary... The answer will be found 
before long, when we have a combined staff at the centre, in London, and in 
Simla.81 
However, in his 1956 memoirs he was rather more circumspect, concluding that: 
If there is one lesson that stands out farther than others from the long story of 
operations in Waziristan, it is the expensive futility and waste of good material 
involved in a policy which locked up first-class troops under rather demoralizing 
conditions behind wire perimeters in Razmak in the midst of a waterless tangle 
of mountains.82 
Sir David Lee agreed, recording that ‘the Frontier could have been controlled with a 
                                                
79 See Steven Morewood, The British Defence of Egypt, 1935-1940: Conflict and Crisis in the 
Eastern Mediterranean (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 21. 
80 Slessor, The Other Point of View, 30-31. 
81 Ibid., 34-35. 
82———, The Central Blue, 68. 
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few more squadrons of aeroplanes and half the soldiers for a fraction of the price’.83  
What has to be taken into account, given Slessor’s later comments discussed in 
Chapter 6, is that this paper was written while he was a student at Army Staff College, 
when he would have been immersed in an Army environment;84 while Slessor’s aim 
was probably to rebut criticism he had experienced at Camberley, his paper would 
have been understandably written to be receptive to an Army audience.  
Nevertheless, Slessor’s monograph illustrated that air power had, by this time, 
evolved to mitigate some of its disadvantageous characteristics (such as its propensity 
to scatter its victims when targeted) and that the RAF could articulate robust, cogent 
and joint arguments to counter ‘popular’ criticisms. 
Another useful summary of the situation was provided in 1932 by Liddell Hart in 
a chapter of his book, ‘Air and Empire: The History of Air Control’.85  In this, he 
commented that reaction to Lord Trenchard’s maiden speech in the House of Lords in 
April 1930 had revealed ‘an unyielding determination to maintain sectional service 
interests without regard to the general interests of the country’.86  Trenchard had 
outlined how, during the FWW, the RAF ‘was built up to deal with the enemy’s Air 
Force’ but that, to justify its expenditure during the ensuing peace, it should take over 
‘some of what I might call the humdrum responsibilities of peace that the Navy and 
Army had performed for so many hundred years’.  He had continued: ‘We thought 
that, if full use were made of the mobility and moral effect of the Air Force, it could 
keep order in these wide spaces of the British Empire’.  Trenchard had highlighted air 
power’s speed in crossing these ‘wide spaces’ and that ‘There would be no vulnerable 
lines of communication to attack; there would be no convoys to cut up; there would be 
                                                
83 Lee, Never Stop the Engine when it's Hot, 117. 
84 See Chapter 6’s discussion of ‘Improving In-Theatre Relations’. 
85 Captain B H Liddell Hart, "Air and Empire: The History of Air Control" in The British Way in 
Warfare (London: Faber & Faber, 1932). 
86 Ibid., 139.  For a resume of the debate, see Stanley Spooner, "Editorial Comment”, Flight: 
The Aircraft Engineer & Airships, 18 April 1930. 
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no railways and roads to make’.  Turning to the morality of employing asymmetric 
technology, Trenchard had argued that ‘it may sound unsporting or unfair... but I 
submit it is not’... ‘It is only just to your own side and others if you can stop fighting by 
being better armed’ and that, often, ‘the mere presence of an aeroplane, owing to its 
moral effect, is sufficient’.  Air power was humane because ‘the weapon by its very 
nature does not kill so many people... the Air Force is not more brutal than any other 
form of warfare, and all warfare is brutal’.  Trenchard had then highlighted the cost 
effectiveness of air control, finishing with a proposal for an enquiry to determine which 
Imperial theatres the RAF could take over: ‘What about the frontier of India? What 
about the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, the Sudan, and other places?’.   
Earl Beatty had immediately retorted to Harris’ Lords speech that flying boats 
could neither stop and board suspect ships nor ‘show the flag’ as effectively as a 
sloop. Furthermore, weather made the Red Sea and Persian Gulf unsuitable for flying 
boats for nine months a year.  Ex-CIGS Earl Canavan ventured that such a vast 
proposition should be submitted to the CID, not the House of Lords.  His lack of 
understanding of air power was evident when he had stated that ‘Bombing must be 
indiscriminate.  Women and children must take their chance’ and urged that any policy 
change should address ‘humanitarian as well as economical’ implications.  Viscount 
Plummer, a retired FWW General who had been High Commissioner for Palestine 
from 1925 to 1928 displayed a similar dated view when he had highlighted air power’s 
offensive nature and the inappropriateness of bombing civil populations: ‘it is, I 
consider, a mischievous power’.  Lord Lloyd, who had been Governor of Bombay from 
1918 to 1923, announced that the prospect of using the Air Force as the primary arm 
on the NWF filled him, ‘and many others’, with grave alarm as it would be a reversal of 
the present policy of civilisation and pacification as air power was ‘a purely offensive 
weapon’.  Others, such as Lord Gorell and Earl Peel, welcomed Trenchard’s proposed 
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inquiry, while SoS(Air), Lord Thomson, took time to describe the less kinetic aspects 
of air power.87   
In his book, Liddell Hart provided a survey of historical events (including India), 
highlighting the aeroplane’s qualities of responsiveness and cost-effectiveness in 
contrast to ‘the helplessness of static posts and low-mobility troops to cope with a 
mobile antagonist’.88  His conclusions focused largely on the politics of inter-Service 
rivalry, noting that air officers should command air assets to ensure that they were not 
‘misapplied or frittered away on secondary tasks’, while empathising with the soldier’s 
and sailor’s perspective (‘Few of us can be impartial when out livelihoods are 
threatened... Their future is a narrowing horizon.  Little wonder that they are unwilling 
to agree publicly to what they often admit privately’).89  He also noted that opponents 
of air power were increasingly highlighting its inhumanity.  Overall, Liddell Hart’s 
article advocated the implementation of air control, but called for a combined General 
Staff (rather than individual, competing Ministries) that would draw logical, rather than 
partisan, conclusions on the most effective methods of Imperial Defence. 
June 1933 saw the publication of ASM52, the transcript of a lecture by DCAS to 
the Imperial Defence College entitled Air Control.90  Its author, Air Vice-Marshal 
Ludlow-Hewitt, will become one of the key characters in this Thesis, as he progressed  
to become AOC(India) immediately after his two-year DCAS appointment, prior to 
becoming AOC-in-C Bomber Command in 1937.  At the time of his presentation, he 
had been in post for two months (and previously AOC Iraq), explained that he viewed 
air control in the broad sense of the use of air forces to maintain good order and 
security (i.e. policing), and in particular the pacification and settlement of backward, 
undeveloped territories, irrespective of the cloth of the C-in-C.  By this definition, air 
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control covered air operations in the NWF, Somalia and the Sudan, as well as AOC-
commanded theatres, although he reinforced that it had been most effectively 
employed when commanded by the latter.  Indeed, this broadening of the term may 
have been the result of the Army’s resistance to the concept of AOCs commanding 
joint forces, as suggested by Trenchard’s 1929 swansong.  According to Ludlow-
Hewitt, air control was cheap, quick, effective, relatively invulnerable and could be 
applied in areas inaccessible to other forces, virtues which would assure its 
continuance despite calls for the abolition of aerial bombardment.  He explained that 
these characteristics depended on two conditions: firstly, a first-class tactical and 
political intelligence system to understand the enemy in the widest sense;91 and, 
secondly, a command system that could authorise action immediately, which resulted 
in great moral effect.  Air control did not involve the elimination of land forces, as these 
were invaluable in consolidating success after aircraft had broken the enemy’s 
resistance.  However, Ludlow-Hewitt explained that air control was ‘entirely unsuitable’ 
in addressing internal Indian troubles, civil rioting in Palestine, civil or domestic unrest, 
or hunting brigands and criminals.  He explained the importance of explaining 
Governmental terms and what the tribesman had to do to comply.  Once air 
operations commenced, the aim was not punishment but rather to bring about the 
enemy’s submission by causing great inconvenience, albeit with ‘the minimum loss of 
any kind’ to avoid both animosity and the deprivation of livelihood. Ludlow-Hewitt 
introduced the importance of propaganda, pointing out how the tribesmen normally 
received moral support from their own chiefs, fanatical religious leaders, National 
agitators or foreign powers, all of which could be undermined by Governmental 
messages about how easy it was to submit, how light the terms were, how enduring 
and invulnerable air operations were, and how they would apply increasing and 
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unyielding pressure.  Loudspeaker-equipped aircraft could now deliver these ‘sound 
bites’ directly to ‘the ear of the individual tribesman’.  Once the tribesmen had 
submitted, land forces (preferably police) should be deployed to provide food, tend to 
the diseased and wounded, and set up police posts for Khassadars, the ultimate aim 
being to employ locals to build roads and schools and administrate the country.  
Ludlow-Hewitt described how, under this system, the tribes would garrison 
themselves, albeit with the ever-present threat of ‘air reprisals’.  In his conclusion, 
DCAS emphasised that he had not mentioned the ‘common objections’ to air control 
because there was ‘no evidence to support them’ – a bold, but perhaps naive, 
approach, which echoed the sentiments of the 1931 Report of the Tribal Control and 
Defence Committee mentioned previously.92  He concluded that, while expeditions 
aimed to inflict punishment by causing casualties, air control resulted in ‘less 
bloodshed’ and was more economical.  What is particularly interesting about Ludlow-
Hewitt’s lecture is that it revealed both a broadening of the Air Staff’s definition of air 
control away from a command and control system, and its integration into an overall 
system of imposing ‘civilisation’ on previously unadministered regions.  This is all the 
more pertinent to this Thesis given Ludlow-Hewitt’s subsequent key positions.  His 
previous experience is also worthy of recording.  Despite not being very 
approachable, Harris described him as ‘the most brilliant officer I have ever met’ and 
‘one of the few RAF commanders who kept abreast of new techniques’.  After nearly 
ten years in the Royal Irish Rifles, he commanded at squadron, wing and brigade 
levels, and was Chief of Staff of the RAF’s French HQ, during the FWW.  Following 
the War, he had been ADC to the King, secretary to SoS(Air), attended the Royal 
Naval Staff College and been the second Commandant of the RAF Staff College 
before becoming AOC(Iraq).  Thus, not only was he a decorated combat pilot, but he 
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had a background in all three Services and was very well educated and politically 
aware.93 
A revealing insight into the way in which air power and inter-Service co-
operation in India were advanced by local improvisation was provided by Flight 
Lieutenant Chamberlain’s RAFQ article, “The Adoption of R/T for Close 
Reconnaissance Aircraft in India”, published in July 1933.94  This technical article 
described the limitations of the pre-1927 methods of air-ground communication, such 
as: the ‘Popham’ and ‘Stevenson’ Panels;95 the ‘Direction Arrow’;96 the Aldis Lamp;97 
and message dropping/retrieval.98  By 1933, R/T was considered more flexible than 
W/T.99  It was the responsibility of each army co-operation squadron to provide their 
associated Army units with the necessary R/T sets, operators and transportation.  
Squadrons improvised scavenged tenders to establish an R/T capability in the Army’s 
mind.100  Overall, Chamberlain’s article demonstrated that local improvisation, rather 
than central organisation and funding, drove the way in which evolving technology 
was adapted to local field conditions. 
                                                
93 Royal Air Force Website, "Air Chief Marshal Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt: C-in-C Bomber 
Command 1937-40”, 
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in India", RAFQ IV, no. 3  (1933). 
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arms.  However, it required a pre-arranged code, could not be read above about 3000 feet, 
and was obsolete when the article was written.  The Stephenson Panel was a bulky venetian-
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aircraft performance. 
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unsuitable terrain and the probability of being sniped at from above and below. 
99 Nonetheless, aircraft that had been suitable for W/T could be ‘hopeless’ for R/T due to 
interference from the unscreened engines. 
100 The RAF in India sent wireless operators on equitation courses and deployed aircraft R/T 
sets, protected by rubber pads, on specially trained pack animals which accompanied the 
columns when the terrain became impassable to tenders. 
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Chamberlain’s tactical article was followed in July 1934 by a JUSII article which 
provided an Indian perspective on the WO’s 1932 The Employment of Air Forces with 
the Army in the Field.  Published by an Army officer under the pseudonym ‘Mouldy’, 
“Co-operation Between the Army and the RAF” demonstrated that the British Army in 
India maintained a broad view on warfare and was not solely focused on Frontier 
tactics.101  Mouldy’s article largely concentrated on conventional, rather than irregular, 
warfare.  Nevertheless, the need for a sound system of inter-Service co-operation 
based on personal liaison between commanders was deemed especially important for 
minor operations on the NWF involving small columns with improvised staffs.  In India, 
day bomber squadrons were trained in tactical (but not artillery) reconnaissance on 
the NWF, although their effectiveness was handicapped by lack of both R/T and 
message pick-up equipment.102  In contrast, the army co-operation squadrons were 
trained for all forms of reconnaissance and were equipped with R/T, W/T, message 
pick-up gear and one-way W/T for artillery work.103  Mouldy also emphasised the 
importance of educating all Army officers in India in air co-operation and 
recommended that RAF officers and Army Intelligence liaison officers be used to 
lecture, train and exercise with Army units. 
One of the most important publications for this Chapter was Air Staff (India) 
Memorandum No 1 (AS(I)M 1), published in April 1935 and entitled ‘Tactical Methods 
of Conducting Air Operations Against Tribes on the North-West Frontier of India’.104  
Unfortunately, as the internal files of HQ RAF(India) have not survived, the in-theatre 
machinations behind its provenance cannot be positively determined, although its 
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102 The Day Bomber squadrons in India in 1934 were: 27(B) and 60(B) at No 1(Indian Wing) 
Station, Kohat equipped with Hawker Harts and Westland Wapitis respectively; and No 11(B) 
and 39(B) at No 1(Indian Wing) Station, Risalpur, both with Harts.  See Annexes 23 and 24. 
103 The army co-operation squadrons in India in 1934 were: 5(AC) and 31(AC) at No 3(Indian 
Wing), Quetta; No 20(AC) at Peshawar; and 28(AC) at Ambala, all equipped with Wapitis. 
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contents were discussed with the GS(India) during its preparation.105  Its supersession 
in 1939 by the ‘Combined Frontier Manual’ is much clearer.106  Despite the lack of 
primary evidence, it is reasonable to assume that the Air Staff(India) felt it necessary 
to amplify the extant official RAF doctrine (AP1300, ASM46 and its evidential 
companion, ASM48).  The Air Staff(India) were in an unenviable position, being 
culturally attuned to the Air Ministry’s doctrine, but under the command of C-in-
C(India).  Certainly, any official doctrine published by HQ RAF(India) would need at 
least tacit approval from C-in-C(India).  Furthermore, Air Marshal Steel had been 
replaced as AOC(India) by Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt the month before AS(I)M 1 was 
published, and this resulted in a marked improvement in in-theatre inter-Service 
relations.  The new AOC wrote to C-in-C(India) in June 1935 that: 
I am not here to compete with the Army on any ground whatever, but simply to 
cooperate on the best terms under your orders... I believe that one of the causes 
of anti-Air Force feeling out here is fear of substitution, 
to which, in his response, Field Marshal Sir Philip Chetwode blamed the 
misunderstanding over Trenchard’s 1929 ‘ill-advised Cabinet paper on substitution’.107  
Interestingly, at the same time, the RAF staff at Camberley were teaching Army 
students that air control did not exclude the requirement for land forces; ‘Far from it’.108  
AS(I)M 1 was certainly drafted before Ludlow-Hewitt arrived and, although probably 
approved by him prior to publication, his influence was apparently limited; the ten-
page Memorandum focused solely on the use of independent air action, defining the 
primary operational aim to be to compel the tribes to comply with Government terms 
with the minimum use of force.  One rare insight into the staffing of the Memo is a 
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draft copy which advised that, in order to deprive the enemy of minor successes in the 
field, ‘it may be advisable in certain circumstances not to despatch land forces’;109 this 
was substantially softened in the final version to ‘the presence of troops within reach 
of the tribesmen may give rise to the hope of gain through some minor successes in 
the field’, possibly by the hand of the new AOC(India).110  Nonetheless, AS(I)M 1 was 
a remarkably ‘single Service’ statement that reflected more the view of the Air Ministry 
than the Indian in-theatre requirements.  Overall, AS(I)M 1 marks the last example of 
Steel’s emphasis on independent air operations, with a subsequent AOC(India)-led 
change towards joint in-theatre doctrine, as evidenced by the aforementioned 
development of the Combined Frontier Manual, which commenced only a year after 
the Memo’s publication.  That is not to say that the gestation of this replacement 
Manual was not without considerable inter-Service dispute;111 nonetheless, there were 
no subsequent Air Staff(India) Memos published.  Certainly, the change of emphasis 
between AS(I)M 1 and the Combined Manual illustrated the vital influence of the 
relationship between the most senior in-theatre commanders, with the ‘damage’ of 
Trenchard’s 1929 swansong being perpetuated by Steel (who had become 
AOC(India) in February 1931) before Ludlow-Hewitt adopted a more pragmatic and 
conciliatory approach with C-in-C(India) in 1935, as examined later.112 
AS(I)M 1 emphasised some familiar themes, such as the importance of 
intelligence to understand tribal organisation, leadership, the physical vulnerabilities of 
tribal buildings, and the location of mosques so aircraft could target effectively while 
discriminating between hostiles and friendlies.  The recent theme of using Intelligence 
to judge the changing morale of a tribe, the movement of lashkars and leaders, and to 
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vary the pressure accordingly, was reiterated.113  Tribal Directories, compiled from 
interrogations and aerial photographs, were vital, as were accurate maps and pre-
flight study by the crews to distinguish between adjacent and often similarly-named 
hostile and friendly villages.114  The Memo’s emphasis on discriminating friend from 
foe is clear. 
AS(I)M 1 described how air forces should be kept at high readiness so they 
could act swiftly.  However, warnings should invariably be issued before commencing 
air operations against villages.  These warnings were of two types: firstly, an 
ultimatum, which aimed to induce the tribe to submit without employing force by 
warning that air action would commence unless the offending tribes complied with 
Governmental demands; and, secondly, a bombing notice, issued to avoid undue 
casualties by specifying the village(s) to be bombed and warning the inhabitants to 
evacuate by a specific time, not return until told to by a subsequent notice, and 
warning about the danger of delay action bombs.115  In contrast, no warnings were 
required for operations against hostile lashkars, although they could be used to warn 
inhabitants ahead of the advancing hostiles to evacuate a specified area wherein any 
movement could be subjected to aerial attack (a tactic that the Air Ministry referred to 
unofficially as proscription, although the term did not yet form part of the doctrinal 
lexicon).116  This concept of distinguishing between ultimatums and notices was not 
new, having first been raised by the Tribal Control and Defence Committee in 1931.117 
In its examination of tactical methods, the Memo differentiated between 
harassing attacks which targeted the morale of the tribesmen without causing 
                                                
113 Air Staff (India) Memo No. 1, 1-2. 
114 Ibid., 9. 
115 If insufficient time was available, the ultimatums and bombing notices could be combined. 
116 Air Staff (India) Memo No. 1, 2-3.  For an example of the use of the term ‘proscription’, see: 
AIR 23/708 Enclosure 6, Air Vice-Marshal C L Courtney, Letter, Director of Operations and 
Intelligence, Air Ministry, to AOC Aden, 17 October 1936. 
117 Tribal Control and Defence Committee, Report of the Tribal Control and Defence 
Committee 1931, 32. 
Chapter 5 – RAF Tactics and Doctrine, 1928-39 
183 
unnecessary casualties or damage (described again as ‘blockades’) and attacks on 
materiel designed to produce a definitive degree of damage.  The coercive blockade 
was the preferred tactic, because of its economy of effort and the limited physical 
impact it inflicted on tribesmen, their possessions, livelihood and prosperity, along with 
the latent threat of escalation.  A variety of methods were used, including: intermittent 
attacks using light weapons;118 sporadic patrols to attack personnel and flocks to force 
the tribesmen to disperse; light night bombing of villages, wells or caves mouths to 
continue the blockade by darkness (alternatively, where night flying was impractical 
due to weather etc, long-delay action bombs could be dropped by day to detonate at 
night); and the occasional use of heavy attacks to demonstrate the latent ability to 
inflict serious damage.119  In contrast, attacks aimed at producing material damage 
used heavier bombs, followed up by incendiaries to ignite inflammable materiel.120  It 
was recommended that only the houses of important leaders should be attacked, so 
good intelligence to identify these buildings was essential.  The cost of ordnance was 
also a factor.121  The Memo displayed a good understanding of the factors affecting 
the selection of targets and the optimum balance of effort over a wider area: a 
compromise was often necessary between selecting the most disaffected village 
(which would produce the best political result) and the village most vulnerable to air 
attack; additionally, where the aim was material damage, AS(I)M 1 recommended that 
attacks should be concentrated on the minimum number of villages to maximise the 
impact, whereas when harassment and disruption was intended, more widely-
dispersed attacks broadened the effect.  Non-lethal methods such as propaganda 
were also employed to communicate intent to the tribesmen.  However, tribesmen 
would often renege on agreed terms, so air action should not be wholly discontinued 
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until terms had been fully complied with.  If jirgas assembled to discuss terms with the 
political officer, coincidental aerial demonstrations could have beneficial results.122  
Additionally, the Memo recommended that the Air Commander should accompany the 
political officer to enhance his understanding and provide pragmatic advice.123 
AS(I)M 1 demonstrated the interactive nature of warfare and its impact on the 
development of tactics by both parties.  By 1935, hostile lashkars had learnt the 
vulnerability of large bodies of men to air attack and so usually moved by night and 
dispersed by day.  Reacting to this, the Memo recommended that the most effective 
method of dispersing lashkars was to attack their villages of origin, the aim being to 
make the prospect of loot and fighting less attractive by the likelihood and uncertainty 
of loss of personal wealth at home.  The previously-mentioned use of leaflets to 
proclaim an area around land forces, or specific villages, as ‘hostile areas’ to be 
evacuated was aimed at both minimising friendly casualties and denying the lashkars 
the opportunity of hiding within the local population.124 
The Memo also briefly addressed the ramifications of captured aircrew being 
used as hostages, stating that air operations should continue unabated, with reliance 
placed on the Government to avenge any ill-treatment, and the dropping of leaflets 
warning of concomitant retribution.  To avoid being exposed to ground fire, low flying 
machine gun attacks below 3,000 feet were only employed as immediate retaliation 
against tribesmen seen firing at aircraft or to keep tribesmen under cover during air 
blockades.  The only exceptions to this were when lashkars were engaging friendly 
troops or about to enter administrated territory, or against urgent targets where high-
level bombing was difficult.  In all other circumstances, anti-personnel bombs 
delivered from high level were to be used.  Pre-emptive bombing was always detailed 
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in written orders to the pilot, except in emergencies when W/T could be used.125  This 
guidance is interesting, as it demonstrated that, to avoid the political ramifications of 
aircrew being captured, the RAF was being forced to operate at high level where 
precise weapon delivery was difficult.126  Overall, the Memo is notable for its complete 
absence of any reference for the need for precision weapon delivery. 
AS(I)M 1 concluded with a repetition of the enduring theme that ‘success in air 
operations is dependent on their effect on the enemy’s morale’ and that this had to be 
achieved ‘by the use of the minimum force’.  The Air Force Commander had to be 
familiar with the political aspects of the situation and keep his finger on the pulse of 
the tribe.  To achieve this, the Air Force Commander should keep in the closest touch 
with the political authority.127  The Air Staff(India) were careful not to contradict higher 
Indian authorities; AS(I)M 1 began with the caveat that it was issued as guidance for 
RAF officers and did not impinge on the control of air power as laid down by the 
GoI.128  Nonetheless, the Memo highlights the significant difference between the 
methodologies of Army punitive expeditions and RAF tribal operations.  While the RAF 
emphasised ‘the use of the minimum of force to compel the tribe... to comply’, Army 
Staff College were teaching in 1933 that ‘we want the enemy to stand and fight’.129  
Notwithstanding that Camberley had softened its tone slightly from 1929 (when it had 
taught that the aim was ‘a ground and air fight with a view to killing’, while admitting 
that ‘You could of course deal with the whole problem up to a point – by air’), the 
fundamental disparity remains clear.130  Furthermore, the aim of the Army’s punitive 
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columns was to threaten tribal villages to compel the tribesmen to defend their homes 
in ‘traditional’ massed formations where they became vulnerable to the British Army’s 
technical advantage in asymmetric firepower while, in contrast, air blockades 
attempted to disperse the inhabitants of the village to deny them their ordinary mode 
of life.  Even when the objective was a tribal lashkar, Camberley emphasised that, in 
response to air action, tribesmen ‘will scatter and you won’t kill many’, thereby denying 
the Army of its primary advantage – superior firepower against a clearly identifiable, 
massed, enemy formation.131  Understandably, the RAF’s faith in dispersing lashkars 
by independently targeting their villages of origin was not shared by the Army, who 
saw the RAF’s role as direct support of troops; Camberley was teaching its Army 
students in 1937 that aircraft should only be used in close co-operation with troops, 
and that attacks against lashkars were limited to low flying attacks, especially against 
hostiles on reverse slopes.132  Gwynn stated in 1936 that ‘infantry still remains the 
chief offensive agent’ while noting, in his analysis of the Afridi lashkars which 
advanced towards Peshawar in 1930, that ‘a combination of ground and air action 
becomes necessary to secure results and close co-operation between the Services is 
essential’.133  Doctrinally, in 1935-India, this co-operation was absent.  This 
discontinuity had been evident as early as the 1930 operations in Waziristan, when 
the Chief Commissioner, NWFP, had decreed that ‘air action is likely to meet the case 
adequately whereas attack by troops is likely to induce an extension of the area of 
                                                                                                                                           
punitive terminology is shown in Annex 9.  This may be due to changes in the Indian Army 
Instructor responsible for the Exercise: in 1931, Lieutenant Colonel John Smyth VC replaced 
Lieutenant Colonel Matheson who was, in 1934, replaced by the then acting Lieutenant 
Colonel Slim (who removed all reference to RAF punitive operations).  Smyth later 
commanded 127 Brigade in the British Expeditionary Force during WWII, forcibly retired as a 
divisional commander to become firstly the military correspondent for the Sunday Times, then 
a Member of Parliament, and finally a baronet.  For more details on Smyth, see Richard Mead, 
Churchill's Lions: A Biographical Guide to the Key British Generals of World War II (Stroud: 
Spellmount Ltd, 2007), 430-433 and Nick Smart, Biographical Dictionary of British Generals of 
the Second World War (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2005), 292-293. 
131 Army Staff College, "Mountain Warfare Ex, 1929": 25. 
132 ———, "Mountain Warfare I - The North-West Frontier of India and its Problems": 2. 
133 Charles W Gwynn, Imperial Policing (London: Macmillan, 1936), 29, 280. 
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tribal hostility’ noting afterwards that ‘the local Commander resented the inactive role 
of the Razmak column while air action was in progress’.134  Another important theme is 
clear – the RAF’s desired effect was on the tribesmen’s morale rather than the denial 
of materiel by precise weapon delivery. 
Validation of the tactics expounded in AS(I)M 1 came in the Air Ministry’s post-
action analysis of the 1935 Mohmand operations, which was circulated to RAF Staff 
College and the overseas Commands.135  This comprised a questionnaire covering the 
air blockades against the Burhan Khel, Isa Khel and Safi which had been completed 
by the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar and OC No 1(Indian) Group.136  The Air 
Ministry drew four lessons from the Mohmand operations.  First, excessive force had 
been applied; normally, only light bombs should be used to enforce air blockades.  
Secondly, the incendiary bombs used against the houses and crops of specific ‘die 
hards’ had caused great destruction and created a marked deterrent effect.  However, 
the Air Ministry deprecated anything other than the use of minimum force, stating that 
incendiary bombs should only be used for punitive operations.  Third, delayed action 
bombs could not completely replace night bombing, but supplemented it effectively.  
The tribesmen did not understand the concept of the deliberate use of delayed action 
bombs, so needed to occasionally hear aircraft overhead at night.  Night bombing 
against camp fires seen in the area had been ‘a great deal more effective’.  Lastly, it 
was vital that political officers educated the tribesmen about the aim of air blockades, 
how easy they were to apply and how futile resistance was. 
Overall, the  Mohmand questionnaire demonstrated the different views of the Air 
Ministry (operating at the near-political level) and the Air Staff(India) (operating at the 
in-theatre tactical level).  The Air Ministry appeared keen to use the minimum amount 
                                                
134 Griffith, Note by Governor NWFP, describing Red Shirt-inspired operations in the Shaktu 
and Baddar valleys. 
135 Courtney, Letter, Director of Operations and Intelligence, Air Ministry, to AOC Aden. 
136 OC No 1 Indian Group was Group Captain Norman Bottomley who later became DCAS and 
then replaced Harris as C-in-C Bomber Command.  See Chapter 6’s analysis of the operation. 
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of force necessary (in accordance with air control doctrine) for reasons of political 
acceptability and to avoid tribal resentment, while the in-theatre objective was to 
compel the tribesmen to comply as swiftly as possible.  The IO had a different 
perspective and refused to publish their 1935 Mohmand report because: 
in view of the keen interest taken, in political and public circles, regarding air 
action against tribesmen, particularly in regard to events in Abyssinia, the SoS 
for I thinks it better not to publish.137 
In mid-October 1936, the Air Ministry circulated a memorandum entitled Air 
Blockade which clarified policy.138  The gestation of this memo is revealing. The Air 
Ministry had felt that C-in-C(India) was increasingly preventing the use of aeroplanes 
in their ‘primary role’ on the NWF, ‘pretending’ to be worried about claims of 
inhumanity in the Indian Press and Legislative Assembly.  The 1935 Mohmand 
operations had culminated in SoS(India) refusing to publish the official report in ‘one of 
those periodical attacks by India’.  As a result, CAS had arranged a round-table 
conference with the IO, the outcome of which had been a letter from the SoS(India) to 
the GoI stating that the air blockade was not inhumane.  This, the Air Ministry hoped, 
would curtail C-in-C(India) from using his previous excuse.  The Air Blockade memo 
had been prepared for this conference.139  This memo emphasised that no land forces 
should enter a blockaded area until the tribe had submitted in order to deny the 
tribesmen a potential source of retribution.  In ‘normal times’, aircraft should regularly 
visit tribes, accompanied by medical officers, to maintain relations and gain vital 
                                                
137 IOR/L/PS/12/3187, E358, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Edward L Ellington, Letter, 
Chief of the Air Staff to Lieutenant General Sir John Coleridge, Secretary, Military Department, 
India Office, 18 April 1936. 
138 AIR 23/708, Enclosure 2, Deputy Director Operations and Intelligence Air Ministry, Air 
Blockade, October 1936.  The meeting this memo was prepared for was held on 25 
September, where the Directorate of Operations and Intelligence was represented by AVM 
Courtney (DCAS and Director, Operations and Intelligence), Wing Commander Pirie and 
Squadron Leader Darvall.  Group Captain Arthur Harris, a Deputy Director, may also have 
been involved in the memo’s staffing. 
139 AIR 23/708, Enclosure 10, Wing Commander G C Pirie, Letter from Air Ministry to Air 
Officer Commanding, Aden Command, 4 February 1937.  For more analysis of this round-table 
conference, see Chapter 7, AIR 2/1721 and IOR/L/PS/12/3187, E286, Notes of a Meeting at 
the India Office, 25 September 1936.  Pirie’s biography is at Annex 7. 
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intelligence.  On occasions where force was necessary, commanders were reminded 
to avoid action (such as casualties or serious damage to houses, herds or crops) likely 
to result in undue subsequent resentment.  The Air Blockade memo acknowledged 
that similar pressure could be achieved by troops or police, but that punitive columns 
were slow and costly in both money and casualties on both sides.  In its conclusion, 
the Air Staff’s memo stated: ‘it is difficult to see... how any charge of inhumanity can 
possibly be levelled against the policy’, whilst accepting that: 
in the past on the frontier of India and elsewhere the air blockade method has 
sometimes not been properly applied, and alas have too many forceful methods 
of different kinds been misapplied at different times...  Granted care and restraint 
however there can surely be few if any methods of applying force less calculated 
to cause bloodshed or more humanitarian in conception and practice.140 
Given that the objective of this Air Ministry memo was to convince SoS(India) that the 
air blockade method was humane and acceptable within the developing ethical 
landscape, it is perhaps not surprising that it focused on political acceptability, rather 
than tactical effectiveness.  Indeed, the Air Ministry later unofficially admitted that the 
staff had been ‘particularly humanitarian-minded’ when drafting the memo.141  
Nonetheless, these tactics endured and were reiterated in June 1938 by Group 
Captain Slessor, Deputy Director Plans, to rebuke Parliamentary Questions from the 
Opposition on 16 June 1938.142 
The disparity between the views of the Air Ministry and ‘theatre’ was not 
confined to the NWF.143  The Air Ministry rebuked AOC Aden in October 1936 for the 
unnecessary destruction caused by the use of incendiary bombs in the Lower Aulaqi 
                                                
140 AIR 23/708, Enclosure 2, Air Ministry Deputy Director Operations and Intelligence, Air 
Blockade, October 1936, 10. 
141 Pirie, Letter from Air Ministry to Air Officer Commanding, Aden Command. 
142 Slessor, Notes on Police Bombing dated 18 June 1938.  The same tactics were also 
articulated in a 1938 paper entitled Air Blockade filed by the Air Ministry, although the exact 
author and date of this paper cannot positively be identified - see AIR 5/1327, Enclosure 2, Air 
Blockade, 1938; this file originated from the Deputy Director of Operations (Overseas) and was 
his 1938 ‘India’ file (see Sebastian Cox, Head of Air Historical Branch (RAF) to Author, Email, 
10 January 2013). 
143 For further analysis of different views between the Air Ministry and RAF(India), see the 
discussion in Chapter 6 concerning AOC(India)’s UK visit in May 1938. 
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area.144  This resulted in a protracted exchange, with AOC Aden disagreeing with the 
Air Ministry’s lessons from the 1935 Mohmand operations, explaining that he had 
insufficient resources to impose long blockades and that the Aden Resident was in 
agreement that ‘hitting as hard as I could the few available targets’ was quicker and 
more effective.145  The Ministry’s letter also revealed how the transparency of 
operations to a wider audience could impact on the acceptability of tactics, especially 
when ‘dealing with what were no more than ‘a bunch of scallywags’’: 
On the Frontier of India we must, for political and other obvious reasons, 
undertake any air blockade operation strictly in accordance with the principles 
laid down...  At Aden, on the other hand, there is no Legislative Assembly or 
local politician to worry about and on other grounds too, the conditions there do 
permit of a slight departure from the orthodox methods...  we suggest you 
should carry on as before.146 
In his response, AOC Aden retorted that: 
I agree that in theory the so called air blockade sounds delightfully humane, and 
to the ignorant may sound as though the R.A.F. can achieve wonders without 
hurting anyone, or in other words can make omelettes without breaking eggs...  
The Aden tribesman requires definite proof that we can hit him hard... The 
methods I advocate result in a certain amount of damage to property (mainly 
houses and forts) which can be readily repaired afterwards, thus keeping the 
tribesmen out of mischief while that is being done.147 
The Air Ministry’s final response to AOC Aden confirmed that the general principles of 
air control remained the same in all undeveloped countries, but that local factors 
affected their exact application, with air blockade policy being driven, and constrained, 
in particular by the political situation on the NWF: 
We believe that the tribesmen on the North West Frontier is a more fearless and 
rugged fighter than the average Arab of, say, the Aden Hinterland.  Moreover, 
he is more familiar with modern engines of war and is therefore probably much 
                                                
144 AIR 23/708, Enclosure 3, Air Council, Letter to Air Officer Commanding, Aden Command, 
24 October 1936. 
145 AIR 23/708, Enclosure 5, Air Commodore W A McClaughry, Letter from Air Officer 
Commanding, Aden Command, to Air Ministry (Wing Commander G C Pirie), 11 November 
1936. 
146 Pirie, Letter from Air Ministry to Air Officer Commanding, Aden Command. 
147 AIR 23/708, Enclosure 12, Air Commodore W A McClaughry, Letter from Air Officer 
Commanding, Aden Command, to Air Ministry (Wing Commander G C Pirie), 12 May 1937. 
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less impressed by spectacular damage caused by bombing.  Thus, unless 
severe casualties to personnel are permissible, it is probable that the “air 
blockade” method pure and simple – though admittedly long drawn out – is the 
only effective method on the North West Frontier.148 
This exchange provides another insight into the varying factors affecting the 
development of doctrine at ‘home’ and the various ‘theatres’, illustrating how generic, 
world-wide doctrine was unofficially permitted to be refined according to specific local 
political and tactical conditions. 
The final ASM considered within this Thesis is ASM55: The Role and 
Employment of Bomber Transport Aircraft, published in November 1936.149  This ASM 
emphasised that bomber-transports were a compromise between an offensive 
weapon and a transport vehicle.  As a result, they were unarmed and had poor 
performance, so could only operate were no air opposition was anticipated.  Their 
primary role was strategic mobility.  In a germane example, the Memo described how, 
should a squadron of medium bombers from Egypt need to reinforce the NWF, a flight 
of bomber-transports would transfer the necessary squadron personnel and 
equipment to allow the medium bomber squadron to become fully operational with six 
days, where it would otherwise take three to four weeks.  In undeveloped countries, 
where large distances were involved and land communications poor, squadrons and 
their logistics could be rapidly redeployed to remote bases, and subsequently 
resupplied, by bomber-transport aircraft.  The troops and police required to secure 
these airfields and co-operate with the air forces could also be transported and 
                                                
148 AIR 23/708, Enclosure 13, Wing Commander R H M S Saundby, Letter from Air Ministry to 
Air Officer Commanding, Aden Command, 17 September 1937.  Saundby had just replaced 
Pirie, and had appropriate local experience, having been a flight commander on 45 Squadron 
at Hiniadi in 1922 (where, as Arthur Harris’ co-pilot, he helped develop a bombing capability for 
the Vickers Vernon) and commanded the Aden Flight in 1925.  He rose to become Deputy 
AOC-in-C. Bomber Command, in 1943. 
149 AIR 10/2173, Air Staff, Air Staff Memorandum 55: The Role and Employment of Bomber 
Transport Aircraft, November 1936.  Although not mentioned by name, the ASM referred to the 
recent introduction of the Vickers Valentia.  The evolution of the BT concept, which had 
resulted in the formation of the BT Flight at Lahore by 1931, is described at: Wing Commander 
C G Jefford, "The Bomber Transport and the Baghdad Air Mail", Journal of the Royal Air Force 
Historical Society, no. 22  (2000). 
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maintained by air.  As a secondary role, they could be employed as bombers, 
operating at range from secure (rather than advanced) bases, thereby simplifying 
logistical and security challenges.  Bomber-transports could carry the heavy bombs 
required to demolish buildings when required or, for blockade operations, maintain 
pressure for long periods by day or night with a large number of small bombs, at great 
economy.  They could also fulfil a variety of tertiary roles, such as swiftly moving 
police or troops to a point of growing disorder, or reinforcing borders against external 
threats.  They could also obviate the need for small, vulnerable garrisons, allowing 
troops to be concentrated centrally.  However, bomber-transports could not move 
large numbers of troops during emergencies, as heavy equipment could not be carried 
and the aircraft’s primary role was to relocate RAF squadrons.  Nonetheless, when 
small land units were transported, they could also be subsequently resupplied with 
ammunition, rations, medical stores, etc, and could be used to temporarily support 
larger land formations in the case of unforeseen shortages of essential supplies.  In 
both cases, supplies could be conveyed to advanced aerodromes, or dropped by 
parachute.  However, ASM55  warned that it would be ‘extremely unwise to rely on 
aircraft for anything more than the purely temporary maintenance of military garrisons 
at frontier posts’ because ‘all available aircraft should be free for offensive action’; 
nonetheless, ‘In the event of serious trouble these posts might immediately be 
withdrawn by air and the bomber-transport aircraft are then free for their more 
important duties’.  The memo dwelt on the vulnerability of these aircraft while on the 
ground and the need for land forces or, in their absence, the police, to secure the 
landing grounds.150  Bomber-transports could also be used for the emergency 
evacuation of non-combatants or invalids, as had been demonstrated during the 
                                                
150 It even went as far as to suggest that, in the absence of ground forces at remote landing 
grounds, a squadron of Army Co-operation aircraft could reconnoitre the landing surfaces first, 
a flight of which could land and deploy themselves to protect the landing area with their rear-
facing guns, while the remaining flight patrolled overhead. 
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1928/29 evacuation of the British legation from Kabul and the 1935 Quetta 
earthquake.  On a similar theme, although it was impossible to provide bomber-
transports specifically as dedicated air ambulances during the early stages of 
hostilities, they could be used to evacuate casualties on return sectors once their 
cargo had been offloaded.  Loudspeakers could also be fitted for propaganda 
purposes.  The relative priorities of these secondary roles would depend on the 
circumstances and vary over time.  ASM55 demonstrated the competing priorities the 
Air Staff had to manage in advocating the utility of the bomber-transport in supporting 
land forces, whilst their role in offensive action remained paramount.  This illustrated 
the enduring quandary of costly, multi-role aircraft which, due to their commensurate 
limited numbers, could be in simultaneous demand from a variety of users.  The 
number of Indian references within this ASM indicates that part of its purpose was to 
provide the doctrine to support the case to expand the Bomber-Transport Flight (BTF) 
at Lahore to squadron strength.  The Heavy Transport Flight had formed in 1932 and 
been renamed the BTF a year later, but its expansion to squadron strength was 
frequently discussed but never funded.151 
Air Commodore Charles Portal’s February 1937 RUSI presentation entitled “Air 
Force Co-operation in Policing the Empire” was notable on several fronts.152  Not only 
had he been responsible for applying air control as AOC Aden during 1934-36, but his 
presentation cemented terms such as ‘Air Force policing’ and ‘inverted blockade’ into 
the lexicon.  His employment of air power to resolve raiding by the Quteibi tribe in 
1934, a major theme of his presentation, was used by the Air Council to extol the 
                                                
151 Expanding to a ten-aircraft squadron was still being discussed in 1938 by the Chatfield 
Committee.  See CAB 24/287/16, AIR 8/255, Lord Chatfield, Cabinet Paper 133(39): Report of 
the Expert Committee on the Defence of India, 1938-39 [Chatfield Report], 30 January 1939, 
41-43 (also published as ID(38)10 in CAB 27/654).  See also AIR 23/687, Air Staff, Proposal to 
Form a Bomber Transport Squadron. 
152 Portal, "Air Force Co-operation in Policing the Empire". 
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advantages of the air method.153  Portal categorised operations into two types: firstly, 
those in ‘fully administrated territory where communal or other trouble had escalated 
beyond the control of the Civil Power’; and secondly, those in ‘unadministered or 
loosely administered territory where the agents of civil control are non-existent or, if 
they exist, are too few to cope with any but isolated acts of lawlessness’.  In the first 
case, the ‘senior partner’ would probably always be the Army (due to the proximity of 
the guilty and innocent), while in unadministered country the aeroplane had 
increasingly become the primary weapon, although Portal conceded that it was most 
effective when the tribes were settled and dependent on their land, rather than 
nomadic.154  A key issue highlighted in the presentation was that the air and land 
policing mechanisms were fundamentally incompatible: ‘the two methods are like oil 
and water in that they will not mix : the air method drives the tribesmen away, the 
army punitive expedition makes him stand and fight’.  Whilst ‘both the air method and 
land operations have advantages and disadvantages’, Portal recommended that: 
any operation in wild country should either be left to the Air Force until the time 
for consolidation had arrived or else that they should be done by the Army, with 
of course its air units in co-operation for reconnaissance, spotting and perhaps 
for the role of artillery.   
... but acknowledged that this was not fully accepted in India.155  When supporting the 
Army, Portal visualised transport aircraft deploying a new type of specially recruited 
                                                
153 Portal’s original Quteibi report (AIR 10/2196, Report on the Operations Carried Out from 
Aden Against the Quteibi Tribe from the 22nd March to the 21st May 1934, 1935) had been 
circulated earlier as a Confidential Document (AIR 2/1385, Air Ministry, CD 109: Aden 
Operations Against Quteibi Tribe, June 1934) while his RUSI presentation was also 
immediately précised in The Aeroplane magazine (see  "Air Control By Blockade", The 
Aeroplane, 24 February 1937).  Subsequent air control operations against the Aulaqi tribe were 
also publicised in this magazine (see "Operations in the Aden Protectorate", The Aeroplane, 4 
November 1936).  This latter article was deemed sufficiently important to have its contents 
typed up and circulated within the Air Ministry (see AIR 23/708 Enclosure 6, Extract from "The 
Aeroplane" of November 4th, 1936: Operations in the Aden Protectorate, 4 November 1936).  
Further background on Portal's time at Aden is contained in Richards, Portal of Hungerford: 
The Life of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Viscount Portal of Hungerford KG, GCB, OM, DSO, 
MC, 107-119. 
154 Portal, "Air Force Co-operation in Policing the Empire": 344, 357. 
155 Ibid.: 355-356. 
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lightly-armed ‘fly-weight’ policing troops to counter internal security crises, noting that: 
there is much scope for it in India, and I believe that this is recognized by the 
authorities there, though up to now money has not been available to provide the 
necessary aircraft.156 
Portal explained how W/T had been used by troops in Palestine to summon air 
support which would arrive within fifteen minutes.157  Controversy over the air method 
was ‘now dead’, but misunderstanding continued in some quarters, as had been 
evident by the ‘ill-informed’ criticism of ‘police-bombing’ at the 1932-34 Geneva 
Disarmament Conference.158  Occupying large territories with troops or armed police 
could maintain the peace, but would be prohibitively expensive and would be 
disturbing for law-abiding tribes.  Portal viewed the alternative of paying tribes to 
behave as bribery and futile.  He was equally disparaging of the ‘bomb and scuttle’ 
method of immediate bombing as punishment for misbehaviour, emphasising instead 
that the object was to generate ‘a change of heart, and we want to get it by the use of 
the minimum amount of force’.159  Using the Quteibi operation as an example, Portal 
described how the tribe’s Sheikh had been summoned by an air-dropped message to 
meet the political officer at a landing ground in neighbouring neutral territory, where he 
was accused of, and admitted, the crime, claiming that he was unable to control the 
offenders.  As a result, a very carefully worded ultimatum had been drafted and 
dropped on most of the villages within the Sheikh’s territory.160  During the ultimatum 
period, vital additional intelligence was gathered on the tribe, and maps refined.161  
Within a few minutes of the ultimatum’s expiry, aircraft had dropped a few small 
                                                
156 Ibid.: 345. 
157 Portal explained that this air support could deliver as much firepower as 650 18-pound 
artillery shells and 24 machine guns. 
158 See Chapter 7. 
159 Portal, "Air Force Co-operation in Policing the Empire": 350. 
160 This ultimatum contained three themes: firstly, an explanation of how they could avoid 
bombardment by complying with the Government’s ‘full, final and irrevocable demands’; 
secondly, the avoidance of any demands that could be considered as being unreasonable or 
impossible; and, lastly, an explanation of what would happen if the demands were not met by a 
specific date (see Ibid.: 351). 
161 Portal explained that the ultimatum period was typically ten days. 
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bombs on the principal villages, even though the population had left, while heavier 
bombs were dropped on the Sheikh’s house and his closest supporters.  When the 
tribe had expressed contempt over the light bombing, a small but conspicuous village 
belonging to the miscreants had been flattened.  Meanwhile, aircraft patrolled all day 
and, when the moon allowed, by night, with delayed-action bombs being dropped prior 
to unsuitable nights.  After two months, the Quteibis' mood had changed.  They had 
begun in an excited, defiant and revengeful mood, shooting freely, but ineffectively, at 
aircraft.  Under the pressure of economic hardship, discomfort and propaganda, 
squabbling then broke out as tribesmen blamed one another for causing the hardship 
and protesting against the Government.  This was followed by wistful boredom and 
reflection on the prospect of being unable to harvest their forthcoming crops.  After a 
combination of the Resident expressing his desire for the Quteibis to return to their 
previous, law-abiding existence, and a fairly heavy bombardment, mediation began.  
This had been enabled through a neighbouring Sultan, while a two-day suspension of 
bombing had allowed the whole tribe to meet and reach agreement.  The Quteibis 
having conceded, the Political Secretary flew out to receive their fine and offer them 
help in resuming their previous existence as soon as possible, which had been 
received with ‘fervent cheers and long-winded protestations of loyalty and goodwill’.162  
All unexploded ordnance was immediately demolished and a medical officer flown 
in.163  Portal reported practically no ill-will; indeed, the tribesmen even fraternized with 
the airmen, viewing the aeroplane as ‘an impersonal agent of Government’, able to 
return at any moment.164 
                                                
162 Portal, "Air Force Co-operation in Policing the Empire": 354. 
163 Portal reported that the only casualties were three tribesmen killed whilst dismantling a 
delayed-action bomb. 
164 Portal, "Air Force Co-operation in Policing the Empire": 354. 
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Slessor’s “RUSI Gold Medal Essay”, published in August 1937, gives yet 
another interesting perspective on the role of aircraft on the NWF.165  It focused on the 
offensive use of armoured vehicles, predominantly in European theatre.  Since 
originality was a key facet against which RUSI judged the winning submission, it is 
perhaps not surprising that Slessor advocated ‘a rather revolutionary change’ in Army 
organisation and strategy from that of penetration (a FWW hangover) to one of 
employing mobility and manoeuvre to envelope the enemy.166  Despite the European 
theme, Slessor provided an Indian perspective, stating that claims that the challenges 
of the NWF could be solved by air power alone were ‘demonstrably fantastic’.  
Instead, he suggested that all Frontier troops, Covering Troops and the Field Army 
should be Indian (which, if organised along the lines of the previous Punjab Frontier 
Force, would be better suited than British troops), but that the British element should 
be ‘in the air and in tanks’.167  Whilst, by its nature, this essay had to be novel, and the 
Indian element was an adjunct, it nonetheless provides an insight into concepts being 
aired during this period and Slessor’s broad appreciation of joint operations.  And 
India offered the potential for change.  According to Bond, Sir Andrew Skeen, while 
Chief of the General Staff, India (CGS(India)) in 1924-27, decreed that ‘no modern 
instruments of warfare were to be introduced into schemes or manoeuvres’.  Skeen’s 
successor, Chetwode, was more innovative.  In 1932, Quetta Staff College had 
designed a plan to occupy Kandahar in two days using light tanks and aircraft, 
whereas the official plan required 70 days.  The scheme ended with the remark: ‘The 
Air Force is a good show out here; I wish the Army was as progressive’.168  
                                                
165 Slessor, "Gold Medal Essay (Military), 1936". 
166 Ibid.: 464.  Slessor was, at the time, OC 3(Indian) Wing at Chaklala (whose squadrons had 
deployed there from Quetta following the 1935 earthquake) which was co-located with the 
Army’s Armoured Car/Light Tank Military Testing Ground and had no doubt fuelled his 
thoughts). 
167 Ibid.: 482. 
168 Bond, British Military Policy between the Two World Wars, 106. 
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It would be incorrect to state that the British Army in India did not experiment 
with air power, albeit generally at a local level.  Major Wingfield’s October 1939 JUSII 
article, “Mountain Warfare”, described a small-scale trial to maximise the mobility of 
troops by minimising their organic logistical tail.169  Wingfield’s thesis was that: 
A heavy column with a mass of mules is not a necessity, for we can move, fight, 
feed, water and rest without a single mule within a brigade, provided that we 
employ reasonable and light supporting weapons and take advantage of mobile 
methods of supply and communication with modern developments in place at 
our disposal.170 
Winfield proposed the use of auto-gyro ambulances or, in their absence, armoured 
vehicles to overcome ‘undoubtedly, the biggest problem that a column of this nature 
has to face’.171  Autogyro landing grounds could easily be constructed and would also 
enable face-to-face Army-RAF liaison and personal reconnaissance by brigade and 
battalion commanders.  No reserve of water need be carried, reliance being placed on 
aerial re-supply or springs instead.172  Wingfield considered the following roles for the 
RAF: preliminary reconnaissances by the column commander; subsequent tactical 
reconnaissance; close support using bombs and machine guns; communication via 
message-dropping and locally-designed light-weight Popham panels; tracking and 
reporting the column’s progress via wireless to an R/T Tender co-located at the Army 
HQ;173 dropping ammunition, water, rations or medical supplies; and aerial 
photography.  Although aircraft could replace long-range artillery, time-critical short-
range support was best provided by organic mortars.174  Overall, Wingfield showed a 
sound awareness of the disadvantages of conventional ‘field army’ tactics in mountain 
warfare and displayed a willingness to use novel techniques to overcome them. 
                                                
169 Wingfield, "Mountain Warfare". 
170 Ibid.: 493. 
171 Ibid.: 496. 
172 Ibid.: 498. 
173 Wingfield explained that, whilst flags could be used to communicate within a battalion, 
communication between deployed battalions would be relayed to W/T-equipped aircraft via 
one-man pack sets, initiated via Popham panels. 
174 Wingfield, "Mountain Warfare": 499-501; 504. 
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Air Commodore Bottomley’s November 1939 JRUSI article, “The Work of the 
Royal Air Force on the North-West Frontier”, provided a detailed examination of the 
state of evolution of RAF tactics at the end of the inter-war period.175  It appears to 
have been written as a counterpoint to a March 1938 RUSI lecture by the Governor, 
NWFP, which the Air Staff felt had deliberately underplayed air power’s role and 
evaded the air-land controversy.176  Bottomley had been OC No 1(Indian) Group at 
Peshawar between 1934 and 1937 and had participated in two biennial Chitral Relief 
Columns, the 1935 Loe Agra and Mohmand operations and the 1936 Waziristan 
operation.177  Given that later, as DCAS to Portal during the Second World War, he 
was an advocate of area bombing, Bottomley’s presentation is particularly germane 
and provided an interesting glimpse at his formative experiences.  Bottomley opened 
with a declaration that the NWF was ‘an insoluble problem’ where the line between 
peace and war was very ill-defined.178  In places, Europeans could move in complete 
safety, whereas military escorts were essential in Mohmand country and on the 
recently-built roads of Waziristan.  Other parts, such as the heart of the Tirah, had not 
been visited by the ‘white man’ since 1897, and the RAF provided the only direct 
intelligence.  Bottomley categorised RAF operations on the NWF into two types: 
peacetime ‘watch and ward’ duties; and ‘operations’ when more serious situations 
arose.179  In describing  ‘operations’, Bottomley revealed that ‘the more scientific and 
                                                
175 Bottomley, "The Work of the RAF on the NWF".  The article is the transcript of Bottomley’s 
March 1939 presentation at the Institute, which was presided over, rather appropriately, by 
General Muspratt, who had been GOC Peshawar District at the same time as Bottomley and 
was, by 1939, the IO’s Military Secretary.  He played a significant role in the gestation of the 
1939 Combined Frontier Operations Manual, as described in Chapter 7. 
176 AIR 2/2051, Squadron Leader L Darvall, Minute to DCAS, 29 March 1938. 
177 No 1(Indian) Group comprised four bomber squadrons, the Wapitis of No 27(B) and 60(B) 
Squadrons at No 1(Indian Wing) Station, Kohat, and the Hawker Harts of No 2(Indian Wing) 
Station, Risalpur, comprising No 11(B) and No 39(B) Squadrons.  
178 Bottomley, "The Work of the RAF on the NWF": 669-670. 
179 ‘Watch and ward’ duties included special air reconnaissance over vast tracks of 
inaccessible areas for the political or military authorities, and regular, routine reconnaissance 
and photographic surveys to collate accurate maps which also ‘show the flag’.  As Bottomley 
pointed out: ‘The airman may see few tribesmen on these reconnaissances, but thousands of 
tribesmen see the aircraft’ (see Ibid.: 771). 
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effective method of air blockade, such as we have practised successfully in Iraq and 
Aden, has never been properly tried in India’, although the RAF had attempted to 
enforce tribal submission by destructive or punitive air action on a few occasions.180  
As a result, Bottomley confined himself to describing the types of operations 
undertaken under Army control during his tour of duty, namely: ‘destructive air action’; 
‘proscriptive air action’; ‘close support’; and ‘troop carrying and supply’. 
‘Destructive air action’ was reserved ‘for punishment of particularly “bad hats” or 
specially outrageous sections’, the aim being to inflict a specified measure of 
punishment for definite misdeeds.181  Bottomley contrasted this with air blockades, 
which kept destruction to an absolute minimum.  He also noted that offenders often 
removed the valuable timbers from their dwellings beforehand, adding to the 
destruction.  An example of destructive air action was the 1937 operation against of 
the Mahsud hamlet of Arsal Kot where the FoI was sheltering which, following 
warnings by messengers and notices dropped 48 hours beforehand, was completely 
obliterated in two days.182 
‘Proscriptive air action’ was used to clear an area of tribesmen for a variety of 
reasons.  As aircraft were largely unable to distinguish between the guilty and 
innocent, by ordering everyone to clear an area, anyone remaining could be deemed 
hostile and freely engaged.  The primary uses of proscription were: (i) to disperse a 
hostile lashkar or prevent it traversing an area; (ii) to prevent access to hostile leaders 
in an area of unrest;183 (iii) to reduce opposition to advancing troops; or occasionally 
(iv) as a punitive measure to deny grazing areas.  AOC(India) had described the first 
                                                
180 Ibid.: 773. 
181 Destructive operations normally took a day or two and targets were normally publicised in 
advance. 
182 Bottomley, "The Work of the RAF on the NWF": 774.  For a précis of the Faqir of Ipi and the 
Arsal Kot operation, see: Milan Hauner, "One Man against the Empire: The Faqir of Ipi and the 
British in Central Asia on the Eve of and during the Second World War", 
http://www.khyber.org/publications/021-025/faqiripi.shtml (accessed 3 October 2013).  See 
Annex 2 for the weapon expenditure statistics. 
183 The FoI’s Arsal Kot hamlet was subjected to proscriptive air action following its physical 
destruction described above.
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three techniques as ‘tactical proscription’ and the latter as ‘punitive’ in 1938.184  This 
had caused a dispute between AOC(India) and the Air Staff over the confusion 
between punitive proscription and air blockading which had led to the application of 
the former rather than the latter.185  Even in the most serious situations, the 
Government would enforce a minimum of 48-hours notice via messengers, notices or, 
if possible, by direct announcement in jirgas. 
‘Close support for troops’ was an intensified version of normal ‘watch and ward’ 
duties, but with army co-operation squadrons allotted to specific Army formations.186  
Bottomley noted that, since the 1930 Afridi Peshawar incursions, hostile lashkars 
rarely presented themselves as targets because ‘the tribesman is now too air-minded 
and too conscious of the effects of the bomb and machine gun to expose himself in 
that manner’.187  As a result, by 1939, it was only during the close support of troops 
that hostile tribesmen were encountered in any numbers.  This proximity, however, 
required precision attacks to avoid friendly casualties which were only possible by 
‘low-dive bombing attacks’ down to about 1,000 feet.188  The requirement for precision 
precluded high-level bombing and brought aircrew within hostile rifle fire, something 
which the aforementioned AS(I)M 1 had sought to avoid in all but extreme 
circumstances.  It also required the closest liaison between pilots and troops using 
R/T, supplemented by ground signals.  Due to these challenges, exacerbated by the 
NWF’s terrain, the RAF preferred to engage targets that the Army could not tackle 
                                                
184 See AIR 2/2065, Air Marshal Sir Philip Joubert de la Ferte, Letter, Air Officer Commanding, 
India, to Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, 5 October 1938. 
185 AIR 2/2065, Squadron Leader L Darvall, Minute, FO5 to Deputy Chief of the Air Staff and 
Deputy Director Plans, 14 July 1938.  The dispute between ‘tactical’ and ‘punitive’ proscription 
is described in the analysis of the Combined Frontier Manual in Chapter 7. 
186 Close support roles included  reconnaissance, communications as well as traditional ‘close 
support’ using bombs and machine guns. 
187 Bottomley, "The Work of the RAF on the NWF": 776. 
188 This profile was known locally as the ‘VBL’ or Vickers-Bomb-Lewis attack, with the front 
Vickers gun being used to cover the approach prior to bomb release, while the rear gunner’s 
Lewis kept heads down during the ‘get away’ as the aircraft returned to the sanctuary of height. 
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with their own weapons, such as hostiles on reverse slopes, except in emergencies.189   
Finally, ‘troop carrying and supply’ had been employed for a wide variety of 
tasks, including: personnel movement;190 the evacuation of casualties, the sick and 
medical staff;191 and the re-supply of isolated garrisons and columns to relieve them of 
the burden of supply chains.192   
Bottomley concluded with a revealing reflection on inter-Service co-operation: 
Whatever conflicting views may be held by higher circles as to the best methods 
of control on the frontier, those different points of view have never prejudiced the 
single aim which has always characterized inter-Service co-operation in the 
field... there is great mutual understanding, most friendly co-operation and the 
greatest confidence in inter-Service relations on the North-West Frontier itself.193 
Bottomley’s article highlights how the Air Ministry’s sophisticated air blockade policy 
had been constrained from being applied in India.  Instead, the Army had insisted on 
the RAF applying ‘punitive proscription’, a tactic not recognised by the Air Staff.194  It 
also demonstrates how the tribesmen had countered the threat of aircraft by 
dispersing, only presenting a concentrated target when forced to counter British 
troops.  The concomitant proximity of friendlies and hostiles had driven the RAF to 
focus on precision, a rare aberration from the normal emphasis on ‘morale effect’, and 
one enforced on it by Army, rather than Air Force, requirements.  In contrast, the Air 
Staff would have preferred to use the dispersing effect of air power to enforce inverted 
                                                
189 This was in harmony with the Army Council’s guidance, which stated that ‘Troops deployed 
are not suitable targets for fighters, nor should fighters be used to attack objectives that can be 
engaged by artillery or machine guns on the ground’ (see Army Council, The Employment of 
Air Forces with the Army in the Field (London: HMSO, 1938), 38). 
190 Bottomley explained that the 14-day Peshawar-Gilgit journey could be made in two-and-a-
half hours by air. 
191 As had been employed during the 1935 Quetta earthquake.  See Slessor, The Central Blue, 
102-118. 
192 During 1937, Wana had been re-supplied with 145 tons of supplies and 5,000 men by air 
when the roads were closed. 
193 Bottomley, "The Work of the RAF on the NWF": 778.  General Muspratt, the IO’s Military 
Secretary, was chairing the RUSI presentation and agreed with Bottomley’s sentiments about 
inter-Service accord.  See Chapter 6’s  section on ‘improving inter-Service relations, 1935’. 
194 The biography of John Masters, a Ghurkha officer on the NWF, revealed how punitive 
proscription worked: ‘Ideally aerial proscription sent all the tribe into the safe enclave and 
forced its surrender, without bloodshed, by the complete disruption of its normal life.  In 
practice the threat was often enough’.  See Masters, Bugles and a Tiger, 215. 
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blockades.  Equally important is Bottomley’s description of how, despite inter-Service 
disagreement over the employment of the RAF on the NWF, there was nevertheless 
very close co-operation at a local, tactical level. 
COMBINED FRONTIER MANUAL 
The 1939 Frontier Warfare – India (Army and Royal Air Force), known at the time as 
the ‘Combined Frontier Manual’, forms an appropriate full stop at the end of the 
doctrinal publications considered in this Thesis.195  It could be argued that Edition 2 of 
AP1300 is also a logical end-point.  Although published in 1940, its gestation began in 
1938 when Wing Commander Ivelaw-Chapman was appointed editor.  Whilst Edition 
2 was a significant re-write, it continued to emphasise that morale effect was the 
primary aim.  Chapter XIII ‘Operations in Unadministered and Undeveloped Areas’ 
closely reflected the themes of the Combined Manual and emphasised that the aim 
was ‘to induce the enemy to submit with the minimum destruction of life and property, 
and with due regard to economy in time, money and energy’.196  One notable 
additional AP1300 tactic was the ‘air cordon’; also known as ‘air pinning’, it involved 
air forces assisting troops in surprise searches of villages by imposing an aerially-
enforced cordon and dropping notices warning the inhabitants to remain within the 
village or be liable to be shot if they left.  This allowed time for ground forces to then 
deploy and search for offenders.197 
Nonetheless, the Combined Frontier Manual replaced both the Army’s 1925 
Manual of Operations and the 1935 AS(I)M 1.198  Indeed HQ RAF(India) was so keen 
to use the new Combined Manual that it replaced AS(I)M 1 with a proof copy of the 
                                                
195 Defence Department, Frontier Warfare - India. 
196 Air Ministry, AP 1300: Royal Air Force War Manual. Part I - Operations, 2nd ed. (1940), Ch 
XIII, para 8. 
197 AIR 5/1327, Enclosure 1, Notes on the Air Cordon, 1938. 
198 Army Headquarters, Manual of Operations on the North-West Frontier of India (Calcutta: 
Government of India, 1925); Air Staff (India) Memo No. 1. 
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new Combined publication the year before it was officially published.  Understandably, 
the gestation of the Combined Manual was not without issues, especially over 
independent air operations, as explained in Chapter 7.  Air operations were covered in  
Chapter III (Air Operations - Principles), IV (independent Air Operations - Methods), 
while Chapter VII covered Co-operation by Land and Air Forces, with Chapters IV  
and VII being the most relevant.  Overall, the Manual’s tactics correlate closely with 
Bottomley’s JRUSI article and reflected the contemporary derived doctrine. 
Chapter III, a short, three-page section entitled ‘Air Operations – Principles’, 
grouped operations into three broad, overlapping, categories, namely: air blockade; 
destructive air action; and the direct attack on hostile tribesmen.  Interestingly, the 
latter two categories were specific in-theatre techniques that had developed in 
reaction to the NWF’s circumstances.  Of note, the Combined Manual recommended 
that, to take advantage of the speed of response of aircraft, the decision to take air 
action should be reached ‘as soon as possible’.  If crews were captured, notices would 
be dropped explaining that air action would not be relaxed and that the tribesmen 
would be held responsible for the airmen’s safety.199 
Chapter IV (Air Operations – Methods)’s thirteen pages provided a detailed 
description of the independent employment of aircraft.  The primacy and prior 
approval of the political authorities was emphasised.  The Chapter described in detail 
how to draft warning notices that the RAF, augmented by messengers, would deliver, 
the ‘preliminary warning notices’ being on white paper, and the ‘final bombing notices’ 
on red paper.  It then described the three categories of independent air operations (air 
blockades, proscriptive and destructive air action). 
The detailed description of air blockade methodology was consistent with the Air 
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Staff’s previously-described 1936 and 1938 Air Blockade memos.200  At the IO’s 
request, there was no reference to the use of delayed-action bombs.201  Interestingly, 
a December 1939 paper by the Air Staff’s Directorate of Plans concerning attack on 
German industrial targets opined that delayed action bombs were humane because 
they gave ‘all workers and civil population in the neighbourhood time to move away’.  
However, the Air Staff were clearly conscious of the Army’s position, with the Deputy 
Director of Intelligence noting that: 
I do not think that the analogy of action against black and yellow tribes is a true 
one.  Such people cannot be persuaded to understand what they read, even if 
they read it.  They have little sense of time and are unable to reason logically.  
Against them, the long-delay bomb is likely to wreak havoc.202 
If this was a generally-held view, it significantly undermined the perceived 
effectiveness of warning notices.  Nonetheless, the Deputy Director commented, with 
reference to delayed-action bombs against Germany: ‘Would the world at large agree 
that we had found the answer to the normal humanitarian objections to bombing?  I 
think on the whole it would’.203  So, ironically, the use of delayed action bombs that the 
IO objected to was soon to be advocated as humanitarian against Europeans. 
The Combined Manual categorised proscriptive air action as being either 
‘tactical’ or ‘punitive’.  Terminology apart, the tactics are identical to Bottomley’s 
previously mentioned 1939 JRUSI article.  To pacify the Air Staff’s concern over 
                                                
200 See Air Ministry, Air Blockade, 1936; Slessor, Notes on Police Bombing dated 18 June 
1938; and Air Blockade, 1938. 
201 All mention of delayed-action bombs in a draft copy of the Manual were crossed through by 
the IO, and did not appear in the final version.  See AIR 2/2065, India Defence Department, 
Frontier Warfare - India (Army and Royal Air Force) - Draft, 7 October 1938, 23, 27.  Delayed-
action bombs did cause some casualties; Air Commodore Chamier wrote to The Times 
describing a personal interaction in 1925 with the Jalal Khels on the NWF: ‘They spoke of 
many bombs which failed to explode and their value for the brass they contained, and laughed 
as they told of the effect of one of the long delay action bombs which blew one of their number 
to pieces as he tried to unscrew the fuze’.  See AIR 9/12, E54, Air Commodore J A Chamier, 
Letter to the Editor, The Times, 23 September 1932, 2. 
202 AIR 20/438, Group Captain H H MacL Fraser, Memo from Deputy Director Plans 
(Operations) to Director of Operations (Group Captain J C Slessor), 16 December 1939. 
203 AIR 20/438, Deputy Director Intelligence (3), Minute from Deputy Director Intelligence to 
Deputy Director Plans (Operations), 21 September 1939. 
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confusion between punitive proscription and the air blockade (described in Chapter 7), 
the Manual noted that the former ‘bear no relation to air blockade’.204 
The Combined Manual’s description of destructive air action is almost identical 
to Bottomley’s JRUSI article.  No doubt to the Air Staff’s chagrin, the description 
added that, in addition to being used purely punitively (as an Army punitive expedition 
would be), destructive air action could also be used to bring pressure to bear on tribes 
‘when conditions are not suitable for air blockade’ or, alternatively, in conjunction with 
air blockades or proscriptive air action.  If used to apply pressure, the Manual 
recommended that the destruction should be progressive, with each destructive phase 
notified well in advance (to maximise psychological pressure, as well as to avoid 
casualties).  The selection of objectives for destruction had to be made with due 
regard to their susceptibility to aerial bombardment and, as a considerable 
expenditure of heavy bombs would usually be necessary, the individual objectives 
should not be too numerous, presumably to minimise cost and effort.205 
Chapter VI of the Combined Manual, which described the Characteristics of the 
Armed Forces, contained a brief description of the roles of bomber and army co-
operation squadrons in India.  For the first time in formal doctrine, the role of the 
bomber-transport was described, namely: increasing the mobility of squadrons; 
evacuation of troop casualties; and the carriage of reinforcements, supplies and 
ammunition to isolated posts or small detached forces.  The Chapter also warned 
Army officers not to unnecessarily risk the loss of an aircraft due to the repercussions 
if the crew were captured.206 
 Chapter VII, Co-operation by Land and Air Forces, just two pages shorter than 
Chapter IV on independent air operations, underlined that army co-operation aircraft 
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would be placed under the command of the Army force commander, with an RAF 
advisor attached to the force HQ.  If this HQ did not accompany the column, another 
RAF officer would deploy to advise and liaise with the column HQ.  Bomber aircraft 
would remain under RAF control, albeit co-ordinated with the army co-operation 
squadrons.  The four discrete army co-operation roles of ‘air reconnaissance’, ‘troop 
carrying and supply’, ‘offensive air action in co-operation with land forces’, and ‘close 
support’ were described in detail. 
‘Air reconnaissance’ patrols provided advanced warning of tribal attacks against 
Army posts.  Tribesmen had learnt to move at night or in small parties, and to conceal 
and camouflage themselves when aircraft were heard, but machine gun fire or light 
bombs could be used to stimulate movement.  Pilots would normally remain above 
effective rifle range, but could descend at high speed if absolutely necessary.  
Stereoscopic photographs could be an ‘invaluable supplement’ to ground 
reconnaissance.207 
Expanding upon the advice in Chapter VI, the Manual explained that improvised 
landing grounds should be prepared near Army posts and halting places.  In their 
absence, limited supplies could be dropped to Army units.  Potentially, with sufficient 
aircraft, brigade-plus-sized formations could be re-supplied.  However, troops would 
have to protect low-flying or landing aircraft as well as parachute drop zones.208 
As explained by Bottomley, during watch and ward duties, aircraft co-operating 
with troops could only use lethal force against tribesmen in self defence; habitations 
could only be engaged with the prior sanction of the GoI.  However, in emergencies, a 
land commander could request aerial ‘offensive air action’ against tribesmen actually 
engaged with troops.  Tribesmen seen approaching a column with apparent hostile 
intent, even if seen preparing an ambush, could not be engaged until they had opened 
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fire.  Even during Government-authorised operations, villages could not be engaged 
until warning and bombing notices had been dropped; similarly, to separate friendlies 
and hostiles, an area had to be cleared (proscribed) prior to offensive air action, 
except in self defence or in emergencies.209 
When an area around a land force had been proscribed, army co-operation 
squadrons could ordinarily employ light bombs and machine gun fire against 
approaching or retiring tribesmen.  Thus, aircraft could be used simultaneously in an 
independent role to proscribe an area, while also conducting ‘close support’ work with 
ground forces.  Their greatest value in this latter role was in dispersing tribesmen 
about to overwhelm friendly troops; indeed, their mere presence could prevent 
tribesmen from concentrating.  Thus, while punitive columns aimed to compel 
tribesmen to concentrate and give battle under advantageous conditions, the Army 
used the RAF to disperse tribesmen when disadvantaged.  The Manual 
recommended, as had Bottomley, that aircraft should only rarely engage targets that 
ground forces could engage; the reason for this recommendation is unclear, but was 
probably due to difficulties with air-to-ground communication.210  It was recommended 
that, normally, only one aircraft should attack at a time, while the other aircraft 
remained outside the range of effective rifle fire.211  Due to the lack of robust 
communications, standing air patrols would, when possible, be arranged.  
Independent detachments (such as advanced guards) could be allocated their own 
close support aircraft.  However, the Manual warned that, where two or more troop 
formations acted together in the same operation, a higher commander should control 
any air support due to the individual formations’ inability to maintain situational 
                                                
209 Ibid., 63-64. 
210 The Army was responsible for land-line telephony between their HQ and the landing 
grounds, while ground-to-air direction was maintained via either R/T, visual signals such as the 
Popham Panel, or by cloth strips. 
211 Normally above 2500 feet.  While it was ‘the duty of a pilot to fly temporarily at a lower 
height’ if required, it was seldom necessary for attacking aircraft to descend below 1500 feet.   
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awareness of each other.212 
The Combined Manual is an apt place to halt the inter-War analysis of RAF 
NWF doctrine.  Certainly, this was an unprecedentedly joint publication which, given 
its similarity to Bottomley’s description to RUSI, probably largely reflected actual 
practice.  Some items are notable by their absence, such as lack of any mention of the 
use of aircraft in rearguard actions.  Another anomaly was the inclusion of air 
blockade tactics which, as Bottomley had explained, had never been properly applied 
in India (indeed, the Air Ministry had stated in 1935 that ‘there is every indication that it 
will never be allowed to be used’);213 SoS(India) had allowed this be included at the 
RAF’s insistence, despite the Army’s wishes.214  This is interesting, given that the air 
blockade was designed to minimise damage, whereas the Army were active sponsors 
of punitive proscription and destructive air action which achieved their aim by 
deliberately inflicting damage.  Certainly, the overlap between the air blockade, 
punitive proscription and destructive air action was confusing.  The reasons for the 
Army’s reticence about the air blockade may be diverse.  Firstly, the Army and RAF 
authorities in India had to take a pragmatic approach to the practical issues of the 
NWF, while the Air Staff’s ‘battles’ were largely political in nature, focusing on their 
need for an ethically-defensible, air-only tactic.  Additionally, there was wider 
normative acceptance of troops delivering lethal force than of the “unsportsman-like”, 
asymmetric use of air power on tribesmen who could not easily retaliate.  Importantly, 
many within the Air Ministry thought the reason was ‘largely fear of reductions being 
made in the land forces of INDIA’ following Trenchard’s 1929 swansong.215  Indeed, 
one fairly constant theme was the Army’s preference to accept casualties, rather than 
                                                
212 Defence Department, Frontier Warfare - India, 64-67. 
213 AIR 5/1325, Squadron Leader L Darvall, Paper for Deputy Director Operations (Group 
Captains R H Peck and A T Harris): Air Power on the North West Frontier of India, 16 October 
1935. 
214 This is discussed in Chapter 7. 
215 Darvall, Air Power on the NWF of India, 16 October 1935.  Trenchard’s swansong is 
discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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employ aircraft to their full effect; C-in-C(India) had complained in 1922 that the 
capture of two RAF crews during a Waziristan operation ‘caused much 
embarrassment to the GOC’, while Beaumont commented that, in 1931:  
‘In the prolonged debate over air policing in India, the Army was manoeuvered 
at one point into arguing that it was better that they[,] rather than their enemies[,] 
should suffer heavy casualties’.216   
CONCLUSION 
Trenchard’s 1929 call for substitution (‘control without occupation’) on the NWF 
caused a significant rift between the Air Staff and IO. 217  AP1300’s guidance on 
undeveloped and semi-civilised operations was rapidly updated by ASMs, with 
increased emphasis on morale effect, political control, rapid decision-making and 
allowing aircraft freedom for manoeuvre, all aimed at removing Army constraints on 
the employment of air power.  To counter accusations of brutality, there was also a 
broadening of emphasis towards inter-theatre and tactical troop transport, evacuation 
and aerial resupply enabled by the advent of bomber-transports, which also offered 
longer loiter times and bomb loads.  However, as Vincent Orange pointed out, RAF 
transport aircraft technology lagged well behind the Germans and Americans.218  
While this capability would have greatly reduced the logistical issues associated with 
punitive columns on the NWF, it was rejected by C-in-C(India) on the grounds of cost; 
the concomitant threat to Army structure, especially under the shadow of Trenchard’s 
swansong, along with mixed messages from the RAF, were probably significant 
factors.  Indeed, although the RAF displayed local technical innovation in India 
(because it increased capability), the Army seemed to ignore it, probably because 
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technology threatened man-intensive force structures.219  AS(I)M 1 supported 
substitution, focusing on independent air operations alone and recommending the use 
of minimum force in imposing coercive blockades, rather than destructive, punitive 
strikes.  When supporting ground troops, AS(I)M 1 recommended coercive strikes 
against the village-of-origin of lashkars.  In contrast, the Army required, 
understandably, precision attacks on tribesmen to directly support troops.  It became 
evident that, while ground operations endeavoured to force the tribesmen to 
concentrate in conventional battle, the ‘air method’ tended to disperse them; the two 
methods were incompatible unless carefully co-ordinated and a clear decision on 
whether the Army or RAF took the lead.  In India, it was always the former, and air 
blockades were almost never imposed.  The arrival of Ludlow-Hewitt as AOC(India) in 
1935 marked a watershed for Army-RAF relations on the sub-continent.  While the Air 
Staff’s doctrine continued to favour the ‘inverted blockade’, in India, the Combined 
Manual focused on co-operative methods, although ‘blockade’ tactics were still 
included at the Air Staff’s insistence, despite never being allowed to be used.  
Interestingly, while the Army’s greatest public criticism of the air method was its 
‘brutality’, they advocated punitive, destructive, air action rather than the RAF’s tactic 
of minimum force in enforcing blockades, whilst remaining sensitive to the 
consequences of captured aircrew. 
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CHAPTER 6 – A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE RAF ON THE NWF 
INTRODUCTION 
The previous Chapters described the development of Air Staff doctrine pertinent to 
NWF operations.  This Chapter examines the conduct of NWF air operations against 
this doctrine, focusing on the influence of inter-Service friction rather than 
comprehensively describing events.  The analysis shows that discord occurred at 
several levels: first, over funding and resource allocation in a competition over relative 
force structures and concomitant political influence; and second, over the most 
efficient strategy for employing aircraft.  These were linked by further competition over 
the command and control of in-theatre assets, which allowed the ‘supported’ Service 
to dictate tactics to the subordinated, ‘supporting’ force.  The dynamic was not just 
between the Army and RAF, as routine political control was vested in the GoI’s 
Foreign and Political Department.  The Army and RAF approached this hegemony 
differently.  The Army sometimes adopted a ‘surly if not actively hostile’ attitude, while 
the Air Staff promoted their ability to cheaply deliver political effect with minimum force 
without costly punitive land operations.1  Despite this enduring inter-Ministry tension, 
the exigencies of the growing insurgency in the late 1930s resulted in generally 
effective tactical co-operation between the in-theatre Services.  Overall, the inter-
Ministry conflict centred on competition over control of resources and political 
influence rather than tactical capability.  Frustrated by their lack of influence, the Air 
Staff became unnecessarily critical without fully appreciating the context.  In contrast, 
the Air Staff(India) remained pragmatic, promoting the most efficient use of air power 
within the in-theatre constraints, despite disagreeing with GS(India) strategy.  This 
placed the Air Staff(India) in an invidious position; a pragmatic approach was required 
to address urgent local security issues and demonstrate the RAF’s ability to delivered 
                                                
1 Ledwidge, "Review of Tripodi, 'Edge of Empire'": 107.  See Chapter 2. 
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the effects tasked by the Army’s command chain.  To petition continually for the 
application of the Air Staff’s doctrine may have alienated their Indian (Army) command 
chain and been detrimental to the RAF’s in-theatre reputation, especially since, 
constitutionally, there was no official links between the Air Staff(India) and the Air 
Ministry over policy issues.  Ultimately, the Air Staff(India) had a duty to comply with 
their in-theatre command chain.  Conversely, most RAF officers seemed to agree with 
core RAF doctrine and were keen to maximise air power’s potential on the NWF.  As 
will be seen, different AOC(India)s took different approaches to balancing these 
contradictory factors, but most ultimately erred on the side of complying with the 
requirements of the job in hand.  
EARLY INDIAN AVIATION 
The archive reveals India’s initial enthusiasm for air power.  In 1911, twelve generals 
observed a Bristol Box-kite participate in a cavalry exercise.2  C-in-C(India) ‘realized at 
once its vast possibilities and its future importance to the Indian Empire’.3  CGS(India), 
Douglas Haig, subsequently informed the WO that ‘We are considering here how best 
to start a school of instruction and a corps for air work...’ although ‘Money at present is 
very tight’.4  By April 1914, an Indian Central Flying School had been established ‘to 
gain experience in aviation under Indian conditions’.5 
                                                
2 Macmillan, Sir Sefton Brancker, 14-18.  The first aeroplanes had flown over India in late 1910 
when three companies carried out demonstration flights (see also Clive Richards, Origins of 
Military Aviation in India and the Creation of the Indian Air Force, 1910-1932, Part One: The 
Origins of Military Aviation in India, 1901-1918, Manuscript from Author, 2007, 2). 
3 Macmillan, Sir Sefton Brancker, 19. 
4 Michael Paris, "Air Power and Imperial Defence 1880-1919", Journal of Contemporary History 
24, no. 2  (1989): 218.  Financial considerations remained an enduring constraint in India (see  
B R Tomlinson, The Political Economy of the Raj 1914-1947 (London: MacMillan Press, 
1979)). 
5 "Flying School for India”, Flight, 11 April 1914. 
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FIRST WORLD WAR 
At the outbreak of the FWW, all India’s aircraft and associated personnel were 
deployed overseas.6  In April 1915, India’s Inspector of Mechanical Transport, Lord 
Montagu, informed the GS(India) that ‘The moral effect of aeroplanes and the 
dropping of high explosive bombs on hostile Lashkars and villages would probably be 
very great’, advocating a chain of airfields along the NWFP.7  The Chief 
Commissioner, NWFP, added ‘I am quite sure that [Montagu] will have done more for 
the pacification of the Frontier and for the prevention of a possible Afghan war than 
anyone has done in the last twenty years’.8  In August 1915, the Viceroy requested 
that the WO deploy aircraft to the NWF as ‘one of the most valuable’ measures of 
mitigating his garrison’s depleted strength:9 
The early establishment of an efficient and adequate flying service... on the 
North West Frontier is so essential for us that we press for all promptitude in the 
matter.10 
Even at this early stage, India appeared keen to control its own air power, rather than 
rely on the RFC, proposing the re-establishment of an Indian aviation school.  The 
WO rejected this due to lack of resource and concerns over sustaining the supply 
chain at such great distance, a constraint that would endure.11  The WO conceded in 
November 1915, deploying 31 Squadron to India.  The Squadron soon demonstrated 
over the Chief Commissioner and trans-border tribal leaders.  One chief reflected: ‘the 
day of the Robber and Murderer was at an end as the Raj... could see all their 
                                                
6 Paris, "Air Power and Imperial Defence": 218. 
7 Ibid.: 218-219.  For a detailed analysis of Montagu’s influence, see Michael Collins, "A 
Technocratic Vision of Empire: Lord Montagu and the Origins of the Royal Air Force", 
http://www.academia.edu/2786237/A_Technocratic_Vision_of_Empire_Lord_Montagu_and_th
e_Origins_of_the_Royal_Air_Force. 
8 Paris, "Air Power and Imperial Defence": 218-219. 
9 AIR 1/31/15/1/165 E2, Under Secretary of State for India, Copy Telegram from Viceroy to 
Secretary of State. Dated 20th August 1915, 28 August 1915. 
10 AIR 1/31/15/1/165 E5, India Office Military Secretary, Telegram from Viceroy. Dated 22nd 
August 1915, 10 September 1915. 
11 AIR 1/31/15/1/165, B B Cubitt, Letter, Assistant Secretary to the War Office to Under 
Secretary of State for India, 2 October 1915. 
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doings’.12  In July 1918, the IO requested two additional squadrons:13 
Recent frontier warfare has shown their extreme value…  an efficient and 
sufficient force of aeroplanes can bring about a decision in our favour on the 
frontier more quickly than anything else, and incidently[sic] save many lives, 
considerable bloodshed, and much money, 
simultaneously highlighting air power’s role against potential Russian aggression.14  
Whilst agreeing in principle, the Air Staff ‘regretted that it is not possible at the present 
time to divert any additional Air Force to India’, although they could ‘despatch 
squadrons from Egypt to India in the case of emergency’.15  Nevertheless, the IO 
continued to ‘strongly urge’ the development of aircraft suitable for the NWF.16 
The early development of air power in India is revealing given the Army’s 
subsequent attitude.  First, Army officers swiftly recognised the aircraft’s potential and 
sought an Indian capability.  Second, the FWW’s outbreak stifled the Indian air arm’s 
development, leaving India dependent on UK assets; ‘India’s’ aspiration for an organic 
capability probably influenced the subsequent attitude towards ‘outside’ airmen.  
Third, the Army’s early enthusiasm was a reaction to Indian troop reductions; the 
Army recognised air power’s utility as a force multiplier, partially substituting troops 
and mitigating the inherent risks associated with a numerically-depleted force.  The Air 
Staff would later use the same argument during the strain on troop numbers during 
the 1935 Mohmand Campaign to propose the expansion of NWF air action.17 
                                                
12 The History of No 31 Squadron Royal Flying Corps and Royal Air Force in the East from its 
Formation in 1915 to 1950, 1-2. 
13 AIR 2/68 (A1179), Air Council Secretary, Letter to Under Secretary of State, India Office, 29 
July 1918. 
14 AIR 2/68 (A1179), Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert Cox, Letter, Secretary, Military 
Department, India Office, to Secretary, Air Ministry, 11 July 1918. 
15 Air Council Secretary, Letter, Air Ministry to USoS India, 29 July; AIR 2/68 (A1179), India 
Office Military Secretary, Letter to Secretary, Air Ministry, 8 August 1918. 
16 AIR 2/68 (A1179) E6, Sir James Seabrooke, Letter, Military Department, India Office, to 
Secretary, Air Ministry, 27 August 1918. 
17 See Chapter 7. 
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POST-FWW AVIATION 
The Armistice catalysed a significant volte-face from both the Air Ministry and IO.  In 
November 1918, the Air Ministry recommended that India establish a twelve-squadron 
force of army co-operation and long-range striking squadrons, as developed during 
the FWW, ‘paid for by the Government of India’.18 The Air Ministry’s thinly veiled 
agenda, as it faced the possibility of re-absorption into its parent Services, was 
probably to retain as much wartime force structure as possible (and therefore maintain 
inter-Service influence), at India’s expense.  This was clearly a dangerous gambit, 
given that “he who pays the piper calls the tune”, something that would become an 
enduring issue for NWF air power.  The IO promptly questioned why the Air Ministry’s 
recommendation was three times larger than its July suggestion, given the absence of 
a hostile air threat, adding that: 
... any increase beyond what is necessary for local defence must depend upon 
the role of India in any scheme for Imperial defence in the future, a matter 
which... has not yet been decided.19   
The Air Ministry responded that the bomber’s ‘long range and great weight carrying 
capacity would... be particularly valuable for action against frontier tribes’ and could 
‘save expenditure in minor operations’.20  Despite the Air Ministry reducing its 
suggested force strength to seven squadrons, the IO directed that only five squadrons 
should be included in the Air Estimate, resulting in 20, 48, 99 and 97 Squadrons 
                                                
18 The Air Ministry suggested a force of four Army Co-operation ‘Corps Reconnaissance’ 
squadrons, two fighter reconnaissance squadrons, two squadrons of ‘Day Bombers’,  two 
‘Scout’ squadrons and two heavy bomber ‘Giant’ squadrons.  See AIR 2/68 (A2177), H W W 
McAnally, Letter, Assistant Secretary, Air Council, to India Office, 20 November 1918.  The 
funding suggestion echoed Churchill’s speech to Parliament described in Chapter 3 (see 
McAnally, Letter, Air Council to India Office, 20 November). 
19 AIR 2/68 (A2177), E9, India Office Military Department, Letter, India Office to Secretary, Air 
Ministry, 28 November 1918. 
20 AIR 2/68 (A2177), E13, Sir W A Robinson, Letter, Secretary, Air Council, to India Office, 7 
December 1918. 
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forming in India between June and August 1919.21 
In December 1919, Trenchard published a Cabinet White Paper for the 
permanent organization of the RAF, proposing eight squadrons for India ‘in 
accordance with a proposal... now under consideration by the GoI’, adding that: 
Recent events have shown the value of aircraft in dealing with frontier troubles, 
and it is not perhaps too much to hope that before long it may prove possible to 
regard Royal Air Force units not as an addition to the military garrison but as a 
substitute for part of it.  One great advantage of aircraft in the class of warfare 
approximating to police work is their power of acting at once.22 
Accordingly, in January 1920, 1 and 3 Squadrons formed in India with Sopwith 
Snipes.23  Despite this increase in squadrons, the Viceroy telegraphed SoS(India) in 
March that any operations against Kabul would require an additional ‘four squadrons, 
namely, one Scout, two Corps reconnaissance, one bombing’ as well as an additional 
bomber squadron for a simultaneous advance on Kandahar, a force equal to the Air 
Ministry’s 1918 suggestion that the IO had rejected.24  Nonetheless, the logistical 
burden of supporting an additional aircraft type resulted in many Snipes becoming 
permanently grounded.  In January 1921, the GoI petitioned the IO to withdraw two 
squadrons, something the Air Ministry only discovered three weeks later.  A frustrated 
Trenchard appealed through SoS(Air) to the CID’s Committee of Indian Military 
Requirements (CIMR) that: 
                                                
21 AIR 2/68 (A2177), E15, ———, Letter, Secretary, Air Council, to Under Secretary of State 
for India, 6 March 1919; AIR 2/68 (A2177) E16, Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert Cox, Letter, 
Military Secretary, India Office to Secretary, Air Ministry, 10 March 1919; Jefford, RAF 
Squadrons: A Comprehensive Record of the Movement and Equipment of all RAF Squadrons 
and their Antecedents since 1912, 31, 40-41, 53; Bowyer, RAF Operations 1918-1938, 153; 
James J Halley, The Squadrons of the Royal Air Force & Commonwealth, 1918-1988 
(Tonbridge: Air-Britain (Historians), 1988), 57-58, 106, 169, 171. 
22 "The Permanent Royal Air Force”, Flight, 18 December 1919, 1622. In addition to the GoI 
funding the Indian-based squadrons, the Air Ministry also discussed the possibility of India 
paying a proportion of the costs of running the Air Ministry and experimental stations (see AIR 
8/46, E2, Air Staff, Indian Establishment - Financial Arrangements, 4). 
23  Jefford, RAF Squadrons: A Comprehensive Record of the Movement and Equipment of all 
RAF Squadrons and their Antecedents since 1912, 23-24. 
24 CAB 6/4, Edwin S Montagu, Papers Relating to the Size, Composition and Organisation of 
the Army in India (CID 119-D), 3 January 1921, 4.  ‘India’ subsequently amended its estimate 
of the number of additional squadrons to two (see CAB 6/4, Captain Frederick E Guest, Air 
Staff Memorandum of an Afghan War (CID 123-D), 8 November 1921, 1).   
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existing arrangements should be revised so as to provide that communications 
on Air matters received from the Government of India or from the C. in C. should 
in the first instance be referred by the recipient Department to the Air Ministry, in 
order that they may be considered at the earliest stage by that Department as 
primarily responsible to H.M.Government for all questions affecting national or 
imperial Air interests.25 
Nevertheless, both Snipe squadrons were withdrawn by September.26 
THIRD AFGHAN WAR 
During the 1919 Third Afghan War, aircraft were employed extensively on the NWF for 
the first time.27  Aircraft were mostly confined to close reconnaissance patrols.  
However, long-range attacks against Dakka and Jalalabad in May generated 
significant moral effect.28  Additionally, Captain ‘Jock’ Halley’s Handley Page V/1500 
famously bombed Kabul on Empire Day.  The Amir agreed an armistice in May, ‘laying 
great stress on the bombing of the Jalalabad and Kabul Royal Palaces’.  Halley later 
claimed his aircraft had ‘ended a war on its own’;29 C-in-C(India) was more measured, 
stating that ‘this raid was an important factor in producing a desire for peace at the 
headquarters of the Afghan Government’.30  The Thal garrison commander reported 
that hostile tribesmen ‘live in dread of aeroplanes... Wherever action was taken by 
aeroplanes the enemy dispersed, often abandoning guns and horses’, while the RAF 
                                                
25 AIR 8/40, E1, Air Marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard, Memorandum: 'Status of the Royal Air Force 
in India', circulated by Secretary of State for Air to the Committee on Indian Military 
Requirements, 8 December 1921. 
26 Jefford, RAF Squadrons: A Comprehensive Record of the Movement and Equipment of all 
RAF Squadrons and their Antecedents since 1912, 23-24. 
27 AIR 5/1329, Resume of Operations against Afghanistan 18th May to 31st May 1919,  1919, 
4. 
28 AIR 5/1329, HQ RAF India SO "A", Daily Detail of Work Done - 52nd Wing 1919, 1; Army 
Headquarters General Staff Branch, India, The Third Afghan War 1919 Official Account 
(Calcutta: Government of India  Central Publications Branch, 1926), 35; Sir Charles Monro, "An 
Account of the Recent Operations Against Afghanistan”, The London Gazette, 12 March 1920, 
3276-3277; AIR 8/46, E12, Air Staff, The Progress of the Development of Air Power in India, 
June 1926, 2; Resume of Operations against Afghanistan 18th May to 31st May, 1; General 
Staff Branch, The Third Afghan War 1919 Official Account, 49; "Air Work on Indian Frontier”, 
Flight, 18 March 1920, 310. 
29 Halley, "The Kabul Raid”, 441.  One 112 and three 20-pound bombs hit the Palace while 
three 112 and seven 20-pounders hit the arsenal at Arg, the latter resulting in a large explosion 
(see Resume of Operations against Afghanistan 18th May to 31st May, 1-2). 
30 Monro, "An Account of the Recent Operations Against Afghanistan”, 3277. 
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recorded ‘the almost complete demoralization of Afghan troops and tribesmen as a 
result of offensive action by aircraft’.31  However, the GS(India)’s official account noted 
that the campaign: 
proved the value of aeroplanes in long-distance strategical reconnaissances, in 
bombing areas of concentration, supply depots and transport, but in short-
distance tactical reconnaissances they were of no great value...  the tribesmen 
soon learnt how to break into small groups and to keep still when an aeroplane 
was overhead.32 
The RAF noted that a shortage of aircraft had resulted in inadequate Army co-
operation, while splitting squadrons into small detachments had rendered 
concentrated offensive action almost impossible.33  It is clear that the Air Staff 
considered the greatest RAF effect had been on Afghan morale, most pivotally by 
unexpected long-range bombing against strategic targets, with the inherent threat of 
escalation. 
The lack of a decisive outcome from the Third Afghan War and ensuing poor 
Anglo-Afghan relations, combined with India’s poor post-FWW financial position and 
shortage of effective manpower, led to the possibility of further conflict with 
Afghanistan.34  This was exacerbated by improving Russo-Afghan relations following 
their 1920 Treaty, including the Russian sponsorship of the Afghan Air Force as a 
defence against future British air attack.35  The Air Staff ventured in November 1921, 
in anticipation of the forthcoming CIMR report, that ‘the conditions for an air campaign 
                                                
31 Resume of Operations against Afghanistan 18th May to 31st May, 1-3.  The Thal garrison 
commander subsequently messaged the RAF that ‘But for the excellent  information which you 
gave, and your accurate shooting and bombing, my task would have been infinitely harder’ 
(see AIR 5/1329, GOC 45th Infantry Brigade, Letter from Commander Field Force, Thal, to OC 
RAF Detachment, Kohat, 3 June 1919); Resume of Operations against Afghanistan 18th May 
to 31st May, 1-2. 
32 General Staff Branch, The Third Afghan War 1919 Official Account, 133. 
33 Resume of Operations against Afghanistan 18th May to 31st May, 4. 
34 Guest, CID 123-D. 
35 CAB 6/5, Lord Erwin, Despatch No 9 from Government of India to Secretary of State for 
India, dated 7th October 1926 (Annexure A in CID 149-D), 7 October 1926, 3.  See also the 
comments of the GoI’s Foreign Secretary during a 1927 meeting of the CID, CAB 16/83, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Sir M P A Hankey, Committee of Imperial Defence: Minutes of the 223rd 
Meeting, 17 March 1927, 4. 
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against Afghanistan are exceptionally favourable to the employment of aircraft as the 
sole striking force’.  This was due to the increasing concentration of Afghanistan’s 
population and wealth in fair-sized towns (80% of which were within striking distance 
of Frontier aerodromes), and its lack of efficient air defences.36  The CIMR established 
a joint Army-RAF Technical Sub-Committee chaired by CIGS which ‘disclosed sharp 
divisions of opinion between the General and Air Staffs’.  The CIMR recommended 
that the Air Force’s utility in Indian warfare should be further studied by a high-ranking 
air officer under C-in-C(India), adding that: 
If, as we think possible, the result of this study is to show that in present 
conditions the most effective and most economical method of defence lies in an 
increase in the offensive power of the Air Force, we should hope that the 
conclusion would be accompanied by a clear possibility of a compensatory 
reduction of military expenditure; and we should advise that the present 
establishment of the Air Force in India should be increased to enable effective 
bombing of vital points in Afghanistan’.37 
WAZIRISTAN, 1919-1920 
Tribal unrest persisted following the Third Afghan War.  In November, aircraft bombed 
the Madda Khel tribe, bringing about their immediate submission.  The Mahsud’s 
principal villages were also bombed,38 but C-in-C(India) reported that ‘It soon became 
apparent... that operations from the air, alone, would never force the Mahsuds to 
                                                
36 Guest, CID 123-D, 1-2.  In 1926, the Air Staff(India) professed that, from aerodromes at 
Jalalabad, air power could stop a Russian advance against Kabul with minimal Army support, 
something which CIGS described as ‘a most dangerous doctrine’ (see CAB 6/5, India Air Staff, 
Air Staff, India's, Views on the Employment of the Royal Air Force in Substitution of and in Co-
operation with the Military Forces (Appendix II in CID 149-D), 17 September 1926, 22 and CAB 
6/5, General G F Milne, Memorandum by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff on the 
Integrity of Afghanistan (Annexure D in CID 149-D), March 1927, 40). 
37 CAB 6/4, Committee of Imperial Defence, Report of the Sub-Committee on Indian Military 
Requirements, dated June 22nd, 1922: As Amended and Approved by His Majesty's 
Government, dated January 26th, 1923 (CID 130-D), 26 January 1923, 20.  The Committee 
consisted of: the Prime Minister (Chamberlain); SoS for the Colonies (Churchill); 
SoS(India)(Montagu/Peel); SoS(War)(Worthington-Evans); President of the Board of Education 
(Fisher); SoS(Air) (Guest); CIGS (Wilson/Cavan); CAS (Trenchard); Viceroy (Chelsford); and 
Ex-C-in-C(India)(Monro). 
38 Sir Charles Monro, "Report on the Operations in Waziristan during the Period 3rd November, 
1919, to 7th May, 1920”, The London Gazette, 8 December 1920, 12131; AIR 5/1329, Wing 
Commander R P Mills, Summary of Operations: 9th November to 15th December 1919, 11 
January 1920, 4. 
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accept our terms’.39  The situation was stabilised by combined Army-RAF operations 
in May 1920.  C-in-C(India) concluded that: 
It is impossible to over-estimate the value of aircraft in tactical co-operation with 
other arms...  Their presence alone greatly raised the moral of our troops, while 
correspondingly decreasing that of the enemy...  On the other hand results from 
bombing and tactical reconnaissance did not fulfil expectations.  This was 
largely due to the nature of the country and the skill with which the tribesmen 
concealed themselves.40 
However, the Air Staff later explained that: 
Bombing... was subordinated to the requirements of the Army for close 
reconnaissance, with correspondingly disappointing results...  the importance of 
the new air arm was not as yet fully appreciated by the Government of India.41 
Thus, the Army drew almost opposite conclusions on air power’s utility from the 
Waziristan campaign and the Third Afghan War: in the latter, they extolled the virtues 
of long-range air action and denigrated tactical co-operation; whereas in the 
Waziristan campaign, they besmirched bombing but praised tactical co-operation.  
This reflected the two campaigns’ different characteristics, with fewer ‘strategic’ 
targets and regular troop concentrations in Waziristan and a desire by the Army to 
employ aircraft in a supporting, rather than independent, role. 
BUDGETARY ISSUES 
The conclusion of the 1919-20 Waziristan campaign resulted in a comparatively 
peaceful state.  Brancker wrote in 1921 that: 
It seems obvious that the garrison in India can be reduced to the strength 
necessary for purely defensive work, and that all offensive operations, both on 
the frontier and internally, can be entrusted to the Royal Air Force, with a great 
saving in money and a far greater saving in men.42 
                                                
39 Monro, "Report on the Operations in Waziristan”, 12131. 
40Army Headquarters General Staff, India, Operations in Waziristan, 1919-1920, 2nd ed. 
(Delhi: Government Central Press, 1923), 156-157.  Similar comments were included in the C-
in-C’s despatch (see Monro, "Report on the Operations in Waziristan”, 12139). 
41 Air Staff, The Progress of the Development of Air Power in India, 1-2. 
42 Macmillan, Sir Sefton Brancker, 241. 
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Instead, severe cuts were made in the Indian air budget with an embargo on spares, 
causing a deteriorating serviceability rate with a concomitant impact on RAF morale.  
CAS later attributed this to ‘a failure on the part of the Government of India to 
appreciate the importance of maintaining adequate reserves’.43  Despite Air Ministry 
protestations, the deterioration continued; towards the close of 1921, ‘the Royal Air 
Force in India almost ceased to exist as a fighting service’.44  Pressure from a national 
press campaign, supported by Montagu, House of Commons questions, and an Air 
Staff memorandum to the CIMR (highlighting AOC(India)’s lack of access to the 
Viceroy and the need for a separate RAF(India) financial vote), brought an end to the 
embargo in April 1922 and the decision to conduct an in-theatre review.45  
Nevertheless, SoS(Air) complained in September 1922 that, as AOC(India) had no 
right of correspondence with the Air Staff, their only source of information was 
unofficial, anecdotal reports.  This illustrated the GoI’s continued reluctance to admit 
the state of affairs.  SoS(Air) recommended that AOC(India) be given the right of 
access to the Viceroy and the Air Ministry, as was the case with CGS(India) and the 
WO.46 
                                                
43 Air Staff, The Progress of the Development of Air Power in India, 2.  For more detail, see 
AIR 8/46, E4, Secretary of State for Air, Cabinet Paper 4179: Shortage of Equipment of the 
Royal Air Force in India, September 1922, 1. 
44 Air Staff, The Progress of the Development of Air Power in India, 2. 
45 Bowyer, RAF Operations 1918-1938, 163; Secretary of State for Air, CP 4179: Shortage of 
Equipment of the RAF in India, 2; Laffin, Swifter than Eagles, 152-153; IOR/L/MIL/7/19272, 
Captain Frederick E Guest, Memorandum from Secretary of State for Air to Indian Military 
Requirements Committee: Status of the Royal Air Force in India, 8 December 1921.  These 
issues are discussed in Chapter 7. 
46 Secretary of State for Air, CP 4179: Shortage of Equipment of the RAF in India, 1-2. 
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1922 SALMOND REVIEW 
Trenchard recommended that Jack Salmond chair the Indian review47 and drafted 
wide-ranging Terms of Reference.48  Salmond’s team arrived in India in June 1922, 
finding only a handful of serviceable aircraft, aircraft with holes in the wings and FWW 
battle damage, pilots who rarely flew, and ‘rock-bottom’ morale.49  According to 
Saward, ‘Salmon received scant, if any, cooperation from the Army’.50  Laffin’s 
biography of Salmond concurred, noting that Arthur Harris (then OC 31 Squadron) 
reported that the Army’s attitude changed on learning of the looming review:  
They obviously panicked... all the stores that we had been unable to obtain for a 
year and more in the past were rushed up to us before Salmond could reach 
India.  I am sure that it was because of my personal knowledge of the 
disgraceful technical conditions of the R.A.F. in India under the Army that I was 
hurriedly posted to Iraq... but I stayed long enough to help put [Salmond] wise.51 
The impending review changed the tone of correspondence between C-in-C(India) 
and CAS, with Rawlinson appearing keen to avoid any blame; in April, Rawlinson 
asked Trenchard to ‘make as much noise as possible over our shortage of spares’ 
which he alleged was: 
entirely due to the action of... our Finance Member, in stopping the purchase of 
spare parts...  I took the matter to Council three times, and urged the Viceroy 
                                                
47 C-in-C India had recommended to Trenchard in April 1922 that Air Vice-Marshal Phillip 
Game head the review; although Salmond was sent instead, Game would become AOC(India) 
in December 1922.  See: Laffin, Swifter than Eagles, 153; MFC-76-1-136, General Lord 
Rawlinson, Letter, Commander-in-Chief India to Chief of Air Staff, 20 April 1922.   
48 Air 8/40 E16, J A Webster, Letter from Principal Assistant Secretary, Air Ministry, to Indian 
Military Requirements Committee (IMR 93): Despatch of Officer of High Rank to India, 11 May 
1922.  The TORs, agreed by SoS(India), SoS(Air) and CIGS, were to: (i) identify possible 
economies by an increased use of the RAF; (ii) investigate the RAF’s role in (a) border 
defence, (b) controlling the border tribes and (c) maintaining internal security; (iii) design an 
improved RAF(India) structure for maintaining air units; and (iv) submit a report to SoS(India), 
through C-in-C(India).  See Salmond, 1922 Report on RAF India, Appendix I. 
49 Group Captain Chamier (the Air Staff’s Deputy Director Operations and Intelligence), a Wing 
Commander engineer and an Aide-de-Camp accompanied Salmond (see Webster, Despatch 
of Officer of High Rank to India, dated 11 May 1922). 
50 See Saward, 'Bomber' Harris, 33 and Slessor, The Central Blue, 34-35.  For an in-depth 
analysis of the Army’s attitude to Salmond during his review, see Waldie, "Relations Between 
the Army and RAF, 1918-39", 174-180. 
51 Laffin, Swifter than Eagles, 155-156.  Harris’ biography is at Annex 7. 
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and my Hon’ble Colleagues to over-ride the Finance Member’s decision.  They 
refused to do so...52 
However, Salmond informed Trenchard privately from India in June that ‘I have my 
doubts whether that is actually the case’ and that ‘There is no doubt that [Rawlinson] 
is thoroughly opposed to giving the RAF more freedom of action’.53  Nonetheless, 
Salmond concurred that ‘The RAF have an unsavoury reputation in financial circles 
not in the least deserved which I have done my best to dispel’.54  
The structure of Salmond’s 59-page report is revealing.  Part I described the 
RAF’s successful use of aircraft abroad (focusing on the NWF), followed by a 
discussion of the advantages of aircraft on the Frontier.  It then outlined a cost-saving 
scheme for the substitution of troops in tribal territory by punitive air operations.55  
Salmond highlighted air power’s ability to bring pressure to bear on Kabul without 
occupying it, predicting: ‘the lesson of history teaches us that if we advance into the 
heart of the land our troubles may only then be commencing’, although he warned that 
‘by rapidly disintegrating the Government of Afghanistan before decisively defeating 
the main Afghan Armies in the field we shall merely create a state of chaos’.56  Two 
themes were evident in Salmond’s proposals.  First, the use of aircraft was envisaged 
as being largely punitive at this time (as a simple substitute for punitive columns) and, 
second, an emphasis on moral, rather than physical, effect. 
Part II focused on RAF(India)’s organisation.  It highlighted: the under-
establishment of most RAF units; the embargo’s impact on all UK technical supplies; 
HQ RAF(India)’s geographic dislocation from Army HQ and the GoI;57 the RAF’s need 
                                                
52 Rawlinson, C-in-C India to CAS, 20 April 1922. 
53 MFC-76-1-138, Air Vice-Marshal Sir J M Salmond, Personal Correspondence to Chief of Air 
Staff 22 June 1922. 
54 MFC-76-1-138, ———, Personal Correspondence to Chief of Air Staff, 8 August 1922. 
55 This required an additional two squadrons to deliver 216 tons of bombs per month. 
56 Salmond, 1922 Report on RAF India, 9-10.  Emphasis in original. 
57 At this time, HQ RAF(India) was at Ambala, whereas the GS(India) was co-located with the 
GoI at Delhi (relocating to Simla between March and October).  
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for a separate, independent budget; and AOC(India)’s lack of access to the Viceroy.58  
Salmond informed the Viceroy that: 
In every part of the world, with the exception of India, the recognition of the 
Royal Air Force as a separate service, the junior indeed but “inter-pares” of the 
three fighting services, is complete : in India I doubt if all the members of Your 
Excellency’s Council are even aware that such is the fact.59 
The Viceroy agreed with Salmond’s recommendations. 60  However, C-in-C(India), 
while concurring with most of Salmond’s recommendations, disagreed with the RAF 
substituting the Field Army in offensive operations against Afghanistan.61  However, 
Rawlinson subsequently caveated to Trenchard privately that: 
Nothing will please me better than if Jack Salmond can demonstrate, beyond all 
question, the power of the Air Force to maintain law and order and to preserve 
our frontiers, for, when this has been indubitably established, we shall be able to 
make considerable economies in India, and our progress on the road to ruin will 
therefore be stayed; but India is a country where we cannot afford to take 
unlimited risks, and we must go carefully in consequence.62 
In response to Salmond’s Review, the Secretary of the GoI’s Foreign Department 
warned that: 
tribal control is never purely military.  The broad political view is that, while 
aircraft have a great future in frontier control, they cannot be allowed to operate 
as a tribal provocative.63   
                                                
58 C-in-C(India) was, constitutionally, the Viceroy’s sole military advisor. 
59 Salmond, 1922 Report on RAF India, 15-21. 
60 Having discussed Salmond’s report in Council on 28 September , the Viceroy announced 
four decisions: (i) AOC(India)’s post would be held by an Air Vice-Marshal instead of an Air 
Commodore, ‘provided this appointment will not entail employment of additional Air Force 
staff’; (ii) AOC(India) was granted access to the Viceroy; (iii) HQ RAF(India) would re-locate to 
Army HQ at Simla; (iv) two additional squadrons would be added to the permanent peace 
strength of the RAF in India and provisions made for the reinforcement of three squadrons in 
the event of war with Afghanistan.  Furthermore, the Field Army would be reduced by a 
division.  However, the C-in-C disagreed with this last decision until the RAF’s effectiveness 
could be demonstrated.  See  IOR/L/MIL/7/19272, Earl of Reading, Telegram from Viceroy of 
India to India Office, 30 September 1922. 
61 AIR 8/46, E1, General Lord Rawlinson, Memorandum on Air Vice-Marshal Sir John 
Salmond's Report 1922, 10. 
62 Rawlinson, C-in-C India to CAS, 13 November 1922.  Salmond had already conveyed his 
similar impression of Rawlinson’s opinion to Trenchard whilst conducting the review in July 
(see Salmond, Salmond to CAS, 3 July 1922).  
63 AIR 8/46, E1, Mr Denys Bray, Note by Mr Denys Bray, Secretary to the Government of India 
in the Foreign Department, 24 August 1922, 13. 
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This political concern over the potential inflammatory effect of aircraft would endure 
and constrain air power’s potential throughout the period under consideration.  C-in-
C(India) qualified his token concurrence with a requirement to secure additional 
finance.  This was not forthcoming.  Consequently, aircraft serviceability only 
improved marginally.  As the Air Staff later described, C-in-C(India) ‘could not see his 
way to effect a corresponding reduction of his ground forces as required by the 
Government of India’.64 
1922-1924 
Operations following the 1919-1920 Waziristan campaign exposed limitations on the 
use of aircraft.  The GoI’s Official History noted that the capture of two crews during 
the 1922 Razmak Operation caused ‘considerable embarrassment’.65  Nevertheless, 
the captives later reported: 
There is no doubt that the moral effect is great.  I had previously thought that 
reports on this score were considerably exaggerated, but am now convinced 
that the enemy have been completely demoralised.66 
The political sensitivity of applying air power near permeable borders was 
demonstrated in 1923 during the bombing of the Ahmedzai Wazirs when a few bombs 
accidentally fell just inside the Afghan border, generating objections by the Afghan 
Government and political embarrassment.67 
                                                
64 AIR 1/2399/283/1, Air Staff, The Progress of the Development of Air Power in India, July 
1925.  A later copy of this Memo is at AIR8/46, E12. 
65 AIR 5/1329, Air Officer Commanding RAF India, RAF India Resume of Operations No 49: 
December 1922, 25 January 1923, 3; AIR 5/1330, ———, RAF India Resume of Operations 
No 50: January 1923 1923, 4-5; "Official History of NWF Ops, 1920-35", 18, 23, 26. 
66 AIR 5/1329, Air Officer Commanding RAF India, RAF India Resume of Operations No 51, 
February 1923, 2-4. 
67 See AIR 5/1330, Royal Air Force Intelligence and Operation Summary for Week Ending April 
7th,  1923, 1; "Official History of NWF Ops, 1920-35", 28.  Two Afghans were killed and five 
injured.  The GoI expressed its ‘unqualified regret’ and provided financial compensation (see 
AIR 5/298 Part I, E88, Earl of Reading, Telegram, Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, 9 
June 1923). 
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PINK’S WAR, 192568 
During 1924, the Abdur Rahman Khel (ARK) Mahsuds, and three smaller tribal sub-
sections, became increasingly hostile;69 this culminated in May 1924, in a two-day air 
action by 1(Indian) Wing that was severely criticised by AOC(India) for not complying 
with extant doctrine.70  The GoI’s Official History reflected on Pink’s War’s importance 
because, firstly, Salmond’s 1922 Report had recommended that the RAF control the 
NWF and, secondly, it achieved ‘the desired result at very small cost in casualties and 
money by comparison with a punitive expedition’.  These factors, ‘albeit based on brief 
localised experience and somewhat incomplete appreciation of Frontier problems, are 
nevertheless of obvious importance’.71  At the time, despite C-in-C(India) declaring the 
operation as ‘active service’, the WO resisted issuing a campaign medal because 
‘there had not been enough casualties’.72 
The GoI’s Official History described three tactics: short, intensive air action by 
multiple squadrons; ‘air blockade’, whereby single aircraft irregularly harassed and 
                                                
68 For comprehensive descriptions of Pink’s War, see Bowyer, RAF Operations 1918-1938, 
170-180 and Roe, "‘Pink’s War’ – Applying the Principles of Air Control to Waziristan, 9 March 
to 1 May 1925".  The operation derives its name from Wing Commander Richard Pink, OC 
2(Indian) Wing at Risalpur. 
69 The ARK had been amongst the agitators in the 1922 Razmak Operation and their tarns-
border, migratory nature and concomitant lack of allowances had complicated a full settlement.  
The other implicated sub-sections were the Guri Khel, Faridai and Maresai.  See "Official 
History of NWF Ops, 1920-35", 33-34 and Air Vice-Marshal Sir Edward Ellington, "Report on 
the RAF Operations in Waziristan for the Period 9th March to 1st May 1925", The London 
Gazette, 17 November 1925, 7596. 
70 Ellington described Wing Commander E Murray’s conduct as ‘disappointing in the extreme’ 
for not complying with Air Staff, Employment of Aircraft on the NWFI.  See AIR 5/298 Part 2, 
Air Vice-Marshal Sir Edward Ellington, Letter, Air Officer Commanding, India, to Wing 
Commander E Murray, OC 1(Indian) Wing, 13 June 1924; AIR 5/298 Part 2, Wing Commander 
E Murray, Report on Operations carried out against Faridai, Maresai, Guri Khel & Abdur 
Rahman Khel Sections of the Mahsud Tribe during May 1924, 5 June 1924.  One could conject 
that Ellington’s lack of confidence was the reason that Pink was given command of the 1925 
operation, given that Pink’s 2(Indian) Wing at Risalpur was more distant from the operational 
area that Murray’s 1(Indian) Wing at Peshawar.  
71 "Official History of NWF Ops, 1920-35", 34. 
72 Trenchard Papers, RAF Museum, MFC 76/1/178/4, Air Vice-Marshal Sir Edward Ellington, 
Letter: Air Officer Commanding, RAF India, to Air Chief Marshal Sir HughTrenchard, 5 May 
1925, 2. It took Salmond’s personal intervention for a campaign Bar to the Indian General 
Service Medal to be issued.  See Laffin, Swifter than Eagles, 207-208.   
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disrupted normal life; and moonlight night bombing by single aircraft.73  To avoid 
small-arms fire, most aircraft bombed from 3000 feet.74 
No attempt having been made to comply with the GoI’s terms, offensive 
operations commenced on 9 March, initially against the ARK. 75  Bombing was paused 
twice to allow inconclusive peace jirgas, with intensive bombing immediately re-
applied.76  By 23 March, the Guri Khel had accepted terms, with the Biland Khel 
following on 25 March.77  After this, British tactics changed to protracted coercion with 
the RAF imposing air blockades.78  When night raids produced ‘excellent moral effect’, 
further night bombers deployed into theatre.79  Following an unsuccessful three-day 
negotiating pause, maximum-intensity bombing recommenced, resulting in the Faridai 
and Maresai submitting on 18 April.  Simultaneously, the ARK fled towards 
Afghanistan, but were stopped by en-route tribes who feared being bombed 
themselves.  Sanctuary denied, the ARK were granted respite for a jirga on 28 April, 
over which fourteen aircraft demonstrated, generating a final settlement on 1 May.80 
Whilst a full analysis of the weapon employment at Annex 10 is outside this 
Thesis’ scope, a cursory glance indicates that the RAF had a clear understanding of 
weapon-to-target matching and were attempting to achieve specific effects from 
different weapons using what would now be called a ‘strategy-to-task’ approach.  
                                                
73 "Official History of NWF Ops, 1920-35", 35-36. 
74 Ellington, "Report on RAF Ops in Waziristan, 1925”, 7597. 
75 "Official History of NWF Ops, 1920-35", 34-35.  The initial deployment of RAF assets is 
described at AIR 5/1330, AOC RAF India, RAF India General Monthly Resume and Diary of 
Operations No 76: March 1925 1925, 4-10.  A graphical description of the Operation, mapping 
the various phases against weapon expenditure, is at Annex 10.  Note that, from May 1924, 
the squadron’s role was incorporated into their title. E.g., 31(AC) Squadron.  This 
nomenclature endured until just before the Second World War, when it was removed for 
security reasons. 
76 The Army’s Official History noted that ‘the fleas that infested the caves were ‘a vigorous and 
important ally to the R.A.F. as they made life unbearable’.   "Official History of NWF Ops, 1920-
35", 36-37, 56. 
77 AOC RAF India, Resume of Operations No 76, 30, 32, 37. 
78 "Official History of NWF Ops, 1920-35", 37. 
79 AIR 5/1330, ———, RAF India General Monthly Resume and Diary of Operations No 77: 
April 1925 1925, 6, 10, 15 and Ellington, "Report on RAF Ops in Waziristan, 1925”, 7598.   
80 See AOC RAF India, Resume of Operations No 77, 17-18, 23 and  "Official History of NWF 
Ops, 1920-35", 37-38. 
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Thus, during the initial, maximum-effort raids, the bomber squadrons predominantly 
used heavy 230-pound bombs to destroy buildings and coerce inhabitants to abandon 
their villages, before switching to smaller 112-pound bombs to deter them from 
returning; this is reflected in the decreasing ratio between ‘total bomb tonnage’ and 
‘number of bombs dropped’.  Similarly, the army co-operation squadrons commenced 
with the mass use of Baby Incendiary Bombs (BIBs) to generate a dramatic effect by 
burning infrastructure previously targeted by the bomber squadrons, before switching 
to 20-pound bombs to harass the tribesmen.  Mapping the weapon employment 
against tribal behaviour reveals how weapons were used to generate specific coercive 
effects to change tribal behaviour.  This data is worthy of further analysis; in particular, 
as Annex 10 is a campaign-wide view, it would be interesting to map the weapons 
used against each specific tribe (and their context) to determine how effective the 
strategy had been.  Nevertheless, it is evident that airmen at this time already had a 
sophisticated understanding of both weapon effects and a strategy of employing them 
to generate the coercive effects necessary to achieve the desired endstate. 
Reaction to the operation was partisan.  AOC(India) noted the operation’s 
length, blaming the shortage of aircraft caused by ‘an under-estimate of the financial 
requirements of the R.A.F. in India’ and the improving spring-time weather which 
made the tribesmen’s exclusion from their homes more tolerable.  His report strongly 
criticised the frequent political cessation of bombing to facilitate inconclusive jirgas, 
which allowed tribesmen to recover property and gave the impression of weak 
Governmental resolution.  Ellington continued:  
On more than one occasion the tribes came to terms without any preliminary 
respite or after bombing had been resumed... This shows that a respite is not 
always necessary, and whenever possible the operations should continue 
without check, until the terms laid down at the beginning have been complied 
with.81 
                                                
81 Ellington, "Report on RAF Ops in Waziristan, 1925”, 7600.  Ellington’s biography is at Annex 
7. 
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Ellington intimated that, by enforcing ‘full tribal responsibility’ and holding the whole 
tribe responsible for their sub-sections, the challenges in differentiating between 
hostile and friendly Mahsud elements could be avoided.  This would become a major 
factor in the years to come.  AOC(India) concluded that: 
the Government of INDIA have a weapon which is more economical in men and 
money and more merciful in its action than other forms of armed force for 
dealing with the majority of problems which arise beyond the administrative 
frontier.82 
RAF(India) acknowledged the ‘very greatest help and encouragement’ from the Army 
and Political services: ‘They co-operated in every possible way to ensure the 
successful outcome of the operations and frequently went to great lengths to render 
special services’.83 
Before the operation, GOC Waziristan had strongly recommended that the RAF 
operations be kept under military command.  Following its successful conclusion, his 
brother, C-in-C(India), initially agreed to press for two additional squadrons.84  
However, C-in-C(India)’s enthusiasm was short lived.  In November 1925, he set the 
die for future ventures by ignoring the time required to muster and deploy land forces 
when he stated that: 
a combination of land and air action would have brought about the desired result 
in a shorter space of time, and next time action has to be taken, I trust that it will 
be possible to employ the two forces in combination. That they were not so 
employed this time was due to our desire to give the Royal Air Force the 
                                                
82 Ibid. 
83 AIR 5/1321, E11, Anon, A Report on the First Military Operation in India Carried Out Solely 
by Air Forces, March-April 1925, 11. 
84 Ellington, AOC(India) to CAS, 5 May 1925, 2.  GOC Waziristan was Major-General Arthur le 
Grand Jacob.  His brother, General Sir Claud William Jacob, was temporarily C-in-C(India) 
following the death of Lord Rawlinson.  See Kenneth Jacob, "Major-General Arthur le Grand 
Jacob CB, CMG, CIE, CBE, DSO, ADC", 
http://www.myjacobfamily.com/favershamjacobs/arthurlegrandjacob.htm (accessed 18 October 
2015) and ———, "Field Marshal Sir Claud William Jacob GCB GCSI KCMG”, 
http://www.myjacobfamily.com/favershamjacobs/sirclaudjacob.htm (accessed 18 October 
2015). 
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opportunity they have long wished for of testing the effectiveness of their 
unsupported action.85 
After Trenchard highlighted this ‘absurdity’, pointing out that land forces compromised 
the effectiveness of independent air action, the IO questioned C-in-C(India) about his 
‘old-fashioned ideas’.86  Bowyer’s 1988 analysis recognised: 
a certain amount of nit-picking in subsequent official Army reports – mostly 
displaying a barely-hidden anxiety that the Army’s long-standing ‘preserves’ 
might now be poached by this upstart air arm.87 
Sensitivity over casualties was evident, even in 1925.  The Air Council 
requested that reference to the munitions expenditure and destruction of livestock and 
crops be omitted from the official despatch, which SoS(India) agreed to.88 
The Waziristan Resident swiftly recognised air power’s potential as a politically-
controlled tool of tribal control, showing an intimate understanding of air power’s ability 
to dislocate normal life and impose ‘annoyance and discomfort’ without causing many 
casualties: ‘there is every reason for using the moral weapon’, although ‘an aerial 
blockade may be a long business’.89  However, the Political Agent, South Waziristan, 
did not fully agree and the Chief Commissioner, NWFP, whilst recognising the 
benefits, responded that the required resources were unavailable, effectively curtailing 
                                                
85 General Sir Claud Jacob, "An Account of the Recent Operations by the RAF against certain 
Recalcitrant Sections of the Mahsuds in March, April and May, 1925”, The London Gazette, 17 
November 1925, 7595. 
86 AIR 5/298 Part II, M142, Group Captain C S Burnett, Minute, Deputy Director Operations & 
Intelligence to Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, 15 August 1925; AIR 5/298 Part II, ———, Letter, 
Deputy Director of Operations and Intelligence to Colonel W E Wilson-Johnston, India Office, 
14 August 1925; AIR 5/298 Part II, M149, Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh M Trenchard, Minute, 
CAS to Group Captain C S Burnett, Deputy Director Operations & Intelligence, 27 August 
1925. 
87 Bowyer, RAF Operations 1918-1938, 180. 
88 AIR 5/298 Part II, Sir Walter F Nicholson, Letter, Secretary of the Air Ministry to The Under 
Secretary of State, Military Department, India Office, 17 August 1925; Trenchard, CAS to 
DDOI, 27 August 1925; AIR 5/298 Part II, Colonel W E Wilson-Johnston, Letter, India Office to 
Secretary, Air Ministry, 2 September 1925.  This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. 
89 IOR/L/PS/12/3260, Evelyn Howell (Resident in Waziristan), Waziristan Border Administration 
Report for 1924-25, 20 May 1925. 
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progress.90  
The Air Staff immediately noted that ‘the result was not only a complete 
success, but had far reaching effect on tribes in no way connected with the 
operations’.91  CAS subsequently described it as ‘a striking tribute to the power of the 
air in subduing semi-civilised people’, the effect of which ‘was felt all through 
Waziristan where a much healthier atmosphere now began to prevail’, all at relatively 
minimal cost.92  He concluded that ‘the power of the air in controlling the semi-civilised 
peoples on the frontier of India, has been clearly demonstrated’.93   
The GoI’s 1945 Official History, written with the hindsight of joint operations 
necessitated by the Second World War, provided a more considered, reflective view.  
It noted a ‘Considerable moral effect’ on both the protagonists and neighbouring 
tribes, highlighting the ‘very great’ financial disparity between the air action and an 
equivalent punitive expedition, ‘even though [the latter] might have achieved the object 
in a shorter time’.  It concluded: 
The moral effect, and interruption caused by the blockade to their daily life, were 
the chief factors in bringing about the tribesmen’s submission.  The fact that 
there were so few casualties was regarded as a satisfactory feature of 
operations, and one tending to avoid leaving a legacy of bitterness.94 
Pink’s War had immediate ramifications.  According to Waldie, in July 1925, 
India’s newly-incumbent SOS requested that the Air Staff prepare a scheme for air 
                                                
90 IOR/L/PS/12/3260, Sir Norman Bolton, Use of the Royal Air Force as a Weapon of Tribal 
Control, 5 June 1925.  The Political Officer, Major (later Major-General) ‘Bunch’ Parsons, had 
been awarded a DSO in the Third Afghan War when he ‘guided, navigated and identified 
targets’ for RAF aircraft (see Trench, Viceroy's Agent, 41). 
91 AIR 5/1330, Squadron Leader G C Pirie, Notes on RAF India General Monthly Resume and 
Diary of Operations for March 1925, 11 June 1925. 
92 As examples, a section of the Malikdinai unexpectedly handed over rifles and paid a fine and 
both the Bahadur and Shabi Khels Khel paid  long-outstanding  fines (see IOR/L/PS/12/3260, 
Air Vice-Marshal Sir Edward Ellington, Extract from a Letter from the Air Officer Commanding 
to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India, 23 June 1925). 
93 Air Staff, The Progress of the Development of Air Power in India, 5-6. 
94 "Official History of NWF Ops, 1920-35", 38-39.  Mahsud casualties were assessed as eleven 
killed or wounded, while the RAF lost two flying officers and their aircraft. 
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control on the NWF;95 SOS(Air) cautiously responded: 
we will send it to you.  We are in no way raising a controversy...  I hope, 
however, no one will think that Trenchard has raised the frontier question upon 
his own initiative.96 
The Air Staff submitted a scheme whereby seven squadrons would control the NWF, 
with two additional squadrons in reserve.  All regular troops would be withdrawn, bar 
those required for airfield and town protection.  An AOC would command the Frontier 
under Political direction.97  Trenchard alerted SoS(Air) that this paper was likely to 
generate ‘a great deal of controversy with the Army’.98  This proved correct: the 
incoming Deputy CGS(India), Kirke, besmirched Pink’s War:  ‘the RAF have the 
sublime impertinence to try and claim all the credit because they squashed a few 
villages and inflicted eleven casualties’.99  He thought the policy should be one of 
pacification rather than punishment, describing the RAF’s proposed scheme as ‘a 
modern and possibly improved variation of the old policy of ‘burn and scuttle’ which 
the Government of India has abandoned’ and which would deny the Army ‘the vital 
assistance of airpower’.100  However, HQ RAF(India) considered that Kirke’s views 
were at odds with the GoI, the Resident’s and Chief Commissioner, adding that the 
RAF ‘are the blue-eyed boys at the moment’.101  Kirke’s focus on the significance of 
                                                
95 Waldie, "Relations Between the Army and RAF, 1918-39", 184. 
96 AIR 5/413, E17, Sir Samuel Hoare, Letter, Secretary of State for Air to The Earl of 
Birkenhead, Secretary of State for India, 9 July 1925.  The Earl of Birkenhead, ‘F E’ Smith, had 
only been in post since November 1924. 
97 AIR 1/2399/283/1, Air Staff, The Progress of the Development of Air Power in India, 
Appendix A: Outline Scheme for the Control of the North-West Frontier of India by Royal Air 
Force, July 1925. 
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of the Air Staff to Secretary of State for Air, 3 July 1925) is now missing from the archive. 
99 Montgomery-Massingberd Papers, Major-General Walter Kirke, Deputy Chief of the General 
Staff (India) to Lieutenant-General Sir Archibal Montgomery-Massingberd, 10 June 1926, 
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101 AIR 5/413, E38, Group Captain J A Chamier, Letter to Director of Operations and 
Intelligence, 30 November 1926. 
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casualties indicates that he did not appreciate the ‘minimum force’ nature of the air 
blockade, viewing it as an airborne version of a punitive expedition.   
Significantly, the Army-RAF friction at this time was not so much about the utility 
of air power, but rather its control.  Additionally, Pink’s War highlighted the paradox 
that the GoI’s swiftest-reacting weapon (the aircraft) could take longer than traditional 
land operations, once deployed, to achieve a decisive result. 
MOHMAND DISTURBANCE, 1927 
In June 1927, a two-day, day/night bombing campaign, authorised by the GOC, 
dispersed a 1500-strong Mohmand lashkar engaging Khassadar positions on the 
administrative border.102  The GoI’s Official History recorded that the crisis ‘was very 
quickly and successfully dealt with by the effective action of the R.A.F.’, attributing this 
to: the tribesmen’s half-hearted conviction (whilst acknowledging that any tribal 
successes could have altered this); and their leaders’ humiliation, having told their 
followers that the bombs would not explode and that they would be safe at night.103 
The operation demonstrated the swiftness of centrally-controlled air action when 
unencumbered by the complexities associated with the presence of troops.  The Air 
Staff made surprisingly little of this operation, possibly because it was commanded by 
a GOC rather than an AOC and therefore not a clinically ‘independent’ air operation.104 
                                                
102 "Official History of NWF Ops, 1920-35", 44-46; AIR 5/1331, AOC RAF India, RAF India 
General Monthly Resume and Diary of Operations No 103: June 1927 1927, 4-8. 
103 "Official History of NWF Ops, 1920-35", 46. 
104 AOC(India)’s Resume of Operations underplayed the operation and drew no conclusions.  
In contrast, the Army’s Official History characterised the operation as ‘attacks from the air 
alone... in a self-contained operation to secure the submission of enemy tribesmen’.  See AOC 
RAF India, Resume of Operations No 103  and "Official History of NWF Ops, 1920-35", 56. 
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COMPARISON OF PINK’S WAR AND 1927 MOHMAND DISTURBANCE 
Given the inter-War Army-RAF friction over NWF air power, the GoI’s 1945 Official 
History contained a refreshingly objective analysis of Pink’s War and the Mohmand 
Disturbance.  It opened thus: 
given certain conditions there is a prospect of bringing hostile tribes to 
submission by the more rapid, economical, and possibly more humane method 
of air attack alone as compared with the use of land forces, or the two 
combined.105 
Clearly, in 1945, India had not discounted the use of independent air action in 
controlling trans-border tribesmen, possibly because of higher wartime commitments 
on land forces.   
The Official History highlighted that both operations represented the tribes’ first 
exposure to aircraft, with night bombing having ‘marked results particularly in regards 
of morale’.  The British predicted that technical innovation would offset any 
diminishment in morale effect.  The History acknowledged the challenges of ‘public 
opinion and ethics of bombing tribesmen’, but countered that ‘public opinion... was 
liable to be fickle and credulous of irresponsible stories’, while ‘air attack judiciously 
handled is probably the most humane method of teaching hostile tribesmen a 
lesson’.106 
Differentiating between the two operations, the History emphasised that Pink’s 
War blockaded villages, generating morale effect by destroying property with large 
bombs, forcing the population to shelter in flea-infested caves.  This interference with 
daily life took time to become intolerable.  In contrast, the numerous small anti-
personnel bombs dropped on the Mohmand lashkar-walas generated instant effect 
through extensive mutilating wounds.  This quickly dispersed the lashkar, ‘the 
operation being over in a matter of hours’.  Additionally, while Pink’s War was an 
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106 Ibid., 56-58. 
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independent RAF operation, the Mohmand Disturbance was backed by troops who 
threatened to engage scattered tribesmen and block their advance towards 
administered territory.107 
Nonetheless, the1945 Official History emphasised that Salmond’s 1922 and 
Ellington’s 1925 proposals were ‘out of date and of doubtful value in view of the great 
air development that has taken place since’, drawing the following conclusions: first, 
that ‘the only real solution of the Frontier tribal problem is development and assistance 
on the road to civilisation’; second, that local, irregular forces required ‘the adequate 
and close support of Regular troops’ to avoid them mutinying; and, finally, that ‘[t]he 
power of control from the air is liable to be curtailed’ by ethical considerations.108 
KABUL AIRLIFT109 
The 1928/29 Kabul Airlift, when 586 diplomatic staff were evacuated from the 
besieged British Legation, was an early demonstration of the strategic influence of air 
mobility.  Although unmentioned in the GoI’s Official History, the RAF and politicians 
drew significant lessons. 
In late 1928, King Amanullah’s increasingly unpopular European reformist 
policies erupted in civil war.110  The Tajik Habibullah’s forces besieged Kabul, cutting 
communications with India and leaving the unarmed British Legation isolated between 
the belligerents’ crossfire.111  In January, Amanullah abdicated in favour of his brother, 
but Habibullah proclaimed himself Amir, having captured Kabul, forcing Amanullah’s 
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brother to abdicate and flee.112  SoS(Air) recorded in his memoirs: ‘It looked as if 
history was repeating itself, and another British Minister would be murdered in the 
Afghan capital’.   Hoare continued:  
Seeing the double chance of forestalling a catastrophe and proving the 
usefulness of the Air Force, [AOC(India)] at once offered to evacuate by air the... 
staff of the British Legation... There then followed the first great air rescue in 
history.113 
Initially, only twenty-six two-seat bombers were available in India.114  By 29 
December, three Victorias and a Hinaidi had arrived at Risalpur from Iraq.115  In a four-
phase operation between 18 December and 25 February, ground-to-air 
communications were established, the Legation’s families and then the Afghan royal 
entourage were evacuated.  Finally, as tension increased, five additional Victorias 
arrived from Iraq to evacuate the European Legation staffs.116   
In his biography, the SoS(Air) concluded:  
The complete success of this operation immensely impressed the public.  
Instead of being an unwanted child, the Air Force became the favourite in the 
family of the services.117   
Hoare drew two lessons from the operation: 
first of all, the lesson of the mobility of air power; the second lesson is that the 
aeroplane, if properly used, can be made an instrument of real help and benefit 
to the British Empire  and to humanity at large.118 
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As Barthorp noted in 1982, the evacuation by unarmed aircraft ‘could hardly have 
been undertaken by the Army without precipitating a fourth Afghan war’.119  The RAF 
had demonstrated its agility in swiftly moving resources between continents; as Roe 
observed: ‘Trenchard’s vision of an independent Air Force, spanning the world, was 
coming true’.120 
TRENCHARD’S ‘SWANSONG’ 
In November 1929, with the end of his tenure as CAS looming, Trenchard published 
his ‘last will and testament’,121 entitled ‘The Fuller Employment of Air Power in Imperial 
Defence’, based on nearly eight years’ experience of Imperial air control.122  It is likely 
that, in his twilight as CAS, Trenchard saw this as ‘unfinished business’.  Slessor 
reflected: 
This paper fairly took the gloves off and declared unequivocally the belief of the 
Air Staff that real economies with at least no less efficacy could be secured by 
the substitution of Air Forces for other arms over a very wide field.123 
Trenchard’s far-reaching proposals covered all ‘semi-civilised’ Imperial regions, but 
‘By far the most drastic proposals, for which we foresaw would meet with the heaviest 
opposition, concerned India’.124  Trenchard proposed substituting five or six squadrons 
for twenty-five-to-thirty infantry battalions and ten artillery batteries, with the Frontier 
commanded by an AOC reporting to the GoI,125 saving £2 million annually.126  The Air 
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Staff considered that road building and close co-operation with the local irregular 
forces, with regular garrisons defending frontier towns, nested comfortably with the 
Modified Forward Policy.127 
The other Services reacted aggressively.  SoS(War) declared himself in 
‘complete disagreement with the policy underlying the paper’, requesting instead ‘an 
examination... of the present constitution of the Royal Air Force as a separate 
service’.128  The Admiralty, similarly, suggested an examination of ‘all the aspects of 
the division of responsibility between the three Fighting Services’.129  When the issue 
came before the Cabinet in March 1930, the Prime Minister stated that ‘it would be a 
great mistake to reopen ab initio the question of a separate Air Force and Air Ministry, 
which should now be taken for granted’.130  MacDonald did, however, task the CID’s 
Defence of India Sub-Committee with an enquiry into the extended use of air power.131  
Despite the ensuing, prolonged enquiry, Trenchard’s third formal proposal for 
substitution on the NWF found no traction with C-in-C(India) and undermined Army-
RAF relations both between the respective Ministries and within India until at least 
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1935.132  Due to the backlash it generated, Trenchard’s swansong was one of the 
most significant events within the period under consideration.  This backlash is 
examined in more detail in Chapter 7’s section on ‘Personalities and Relationships’.  
1929 RED SHIRT-INSPIRED INCURSIONS 
The Forward Modified Policy and technological developments during the latter 1920s 
produced considerable progress in the pacification of the Frontier tribes.  However, 
the combination of the 1929 Great Depression, MacDonald’s new Labour Government 
and the world disarmament talks generated Frontier unrest which Brock (OC 1(Indian) 
Group) described as ‘more serious and more widespread than it has ever been 
before’, exacerbated by propaganda that the British were leaving India.133  The 
subsequent military action revealed a lack of coherent strategy over the control and 
co-ordination of land and air power that had not been tested during the previous, 
passive, years.  During this unrest, the Chief Commissioner retained operational 
control, with the Army and RAF commanders advising him and acting independently, 
attracting criticism from several Army officers:134  
As an arrangement for the co-ordination of the efforts of the fighting Services it 
had nothing to commend it; certainly it did not produce true unity of control but 
rather direction of operations by a committee of three, of which the chairman, 
being a civilian, had to rely on the advice of the technical members. Such advice 
could hardly be tendered without bias in the absence of full responsibility for 
decision.135 
Civil unrest associated with the arrest of Peshawar-based ‘Red Shirt’ ringleaders 
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during April 1930 resulted in lashkars coalescing along the Administrative Border.136  
In early May, a forty-one aircraft demonstration failed to disperse the Haji of 
Turangzai’s Mohmand lashkar near Peshawar, although the RAF claimed it deterred 
adjacent tribes from participating.137  The GoI initially constrained aircraft to targeting 
the lashkar alone, which merely ‘fixed’ the lashkar-walas in caves, while they 
continued to threaten the settled district.  Brock blamed this on the GoI’s refusal to 
invoke tribal responsibility and swiftly target the Haji’s village:138 
one of our conditions for successful air action – i.e., rapidity in initiating action – 
was absent in this case.  So there we were, fourteen days after the Haji had left 
his home, restricted to action against the lashkar only.139 
When the GoI finally sanctioned targeting the lashkar’s villages in early June, many 
lashkar-walas immediately dispersed; however, the Haji remained intractable until 
coerced by a collective-responsibility ultimatum to bomb his villages.140  Brock 
described his aim to have been to humanely interrupt tribal life and cause a 
nuisance.141  
Swifter action was evident when an Utman Khel lashkar crossed the 
administrative border near Peshawar in June, taking immediate shelter in caves when 
bombed.  When their villages of origin were subsequently bombed, the lashkar 
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dispersed immediately.142  This learning curve continued.  Another Utman Khel lashkar 
turned back in July when its villages of origin were swiftly bombed.  Brock 
summarised: ‘they never crossed the border, and they effected nothing, and they were 
severely punished for their efforts’.143 
Further south in Waziristan, several Mahsud lashkars were dispersed by 
independent air action during May/June, mostly by targeting their villages of origin.  To 
demonstrate decisiveness, aircraft were normally airborne when the ultimatums 
expired, with air action swiftly authorised via W/T.  With the Resident demanding 
complete submission, aircraft often demonstrated over the ensuing jirgas, which 
‘helped to restrain the hotheads’.144  Brock summarised: ‘in three weeks we had 
squashed what might have been a really serious Mahsud rising’.145  This evidence 
suggests that politically-controlled independent air power could be effective against 
lashkars when allowed the prerequisite freedom of action. 
Nonetheless, political indecisiveness often complicated military affairs, requiring 
close land-air co-ordination that would reveal inter-Service friction, as demonstrated in 
June when a 700-strong Red Shirt-inspired Afridi lashkar progressed towards 
Peshawar with ‘every appearance of hostile intent’.146  However, the GoI refused 
Brock’s request for air action.  Gwynn later concluded that: 
The fact that there had been no interference with their march on the previous 
days confirmed the belief and a favourable moment for a jehad appeared to 
them to have arrived,147 
while Brock considered that he had ‘missed a good opportunity of teaching them a 
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lesson that would have been remembered for many years’.148  The Chief 
Commissioner eventually authorised air action the night before the Afridis reached the 
outskirts of Peshawar.149  Although independent and co-operative air action over the 
subsequent week inflicted heavy casualties, Gwynn noted that aircraft dispersed the 
lashkar into small bodies, denying the Army the opportunity to inflict a decisive defeat 
and complicating subsequent co-operative air-land action, although he agreed that 
early air action could have stopped the lashkar maturing.150  This is another example 
of the incongruent characteristics of air and land power; air action tended to disperse 
hostiles, thwarting Western land-based firepower which was optimised against 
massed formations. 
Issues with applying tribal responsibility emerged again in August when lashkars 
of young, disaffected tribesmen advanced towards Peshawar and Kohat.  Aircraft 
were prohibited from targeting their villages of origin, as the tribal elders did not 
support the lashkars.151  Instead, airmen attempted to engage the lashkar-walas, 
preventing organised tribal action, something Gwynn later described as ‘general 
discouragement’.152  On reaching Peshawar, the tribesmen were halted by defensive 
ground action; air-ground co-operation generally proved too dangerous due to the 
proximity of troops and tribesmen.153  But when intensive bombing of the tribesmen’s 
villages was finally authorised, the lashkar-walas retired and conceded terms.154 
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The RAF and Army drew different conclusions.  To the RAF, difficulties in 
targeting lashkars emphasised the importance of blockading villages, something the 
Politicals supported: ‘deprived of its capacity to bomb villages, the Force would be 
reduced to comparative impotence’.155  To the Army:  
All forms of offensive air action are most effective when combined with the 
action of land forces.  This combination can only be achieved by the logical and 
economic method of pacing both forces under one Commander.156 
AOC(India)’s despatch illustrated the Services’ fundamentally different 
perspectives; Salmond’s chronological narrative reflected a widely-acting force 
working under one commander, providing an understanding of the entire theatre 
where a single crew could participate in several separated tactical engagements in a 
single day.  However, C-in-C(India) pointed out that Salmond ‘fails to give a connected 
account...  of operations in any one military or civil district’, reflecting the soldier’s 
more geographically localised perspective with an emphasis on individual environs.157   
The WO commissioned a critique aimed at discrediting air power’s role, probably 
to undermine Trenchard’s recent substitution paper:158 aerial demonstrations had been 
ineffective; lashkar-walas had effectively concealed themselves against aerial attack; 
those lashkar that had withdrawn had done so due to troop action.  Whilst agreeing 
that ‘at times the punitive bombing of villages can be a very powerful factor in 
compelling submission’, it was nevertheless ‘distasteful to all concerned’, although 
land forces had played a large part in the majority of instances.  The GS(India) noted 
the lack of serious damage to villages, recommending ‘prolonged bombing with the 
                                                
155 AIR 5/1325, Olaf K Caroe, Letter, Chief Secretary to Government, NWFP, to Foreign 
Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign and Political Department, 25 October 1933, 4. 
156WO 32/3526, General Staff (India), The Action of the Royal Air Force on the North West 
Frontier during the Disturbances of 1930, 25. 
157 AOC RAF India, CD89, 3.  The Army Council echoed C-in-C(India)’s remarks, questioning 
whether it was wise to publish the despatch at all, incorrectly describing the bombing of 
villages as ‘punitive’  (see WO 32/3526, A E Widdows, Letter, Assistant Under-Secretary, War 
Office, to Under Secretary of State for India, 11 February 1931). 
158 WO 32/3526, Minute 1, Major-General J R E Charles, Minute, Director of Military 
Operations and Intelligence to Colonel K D Murray, MO2, 5 August 1930. 
Chapter 6 – A Brief History of the RAF on the NWF 
245 
heaviest types of bombs’, despite highlighting that 50% of the casualties in one village 
had been women and children, which was ‘regrettable but... unavoidable’.159  The 
paper’s incorrect use of the term ‘punitive’ and the GS(India)’s preoccupation with 
physical damage indicates that they failed to appreciate the air method’s coercive, 
minimum-force nature.  The GS(India)’s Director of Military Operations thought some 
of WO’s criticisms were ‘scarcely fair to the R.A.F.’, which the paper’s sponsor, the 
WO’s Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, over-ruled:160 
I wish to emphasise any cases of failure on the part of the R.A.F.  They are 
never fair to us, and ... I wish to include them however unpalatable they may be 
to the R.A.F...  I do not wish to misrepresent the facts (although the Air Staff 
does do so), but I am not prepared to let them down too easily.161 
Overall, the Red Shirt operations illustrated the different perspectives towards 
air power between the Army, RAF and Politicals, all of whom interpreted events to 
reinforce their own core beliefs; the concomitant lack of agreed strategy resulted in the 
incoherent application of air power driven, by local personalities.  All military 
commentators agreed that prompt action was key.  The RAF wanted to swiftly target 
villages to coerce tribal leaders into exercising tribal responsibility.  However, 
politicians often procrastinated, resulting in indecisive outcomes and frustrated 
soldiers and airmen who selectively interpreted events to bolster their respective 
intuitive perspectives.  The Army viewed aircraft as an auxiliary to their own tactical 
formations, using them to engage tribesmen in close proximity to friendly forces; 
however, this required close co-ordination that was often absent.  The Politicals, with 
limited military expertise, often had to mediate.  Both Services recognised that aircraft 
could disperse tribesmen, which complicated subsequent ground action; this 
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incompatibility entrenched their positions.  Interestingly, Salmond’s despatch provided 
an apparently straightforward recounting of events, rather than offering analysis; this 
may reflect a lack of inter-Service concurrence on the campaign’s lessons and a 
desire to avoid confrontation, although this was unsuccessful.  It is interesting how the 
Army and RAF drew different conclusions from the same events, demonstrating that 
opinions can be shaped by organisational culture.  The GS(India) was constrained into 
assessing events through the lens of its own framework, i.e., the effectiveness of air 
power in supporting the Army and the material damage aircraft had inflicted.  Because 
the Army did not recognise air power’s moral effect, it did not assess its effectiveness 
against this yardstick.  The Air Force, in contrast, was frustrated because, in its view, it 
had been unnecessarily constrained from doing what it did best and was being 
blamed by the command chain that had imposed the constraints.  This difference of 
perspective proved to be an impediment to doctrinal convergence; it was difficult to 
find common ground over techniques without agreement on the desired outcomes. 
Despite these NWF disturbances, a sub-committee of the Indian Round Table 
Conference recommended, in January 1931, that the number of British troops in India 
be reduced to the lowest possible figure, partly due to India’s post-1928 economic 
slump.  This prompted a ‘expert investigation’ under C-in-C(India) whose June report 
retorted that the only possible reductions were the Chitral garrison, an additional 
single infantry battalion and 2 companies of supplementary troops.162  In countering 
‘an obvious criticism by the layman’ of not taking full advantage of air power’s potential 
(a rebuff, presumably, to Trenchard’s swansong), the GS(India)’s investigation 
highlighted its lack of confidence in the possibility of unrestricted use of offensive air 
power against Afghanistan, adding that it could not subscribe to a policy which 
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recognised ‘the bomb as the normal, and indeed the only method of enforcing 
authority and exercising control over a large section of our own subjects’, a policy 
‘more likely to embarrass than help us’.  The GS(India) concluded: 
In framing our plans, therefore, we have taken cognizance not only of the 
additional power conferred, but also of the possible limitations which may be 
imposed for humanitarian and political reasons.163 
When put before the CID’s Defence of India Sub-Committee for their endorsement, 
SoS(Air), while accepting the report’s main conclusions, dissociated the Air Ministry 
from the GS(I)’s comments on air power, wary of compromising the Sub-Committee’s 
ongoing enquiry into the extended use of air power.  SoS(War), however, said that the 
opinion of the ‘responsible authorities in India’ had to be accepted, a comment which 
would have somewhat undermined the Sub-Committee’s authority to challenge 
‘India’.164 
CHITRAL RELIEF, 1932 
Tribal resistance to the biennial relief of the Chitral garrison in September 1932 (the 
first joint operation conducted under the Instructions Regarding the Control of 
Operations on the NWFI) demonstrated further Army-RAF friction.165  A joint 
Army/RAF operation to ‘induce the enemy to come into the open in strength, where 
troops and aircraft would be able to inflict severe punishment’, only resulted in long-
range tribal sniping, possibly due to the deterrent effect of preceding warning notices 
and aerial demonstrations.  Instead, GOC Peshawar directed the heavy bombing of 
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local villages, resulting in ‘a considerable amount of material damage’.166  Persistent 
objections by OC 1(Indian) Group and the Political Agent about the ‘uneconomical’ 
bombing of ‘poor targets’ eventually resulted in a switch to harassment bombing which 
progressively suppressed tribal aggression.167  OC 2(Indian) Wing recorded that ‘It 
was not apparent to [the GOC] that, the more you bomb a target the harder it is to 
damage it’.168  AOC(India) subsequently rebutted criticism of the expense of this ‘air 
operation’ by highlighting the GOC’s role.169 
The Governor, NWFP, concluded that the intensive bombing had shown the 
tribes ‘that they have nothing to gain, but much to lose, by unprovoked attacks’ and 
that ‘the lesson has been thoroughly assimilated by all this region’.  However, C-in-
C(India) remained convinced that it was combined air/land action that had dissuaded 
other sections from participating.  Despite these differing opinions, C-in-C(India) 
concluded that the operations ‘fully achieved their objectives’.170  However, the Air 
Staff(India) subsequently commented that the tribes resisted bombing: 
due to the tempting bait offered by the mobile column...  The young tribesmen 
were happy that their effects should be bombed and that their relations should 
be living in discomfort provided they had the opprtunity[sic] of firing their rifles 
nightly into the piquets and camp.171 
This underlines that tribal responsibility could only be effectively invoked if the tribal 
elders had influence over their disaffected tribesmen while demonstrating the Army’s 
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enthusiasm for heavy bombing (irrespective of target suitability), rather than minimum 
force. 
UPPER MOHMANDS OPERATION, 1933 
In July 1933, the GoI declined a request by the Governor General to subdue conflict 
between the pro-Government Lower and anti-Government Upper Mohmands using air 
action.172  The Air Staff’s India desk officer, Darvall, highlighted the GoI’s concern 
about: bombing hostile lashkars occupying friendly villages; discriminating between 
friendly and hostile tribesmen; and the proximity to the Presumptive Border.173  
Instead, a military column was deployed, but no aircraft were assigned to the GOC, 
despite his protests.174  Bombing notices initially subdued the Upper Mohmands, but 
tit-for-tat army co-operation engagements escalated in September.175  The Afghan 
Government eventually sanctioned British forces to engage the Upper Mohmands 
across the Presumptive Border (avoiding Afghan villages unless occupied by 
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lashkars), which resulted in terms being accepted.176 
The ‘definite reversal’ of the GoI’s policy of bombing villages was swiftly 
questioned by the Governor, NWFP.  Whilst acknowledging the influence of the 
Geneva Disarmament Conference, he ‘strongly’ supported the bombing of villages:  
tribes up and down the frontier now regard with the utmost dread a force which 
can search out their most remote and jealously guarded sanctuaries, and can 
deal out prompt and effective punishment, and which at the same time withholds 
from them the opportunities of looting...177 
The Governor highlighted that previously-bombed lashkars quickly became adept at 
avoiding air action, whereas bombing their villages had been decisive on several 
occasions; if bombing villages was prohibited, the RAF ‘would be reduced to 
comparative impotence’.  He concluded: 
The only alternative... is that we should adopt a consistently forward policy and 
gradually absorb the whole of the tribal area. That, however, is not a matter of 
practical politics at present.178 
The Official History recorded the Army’s frustration over the need to deliver 
ultimatums before bombing lashkars within villages (which did not apply to artillery) 
and the constraint of the Presumptive Border, which ‘greatly limited the power of the 
air arm’.179  This reflected the Army’s tactical desire for swift, uncompromising, reactive 
support, in contrast to the RAF’s more pro-active, theatre-level, coercive strategy.  
Additionally, the GOC noted public sensitivity concerning air power - ‘a matter of the 
greatest delicacy’ which ‘produced an unfortunate feeling in minds of R.A.F. 
Commanders that the best use was not being made of [their] forces’.180  Darvall 
concluded in 1935 that: 
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Had political pressure been exerted earlier to induce the Afghan Government to 
remove the restriction on air action on the border, it is probable that the 
despatch of a column... would not have been necessary.181 
BAJAUR OPERATIONS, 1933 
In May 1933, AOC(India) was authorised to use air power to remove a ‘pretender’ to 
the Afghan throne being sheltered in Waziristan by the Khan of Kotkai.182  Contrary to 
RAF doctrine, the Governor ordered that, following the dropping of bombing notices, 
Kotkai should be bombarded for ten days.183  After two days, the Khan had not 
conceded, so the Governor switched objectives from coercion to punishment.  A day 
later, Khan’s house had been destroyed.  As any further effort would be wasteful, 
bombing was replaced with daily demonstrations for the remainder of the period.184   
The Air Staff highlighted the indecisive strategy that changed from coercion to 
punishment, only to be prematurely suspended.185  As AOC(India) explained, ‘the 
tribal offence did not warrant Government exerting the full pressure necessary to 
ensure compliance’, as the GoI was unwilling to invoke wider tribal responsibility (via a 
full blockade) due to the small number of offenders.  Nonetheless, AOC(India) 
continued, the bombing, backed by the threat of ground action, achieved the expulsion 
of the agitators.186  However, this inconsistent application of air power led to criticism, 
not of the inconsistency, but of air power itself. 
The Indian Legislative Assembly criticised the operation’s punitive character, but 
the Army Department’s Secretary defended it as it was swift, effective, cost 1% of a 
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ground expedition, avoided fatalities on either side, and only inflicted damage 
equivalent to an artillery barrage.187  In 1935, C-in-C(India) retrospectively criticised 
the operation, attempting to dissociate the Army from this action.188  The GoI remained 
sensitive and reticent to publish AOC(India)’s despatch.189   
Despite its superficial success, this minor operation demonstrated that, in the 
absence of coherent objectives, the inconsistent application of air power could 
generate criticism that was difficult to rebut.  It was for this reason that the Air Staff 
strove for the consistent employment of a morally-defensible doctrine.190 
LOE AGRA CAMPAIGN, 1935 
The 1935 Loe Agra campaign demonstrated C-in-C(India)’s continued reluctance to 
employ air power as anything other than an auxiliary to the Army, despite pressure 
from the ‘Politicals’ and RAF.   
In March 1935, the GoI despatched the Nowshera Brigade to inflict fines on the 
Fakir of Alingar for subverting the Loe Agra tribes, north of Peshawar.191  The Fakir’s 
lashkar withdrew intact as the Column reached Loe Agra, but re-occupied it when the 
Brigade withdrew, commencing a series of temporary re-occupations and withdrawals 
by both sides against increasing resistance from the growing lashkar.192  The GoI 
refused repetitive requests by the Governor, NWFP, to bomb the lashkar’s villages of 
origin, despite the Governor’s appeals not to handicap the RAF from bombing enemy 
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concentrations that the Army would not hesitate to bombard.193  When the GoI finally 
sanctioned the proscription of the area 12 April, the lashkar was dispersing, so no 
action was taken.194  Darvall concluded in 1935 that ‘The Fakir was not punished nor 
overawed’ and that ‘There is little doubt but that had the Royal Air Force been allowed 
to bomb the villages... the trouble would have subsided quickly’.195 
MOHMAND CAMPAIGN, 1935 
The 1935 Mohmand operation illustrated continued inter-Service rivalry and a lack of 
agreed Frontier strategy, something that was veiled in the operation’s official report.  
In July 1935, aircraft engaged a 2000-strong lashkar of Upper Mohmands and Safis 
who were destroying a military road.196  The GoI delegated operational control to 
AOC(India) and sanctioned the air blockading of the lashkar’s villages.197  This 
significantly depleted the lashkar and generated tribal requests to discuss terms.198  
The local Army Commander  informed the RAF Group Commander that he intended 
to despatch a brigade-strength column because the Army was being placed in an 
intolerable position; it was bad for Army prestige to have the brigade inactive in the 
face of this affront.  Nevertheless, the Deputy Commissioner did not think Army 
involvement was necessary.199  AOC(India)’s personal letter to CAS revealed his 
perspective on subsequent events: 
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No sooner had the bombing notices been dropped and bombing begun than the 
G.O.C.in.C. Northern Command, strongly backed by Army Headquarters, 
expressed their intention of pushing troops forward into the area.  Of course I 
immediately protested.  My protest although couched as politely and tactfully as 
possible created a furious storm in the official teacup... and the result was that 
for a month we continued using ... two methods mutually opposed both in object 
and in method.200 
The Army-centric Official History’s counter-view was that ‘air action alone was unlikely 
to secure all the objects desired’ and, in late August, GOC-in-C Northern Command 
was given control of land and army co-operation forces.201  However, when the 
column encountered considerable opposition from fresh Afghan tribesmen, control of 
all air operations was transferred to the GOC-in-C.202   
The Air Staff reflected that, at this point, the bombing object changed from 
coercing submission to merely protecting troops.203  With orders to ‘break the will of 
the Upper Mohmands’, aircraft bombed tribesmen and villages ahead of the 
advancing ‘Mohforce’.204  Difficulties with reactive army co-opertion were evident 
when, in September, a company attacked the tribesmen’s strongest position beyond 
its battalion’s supporting range; air action was constrained by the proximity of 
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tribesmen and troops.205  Nonetheless, a settlement was finally reached by jirga in 
October, with thirty-three aircraft demonstrating overhead.206 
The archives reflect the in-theatre friction.  AOC(India) swiftly informed CAS 
that: 
Logically the Army should have conformed during the first phase to the air plan, 
but they did not...  The chief trouble is the difficulty of getting an agreed 
combined plan, because of the military refusal to take any cognisance of the 
principles of effective air action, and... their determination that whatever 
happens they must have their share of the show...  If they would only give up 
their discreditable efforts to discredit the value of air action on the frontier, I 
should have little cause to complain.207 
Furthermore, Ludlow-Hewitt considered the change of strategy unnecessary: 
air was the primary factor in undermining resistance and in preventing the 
spread of the trouble...  peace moves were almost entirely inspired by the desire 
to put an end to the air blockade. 
He continued that the GS(India) initially baulked at mentioning air action in their official 
despatch, but: 
they were very anxious to get an agreed report, and after some haggling they 
have included the main points on which I insisted... they have practically 
admitted the principle that has hitherto been anathema to them, namely that air 
blockade is better without the troops.208   
Nonetheless, the Official History failed to analyse the air action, which may reflect the 
Army’s refutation of air power’s initial role in the operation.209 
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IMPROVING IN-THEATRE RELATIONS, 1935 
The appointment of Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt as AOC(India) in March 1935 marked a 
watershed for in-theatre Army-RAF relations.  Having previously been AOC Iraq and 
DCAS, he was well-suited for this post.  He cultivated improved relations with the 
Viceroy and C-in-C(India), telling SoS(India) in early 1936 that: 
... though seemingly very prejudiced against the use of the R.A.F. on the 
frontier, [C-in-C(India)] was so magnanimous as to lend the whole weight of his 
great influence to push my claims for an improved position for the A.O.C.210 
Whether his letter’s tone can be taken at face value or was, instead, diplomatic and 
intended to curry trust with his new command chain is unknown.  Nevertheless, his 
reputation for inter-Service co-operation was illustrated in a letter to CAS in late 1936: 
even though substitution may be dead – as I think and hope it is – there is still 
plenty of room for economy by the use of air action in place of expensive 
operations...  On the other hand, I am far from being an advocate of air action at 
all or any cost…  All we want out here is that the use of the Air Force should be 
given fair and unprejudiced consideration.  At present, any proposal for the use 
of air action is liable to be met on all sides by bias and prejudice.211 
This quote is interesting.  Firstly, Ludlow-Hewitt ‘hoped’ substitution was dead, but did 
not ‘know’, hinting that he was not fully appraised of the Air Staff’s intent.  Secondly, it 
reveals that, despite C-in-C(India)’s support, anti-Air Force prejudice endured from ‘all 
sides’ (presumably the Army, Politicals and, probably, the Indian Legislative 
Assembly).  Slessor’s arrival as OC 3(Indian) Wing at Quetta from Camberley in 1935 
was apropos.  He criticised his Wing’s primary role of countering the Russian threat, 
preferring ‘to give more attention to close-support training’.212  Nonetheless, despite 
penning his introduction to Air Power and Armies the month he arrived in India, 
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Slessor remained an advocate of Air Staff doctrine:  
[I] never wavered from my view that, in nine cases out of ten, these tribal 
disturbances... could best be dealt with by… the Air Method.  But in 1935 I was 
commanding an Army Co-operation Wing...  the R.A.F. in India would be used, 
rightly or wrongly, on many occasions in co-operation with the Army in tribal 
operations on the Frontier; [I] was concerned to do my best to ensure that when 
it was so used, it should be used to the best advantage.  It did not take me long 
to become quite sure that it was not being used so.213 
His 1936 critique of Montgomery’s Staff College Quetta paper on Frontier operations 
articulated the concept of a ‘primary arm’ and the incompatibility of the Air and Land 
methods: 
... you have got to decide whether to use the Air(Blockade) method or the 
Army(Battle) method; and whichever you decide on then the other service 
cooperates in a minor capacity.  The two methods will not mix.  …the effect (and 
incidentally the object given to) the air blockade is to force the lashkars to 
disperse.  You then decide to send a column in… and the inevitable result is to 
make the lashkars concentrate to oppose you.214 
Slessor deployed his pilots with Army units and held joint Army-RAF exercises to 
increase inter-Service awareness.215  He, and OC Rawalpindi Brigade, persuaded 
Army HQ to make ‘close support’ the theme for the 1936 Khanpur combined training 
exercise.216  Slessor wrote Close Support Tactics. Provisional to supplement a draft 
chapter of the Combined Frontier Manual.217  The exercise report highlighted that ‘the 
success of close support action depends entirely upon good communications’ and ‘the 
essential need for an Air Force Commander at Column H.Q.’. 218  Slessor recognised 
that the paucity of hostile tribesmen, and the challenge of distinguishing them from 
both the background population and terrain, meant that army co-operation aircraft had 
to be directed by troops.  This required intimate ground-to-air co-ordination and 
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centralised control to vest the column commander with sole authority for close 
support.219  However, consensus was absent across RAF(India); Group Captain 
Bottomley (OC 1(Indian) Group) felt that deploying a wing commander with a column 
would disempower the Group and Squadron commanders and that the low flying 
required to achieve the necessary weapon accuracy in the proximity of friendly troops 
unjustifiably exposed aircraft to rifle fire.220  Nevertheless, Slessor deployed with the 
column on the second Khaisora campaign immediately on return from the Khanpur 
exercise to trial his new tactics (presumably to Bottomley’s chagrin).221   
Reflecting for a moment on Slessor’s character, it appears that, while he 
believed in the potential of the air method and substitution (having drafted many 
related ASMs while on the Air Staff), he was nonetheless a pragmatist who was 
dedicated to the job in hand and picked his doctrinal battles carefully.  As we shall see 
later in this Chapter, he would continue to support the requirement for Army Co-
operation tasks following his return to the Air Staff as Deputy Director of Plans in 
1937.  Overall, he appears to have been able to place issues in their proper 
contemporary perspective, displaying a very rounded personality.   
Overall, the requirement for close support during the 1936-39 Waziristan 
campaigns compelled the Army and RAF units on the NWF into intimate tactical-level 
co-ordination such that, by 1939, the IO’s Military Secretary publicly stated: 
nowhere else in the British Empire, except possibly in Palestine at the moment, 
is the ordinary day-to-day work of the two Services so closely and harmoniously 
interconnected.222 
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Nevertheless, the strategy and employment of RAF units was continually questioned 
by the Air Ministry, as described subsequently. 
WAZIRISTAN, 1936-39 – THE FAKIR OF IPI223 
Operations in the later 1930s revolved around the Fakir of Ipi in Waziristan who, in 
Autumn 1936, adopted the role of ‘Champion of Islam’ to subvert the Tori Khel Wazirs, 
Mahsuds and Bhitannis.224  Army operations, which ultimately involved 61,000 
Imperial troops, occurred in four phases: the pacification of the Tori Khel Wazirs; 
operations to expel Ipi; the withdrawal of additional units in late 1937; and the 1938-39 
flare-up.225 
Air support was dismissed, then proved critical, from the outset.  The first 
Khaisora operation began in November 1936 when the GoI invoked its right of access 
to the Lower Khaisora valley to strengthen the authority of the maliks and check Ipi’s 
propaganda.226  The two columns were heavily engaged and failed to make the 
planned evening encampment, requiring emergency re-supply by air.227  Slessor 
reported that, originally, only a single flight of aircraft had been allotted to support the 
two, 15-mile separated, columns.  To avoid inflaming the local population, aircraft 
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With the Khassadars of North Waziristan, 81-82; Stewart, The Savage Border: The Story of the 
North-West Frontier, 194.  For an overview of Ipi’s campaign against the British, see Hauner, 
"One Man against the Empire", available on-line at http://www.khyber.org/publications/021-
025/faqiripi.shtml.  
225 Moreman, The Army in India, 163. 
226 "Official History of NWF Ops, 1936-37", 5-7.  In March 1935, the GoI had increased the Tori 
Khel’s allowances in return for the right of access to the Lower Khaisora and their other 
territories in the North Waziristan Agency.  See "Official History of NWF Ops, 1936-37", 3. 
227 AIR 5/1335, AOC RAF India, RAF India Monthly General Summary of Work No 216: 
November 1936, 3-5; "Official History of NWF Ops, 1936-37", 13; General R A Cassels, 
"Report on Operations in Waziristan 25th November 1936 to 16th January, 1937 (1st Phase)”, 
Supplement to The London Gazette, 2 November 1937, 6812. 
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were forbidden to engage hostile tribesmen, even in self defence, unless directed by 
the columns by panels (contrary to the Grey Book, which authorised retaliation ‘if 
hostile sniping or other active opposition is encountered’).  The offer of deploying a 
liaison officer with each column had been declined and, as the column commanders 
had seldom had the capacity to request air support: 
Pilots had the unenviable experience of seeing tribesmen in considerable 
numbers in the act of opposing the columns, but were precluded by their very 
definitive orders from rendering [ ] assistance.228 
The GoI’s Official History acknowledged that the tribesmen interpreted the lack of 
offensive air action as ‘a manifestation of the Faqir’s piety and miraculous powers’.229  
However, more aircraft were urgently summoned and, during the premature 
withdrawal, OC 1(Indian) Wing rescinded the restrictions, resulting in ‘effective and 
heartening’ close support on several occasions.230  Slessor later reflected that aircraft 
should have been used to expel and discredit the FoI before the columns were 
deployed.231   
The second Khaisora operation was a punitive land-air operation launched in 
early December to regain the initiative.232  GOC-in-C Northern Command was vested 
with full control of land and air operations;233 responsibility for air operations was 
devolved to Bottomley, sidelining AOC(India).  This time, Slessor accompanied the 
                                                
228 Slessor, Ops in Waziristan. 24 November 1936 to 15 January 1937, 3-5. 
229 "Official History of NWF Ops, 1936-37", 20. 
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outside the Khaisora valley (see "Official History of NWF Ops, 1936-37", 17-18). 
233 The Resident in Waziristan was appointed his Chief Political Officer (see Ibid., 17). 
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column.234  Contradicting RAF doctrine, air action against villages was prohibited and 
a 5-mile area around the column was proscribed; however, the GOC initially prohibited 
air attacks within 3000 yards of the column to avoid dispersing hostile tribesmen.235  
Aircraft resupplied troops and, on occasion, effectively substituted for ground picquets 
along potentially-vulnerable passes.236  However, friction with air-ground co-ordination 
was exposed on 22 December when an Indian Company became surrounded beyond 
artillery support; with the location of the Company unclear, effective reactive air action 
proved impossible until additional troops had clarified the situation.237  Independent air 
action demolished Ipi’s Arsal Kot refuge with 230-pound bombs on 30/31 
December;238 the Fakir declared he had caused the bombing to cease, so sporadic 
bombing re-commenced until mid-January 1937 with old 112-pound bombs, 
generating a cognitive, rather than material, effect.239  Co-operative land-air action 
finally dispersed Ipi’s remaining Afghan tribesmen in late January 1937, ending the 
second Khaisora operation. 
Extensive, renewed tribal unrest in February left regular Army units fixed on 
defensive road protection duties.240  This apparently induced a significant change in C-
                                                
234 Slessor, OC 3(Indian) Wing, was assigned as air advisor to the Army HQ, with the four 
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Sword Aviation, 2008), 178). 
239 AOC RAF India, Summary of Work No 217, 5-6; AIR 5/1335, ———, RAF India Monthly 
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statistics. 
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in-C(India)’s policy, whereby the Army remained concentrated in ‘war stations’, while 
air dealt with outlying areas and supported outlying posts.  According to AOC(India): 
This plan permits the Commander-in-Chief to guage[sic] the nature and strength 
of the hostile movement before he commits his troops, meanwhile applying 
heavy pressure by air against some of the most troublesome and inaccessible 
centres of revolt.241 
The GoI’s Official History recorded this change of policy slightly differently: ‘Action by 
land forces... was avoided until political means to restore the situation had proved 
fruitless’.242 
Tripodi has highlighted the friction between the Army and the Politicals over 
strategy; while the Army wanted to capture Ipi, the Politicals feared this would fuel 
tribal unrest.  Forcing a tribe to surrender him would compromise nanawatai and be 
viewed as betrayal by neighbouring tribes.  Tripodi concluded: ‘the only course of 
action available was to dispute his authority, challenge the Iashkars, grind them 
down... and force them to retreat’, keeping Ipi on the move and preventing him from 
building up local support.243     
The Politicals’ strategy nested comfortably with air power.  To stabilise unrest, 
political pressure was first applied on the maliks, followed by progressive punitive and 
proscriptive air action.  Examples included the Governor’s progressive punitive 
bombing of three Madda Khel villages by Bomber squadrons (including the first 
offensive use of the BTF with 540-pound bombs) for the murder of two British officers 
in February, securing the surrender of three accomplices.244  Similarly, the Fakir’s 
refuge at Arsal Kot in the Shaktu Valley was proscribed in March to prevent hostile 
                                                
241 AIR 23/688, Air Marshal Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt, Letter, Air Officer Commanding, RAF 
India, to Sir Edward L Ellington, Chief of the Air Staff, 5 March 1937, 4. 
242 "Official History of NWF Ops, 1936-37", 38. 
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gangs assembling.245  The GoI’s Official History described this Arsal Kot action as an 
‘aerial blockade’, but AOC(India)’s description of the lack of stipulations indicates that 
this was proscription designed to curtail insurgent activity.246  Nevertheless, the 
archive reveals the progressive refinement of punitive tactics.  For example, following 
an unsuccessful first-day’s medium-level punitive bombing of a Datta Khel village in 
April for looting, Bottomley directed a change to lower-level dive attacks.  Despite 
increased ground fire, this apparently improved precision, as only BIBs were dropped 
the next day, following which bombing was suspended.247  A rare example of  
‘punitive’ action against a hostile lashkar’s village of origin occurred in mid-April;  
terms were accepted after three days of bombing.248  Although similar to RAF coercive 
doctrine, the Air Staff continued to rebut the term ‘punitive’ bombing, preferring to call 
it ‘destructive air action’.249 
Notwithstanding the prominence of independent air action, air co-operation 
remained important.  In March, 5(AC) Squadron ‘gave much assistance’ to a column’s 
advance guard ambushed near Damdil.250  It also provided support following a 
significant Mahsud ambush of forty-nine lorries in the Shahur Tangi defile in April.251  
Following this, most convoys were suspended, leaving the Wana garrison reliant on 
                                                
245 AOC RAF India, Summary of Work No 220, 5; AIR 5/1335, ———, RAF India Monthly 
General Summary of Work No 221: April 1937, 3. 
246 "Official History of NWF Ops, 1936-37", 45; AOC RAF India, Summary of Work No 220, 5.  
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251 The event made headlines in social commentary magazines (see, for example, Life 
Magazine at Figure 13).  Ninety-two troops were killed or wounded.  See Ibid., 55-65.  A 
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resupply by the BTF, demonstrating the use of air transport as a force protection 
measure.252 
Despite their proscription, lashkars continued to assemble in the Khaisora and 
Shaktu valleys.  GOC-in-C, Northern Command, was tasked with engaging them on 
ground favourable to British all-arms.253  During the late-April third Khaisora operation, 
3(Indian) Wing’s Advanced HQ accompanied 1 Division, co-ordinating air support 
under OC 1(Indian) Group.254  The lashkars declined battle, but air-land synergy 
inflicted significant casualties on tribesmen flushed out by advancing troops.255  
Nonetheless, Ipi claimed 1 Division’s subsequent withdrawal as a victory and his Arsal 
Kot lashkar grew, despite its proscription.256  The operation exposed different 
perspectives within the Air Staff.  Darvall highlighted the:  
wasted effort & misemployment of aircraft...  Much ammunition was wasted on 
close support work... ‘targets’ i.e. hilltops – patches of bushes, rocks etc were 
plastered with bombs & S.A.A..257 
However, Slessor, just posted to the Air Ministry as Deputy Director of Plans following 
the second Khaisora operation, retorted: 
                                                 
252 The BTF was reinforced by a Flight from 70(B) Squadron from Iraq from June to 
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See Annex 2 for the weapon expenditure statistics. 
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Figure 13 – Shahur Tangi Article, Life magazine (May 1937)258 
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I don’t think [the] above is quite a fair picture. If they must carry out these 
column operations I do not think close support is a “waste”...  Close support 
pilots do not bomb or use their guns except (a) against tribesmen seen and (b) 
areas where the troops know tribesmen are...259 
This exchange demonstrates that, despite Darvall’s less-than-full appreciation of NWF 
all-arms tactics, the in-theatre perspective was nevertheless represented by officers 
with first-hand experience.260 
The escalating insurrection triggered operations to decisively defeat the Shaktu 
lashkars and capture or evict Ipi.261  The aerially-proscribed areas were extended to 
herd lashkar-walas into the Shaktu valley where they would become vulnerable to 
Imperial all-arms.262  New procedures were developed to overcome friction in the 
orchestration of army co-operation, mainly concerning poor communications, as 
Slessor’s replacement had found himself ‘unduly isolated from his squadrons’ when 
deployed on the third Khaisora operation.  This time, HQ 3(Indian) Wing deployed to 
Miranshah and army co-operation liaison pilots accompanied the columns, while RAF 
R/T tenders deployed to Army Advanced HQs, with R/T pack sets at each Brigade.263 
These new procedures proved effective.  On 11 May, a daring moonless-night 
advance through the Iblanke Pass outflanked the lashkars.  The BTF parachuted a 
day’s rations the next morning onto the lightly-equipped troops.  The tribesmen 
commenced a general withdrawal, with army co-operation aircraft significantly 
                                                
259 Covering minute to ———, Summary of Work No 221. 
260 Darvall, for example, would be replaced in 1939 by Basil Embry, fresh from commanding 
20(AC) Squadron (See Embry, Mission Completed, 84).  Embry served in the Deputy 
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depleting the lashkars.264  When the columns occupied Arsal Kot on 28 May, Ipi had 
fled; the Official History noted how the air bombardment had left Arsal Kot completely 
ruined, with only one corner left standing.265  During the subsequent withdrawal, 
aircraft designated the correct route with Verey Lights.266 
Johnson’s 2011 analysis concluded that many tribesmen left Ipi’s cause at this 
stage, demonstrating the importance of co-ordinated action by political officers, the 
Army and RAF.  Thereafter, although the Fakir maintained a small group of acolytes, 
large-scale fighting ceased, with just one area proscribed.267  Convoys recommenced, 
but the permanent road picquetting tied-up large numbers of troops, requiring army 
co-operation aircraft to escort trains.268 
Renewed road-building to encircle Waziristan’s tribal sanctum sanctorum 
provided Ipi with ammunition to encourage unrest.269  The GOC-in-C continued using 
Bomber squadrons to control tribal behaviour via OC 1(Indian) Group, still bypassing 
AOC(India).  Punitive action was sometimes applied to achieve the release of 
hostages, but was also used as pure punishment.270  In June, army co-operation 
aircraft supported troop action against hostile gangs south of Razmak.  The aim (in 
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RAF India, RAF India Monthly General Summary of Work No 224: July 1937, 4-5).  See Annex 
2 for the weapon expenditure statistics. 
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contrast to an air blockade) was to ‘inflict the greatest possible loss’, which they 
achieved.  The GOC-in-C wanted to establish the principle that harbouring Ipi, or his 
cronies, would automatically incur ex post facto aerial punishment, but the GoI would 
only delegate authority to bomb locations while fugitives were physically present.271  
Nevertheless, the Fakir was driven from place to place, often sheltering in caves to 
avoid air action.272 
The improving in-theatre situation abated neither the Army’s caution over air 
power’s decisiveness nor the Air Staff’s disapproval of Army strategy.  The punitive 
destruction of four Bhitanni villages in July and the territory’s subsequent stop-start 
proscription eventually led to the tribe conceding in October.273  Nonetheless, the 
Army refused to accept final terms until a column visited the area.  The anticipated 
resistance was almost absent, which AOC(India) attributed to ‘the deep impression on 
the tribe’ caused by ‘the continuous air sorties by day and night combined with 
punitive action’.274  Within the Air Staff, Darvall described the operation as ‘curious’: 
It would be difficult to imagine more confused action than this.  Constant 
suspensions of operations took place, there was no true air blockade & the aims 
& terms were constantly changing.275 
In contrast, C-in-C(India) noted that ‘close and cordial relations between the land and 
air forces were a marked feature of the campaign’.276  Thus, while the imperatives of 
combat were forging closer in-theatre co-operation, the Air Staff remained steadfast in 
advocating pure RAF doctrine, despite the Army’s increasing use of bombing as their 
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Chapter 6 – A Brief History of the RAF on the NWF 
269 
primary tactic.  In particular, the Army’s heavy bombing contrasted with the Air Staff’s 
‘minimum force’ ethic.277  The tension between these policies exposed the bounds of 
joint planning in August when the GOC-in-C cancelled an operation to capture Ipi after 
a thirty-aircraft demonstration made him flee.278 
Aerial harassment, and lack of Afghan support, forced Ipi into increasingly small-
but-widespread insurgent activity in the late summer.279  This had implications for the 
RAF, requiring 50% more sorties in September than the previous month.280  
Insurgents reacted by sniping at aircraft operating from Miranshah, whose garrison 
had to be augmented as a force protection measure.281  Road attacks increased, 
leading Army HQ to issue orders that ‘the greatest possible loss was to be inflicted on 
any lashkar’.282 The Army Commander ordered the punitive bombing of villages 
associated with hostile activity, which depleted the gangs and coerced several other 
tribes to comply without offensive action.283  This was a rare, but effective, use of the 
Air Staff-endorsed tactic of coercing compliance by targeting villages of origin.  
However, the Official History acknowledged the RAF’s concern that the weapon 
expenditure on some punitive targets was unjustified, countering that ‘the Political 
Authorities considered it well worth while’.284  To suppress gangs, several large areas, 
including the Fakir’s locations, were proscribed using delayed-action bombs.285  By 
December, tribal hostilities had reduced to ‘normal’ levels, allowing most of the 
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reinforcements to be withdrawn.286  Nevertheless, the Army Commander retained 
control of RAF assets.287  C-in-C(India)’s official despatch acknowledged that air 
action ‘played an important part in obtaining the restoration of peaceful conditions’.288 
Sporadic hostilities by Ipi’s lieutenants continued into 1938.289  Insurgents 
increasingly avoided direct confrontation, instead commencing a ‘disturbing’ campaign 
of improvised explosive devices against roads, railways, parade grounds and airfields, 
damaging a taxiing aircraft at Miranshah.290  The RAF increasingly became the main 
offensive weapon, with troops restricted to training marches and small punitive 
columns.291  This was, in effect, Army-imposed substitution driven by troop shortages, 
albeit with air power directed by Army commanders in an unsophisticated, reactive, 
punitive manner in contrast to the Air Staff’s doctrine designed for independent, 
coercive operations to control tribal behaviour.  Darvall noted: 
Until control of air operations in India is made over to an Air Staff, misuse of 
aircraft will continue.  There is no doubt that proscription and destructive air 
action used as a punishment is popular, perhaps because no terms are 
announced and action can be broken off at any time.292 
The RAF apparently recognised that these lower-intensity operations did not 
warrant exposing aircraft to undue risk.  So, when the Madda Khel were punitively 
targeted in March for harbouring Ipi, aircraft remained above 4000 feet to avoid 
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ground fire.  AOC(India) reflected that, ‘In view of the high winds encountered, the 
bombing results were very satisfactory’, inferring that they were not as accurate as 
anticipated.  Thus, the tribesmen were degrading the RAF’s bombing accuracy by 
restricting aircraft to higher altitudes where the effect of wind on the weapons’ longer 
flight time degraded weapon accuracy.293  The bombing forced Ipi to move closer to 
the Afghan border where he was politically difficult to target.  Darvall described this 
deadlock as ‘Gilbertian’, adding later that: ‘Once air operations have begun and terms 
have been announced nothing short of complete submission should cause operations 
to cease’.294 
Continuing discontinuities in joint planning were revealed in April.  A Scout 
operation was deliberately planned without informing the RAF to prevent aircraft from 
revealing the troops’ disposition.  When the operation encountered unexpectedly 
strong opposition at Dargai Sar, air support was summoned by pigeon.  Aircraft 
scrambled within 60 minutes of the bird’s release, remaining overhead until nightfall.  
AOC(India) recorded that: 
The effect of the aircraft’s arrival... had a great effect on the Scouts, all of whom 
broke into a loud cheer.  Although cut off and surrounded, the Scouts thereafter 
felt in very much better spirits.295 
C-in-C(India)’s despatch failed to identify the lessons, merely recording ‘a hard-fought 
action... supported by aircraft’.296  Darvall described the engagement as: 
                                                
293 The operation was conducted by 1 and 2(Indian) Wings and two Valentias.  See AOC RAF 
India, Summary of Work No 232, 6-7; General R A Cassels, "Report on Operations in 
Waziristan, 16th December, 1937 to the 31st December, 1938”, Supplement to The London 
Gazette, 15 August 1939, 5667.  See Annex 2 for the weapon expenditure statistics. 
294 AIR 5/1336, Squadron Leader L Darvall, Minute to RAF India Monthly General Summary of 
Work No 231: February 1938; Darvall, Minute to Summary of Work No 234. 
295 AOC RAF India, Summary of Work No 234, 9-10.  On one occasion, bombing prevented a 
section from being overrun, the Scouts having used Popham panels to direct aircraft onto the 
tribesmen.  Aircraft also dropped medical supplies, ammunition and Very pistols which ‘put the 
Scouts in a satisfactory position for the night’ until they were reinforced the following morning.  
(see ———, Summary of Work No 234, 11; AIR 5/1336, ———, RAF India Monthly General 
Summary of Work No 233: April 1938, 6).  See Annex 2 for the weapon expenditure statistics. 
296 Cassels, "Report on Ops, 16 December 1937 to the 31 December 1938”, 5668.  Pettigrew 
claimed the heroes were the pigeons  for ‘flying so straight and fast that the Audax from Miran 
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one of the best examples... of an entirely unnecessary operation which has led 
to casualties and decorations…  The local Scouts Leaders spoiling for a scrap 
fell into the trap – particularly avoided RAF co-operation…  had aircraft not come 
to their assistance they might have been wiped out.297 
In punishment for the Dargai Sar engagement, six Mahsud villages were proscribed or 
punitively bombed for a month.298  Darvall expressed concern that this ‘air proscription 
without terms’ would attract accusations of inhumanity: 
we see the impossibility of ensuring that the inhabitants understand what areas 
are safe and what are dangerous...  Such conduct and operations would never 
be permitted by an A.O.C..299 
It did.  The German press highlighted Britain’s barbaric bombing of Crown citizens.300  
Darvall’s minute seems to have been circulated exclusively to junior Air Staff 
members, possibly to avoid adverse comment by Slessor following their disagreement 
in April 1937.301  Unfortunately, few of Darvall’s comments on the 1937 Monthly 
Summaries survive in the archive, making a definitive assessment impossible. 
Although the Air Staff(India) archives have not survived, AOC(India) provided a 
rare insight into Indian/London Air Staff dynamics while on UK leave in May 1938.  
CAS was ‘very anxious’ that Joubert protest to C-in-C(India) over AOC(India)’s 
exclusion from the decision-making process and OC 1(Indian) Group’s lack of latitude 
to apply air power in an appropriate fashion.302  Peck, Acting AOC(India) in India, 
hastily informed Joubert that the facts ‘do not warrant a protest’, assuring him that he 
had access to C-in-C(India) and CGS(India) and had been consulted ‘on all material 
                                                                                                                                           
Shah was over the target in just over half-an-hour’ (see Warren, Waziristan, the Faqir of Ipi, 
and the Indian Army, 214).  Warren, however, made no mention of the lack of inter-Service co-
operative planning (see ———, Waziristan, the Faqir of Ipi, and the Indian Army, 214). 
297 Darvall, Minute to Summary of Work No 234. 
298 AOC RAF India, Summary of Work No 233, 6-7; ———, Summary of Work No 234, 8; 
Cassels, "Report on Ops, 16 December 1937 to the 31 December 1938”, 5668.  See Annex 2 
for the weapon expenditure statistics.   
299 Darvall, Minute to Summary of Work No 234. 
300 Warren, Waziristan, the Faqir of Ipi, and the Indian Army, 215. 
301 Darvall, Minute to Summary of Work No 234. 
302 AIR 23/688 E72, Air Commodore Richard H Peck, Letter, Senior Air Staff Officer, India, to 
Air Officer Commanding, India, 21 June 1938; AIR 23/688, Air Marshal Sir Philip Joubert de la 
Ferte, Letter, Air Officer Commanding, RAF India, to Senior Air Staff Officer, India, Air 
Commodore Richard Peck, 16 June 1938. 
Chapter 6 – A Brief History of the RAF on the NWF 
273 
occasions’, despite occasional over-rulings by the Political Authorities.  Similarly, OC 
1(Indian) Group was free to use his professional judgement.  Indeed, in March 1937, 
AOC(India) had finally been recognised as an ex-officio member of C-in-C(India)’s 
Military Council.303  Whilst Peck admitted that weapon expenditure had been heavier 
than necessary and an AOC(India) would have applied air power more effectively, ‘I 
could not say that these disadvantages have had seriously prejudicial effect’.  
Nonetheless, Peck opined that the ‘hopelessly ineffective and extravagant’ Waziristan 
system had driven security ‘steadily from bad to worse’; whilst a deeper solution was 
required, the Air Staff’s criticism of current operations was unhelpful because they had 
misrepresented the facts.  In the meantime, Peck was focused on providing the GoI 
with ‘the benefits and economies of the air method ... which do not clash with the... 
Army’s method of “implementing the forward policy”’.  Furthermore, Peck warned that 
‘there is more than a chance of bombing being stopped by H.M.G. and a protest about 
air operations just now might contribute thereto, which would be a pity’.304  This is an 
important text, as few of the internal Air Staff(India) papers have survived.305  It reveals 
the differing viewpoints between the London and Indian Air Staffs and how events 
were misinterpreted to discredit the Army’s employment of Indian air power.  It also 
indicates that the Air Staff(India) were dedicated to delivering air power in the most 
effective manner possible, despite the constraints and frustrations placed upon them 
by the Indian command and control system. 
India’s use of independent air power to influence tribal behaviour beyond the 
range of land forces was demonstrated in June when a Syrian agitator, the ‘Shami 
                                                
303 AIR 23/5388, G R Tottenham, Letter, Secretary of the Government of India to Chief of the 
General Staff, Adjutant General in India, Quartermaster General in India, Master General of 
Ordnance in India and Financial Adviser, Military Finance, 8 March 1937. 
304 Peck, SASO(India) to AOC(India), 21 June 1938.  Joubert’s biography is at Annex 7. 
305 This internal Air Staff(India) correspondence only survives in the archives because 
AOC(India) was on UK leave and it was filed by the Air Staff. 
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Pir’, attempted to incite a rebellion against the Afghan Amir from South Waziristan.306  
As his lashkar moved towards the Afghan border, rigorous political warnings and 
specially-authorised low-flying demonstrations by Basil Embry’s 20(AC) Squadron 
dispersed it.307  This was the first time that independent air action had been used to 
stop lashkars crossing into Afghanistan and generated a direct political effect. 
A dramatic increase in ‘outrages’ through the summer catalysed a two-brigade 
campaign against Ipi and a re-organisation of command and control arrangements. 
The post of ‘Commander Waziristan’ was created at Razmak, where  AOC 1(Indian) 
Group co-located his Advanced HQ, apparently to give him assured access to 
Commander Waziristan.308  Embry flew both column commanders over the area of 
impending operations at Kharre.  Inter-service liaison was facilitated by deploying a 
20(AC) Squadron officer with each brigade and two Army officers to Miranshah.309  
This proved ‘extremely successful’; aircraft ‘rendered most valuable support’ in difficult 
terrain, inflicting unusually high tribal casualties, primarily because Ipi’s largely-Afghan 
lashkar-walas, unaccustomed to aircraft and dressed in white, failed to conceal 
themselves.310  After strong tribal opposition, both sides withdrew.  Kharre was 
subsequently inconclusively proscribed to deter the Fakir’s return using a new locally-
                                                
306 AIR 5/1336, Squadron Leader L Darvall, Minute to RAF India Monthly General Summary of 
Work No 235: June 1938.  The ‘Shami Pir’ was a relative of the Queen of ex-King Ammanullah, 
rumoured to be sponsored by the Axis powers.  For a good resume of the political context to 
the Shami Pir affair, see Hauner, "One Man against the Empire: The Faqir of Ipi and the British 
in Central Asia on the Eve of and during the Second World War". 
307 AIR 5/1336, AOC RAF India, RAF India Monthly General Summary of Work No 235: June 
1938, 3, 9-11; Embry, Mission Completed, 80-82. 
308 AOC RAF India, Summary of Work No 236, 3-4; AIR 5/1336, ———, RAF India Monthly 
General Summary of Work No 238: September 1938, 3.  Group Captain Bottomley had left 
India in January 1938 and been replaced by Air Commodore Charles Darley, temporarily 
elevating the post from OC to AOC 1(Indian) Group. 
309 The 20(AC) Squadron officers deployed with the columns communicated with aircraft via 
W/T pack sets, Popham panels, picquetting strips and message dropping, while the Army 
Commander communicated with his Miranshah liaison staff via wireless sets. 
310 AOC RAF India, Summary of Work No 236, 5-6, 8-10; Cassels, "Report on Ops, 16 
December 1937 to the 31 December 1938”, 5669. 
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developed tactic termed ‘tactical air proscription’.311  The Air Staff described this as ‘an 
objectionable form of air action, except in co-operation with troop movements’ 
because it neither imposed terms nor invoked tribal responsibility.  Darvall noted a 
repetition of the previous year’s May/June flying surge, concluding: ‘At the end of 
nearly two years of operations trouble appears to be more widespread than ever...  an 
alteration in frontier policy is urgent’.312  The operation illustrated that, despite effective 
air-land co-operation and local tactical successes, the effect of both punitive columns 
and aerial proscription was temporary and required constant engagement to counter 
insurgent activity. 
In August, AOC(India) was delegated control of an ‘independent’ tactical air 
proscription of the Bannu Wazir salient.313 However, aircraft proved unable to 
consistently disperse the raiders.  Instead, two columns were dispatched, supported 
by 20(AC) Squadron who inflicted casualties, while aircraft mitigated resupply issues 
and located water sources.314  Darvall noted in the margin that this episode 
demonstrated: 
how to, or perhaps better, how not to handle a large variety of problems 
inseparable from the assumption of Sovereignty over wild men in wild places... 
in no instance was the principle of tribal responsibility invoked.  The principle of 
“burn and scuttle” now applied by aircraft, coupled with the use of aircraft as a 
"flying column" was used instead.  The results, as might have been expected, 
have been entirely unsatisfactory.... The more these situations are studied the 
clearer it is apparent how admirable a method the air blockade one is.315 
Despite the Air Staff’s disapproval, several areas were subjected to tactical air 
proscription, destructive air action and punitive air proscription between September 
                                                
311 AOC RAF India, Summary of Work No 236, 10-11; AIR 5/1336, ———, RAF India Monthly 
General Summary of Work No 237: August 1938, 7; ———, Summary of Work No 238, 7. 
312 Darvall, Minute to Summary of Work No 236. 
313 Peck, still acting as AOC(India), described this tactical proscription as ‘independent’ 
because troops were not involved.   See AOC RAF India, Summary of Work No 237, 8-9. 
314  ———, Summary of Work No 238, 7-8. 
315 AIR 5/1336, Squadron Leader L Darvall, Minute to RAF India Monthly General Summary of 
Work No 238: September 1938. 
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and December 1938, all without invoking tribal responsibility.316  One case, the Tori 
Khel, took almost seven months to concede and required a joint political, economic 
and land blockade.317  AOC(India) summarised this action thus: 
Although the original aim... was of a punitive nature, it was hoped at the same 
time that air action and other punitive measures would bring sufficient pressure 
to bear on the tribe to induce them to settle...  This hope, however, was not to be 
realised as the hostiles repeatedly declared their inability to submit until the 
FAQIR himself makes his peace, but the tribe has nevertheless shown their 
desire to divorce themselves completely from their hostiles in the future.318 
This indicates that the Air Staff(India) were actively fostering doctrinal convergence by 
manipulating the Army’s punitive policy into a coercive action akin to the RAF Air 
Staff’s doctrinally-pure air blockade.  It is apparent that the Air Staff(India) viewed air 
action in terms of ‘effects’, using their resources to achieve the Army’s objectives (the 
compliance of the tribes) but via a different causal mechanism (coercion, rather than 
punishment) based on the use of minimum, rather than overwhelming, force.  
AOC(India)’s commentary also indicates that joint action was generating tension 
between the tribes and Ipi despite the cohesive bonds of Pashtunwali.  It also 
highlights the close association between air and political action, with the blockade 
extending to the political and economic domains.     
With the Army largely confined to road protection duties, harassing Ipi required 
300% more sorties in February/March 1939 than the previous year.319  The GoI 
simultaneously imposed a successful, forty-three-day air, ration and financial 
                                                
316 See AOC RAF India, Summary of Work No 238, 8; AIR 5/1336, ———, RAF India Monthly 
General Summary of Work No 239: October 1938, 6-9; AIR 5/1336, ———, RAF India Monthly 
General Summary of Work No 240: November 1938, 5-7; AIR 5/1336, ———, RAF India 
Monthly General Summary of Work No 241: December 1938, 7-8. 
317 This punitive air proscription involved the exclusion of the Tori Khel from their grazing 
grounds for hostile action and hostage taking.  See Annex 2 for the weapon expenditure 
statistics. 
318 AOC RAF India, Summary of Work No 234, 6. 
319 There were about 600 sorties in February/March 1938 vs about 2200 sorties in 
February/March 1939 (see AIR 5/1337, ———, RAF India Monthly General Summary of Work 
No 246: May 1939, 9). 
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‘blockade’ on the Madda Khel.320  This only differed from a doctrinally-pure air 
blockade in that the terms were somewhat vague.321  AOC(India) attributed success to 
‘the effective pressure maintained by air action’, political and economic measures, and 
inclement weather.322  In London, Embry, recently returned from India to replace 
Darvall as the Air Staff’s India desk officer, described the blockade as ‘an epoch 
making event so far as air power in India is concerned’: 
It is interesting that it took only six weeks to bring about the complete 
submission of the tribe, whereas the proscription and half hearted air blockade 
of the Tori Khel which has been undertaken in conjunction with land operations 
has taken over six months to bring about the desired results.323 
Embry’s comparison between the previously-described Tori Khel punitive proscription 
(which started before and ended after the Madda Khel air blockade, receiving a very 
matter-of-fact commentary from Embry) is interesting.324  It demonstrates how a 
recently-returned NWF squadron commander felt comfortable criticising the Army’s 
application of air power.  Conceptually, the Madda Khel operation was a stepping-
stone between the Army’s policy of purely punitive proscription and the Air Staff’s 
endorsed doctrine of coercive air blockading.  Despite their significantly different 
durations, the bombing tonnage of both operations was similar, highlighting their 
different characteristics.325  The objective of the shorter, Madda Khel blockade was to 
exclude tribesmen from their villages to disrupt daily life, thereby requiring the 
                                                
320 See AIR 5/1337, ———, RAF India Monthly General Summary of Work No 243: February 
1939, 11-12; AIR 5/1337, ———, RAF India Monthly General Summary of Work No 244: 
March 1939, 13; AIR 5/1337, ———, RAF India Monthly General Summary of Work No 245: 
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321 See the translation of the bombing notice at Annex 12 from AOC RAF India, Summary of 
Work No 243, 18. 
322 ———, Summary of Work No 245, 8-9. 
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bombing of largely deserted villages, whereas the longer Tori Khel proscription denied 
tribal grazing areas, predominantly by machine guns rather than bombs.326 
In April, AOC(India) assessed that constant aerial harassment and action 
against Ipi’s supporting tribes had nullified his influence, leaving the tribes wanting 
peace and allowing Waziristan aircraft strength to reduce to peacetime levels.327  After 
two years of Army control, the Governor, NWFP, re-assumed political control of 
Waziristan and independent air action.  OC 1(Indian) Group acted as advisor to both 
the Resident and Commander, Waziristan, dispensing with the Air Staff(India) Officer 
at Waziristan’s Army HQ.328  Despite greater RAF influence, the Mohammed 
Ahmadzai Khel Wazirs were proscribed from June 1939 to May 1940 for raiding.329 
Ipi returned to Kharre in July, but immediately crossed back into Afghanistan 
after leaflets re-imposing proscription were dropped.330  When he returned, his new 
locale was immediately proscribed, forcing him back to Afghanistan in September.331  
By this stage, Ipi appears to have been classically conditioned; he had progressively 
learnt to react to leaflet-dropping by re-locating, a conditioned response acquired 
through the experience of previous, repetitive harassment.  This response was only 
effective against tribesmen who had previously experienced proscription and would be 
relatively impermanent unless frequently reinforced.  Nonetheless, by 1939, aerial 
harassment of the Fakir was relatively effective in denying him respite.  Ipi’s 
supporters were also conditioned; AOC(India) described how the aim of proscription 
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was to obstruct and deter hostiles visiting Ipi and make him ‘an unwelcome lodger’ to 
the tribes.332  It is interesting to compare this technique to an air blockade, which did 
not rely on previous experience, as the discomfort from the disruption of normal life 
would generate the desired unconditioned coercive pressure to concede to 
Governmental terms.  However, a blockade generally took longer to achieve the 
desired outcome because the response was not pre-learnt and the discomfort took 
time to take effect and change tribal behaviour. 
PRE-WAR MODERNISATION IN FINANCIAL AUSTERITY 
Throughout the inter-War period, Britain and India clashed over the Indian Army’s 
Imperial role.  The GoI, constrained by increasing nationalism, financial austerity and 
NWF unrest, refused Britain’s demands, passing the 1919 GoI Act which placed 
India’s defence as the Army’s priority.  A series of committees attempted to reconcile 
these Frontier and Imperial commitments.333   
The 1933 Garran Tribunal made India responsible for internal security while 
Britain provided £1.5 million/year towards maintaining an Imperial Reserve.334  
AOC(India) complained when the RAF was excluded from a 1936 Watch and Ward 
Expenditure Committee, but was rebuked by the GoI’s Foreign Secretary with: ‘this 
was a question entirely in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief and if [he] preferred 
to use the Army... there was nothing more to be said’.335 
The Air Staffs in both London and India had long been aware of RAF(India)’s 
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obsolescence to counter the ‘major threat’ from Russian.  The CID’s 1928 plan for war 
against a Russian invasion of Afghanistan relied on the assumption that RAF(India)’s 
squadrons would be modernised and bomber-transports fully introduced.  The CID’s 
1934 review highlighted that this essential re-equipment had not happened and that 
‘types should be selected more with a view to their employment against long range 
targets in the Central Asian military district than to meet the immediate requirements 
of frontier operations’.  The next year, AOC(India) reiterated that the necessary 
modernisation had still not yet occurred, leading CAS to agree with Peck (then the Air 
Staff’s Deputy Director of Operations and Intelligence) that the Afghan war plan was 
therefore fallacious and that the Air Ministry should not allow the customary waiver of 
the CID’s Defence of India Sub-Committee’s annual review of its Afghan war plan.336  
Thus, the strategy behind the plan was flawed because there were insufficient means 
to achieve the stated aims, largely because India refused to acknowledge its 
responsibility to fund the necessary resources to support the CID’s plan.  Within the 
Air Staff, Darvall highlighted in 1937 that India had not accepted a commitment to 
maintain adequate air forces to meet the Russian threat.337  However, Slessor (who 
had replaced Peck as the Deputy Director of Operations and Intelligence) preferred to 
‘get squadrons out to India on the outbreak of war – not to put any more in!’ due to 
‘more pressing problems’ in Europe; Darvall retorted that ‘India is ceasing to be of 
value as an Imperial Reserve & is becoming a liability’.338 
In February 1938, SoS(War) called for a reorganization of the British Army in 
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India in light of the growing threat of world war.339  The GoI simultaneously declared it 
was unable to bear the cost of India’s military modernisation, urging the IO to 
reassess India’s defence position.340  The GoI’s appreciation concluded that the 
requirement to replace RAF(India)’s ‘obsolete aircraft by the most suitable modern 
types available can not be exaggerated and may well be said to take precedence over 
all other proposals, however urgent they may be...’ and called for ‘a new “contract” 
between the United Kingdom and India in which India’s financial limitations are 
recognised’.341  An internal Air Staff memo reflected on RAF(India)’s 4.7% share of the 
Indian defence budget: 
We see, therefore, that although in their words the re-equipment of the Royal Air 
Force in India is of greater urgency and importance than any other defence 
requirement, this view is not reflected in the apportionment of the Defence 
Budget, nor can I see any possibility of this situation being remedied until the 
R.A.F. vote ceases to be filtered by the Commander-in-Chief.342 
Nevertheless, DCAS and the WO’s Director of Military Operations and Intelligence 
initiated a joint appreciation to inform their respective SoSs.  However, the WO 
subsequently became ‘disinclined to continue discussions’ in preference to a bilateral 
WO-India committee.343  The Air Staff’s reaction demonstrated how the threat of world 
war had changed their priorities: 
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we are not interested in “substitution” in India, or (except as a factor in the 
economic use of forces) in the methods of control of the Frontier.  But we cannot 
tolerate much longer the continuance of this virtual “Army Air Arm” in India, 
where 8 valuable squadrons are inefficiently administered and equipped.344 
CAS highlighted to SoS(Air) RAF(India)’s obsolete framework and its inability to meet 
its commitment to provide two squadrons for the defence of Singapore and four for the 
Middle East: 
The subordination of the R.A.F. and the unsatisfactory constitutional position of 
the A.O.C. prevents alternative methods of frontier control, internal security or 
major defence being adequately discussed or placed in front of the Viceroy or 
the Government of India... the provision of a large subsidy to re-organize the 
land forces can provide no remedy for India’s problem but merely a perpetuation 
of the existing state of affairs at increased expense to Imperial funds.345 
SoS(Air) suggested to the Prime Minister that he task the CID’s Joint Planning 
Committee to examine the issue and the organisation and control of the RAF in India, 
a move which SoS(India) supported.346  However, the WO objected to the Joint 
Planning Committee’s involvement, admitting privately that ‘representation of the 
Admiralty on the J.P.C. would result in a claim by them for money for naval purposes, 
and a consequent reduction in the amount available for the War Office’.347  However, 
SoS(War) did not mention this in his subsequent letter to the Prime Minister, but 
merely stated that: 
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211), so the 1% of India’s defence budget allocated to the Royal Indian Navy was a sensitive 
subject (see AIR 8/529, ———, Letter, Chief of the Air Staff to Secretary of State for Air, 2 
June 1938, 3). 
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... the defence problem in India is in the first instance the responsibility of the 
Commander-in-Chief... I feel we should put ourselves in the wrong if we were to 
present the General Staff representatives from India with an appreciation of a 
subject which is so much their own responsibility.348 
This was a tenuous argument, given that the CID’s Defence of India Sub-Committee 
had historically been used for exactly this purpose.349  Nevertheless, the argument that 
it was India’s (rather than London’s) responsibility had been used previously by the 
WO to challenge changes that were not in their interest.350  Instead, a sub-committee 
of the CID’s COSC - the Pownall Committee - was instigated which, supported by 
CGS(India) and AOC(India), reported in May.351  While accepting the Air Ministry’s 
need to modernise India’s aircraft to counter ‘the major threat of a first class Power’ or 
‘in the wider sphere of Imperial defence’, the GoI stated it required only six 
modernised squadrons for the minor threat of tribal control if employed in line with the 
recently-published Combined Frontier Manual.352  However, the Committee noted 
India’s historical under-utilisation of air power, highlighting ‘the marked disparity 
between the capacity of India's land forces and... her air forces’.353  A further four 
Bomber squadrons were required for contingent Afghan operations, which could 
conditionally contribute to a Middle/Far East Imperial Reserve.354  The Air Ministry 
                                                
348 AIR 8/1086, Leslie Hore-Belisha, Letter, Secretary of State for War to Prime Minister, 13 
April 1938. 
349 See, for example, the Sub-Committee’s 1927 appreciation on the defence of India 
(Birkenhead, CID 158-D). 
350 See Chapter 7’s analysis of Personalities and Relationships. 
351 CAB 53/39/4, Major-General H R Pownall, COSC Paper 187(38) Annex 2: A Report of a 
Sub-Committee on the Defence Problems of India and the Composition and Organization of 
the Army and Royal Air Force in India [Pownall Report], 12 May 1938, 22.  The Committee was 
chaired by Major-General Henry Pownall, the WO’s Director of Military Operations and 
Intelligence (later Chief of Staff of the British Expeditionary Force).  RAF members of the 
Committee were AOC(India), Joubert de la Ferte (temporarily in London), Group Captain 
Slessor (Deputy Director of Plans) and Squadron Leader Darvall (FO5). 
352 AIR 8/529, AIR 20/202, Air Staff, Note of a Meeting held in the Chief of the Air Staff's Room 
at the Air Ministry on Thursday, 28th April, 1938 for a Preliminary Discussion on Indian 
Defence Problems with the Delegation from the Government of India, 28 April 1938, 2; 
Pownall, Pownall Report, 30.  The six squadrons would comprise two bomber, three army co-
operation and one bomber-transport squadron.   
353 Pownall, Pownall Report, 30, 38. 
354 Ibid., 30, 33.  A 1937 air appreciation had determined that an Imperial Reserve of 12 
squadrons was required for Middle/Far East commitments.  The CID and AM held that this 
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proposed directly administrating these squadrons as an ‘agency’, with an RAF-funded 
independent RAF(India) Command, an RAF Army Co-operation Wing (funded by the 
RAF, but subsidised by the GoI) and a GoI-funded Indian Air Force Wing, the latter 
two dedicated to India’s defence.355  Despite some RAF reservations, the IO, WO and 
Air Staff agreed with Pownall’s broad considerations.  Nonetheless, CAS informed 
CIGS in May that, ‘if financial or constitutional considerations are injected into the 
picture... I fear that the C.I.D. and ultimately the Cabinet will get a very confused 
conspectus’ and recommended that Pownall’s report be passed to the COSC to give 
the Admiralty the opportunity to review it.356  Indeed, CAS clearly considered the 
moment opportune and informed SoS(Air) in June that ‘with a proper use of the air 
force, considerable economies are possible in [India’s] land forces’.357   Following a 
meeting with CGS(India), AOC(India) and Pownall, the COSC endorsed Pownall’s 
findings in July, noting that, as India was incapable of discharging many Imperial 
commitments, her defence was not a self-contained problem, and that the ‘agency 
basis deserved expert examination’.358  However, CAS questioned whether India could 
reconcile her assurance that modernising her squadrons was C-in-C(India)’s ‘first 
priority’ against the RAF’s 7% share of their defence budget; this sum was less than 
the cost of India’s sixteen horsed cavalry regiments whose utility, CGS(India) 
                                                                                                                                           
would be provided by four squadrons from Iraq, four conditionally from India and four 
unconditionally from India (see AIR 8/529, Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril Newall, Letter, Chief of 
the Air Staff to Air Marshal C L Courtney, 10 December 1938, 1-2; CAB 53/39/4, Committee of 
Imperial Defence Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee Report 737: The Defence of India, 2 July 
1938, 3). 
355 AIR 8/529, Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril Newall, Directive for AOC India (Air Marshal P B 
Joubert de la Ferte), 17 September 1937; Pownall, Pownall Report, 34. 
356 AIR 8/529, Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril Newall, Letter, Chief of the Air Staff to Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff, 16 May 1938.  The Air Staff’s critique of Pownall’s report is at AIR 
8/529, Air Staff, Review of Indian Defence Requirements - Air Staff Attitude to Report, 11 May 
1938. 
357 Newall, CAS to SoS(Air), 2 June 1938, 3. 
358 Minutes of this meeting are at: CAB 53/9/5, Committee of Imperial Defence, Chiefs of Staff 
Sub-Committee: Minutes of the 241st Meeting, held on 21st June, 1938, 21 June 1938; the 
outcome was formally articulated as CID COS 737, 1, 5, 9-10. 
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admitted, was ‘open to doubt’.359 
In June, the Cabinet had instigated a Cabinet Committee on the Defence of 
India, chaired by the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence, Sir Thomas Inskip.360  The 
output of the Committee’s six meetings was Inskip’s July report which generally 
agreed with the COSC’s recommendations, noting RAF(India)’s ‘deplorable’ 
obsolescence which rendered it unemployable against modern aircraft.361  However, 
SoS(India) was concerned that administering RAF(India) on an agency basis might 
diminish C-in-C(India)’s authority; as there was no Indian equivalent of the tri-Service 
CID, who would adjudicate over differences of opinion between C-in-C(India) and 
AOC(India)?  If it was to be the Viceroy, then C-in-C(India) was his constitutional 
military advisor, yet he would be a party in the dispute.362  In its response, the Air 
Ministry highlighted RAF(India)’s disadvantageous administrative system, proposing 
instead that the Air Ministry should be responsible for equipping, maintaining and 
training RAF(India)’s squadrons.  Notwithstanding this, the agency proposal would not 
affect existing arrangements for operational control or the determination of the 
strength of RAF(India).363  However, as the agency proposal was not as urgent as the 
other issues being addressed by the Cabinet Committee, the matter was not 
                                                
359 COSC: Minutes, 21 June 1938, 5, 8-9.  Bond recorded that Cassels, C-in-C(India), had ‘a 
simple mind but was quite a reasonable man apart from his passion for cavalry’ (see Bond, 
British Military Policy between the Two World Wars, 120).  The RAF’s exact proportion of 
India’s defence budget is debatable; the Air Staff often used a figure of 4% (see AIR 8/529, Air 
Staff, Note by the Air Staff on the Present Problems of Indian Defence, October 1938, 2). 
360 CAB 23/94, Cabinet Conclusion 30 (38) 6: Defence of India, 29 June 1938, 12.  This was a 
new Committee, distinct from the CID’s Defence of India Sub-Committee.   
361 CAB 24/278/22, T W H Inskip, Cabinet Paper 187(38): India: Defence Questions: Second 
Report of Cabinet Committee, 29 July 1938, 2, 6.  The minutes and memos of the Cabinet 
Committee on the Defence of India are at CAB 27/653 and CAB 27/654 under the ID(38) 
series of papers.  The Air Staff copies of these papers, with associated correspondence, are in 
AIR 8/255 and AIR 8/256. 
362 CAB 27/653, AIR 8/256, Cabinet Committee on Defence of India: Conclusions of the First 
Meeting (ID(38) 1st Meeting), 6 July 1938, 5. 
363 CAB 27/654, AIR 8/255, Cabinet Committee on Defence of India: Report from a Conference 
of Representatives of the Treasury, India Office, War Office and Air Ministry (ID(38)7): Annex 
A: Memorandum by the Air Ministry: Proposals for an "Agency Basis" for RAF Squadrons in 
India 23 July 1938, 18-22. 
Chapter 6 – A Brief History of the RAF on the NWF 
286 
pursued.364 
In July, the Cabinet approved Inskip’s proposals, including £5 million to fund an 
Imperial Reserve Division in India, the increase of the Garran Award to £2 million per 
year to meet this Division’s recurring costs and £3 million to re-equip India’s four 
bomber squadrons.  However, the Chancellor of the Exchequer was unwilling to 
subsidise India’s other forces (including the enlargement of Indian aerodromes) until a 
detailed enquiry had determined what efficiencies could be made.  The Cabinet 
therefore agreed that the GoI should invite a ‘Committee of Enquiry’ to visit India.365  
The GoI initially objected to this Enquiry being conducted by UK-based officers.  
However, the Air Staff’s view, largely supported by the WO, was that the Enquiry: 
... has such enormous repercussions on Imperial defence as a whole, and so 
closely affects the budgets of the Imperial Defence Departments, that we 
consider it essential that there should be a new conspectus of Indian defence as 
a whole, including Frontier policy, by a commission including representatives of 
the Defence Departments at home.366 
Unknown to the Air Ministry, C-in-C(India) concurrently commissioned an 
internal review chaired by Auchinleck, Deputy CGS(India), because ‘the armament, 
equipment and means of mobility of the Army in India has remained virtually 
unchanged since the end of the Great War’ and ‘must be rescued from 
obsolescence’.367  This Modernization Committee recommended drastic reductions in 
                                                
364 CAB 27/654, AIR 8/255, Cabinet Committee on Defence of India: Report from a Conference 
of Representatives of the Treasury, India Office, War Office and Air Ministry (ID(38)7), 23 July 
1938, 12. 
365 CAB 23/94, Cabinet Conclusion 35 (38) 6: INDIA: Defence Questions, 27 July 1938, 8, 17-
18. 
366 AIR 8/255, Group Captain J C Slessor, Notes for Secretary of State in the Cabinet Sub-
Committee on the Defence of India, 25 July 1938. 
367 IOR/L/MIL/17/5/1801, Major-General C J E Auchinleck, Report of the Modernization 
Committee, October 1938, 3-4.  Other Committee members were the Director of Staff Duties, 
the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, and the Director of Military Training.  See 
Philip Warner, Auchinleck: The Lonely Soldier (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2006), 37; Air 
Staff, Discussion on Indian Defence Problems with the Delegation from the Government of 
India, 28 April 1938, 8; James M Ehran, "Ways of War and the American Experience in the 
China-Burma-India Theater, 1942-45" (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Kansas State University, 
2006), 34-36.  The Modernization Committee’s report recognised that war with Afghanistan 
was unlikely and would be subsidiary (and therefore be of a defensive character) to conflict 
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the Indian Army and envisaged an Imperial Reserve entirely funded by London.  
AOC(India) pointed out privately that the Forward Policy’s requirement for ever-
increasing military penetration of the tribal areas and its concomitant increased 
military expenditure was inconsistent with the financial savings required by the Army’s 
Modernization Scheme; the increased use of air power was the solution.368  However, 
despite a lack of analysis concerning air power and without any RAF representation, 
the Committee recommended a reduction to ‘two bomber squadrons only for India’s 
local defence’, presumably to fund Army modernization.369  CAS subsequently 
reflected on Auchinleck’s ‘fantastic view that no air forces are really required for 
India’s local defence’: ‘It is astonishing... that quite so narrow a view should have 
emanated even from so antiquated a military edifice as Army H.Q., Delhi’.370   
Following a three-month tour of India, the Expert Committee, chaired by ex-
Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Chatfield, and supported by Auchinleck and ex-AOC Iraq, 
Air Marshal Courtney, reported in January 1939.371  During the tour, the Air Staff 
unsuccessfully lobbied for Chatfield to examine the ‘higher direction’ of Indian 
                                                                                                                                           
with Germany, Italy and Japan.  It recommended that army co-operation squadrons should 
have a dual role incorporating defending ports from naval bombardment and that the threat of 
air attack would require an increase from one to three batteries of modern anti-aircraft artillery 
(see Auchinleck, Report of the Modernization Committee, 1, 9-10).  The subsequent 
modernization plan is at: IOR/L/MIL/17/5/1803, Lieutenant-General E de Burgh, Plan for the 
Modernization and Reorganization of the Army in India, August 1939 and 
IOR/L/MIL/17/5/1804, ———, Plan for the Modernization and Reorganization of the Army in 
India (Operations) 1939. 
368 AIR 23/5388, Air Marshal Sir Philip Joubert de la Ferte, Letter, Air Officer Commanding, 
India, to Air Marshal C L Courtney, 29 November 1938. 
369 Auchinleck, Report of the Modernization Committee, iv, 104; AIR 8/529, Air Marshal C L 
Courtney, Letter, Courtney to Chief of the Air Staff, 14 November 1938, 2. 
370 Newall, CAS to Courtney, 10 December 1938, 3, 1.  See similar Air Staff’s comments at: 
AIR 8/255, Air Staff, Report of the Expert Committee on the Defence of India (ID(38)10): 
Summary and Comments by the Air Staff, 17 February 1939, 7. 
371 Chatfield, Expert Committee Report.  The Committee held 78 meetings with 63 witnesses, 
including Ludlow-Hewitt, Bottomley and Slessor (see ———, Expert Committee Report, 4 and 
AIR 8/529, Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril Newall, Letter, Chief of the Air Staff to Air Chief Marshal 
Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt, 17 October 1938).  The Report is also in the Committee’s file at: CAB 
27/654, AIR 8/255, Lord Chatfield, Report of the Expert Committee on the Defence of India, 
1938-39 (ID(38)10), 13 February 1939.  Courtney’s personal papers from the Committee are in 
AIR 23/5388, while Auchinleck’s invitation to join the Committee is at: Auchinleck Papers, 
GB133 AUC/2, Marquess of Zetland, Letter, Secretary of State for India to Major-General C J 
E Auchinleck, 24 October 1938. 
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defence, the RAF’s subordinate position and their proposed agency concept; this was, 
instead, deferred to the Cabinet.372  Chatfield’s Committee endorsed most 
recommendations from the COSC and Auchinleck Committees, although they could 
not agree on air power’s utilisation or the minimum air strength (in particular, C-in-
C(India)’s proposed reduction to eight, rather than Pownall’s ten, squadrons).373  The 
Report played down the Russian threat while recognising external threats from 
Afghanistan and the Far East.374  The Committee heard divergent and conflicting 
evidence concerning the Forward Policy, noting the lack of coherent planning and 
unsound methodologies.  It recommended an entire review.375  Chatfield also noted 
the controversy over the employment of air power and emphasised the importance of 
maintaining inter-departmental confidence by fully acknowledging Military, Air and 
Political perspectives.  However, air power’s recent increased role was acknowledged, 
as was the inter-Service collaboration over the Combined Frontier Manual.376  The 
Report provided an interesting perspective on the political constraints concerning air 
blockades: 
Some political officers dislike the dictation of terms in advance... on the grounds 
that it is not always expedient... to commit themselves to prolonged bombing 
operations... and that once started an air blockade cannot, without a serious loss 
of prestige, be discontinued before it has been brought to a successful 
conclusion... 
... whereas, during proscriptive air action: 
                                                
372 AIR 8/529, Air Marshal C L Courtney, Telegram, Courtney to Chief of the Air Staff, 14 
November 1938; AIR 2/2065, Group Captain J C Slessor, Minute, Deputy Director Plans to 
Chief of the Air Staff, 21 October 1938; AIR 8/529, Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril Newall, 
Telegram, Chief of the Air Staff to Air Marshal C L Courtney, 23 November 1938; Newall, CAS 
to Courtney, 23 November 1938, 2; Chatfield, Expert Committee Report, 66; CAB 24/287/21, T 
W H Inskip, Cabinet Paper 138(39): Report on the Report of the Expert Committee on the 
Defence of India, 23 June 1939, 11, 13.  The Cabinet Committee on the Defence of India, 
chaired by Sir Thomas Inskip, Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, was the body who co-
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373 Chatfield, Expert Committee Report, 4, 22. 
374 Ibid., 8-9, 11, 42-43, 56, 64. 
375 Ibid., 11, 14. 
376 Ibid., 15-16. 
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there is no prior announcement of terms, and the Government are thus free to 
discontinue air action at any stage.  Some political officers therefore prefer this 
method to that of the air blockade.377 
The Committee’s internal notes reveal C-in-C(India)’s position on substitution on the 
NWF: ‘Unless and until it has been proven that air action can exercise decisive control 
a further reduction of regular troops is not a practical proposition’.  However, as the air 
member of the Committee pointed out, this proof would never be forthcoming as the 
Army moved in troops every time the air method was employed.378   
Nevertheless, Chatfield found appreciable support for the unrestricted use of 
aircraft in a primary role to inflict heavy casualties.  Unfortunately, because of the 
anonymous nature of the Committee’s interviews, it is not clear who voiced these 
views.379   However, SoS(Air) subsequently described the source as ‘one or two fire-
eaters... who advocate a policy of frightfulness from the air, e.g. bombing women and 
children in villages without notice’.  Given the RAF’s minimum force ethic and the 
Army’s contrasting maximum lethality modus operandi, this may have been a military 
perspective reflecting Army frustration against an elusive opponent.  Nevertheless, the 
Committee dismissed any peacetime relaxation of the rules governing NWF air power.  
Indeed, both SoS(Air) and CAS dissociated themselves from any relaxations, such as 
the dropping of warning notices.380  Nonetheless, this episode is important in 
illustrating the Army’s simplistic view of air power which manifested itself as a 
                                                
377 Ibid., 16. 
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for Air Marshal Courtney, air member on the Committee, probably written by Air Commodore 
Peck, Senior Air Staff Officer, HQ RAF(India). 
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penchant for kinetic effect, in contrast to the Air Force’s greater subtlety in applying 
force.  
In London, the Air Staff’s internal summary of Chatfield’s Expert Committee 
Report described it as ‘a generally practical and acceptable scheme which the Air 
Ministry can approve in principle, subject to certain reservations and modifications’.  In 
particular, the need for consultation between India and the CID was highlighted: 
It is essential that it should no longer be possible, as it was in 1937, for the 
Government of India – or even a local general on the frontier – to embark on 
their own responsibility upon operations involving thousands of men and half-a-
dozen squadrons of aircraft at a time when that sort of local commitment ought 
to be cut down to the absolute irreducible minimum.381 
The Air Staff were not satisfied that the use of air forces on the Frontier was 
adequately ventilated before the Chatfield Committee, but did not want to raise the 
issue until the Report’s proposed subsequent Frontier enquiry.  Similarly, although it 
had been ‘thoroughly unsatisfactory’ that the Chatfield Committee had expressly 
excluded the higher direction on Indian defence, the Air Staff decided not to delay the 
Report’s general approval but to address the issue later.  They were also critical of 
Auchinleck’s preceding Modernization Committee which had formed the basis of the 
Indian Army’s pitch to Chatfield: ‘the [Indian Army’s] Modernization Committee worked 
out what they wanted for the army, and the Royal Air Force then had to take what was 
left over’.382 
The COSC reviewed Chatfield’s Report in May 1939.383  They reinforced the 
urgent need to review Frontier policy, emphasising that ‘Frontier policy has a direct 
bearing upon our Imperial defence position’.  However, as the UK ‘have as a rule not 
been kept fully informed of India’s plans for local defence’, the COSC underlined 
                                                
381 Air Staff, Expert Committee: Summary and Comments by the Air Staff, 1, 4. 
382 Ibid., 6-7. 
383 CAB 24/278/22, Committee of Imperial Defence Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee Report 874: 
Report of the Expert Committee on the Defence of India, 1938-39, 12 May 1939.  A copy is 
also in the Cabinet Committee on Defence of India archives at: CAB 27/654, AIR 8/255, Report 
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Chatfield’s recommendation that both local and external defence plans should be 
subject to the closest consultation between India and the CID before being approved 
by both Governments.  They also recommended that a full-time senior RAF staff 
officer should be posted to the IO’s Military Department to improve liaison between the 
IO and Air Ministry.384 
The Chatfield Report was discussed in Cabinet in July where it was noted that, 
while expenditure could be reduced by increased use of air power, it was generally 
held in India that troop levels could not be correspondingly reduced.  Concern was 
expressed over the lack of agreed methods for implementing NWF policy (‘an Indian 
problem which would have to be solved in India’), although the Viceroy had 
commissioned an Expert Committee to report to the Cabinet ‘without delay’.  The 
Cabinet tasked SoS(India) to summons C-in-C(India) before the CID to determine the 
number of Bomber squadrons required.385  Chatfield, now a Cabinet Minister, 
highlighted the unsatisfactory position of AOC(India) relative to C-in-C(India), pointing 
out that the views of the Viceroy and C-in-C(India) were of first importance and 
doubting that the matter could be settled by a UK inquiry; following an involved 
discussion, the Prime Minister directed the Viceroy to be consulted - a somewhat 
circular decision, given that the issue had been specifically excluded from the 
Chatfield Committee’s scope because it required ‘examination by Ministers’.386  This 
illustrates the autonomous nature of decision making in the defence of India and 
London’s lack of influence.  Constitutionally, responsibility for the defence of India 
rested ‘through the Governor-General [ie, the Viceroy] and the Secretary of State for 
India, with the British Government and no one else’.387  Yet, as demonstrated in this 
instance, when a defence issue could not be resolved within India and was raised to 
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Cabinet level, it was referred back to the Viceroy.  This was reinforced by Earl 
Winterton (Under-SoS(India), 1922 to 1929), who reflected in 1938 that ‘it is a 
recognised fact that every Secretary of State for India has the greatest difficulty in 
practice in imposing his views on defence on the Viceroy and Government of India’.388  
This situation placed C-in-C(India) -  the Viceroy’s de facto minister for defence - in a 
uniquely pivotal and autonomous position, explaining the dearth of discussion of 
India’s defence within the Cabinet, CID and its sub-committees as well as the RAF’s 
lack of influence within India during the inter-War years.389  Interestingly, SoS(War) 
described the Chatfield Report as ‘a landmark in military history’ which made for 
‘greater flexibility and co-operation between the Army at Home and the Army in India’, 
exactly the issues previously denied to the Air Ministry and Air Staff(India).390   
The prospect of progress resulting from Cabinet pressure on the Viceroy was 
swiftly overtaken by world events.  Within a month, Cabinet had authorised the 
dispatch of two of India’s Bomber squadrons to Singapore.391 
LOOMING WAR 
The impending outbreak of the Second World War saw an immediate reorganisation 
of the RAF in India and aroused unrest amongst the frontier tribes.392  In September 
                                                
388 AIR 8/529, The Earl Winterton, Memo to Secretary of State for Air and Chief of Air Staff 
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389 CID sub-committees included: the COSC, the Standing Defence Sub-Committee, the 
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1939, Waziristan was relegated to second place in AOC(India)’s Monthly Summaries 
for the first time since October 1936.393  Although war did not end Ipi’s anti-
Governmental activities, the British manipulated the support of the leading, well-
respected Mahsud mullah, Fazl Din, who constrained the FoI’s influence.394  
Nonetheless, the exigencies of the War changed the paradigm of inter-Service 
relations, forming a suitable full-stop to the period under review. 
CONCLUSION 
This examination of the implementation of NWF air power up to 1939, written as a 
chronological continuum to avoid cherry picking events that support any one 
perspective, situates the Thesis by providing a historical backdrop to the period under 
consideration.  It demonstrates the way in which the Indian command and control 
structures caused a divergence between the RAF’s core doctrine (described in 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5) and the in-theatre use of air power, analysed in this Chapter.  
The enduring competition between the various stakeholders in India’s air power 
occurred at different levels, but was tempered at the point of application by the need 
for co-operation to address existential threats.  Despite India’s precarious financial 
position, the Army remained reticent to make the most of air power’s potential 
efficiencies, fearful of conceding status and influence to another Service.  
                                                                                                                                           
The Eagle Strikes: The Royal Indian Air Force 1932-1950 (New Delhi: Ambi Knowledge 
Resources, 2006), 24-25. 
393 Annex 15 shows the length of each AOC(India)’s Monthly Summaries and the proportion 
dedicated to Waziristan superimposed on the Waziristan flying hours from January 1937 to 
June 1939.  There were no operations described in the August 1936 Summary, while October 
1936’s Summary described the Chitral Relief before turning to Waziristan (see AIR 5/1335, 
AOC RAF India, RAF India Monthly General Summary of Work No 215: October 1936; AIR 
5/1335, ———, RAF India Monthly General Summary of Work No 213: August 1936). 
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photographs of a bombed village (see Schofield, Afghan Frontier, 231-232; Lieutenant-Colonel 
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World War"). 
Chapter 6 – A Brief History of the RAF on the NWF 
294 
Furthermore, as experienced was gained, the constraints on air power due to the 
subjective interpretation of the overbearing, asymmetric element of its character 
became more germane, especially against the backdrop of increasing Indian home 
rule.  Nonetheless, even during the very highest tempo operations in the late 1930s 
against the FoI’s followers, the Air Staff in London were becoming more concerned at 
India’s neglect of its Squadrons and RAF(India)’s ability to fulfil its role in the wider 
metropolitan Air Force as world war loomed. 
This Chapter’s study reveals an interesting absence of one particular tactical 
technique.  While, in areas under formal air control, the RAF employed aircraft and 
armoured cars synergistically, there appears to have been a complete absence of this 
form of co-operation on the NWF.  In Iraq, the RAF employed armoured cars to 
provide a ground presence (often following air action) primarily because of their 
mobility over the generally flat desert plains.395  As noted in Chapter 5, Slessor had 
argued in 1931 that a combination of aircraft, armoured cars, irregular corps, militia 
and tribal levies could avoid the cost of military occupation.396  While armoured cars 
had first been used in India on the Mohmand border in 1916 and armoured cars, 
cavalry and aircraft had been used to harass tribesmen withdrawing from the siege of 
Thal at the end of the Third Afghan War, the NWF’s mountainous terrain restricted 
them largely to roads, making them predictable.  Nonetheless, they were used in 
limited numbers to open roads and escort convoys, reducing the number of troops 
required.  Thus, it was their degree of protection and firepower that was exploited to 
provide a defensive, force protection capability; in contrast to their use in Iraq, the 
armoured car’s relative lack of off-road mobility (compared with troops and pack 
animals) was a limitation, despite occasionally being used for tactical reconnaissance 
                                                
395 In his award-winning 1930 RAFQ article, McClaughry listed the role of armoured cars during 
air control as: internal security; active operations; guarding advanced landing grounds; 
conveyance of stores; reconnaissance and showing the flag; and salvaging force-landed 
aircraft.  See McClaughry, "The "Gordon-Sheppard" Memorial Prize Essay, 1929": 454-456. 
396 Slessor, The Other Point of View, 19. 
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on the plains.  This limitation was demonstrated during the 1937 Shahur Tangi convoy 
ambush where the four escorting armoured cars were penned in and unable to 
elevate their guns sufficiently to engage the tribesmen on the slopes of the defile.  
Indeed, Moreman recorded how Colonel Tuker, at the request of Deputy CGS(India)  
wrote an article for JUSII in 1938 which highlighted how the value of armoured and 
mechanised forces resupplied by air and supported by close support aircraft had not 
been fully exploited.397  It should also be remembered that India had drifted far behind 
modern military standards; as stated by Auchinleck’s 1938 Modernization Committee, 
the ‘mobility of the Army in India has remained virtually unchanged since the end of 
the Great War’.398  Overall, it appears that the extreme terrain, combined with the need 
to resupply isolated, garrisoned troops, drove the Army to employ its limited number of 
armoured cars in a defensive, rather than offensive, manner, leaving no opportunity 
for the synergistic mobility of aircraft and armoured cars to be exploited. 
                                                
397 Moreman, The Army in India, 99, 106, 125, 128, 146, 157-158, 166, 170-171.  
398 In 1938, the bulk of India’s cavalry was still horsed, the sole progress envisaged or 
achieved being the conversion of four British horsed cavalry regiments into light tanks and two 
Indian horsed cavalry regiments to armoured cars to replace the tank corps units assigned to 
the Western Frontier.   See Auchinleck, Report of the Modernization Committee, 3. 
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Figure 14 – Waziristan Area of Operations, 1936 
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PUNITIVE VILLAGE BOMBING  
1 Arsal Kot Tori Khel 14 Stara Kazha Madda Khel 
2 Zuram Atsar Madda Khel 15 Wucha Kazha Madda Khel 
3 Ismail Khel Madda Khel 16 Sarrum Madda Khel 
4 Raghzai Kalai Madda Khel 17 Sar Kalai Madda Khel 
5 Datta Khel Tori Khel 18 Sherani Madda Khel 
6 Urmur Khel Kile Mahsuds 19 Kashakai Janbe Khel Madda Khel 
7 Raghzai Kile Bhitanni 20 Manz Kalai Madda Khel 
8 Bara Kile Bhitanni 21 Rashida Madda Khel 
9 Lowazhi Bhitanni 22 Tamora Madda Khel 
10 Tali Palosai Bhitanni 23 Star Kile Madda Khel 
11 Razin Mahsuds  
12 Laswandai Mahsuds  
13 Khonia Kel’s kot Mahsuds  
 
PROSCRIBED AREAS 
1 Arsal Kot 
 - Proscribed 31.12.36 to 4.1.37 
 - Resumed 11.1.37 to 19.1.37 
 - 3 mile radius proscribed 17.3.37; reduced to 1 mile 24.3.37 to 25.3.37 
 - 3 mile radius resumed 6.4.37 to 31.5.37 
2/3 Tori Khel area 
 - Proscribed 6.4.37 
 - Extended to area 3 (Sham Plain) 13.5.37 
 - Lifted 31.5.37 
4 Saruna area (Jalai Khel Mahsud grazing grounds).  Proscribed 28.4.37 to 31.5.37 
5 Shinki Defile.  Area 3 miles either side of road proscribed 12.4.37 to 10.9.37 
6 Prekari Sar area.  Proscribed 1.8.37 to 8.8.37 
7 Bhitanni area 
 - Proscribed 30.8.37 to 2.9.37 
 - Resumed 9.9.37 to 13.9.37 
 - Resumed 23.9.37 to 12.10.37 
8 Baddar and Main Toi areas.  Proscribed 11.9.37 to 15.9.37 
9 Shawal area.  Proscribed 25.9.37 to 8.10.37 
10 Spli Toi area.  Proscribed 4.10.37 to 15.10.37 
11 Upper Baddar and Maintoi.  Proscribed 18.5.38 to 18.6.38 
12 Spli Toi.  Proscribed 17.5.38 to 18.6.38 
13 Madda Khel.  Proscribed 16.6.38 to 29.6.38 
14 Mami Rogha.  Proscribed 21.6.37 to ? 
15 Kharre.  Incomplete data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15 – Waziristan Air Operations 1936-381 
                                                
1 All data from: AOC RAF India, Summary of Work No 235, 17-19.  See also Annex 2 for weapon expenditure. 
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CHAPTER 7 – ‘CONTROL AND CONSTRAINTS’ - CHALLENGES 
TO THE APPLICATION OF AIR POWER 
INTRODUCTION 
During the period under examination, Frontier air power was constrained by a wide 
variety of factors.  The economic, political and moral realities associated with Imperial 
decline and the post-FWW Great Depression exacerbated inter-Service competition 
over the decreasing defence vote.  Air power had successfully shaped the perception 
of the international community about the destructive potential of the bomber; an 
unintended consequence was a humanitarian backlash against the ‘frightfulness’ of 
using asymmetric technology against tribesmen.  This resulted in what Peter Gray 
described as ‘internecine bickering’ between the Air Staff, IO, WO, GoI, Viceroy, C-in-
C(India), CGS(India) and AOC(India), with each party using rhetoric to advance its 
own ends.1  CIGS, for example, summed up air action as ‘The bomb that falls from 
God knows where and lands on God knows what’;2 the Air Staff thought that ‘air forces 
have been grossly mishandled under military control’ due to ‘the ignorance and gross 
prejudice of senior military officers’.3  This was set against the background of financial 
austerity, demands for disarmament and the abolition of aerial bombing, with pressure 
groups berating that ‘there is to most of us something peculiarly revolting in reprisals 
from the air’.4  This Chapter analyses the significant factors that constrained NWF air 
power.  It reveals dogmatic debate and how advocacy sometimes obscured accuracy. 
                                                
1 Gray, "The Myths of Air Control and the Realities of Imperial Policing": 49. 
2 Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, quoted in Slessor, The 
Central Blue, 66. 
3 AIR 9/12, E33, Air Staff, Instances of Misemployment of Air Forces in India by General 
Officers Commanding, 28 May 1930, 5. 
4 C F Andrews, The Challenge of the North-West Frontier: A Contribution to World Peace 
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1937), 120-121.  For a discussion on the Geneva 
Disarmament Conference, see: Peter W Gray, "The Strategic Leadership and Direction of the 
Royal Air Force Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany from Inception to 1945" (PhD Thesis, 
University of Birmingham, 2009), 118-130.  See also Renfrew, Wings of Empire, 233-239. 
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THE CONTROL OF AIR POWER 
From 1925, the GoI imposed control measures which divided Frontier airspace into 
the following five categories: a six-mile prohibited zone along the Durand Line, to 
avoid the political embarrassment of aircraft straying into Afghanistan; unrestricted 
zones, such as Waziristan, most of Mohmand country and Baluchistan; areas where 
entry required the authority of the local political officer, such as the northern Agencies, 
Peshawar and Hazara Districts; ‘nibbling’ areas, where political officers could be 
carried over tribal territory, often co-ordinated with local Maliks; and, from 1930, free-
flight corridors between major towns, such as Peshawar to Kohat.5  These measures 
balanced air power’s ability to influence ground events against overly-antagonistic 
activity.  Nonetheless, the Air Staff complained about the lack of freedom to 
manoeuvre from the late 1920s, to little effect.6 
At the point of application, air power was constrained by what are now termed 
“rules of engagement”.  The first were published in 1924 by the Air Staff(India) with the 
approval of the GoI.  As described in Chapter 3, Employment of Aircraft on the NWF 
was a broad-ranging, fourteen-page pamphlet which, amongst tactics and techniques, 
covered aspects of legitimacy, humanity and proportionality.  It detailed which targets 
required warning notices and constrained the employment of delayed-action bombs.7  
This was replaced in 1928 by Instructions Regarding the Employment of Aeroplanes 
                                                
5 IOR/L/PS/12/3260, Government of India Army Department, Rules Relating to Military Aviation 
on the North-West Frontier and Baluchistan, 13 November 1930.  This superseded a similar 
document issued on 19 February 1925. 
6 This is discussed in Chapter 5.  The generic issue was raised at Cabinet level in 1928, for 
example, which stated that it was ‘important, once it has been decided to initiate air action, not 
to tie down aircraft to narrow geographic limits’.  See Air Staff, Notes by the Air Staff on the 
Regulation of Air Control in Undeveloped Countries, 2.   
7 ———, Employment of Aircraft on the NWFI.  This also imposed a 6-mile no-fly-zone along 
the Afghan border, prior to the aforementioned 1925 airspace control measures.  When 
employing air support, Army units were similarly bound by secret policy letters issued by the 
Army Department of the GoI in 1925 and 1926 (Army HQ secret letters No 15208-MO 1 dated 
28 February 1925 and No 15208-MO 1 dated 23 April 1926).  See IOR/L/PS/12/3260, Army 
Department, Instructions Regarding the Employment of Aeroplanes on the North-West Frontier 
of India, 4 July 1928, 1. 
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on the NWF, published by the GoI’s Army Department.8  This five-page confidential 
document allowed reconnaissance and demonstration flights, and action to defend 
troops in combat, to be sanctioned without referring to the GoI.9  However, warning 
notices and offensive air action required prior Governmental authority.  When 
supporting Army columns, aircraft could retaliate against tribesmen engaging friendly 
troops, but could not target their villages.  Nonetheless, during the1930 Peshawar 
emergency, authority for offensive action was temporarily delegated to the Chief 
Commissioner, NWFP, due to the necessity for swift retribution.10  When this was 
rescinded as unrest subsided, the Air Ministry expressed anxiety to the IO at this 
‘return to a system which has already been found wanting under trial’, highlighting the 
need for political officers to be delegated discretionary powers to authorise air action 
to swiftly nip unrest in the bud, thereby localising issues.11  
In August 1931, the GoI published new provisional combined Instructions 
Regarding the Control of Operations including the Employment of Air Forces on the 
NWF which emphasised co-ordinated Army-RAF action, allowing slightly more 
delegated authority during day-to-day watch and ward flights.12  Aircrew retained 
authority to retaliate in self defence of themselves or troops against tribesmen in 
active opposition.  However, the Instructions also emphasised that: 
In order that the fullest use may be made of the air arm to act rapidly, central 
control is necessary, and the control of squadrons, other than those detailed to 
co-operate with land forces, will not normally be delegated, except in a definite 
and limited operation.13   
                                                
8 Army Department, Instructions Regarding the Employment of Aeroplanes on the NWF, 1928. 
9 Pertinent extracts from these Instructions are at Annex 13. 
10 See IOR/L/PS/12/3260, Telegram to Chief Commissioner, NWFP, 14 May 1930. 
11 IOR/L/PS/12/3260, C Bullock, Letter from Principal Private Secretary to Secretary of State 
for Air to Under Secretary of State (Military Department), India Office, 14 July 1931, 2. 
12 IOR/L/PS/12/3260, Army Department, Instructions Regarding the Control of Operations, 
including the Employment of Air Forces, on the North-West Frontier of India, 1 August 1931.  
Pertinent extracts of the 1931 Instructions are at Annex 14. 
13 Ibid., 3-4.  The Instructions also detailed political action to be taken to recover captured 
airmen. 
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Concerned about the Army’s mishandling of air power, the Air Ministry wrote again to 
the IO, strongly urging that this last sentence be deleted and recommending that 
senior political officers be empowered to authorise warnings and air action against 
villages in an emergency.14  The final 1932 version of the Instructions incorporated 
several amendments. Political officers had to inform the local military commander prior 
to ordering air demonstrations in case they impacted on impending military operations.  
Once the GoI had authorised the issuance of warning notices, political officers could 
subsequently commence air action without further reference.  Finally, the centralised 
control of aircraft was now to be maintained except ‘in the most exceptional 
circumstances’, vice the previous ‘definite and limited operations’.15  Thus, the Air 
Ministry’s petitioning resulted in some regulatory relaxation, but C-in-C(India) 
remained in control of air power except when tactically supporting troops.  This denied 
the RAF the autonomy to demonstrate its coercive capability, something the Air 
Ministry suspected was a deliberate Army policy resulting from Trenchard’s 1929 
swansong.16 
Despite the published rules, the Army sometimes circumvented them.  In June 
1937, OC 1(Indian) Group was ordered by the local Brigadier to bomb a house 
thought to be occupied by the FoI without first dropping warning notices, something 
outwith his authority;17 only after AOC(India) consulted CGS(India) was the order 
                                                
14 IOR/L/PS/12/3260, J S Ross (Principal Assistant Secretary to the Air Ministry), Letter to 
Under Secretary of State, India Office, 24 October 1931.  This very much upset C-in-C India, 
as discussed later. 
15 Army Department, Control of Operations on the NWF, 1932.  These Instructions remained in 
force until they were replaced in 1941.  See IOR/L/PS/12/3260, Defence Department, 
Instructions Governing the Employment of Armed Forces in the Maintenance of Tribal Control  
on the North-West Frontier of India and in Baluchistan: 1940, 3 January 1941.  The 1941 
Instructions delegated authority to conduct limited air operations in an emergency to selected 
political authorities, returning almost full circle to the 1930 Peshawar rules. 
16 This theme is developed subsequently in the Thesis. 
17 OC 1(Indian) Group  was Group Captain Norman Bottomley, based at Peshawar. 
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rescinded.18  At a local level, the troops’ adherence to the Instructions was not always 
strict; John Masters, a NWF Ghurkha officer in 1937, revealed that: ‘The government’s 
rules for the conduct of the war mattered less to us than the lives and confidence of 
our men, and we interpreted them in that sense’.19  Slessor similarly reflected that, 
while ‘under no circumstances were any attacks [by aircraft] to be directed against 
tribesmen in a village’ without ‘special permission and the normal period of warning’, ‘it 
was considered perfectly legitimate to shell a tribal village without warning’.20  He 
added that ‘No column commander would ever hesitate to shell a village from which 
an enemy was opposing his advance’.21  In his report on the 1936 First Khaisora 
Campaign, he had complained: 
a land force may advance on a village, shell it and fire into it with machine 
guns, and subsequently burn it to the ground, while the co-operating aircraft 
are not allowed to touch it.22  
He later recalled how, on one occasion in Waziristan when he had refused a request 
to bomb a village from which heavy fire was holding up a group advance, the Army 
Commander responded ‘Oh come on, that will be all right, we’ll say we shelled it!’.23  
Slessor summed up the in-theatre airman’s perspective thus:  
the action of the R.A.F. was ‘cribbed, cabin’d and confined’ by all sorts of 
ludicrously out-of-date instructions on the height we should fly, when, how and 
against what we might use our weapons.24 
 
                                                
18 AIR 23/688, Acting AOC India Air Commodore Richard Peck, Note of Conversation with 
Group Captain Bottomley and General Staff(India), 29 June 1937.  The same papers are also 
present in AIR 23/687. 
19 Masters, Bugles and a Tiger, 209. 
20 Slessor, The Central Blue, 132, 166. 
21 Ibid., 132. 
22 ———, Ops in Waziristan. 24 November 1936 to 15 January 1937, 9. 
23 ———, The Central Blue, 66.  Bottomley recalled a similar story in his 1939 RUSI lecture: ‘If, 
for example, the tribesmen resisting our troops are firing from a village, the artillery can shell 
them, but the airmen cannot bomb them’.  See Bottomley, "The Work of the RAF on the NWF": 
772. 
24 Slessor, The Central Blue, 121. 
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ARMY VS RAF DECISION-MAKING SPEED 
In his 1928 RUSI lecture, “Aircraft in Small Wars”, Wing Commander Peck inferred 
that RAF(India) was constrained by long delays in gaining authorisation up three 
successive levels of distant authority, by which time unrest had spread, squandering 
air power’s rapidity of action.  While these timescales nested comfortably with land 
expeditions, Peck appealed that, once action was authorised, ‘leave the airman, in 
conjunction with the political authorities, to carry it out in the way he understands and 
without continual reference to remote hierarchs’.  According to Peck, the Army’s lack 
of air mindedness meant that the ‘new weapon’ was merely ‘made to subserve[sic] 
existing tactics’.25  Both the Air Ministry and AOC(India) believed that the Army 
deliberately procrastinated to allow time for troops to be deployed, thereby denying 
the RAF any independent glory.26  This allowed the Army to contend that successful 
air actions were really due to the presence of troops, rather than aircraft.27  
C-in-C(India) provided a further insight into Army sensitivities in 1931 when, in 
response to calls from both the Tribal Control and Defence Committee and 
AOC(India) for direct political control of Frontier air operations, he declared that this 
would be ‘prejudicial to my position as supreme commander’.28  Interestingly, while 
offensive air action had to be approved by the GoI, the Army could invoke Section 21 
of the Frontier Crimes Regulations to instigate action without reference to higher 
authority, something which the Air Staff recognised could ‘play into the hands of the 
                                                
25 Peck, "Aircraft in Small Wars": 537-358.  At this point, Peck was in the Air Staff’s Directorate 
of Operations and Intelligence. 
26 As described, for example, in Chapter 6’s consideration of the 1935 Mohmand Operation.  
AOC(India) informed CAS in 1935 that ‘last year orders were issued that whenever air 
operations were to take place troops were immediately to be pushed forward into the area ! 
This policy ensures that the air operations do not succeed, or if they do, that the presence of 
the Army was necessary to that success’ (see Ludlow-Hewitt, AOC(India) to CAS, 20 
September 1935). 
27 ———, Letter: Air Officer Commanding, RAF India, to Sir Edward L Ellington, Chief of the Air 
Staff, 1. 
28 Chetwode, C-in-C(India) to Secretary, GoI, 1 July 1931, 296. 
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soldiers’.29 
Despite Air Ministry attempts to bring RAF(India) under political direct control, air 
power’s swiftness did not always nest comfortably with that of political decision-
making.  The Air Ministry’s favoured tactic, the coercive air blockade, relied on the 
early declaration of terms for tribal compliance.  However, the IPS had become 
accustomed to having time to deliberate terms while a punitive column advanced, 
keeping political options open.  Some Politicals disliked dictating terms in advance 
because of the concomitant commitment and potential loss of prestige if they were not 
achieved.  In contrast, air proscription, which lacked terms, could be halted at any time 
and so was often the Politicals’ preferred option.30  Furthermore, AOC(India) had no 
official channels of communication with the GoI’s Foreign Secretary and had to wait 
for a committee to be appointed to discuss Frontier issues.31 
INTER-SERVICE HIERARCHY, TRUST AND RESENTMENT 
RAF(India)’s subordination under C-in-C(India) rankled the Air Staff.  The Air 
Ministry’s overwhelming priority was to demonstrate an independent capability (rather 
than acting as a mere adjunct to the Army and Navy), thereby justifying the RAF’s 
continued existence as an independent Service.  Conversely, the Indian Armies 
viewed air power as an auxiliary to support their traditional operations.  CGS(India), 
for example, told AOC(India) in 1937 that ‘all operations on the Frontier are combined 
operations and that the Army as predominant partner must always be in control’, an 
attitude which compromised the improving in-theatre inter-Service relations since 
                                                
29 AIR 5/1326, Wing Commander L Darvall, Memo, FO5 to Deputy Chief of the Air Staff 
through Deputy Director Plans, 26 January 1939. 
30 See Chatfield, Expert Committee Report, 16.  This is discussed in Chapter 6. 
31 AIR 23/5388, Air Commodore Richard H Peck, Letter, Senior Air Staff Officer, India, to Air 
Marshal C L Courtney, 12 December 1938. 
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1935.32  Similarly, CAS in 1938 wrote that the GS(India): 
view Bomber Aircraft as artillery only and consider that they cannot really 
undertake any truly independent tasks on the Frontier.  This I am afraid is 
typical of the narrow point of view of the Indian Army soldier who is incapable 
of seeing further than the nearest picquet position.33 
Under the in-theatre hegemony, the RAF often felt disempowered and misemployed 
by Army commanders who did not understand air power.  Slessor later reflected of his 
1921 Indian flight commander tour that 20 Squadron was ‘hampered by absurd 
restrictions based... largely on ignorance and prejudice, not untinged by jealousy’.34  
The emotive aspect of the debate was illustrated by Harris in a hand-written minute 
about the pecking-order of the 1921 Indian Jubilee parade: 
I once had to march my Sqdn past the D. of Wales behind a whole division, 
even the pack mule transport Coys being given precedence, & making the going 
somewhat heavy for us.35 
Harris’ biographer added that he was:  
...incensed by the appalling conditions, lack of spares and unserviceability of 
aircraft...  It made me realise what happens when air forces, or any other forces 
equipped with new weapons... are put under the control of another and older 
service and subordinated to archaic methods and weapons.36 
This angst was not just about perceived prestige, but also the lack of control of 
strategy, tactics and financing of RAF(India).  Trenchard had initially agreed to the 
                                                
32 Joubert de la Ferte, AOC(India) to SASO(India), 16 June 1938.  Trench recorded  another, 
tactical, example whereby an outspoken Frontier Officer attending a high-level operations 
conference by a ‘very senior’ officer on air control responded with: ‘Listen, chum, your job is to 
drive the f_____g aeroplane’ (see Trench, Viceroy's Agent, 77).  The previously improving in-
theatre accord is described in Chapter 6. 
33 Newall, CAS to Courtney, 10 December 1938, 3. 
34 Slessor, The Central Blue, 36. 
35 AIR 2/1294, Minute 6, Wing Commander A T Harris, Minute, Deputy Director Ops to Deputy 
Director Plans, 26 November 1935.  According to Probert, Harris was so disillusioned by his 
time in India (having been verbally abused by a General who accused the RAF of wanting to 
live in the lap of luxury and always having to cover up their delicate aircraft) that he submitted 
his resignation, intending to return to Rhodesia.  As OC 31 Squadron, Harris worked with 
Salmond to produce his 1922 Indian report, during which Salmond persuaded him to withdraw 
his resignation and join him in Iraq, where Salmond was about to become AOC.  See Probert, 
Bomber Harris: His Life and Times, 49-50. 
36 Saward, 'Bomber' Harris, 30. 
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1920 Esher Committee’s recommendation that RAF(India) should fall under C-in-
C(India)’s control; by 1921 his opinion had changed:  
I now consider that far from the Air Force having any chance of increasing under 
Army control in India (it has already decreased by two squadrons) it is already 
unduly low compared with the Army in India, and, in my opinion, it is not taking 
and will not take its proper share of the defence of the country as long as it is 
under the present system.37 
As a result, in August 1921, SoS(Air) wrote to SoS(India) requesting that: firstly, 
AOC(India) ‘should be given the status of a Secretary to Government, which carries 
with it the statutory right of direct access to the Viceroy’; secondly that the Air 
Staff(India) Financial Advisor should be given direct access to the GoI’s Financial 
Advisor; and, lastly, suggesting ‘the institution of an R.A.F. Budget distinct from the 
Military Budget, comprising all R.A.F. expenditure in India’.38  The IO’s internal 
correspondence reveals that its military staff were very much against these requests.39  
However, SoS(India) took the middle ground and procrastinated in October: 'This 
obviously raises an important question into which I should like with your permission to 
go into a little more closely’.40  There was also a concurrent Air Ministry/IO dispute 
over responsibility for air advice to HMG and the GoI.  The Air Council believed they 
were responsible for advising HMG ‘on all questions of Imperial air defence and other 
air matters' and requested that the IO forward all general political intelligence to 
                                                
37 IOR/L/MIL/7/19272, Air Marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard, Memo to Secretary of State for Air, 6 
December 1921.  The Esher Report is at: CAB 6/4, Lord Esher, Report of the Army in India 
Committee, 1919-1920 - Part I (CID 115-D), 2 November 1919. 
38 IOR/L/MIL/7/19272, Captain Frederick E Guest, Memorandum from Secretary of State for Air 
to Secretary of State for India, 15 August 1921. 
39 Colonel Moens (General Staff Officer, IO) highlighted that the Esher recommendations had 
been rejected by the IO, although his superior commented that ‘Possibly a time may come 
when the Air Force in India sd [sic] be separated. But at present it is in its infancy, as regards 
both dimensions & experience' (see IOR/L/MIL/7/19272, Colonel A M Moens, Memo from 
General Staff Officer, India Office, concerning Secretary of State for Air's letter dated 15 
August 1921, 17 August 1921).  
40 IOR/L/MIL/7/19272, Rt Hon Edwin S Montagu, Letter from Secretary of State for India to 
Secretary of State for Air, 7 October 1921. 
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them.41  While the IO conceded to passing-on intelligence (but only after significant 
internal discussion, and for fear of appearing petty), they caveated that 'the Air 
Ministry must not regard itself as having any strategical function, but merely as an 
agency for supplying men and machines' to India.42  With little agreement in sight, 
Trenchard convinced SoS(Air) to appeal to the CIMR in December 1921.  Guest 
wrote: 
The present system in India has been given a fair trial and the difficulties appear 
to be increasing.  These modest proposals represent an attempt to obtain for the 
R.A.F. in India a status similar to that which the Government has accorded to it 
at home, without which a really high state of efficiency cannot be attained.43 
The IO disagreed.  An internal memo explained to SoS(India) that the RAF in India 
was in its infancy and was entirely subsidiary to the Army... 
and that this being so, larger questions of policy will rarely arise for decision, and 
that under ordinary circumstances this Office and the War Office are the 
departments primarily concerned.44 
The Viceroy was also ‘strongly opposed’ to AOC(India) having direct access to him, 
which would have been ‘entirely opposed to constitutional practice’.45  The CIMR’s 
1922 final report acknowledged that the ‘existing arrangements have not proven 
satisfactory’, but deferred a decision pending Salmond’s review.46 
These tensions influenced Salmond’s 1922 RAF(India) review, even before he 
left England.  According to his biographer, Salmond saw his mission not merely as an 
inquiry, but ‘a crusade to educate the Army about proper co-operation with the air 
                                                
41 IOR/L/MIL/7/19272, J A Webster, Letter from Assistant Secretary of the Air Ministry to Under 
Secretary of State (Military Department), India Office, 28 September 1921. 
42 IOR/L/MIL/7/19272, India Office Internal Memorandum to Secretary of State for India, 30 
November 1921. 
43 Guest, Status of the Royal Air Force in India. 
44 IOR/L/MIL/7/19272, J G Laithewaite, Memorandum from Political Department, India Office, 
to Secretary of State for India, 12 December 1921. 
45 The Viceroy also rejected the request for AOC(India)’s Financial Advisor having direct 
access to the Financial Advisor of the Council of India (see IOR/L/MIL/7/19272, Earl of 
Reading, Telegram from Viceroy of India to Secretary of State for India, 29 December 1921). 
46 CAB 6/4, Committee of Imperial Defence, Report of the Sub-Committee on Indian Military 
Requirements (CID 125-D), June 1922, 10. 
Chapter 7 – Control and Constraints 
308 
service and the intelligent use of its capabilities’.47  Salmond’s key issues were the  
need for an independent RAF(India) budget and AOC(India)’s lack of access to the 
Viceroy.  His report resulted in a volte-face by the Viceroy, who granted the 
AOC(India) direct access to him ‘for the purpose of consultation on important air force 
questions’;48 AOC(India) could access the Viceroy if C-in-C(India) vetoed an air 
submission, although the Cabinet later commented that ‘this system was likely to lead 
to friction’.49 
The Air Staff were also frustrated by their inability to officially communicate with 
RAF(India) due to their subordination to C-in-C(India).50  Even by 1930, 
correspondence was limited to intelligence, training and preparation for war, with the 
IO copied-in; direct correspondence concerning RAF(India) policy, organisation and 
administration was specifically prohibited. 51  This caused SoS(Air) to complain that 
the Air Staff were suffering delays in: 
... the rendering of adequate and authoritative reports from the Air authorities in 
India in regard to the onerous and instructive operations in which the Air 
squadrons in India have been and still are engaged...The bare and statistical 
return of hours flown show only how heavily they have been engaged; but of 
operational information we at present get nothing authoritative other than the 
occasional references in the Government of India’s telegrams.52 
Instead, the Air Ministry had to rely on nothing more detailed than ex post facto 
dispatches, where published, supported by GoI telegrams and intelligence summaries 
to glean an understanding of the effectiveness of air power and identify any 
                                                
47 Laffin, Swifter than Eagles, 153. 
48 Reading, Viceroy  to IO, 30 September 1922. 
49 CC 34 (39) 3, 11-12.  See also Tottenham, Letter, Secretary of GoI, 8 March 1937. 
50 See, for example, Secretary of State for Air, CP 4179: Shortage of Equipment of the RAF in 
India, described in Chapter 6. 
51 AIR 8/46 E15, Earl Russell, Letter, Under-Secretary of State for India to Lord Thomson, 
Secretary of State for Air, 17 September 1930.  This policy was promulgated through Air 
Ministry memoranda, namely: AIR 8/110, Sir Walter F Nicholson, Air Ministry Office 
Memorandum 389: Royal Air Force in India - Correspondence, 3 January 1928.  The WO was 
subjected to the same technical limitations.  The constitutional position of the forces in India is 
described in: Memo the Constitutional Position of the Defence Forces in India. 
52 AIR 8/110, Lord Thomson, Letter, Secretary of State for Air to Lord Russell,  Under-
Secretary of State for India, 4 September 1930. 
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concomitant lessons.  Full operational accounts, the planning appreciations and 
associated comments were specifically barred.53  Nonetheless, various AOC(India)s 
did occasionally send sensitive correspondence to CAS, marked as ‘strictly private, 
confidential and personal’, with a warning not to be quoted.54 
Despite Salmond’s 1922 review, AOC(India) was often marginalised.  A 1928 Air 
Staff Cabinet note reiterated the need for AOC(India) to be used as the subject matter 
expert on air matters: 
The air arm is a delicate weapon which is easily blunted if misused, either by 
wielding it too early or too late, and especially too much.  How, where, when and 
in what degree it is to be employed are questions upon which the Air Officer 
Commanding on the spot, and he alone, can give authoritative advice with the 
advice of the local political officer...55 
The situation had not improved by 1937.  In his parting letter to C-in-C(India) at the 
end of his tour as AOC(India), Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt, (a great supporter of joint 
operations) protested that: rather than invoking collective responsibility by blockading 
a whole tribal area, the political authorities were targeting isolated villages; proscribed 
areas were so small that lashkars could cross them before aircraft could react; and 
finally, that bombing was being misemployed as an easy means of reprisal, 
compromising its reputation.56  A year later, an internal RAF note highlighted that 
senior Army commanders continued to use aircraft inappropriately on the Frontier 
while excluding RAF commanders from the operational planning.57  CGS(India) 
admitted to CAS that ‘mistakes, amounting to misuse even’ had probably occurred, 
but the Army was addressing this.58 
                                                
53 AIR 8/110, ———, Letter, Secretary of State for Air to Secretary of State for India, 18 August 
1930. 
54 See various documents in AIR 8/1199. 
55 Air Staff, Notes by the Air Staff on the Regulation of Air Control in Undeveloped Countries, 1. 
56 AIR 5/1323, Air Marshal Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt, Letter to Commander-in-Chief, India, 19 
April 1937. 
57 AIR 23/688, Notes on Mistakes Concerning the Employment of Air Forces in 1938. 
58 AIR 8/529, General Sir Ivo Vesey, Letter, Chief of the General Staff (India) to Chief of the Air 
Staff, 6 July 1938, 2. 
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The RAF’s Imperial role generated friction in the 1930s with the threat of a world 
war looming.  C-in-C(India) viewed RAF(India)’s role solely in terms of the NWF, 
which required relatively simple ‘colonial’ technology, noting in 1934 that ‘the present 
machines are... amply good enough for their task in the tribal areas’ and that they 
should only be replaced ‘when it becomes uneconomical to keep older patterns, and 
not merely because the new ones are better’.59  Critically, however, the Air Ministry 
saw RAF(India) as an integral element of the RAF’s wider commitments, objecting to 
‘a situation in which the organisation, equipment and training... is obsolete and 
ineffective as compared with the rest of the air force’.60  Indeed, in 1927, following 
Trenchard’s evidence to the CID’s Defence of India Sub-Committee concerning the 
Afghan war plan, SoS(India) had commented that it was ‘most regrettable that the 
Royal Air Force in India should be equipped with machines which were quite 
inadequate for operations in the theatre of their probable employment’.61   The GoI 
finally recognised the need for modern aircraft in 1938 when faced with an Eastern air 
threat.62 
Much of the friction between the Air Ministry and C-in-C(India) can be attributed 
to mutual mistrust, combined with both organisations’ protectionist approach to their 
force structures.  Prior to Salmond’s damning 1922 Report on RAF India, the Air 
Ministry believed that the GoI had tried to cover up the poor state of the RAF in India 
by restricting AOC(India) from communicating with them.63  The Report undermined 
                                                
59 AIR 23/687, Field Marshal Sir Philip Chetwode, Conference Transcript, 27 November 1934, 
2. 
60 Air Staff, Present Problems of Indian Defence, 4. 
61 CAB 16/83, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir M P A Hankey, Committee of Imperial Defence: Defence 
of India: Minutes of the Third Meeting (DI/3rd Meeting), 26 April 1927, 10. 
62 Ogilvie, Secretary, GoI, to Secretary, Military Department, IO, 12-14.  The change of 
perceived threat from the West to the East as the Second World War approached is discussed 
at the end of Chapter 6. 
63 Salmond, 1922 Report on RAF India; Secretary of State for Air, CP 4179: Shortage of 
Equipment of the RAF in India.  SoS(Air) emphasised that ‘the only source of information open 
to [the Air Staff] were unofficial reports from officers returned from India and private 
correspondence’ (emphasis in original) (see ———, CP 4179: Shortage of Equipment of the 
RAF in India).  This is examined in Chapter 6. 
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the Air Ministry’s confidence in GS(India)’s understanding of air power and their 
willingness to prioritise funding appropriately.64  Indeed, in 1936, AOC(India) appealed 
for help in a series of letters to CAS because the IO ‘seem to be very ill-informed 
about methods of air control’, considering air blockades to be ‘indiscriminate bombing’ 
and that the Army’s general conviction was that ‘the only thing the air force[sic] could 
do was to bomb villages full of women and children’.65  Indeed, the Army’s air-
mindedness was so poor that AOC(India) wrote to CGS(India) in 1937 complaining 
that Army commanders had described ‘air blockades’ in the Khaisora Valley as having 
failed, whereas no blockade had been imposed.  He continued: 
Perhaps one of the most potent causes of resentment in the Air Force is that 
aircraft have so often been used in a manner not recommended by Air Force 
officers and that then the Force has been represented, quite untruly, as having 
failed in its aim so that the Army must go in to put matters right.66 
The Air Ministry’s mistrust of the IO was illustrated in 1931 by an internal paper 
circulated by Peck highlighting examples of unfair and biased treatment by the IO 
since 1923.  These included: biased responses to Parliamentary Questions; 
procrastination over the establishment of an Indian bomber-transport squadron; their 
refusal to publish despatches highlighting RAF operations; and their failure to include 
                                                
64 In 1938, the Air Staff estimated RAF(India)’s share of the Indian defence budget to be 4%, a 
sum which was ‘totally unsuited to meet the requirements even of India’s local defence’ (see 
Air Staff, Present Problems of Indian Defence, 2-3).  However, the COSC used a figure of 7% 
(see COSC: Minutes, 21 June 1938, 5, 8-9). 
65 AIR 23/688, India Air Staff, Letter to CAS, 23 March 1936; Ludlow-Hewitt, Letter, AOC India 
to CAS, 5 March 1937, 2.  The Army’s dogma was not limited to India.  Brigadier Dobbie, when 
giving evidence before the Palestine Commission of Enquiry, stated that ‘Aeroplanes are really 
a bluff.  The only thing they can do is to drop bombs or to shoot with their machine guns, and 
their action is extremely indiscriminate’, to which the Air Staff responded ‘Clearly, officers 
whose knowledge of the employment of the air arm is so limited, erroneous and prejudiced as 
this, are quite unable to understand how to employ it correctly and, as our experience there 
and elsewhere amply proves, are most reluctant to learn or to give it a chance’ (see Air Staff, 
Instances of Misemployment of Air Forces in India by General Officers Commanding, 5). 
66 AIR 23/688, Air Marshal Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt, Letter: AOC India to General Sir William 
Bartholomew, CGS India, 19 April 1937, 1, 3. 
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the Air Ministry’s expertise in decision-making.67  On being informed that their 
operational summaries were ‘worded... to minimise the success of the Royal Air 
Force’, the IO responded that:68 
Our sole concern is to make sure that India gets the best service in the cheapest 
and most efficient way.  If it were proven to our satisfaction that in future the 
R.A.F. ought to be the dominating factor in Indian defence, we should cheerfully 
consign the Army to a new and subordinate role.  But we are not going to pull 
the present organisation to pieces until we know for certain that we can put 
something better in its place.69 
Conversely, the Army mistrusted the RAF’s intentions following Trenchard’s 1929 
swansong, fearing the substitution of regular Army Frontier units by squadrons (with 
concomitant repercussions for Army force structure and political standing), retorting 
that air power had ‘never yet been tested out in anything but the most minor trouble’.70  
On arrival as AOC(India) in 1935, Ludlow-Hewitt recognised these issues, noting to 
CAS that the increasingly ‘liberal attitude’ by the Army was ‘of course, largely due to 
reassurance on the question of substitution’.71  The IO’s perspective was summarised 
in an internal 1938 minute following an Air Ministry complaint that AOC(India) was 
being denied control of air operations, resulting in the misemployment of air power:72      
This is a troublesome and unfortunate letter from the Air Ministry in which they 
have scraped together various grievances - whether relevant or irrelevant, real 
or imaginary - which they have been nursing for some time past...  ... the Air 
Staff are extremely anxious to prove that Air Blockade is the panacea for tribal 
troubles and they want to see it carried out by an Air Commander independently 
of the local military command.  In addition to the perhaps not unnatural desire to 
                                                
67 AIR 8/46, E22, Wing Commander R H Peck, Memo to Secretary, Air Ministry, 8 July 1931.  
See also AIR 23/687.  For more detail about the Army’s procrastination over the formation of a 
BT squadron, see: Air Staff, Proposal to Form a Bomber Transport Squadron. 
68 AIR 8/46, E22, Air Ministry, Letter to Military Secretary, India Office (General Sir Alexander 
Cobbe, VC), 24 June 1931. 
69 AIR 8/46, E22, S F Stewart, Letter to Secretary, Air Ministry, 4 July 1931. 
70 Trenchard, CP 332 (29); Chetwode, C-in-C(India) to Secretary, GoI, 1 July 1931, 296. 
71 Ludlow-Hewitt, Letter: Air Officer Commanding, RAF India, to Sir Edward L Ellington, Chief 
of the Air Staff.  In the same letter, Ludlow-Hewitt stated that he thought and hoped that 
substitution was dead, but that although he was not an advocate of air action at any cost, ‘All 
we want out here is that the use of the Air Force should be given fair and unprejudiced 
consideration.  At present, any proposal for the use of air action is liable to be met on all sides 
by bias and prejudice’. 
72 Specifically, the Air Ministry cited that punitive action and proscription were being 
misemployed in place of the imposition of air blockades. 
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have 'a show of their own' to run, they take the view that an essentially air 
operation is liable to be mishandled by the soldiers and that in consequence this 
form of operation may not be given a fair chance of proving its worth...73 
These sentiments were widely held.  According to Orange, the Army Staff College 
Commandant stopped Slessor from including air control in the Camberley syllabus 
during his 1931-34 tenure as DS, although this could have been due to conservatism 
or structural problems with changing the course, rather than bias.74  Indeed, 
independent air action was briefly mentioned during the 1933 Mountain Warfare 
module and, by 1937, Slessor’s replacement was: presenting an air control lecture to 
the Senior Course;75 analysing the merits of land and air operations in mountain 
warfare; discussing bomber-transports and supply dropping; and inviting RAF officers 
to act as the Air Staff(India) in their Mountain Warfare exercise.76  This reflects the 
improving Army-RAF relations described in Chapter 6.  Furthermore, RAF students 
attending Camberley sometimes chose air control as the subject of their individual 
presentations.77 
                                                
73 IOR/L/PS/12/3205, Major-General Sir Sydney Muspratt, Minute: Military Secretary, India 
Office, to Political Secretary, India Office, 21 June 1938.  For the RAF perspective, see AIR 
23/688, E72, Acting AOC India Air Commodore Richard Peck, Letter to Air Marshal Sir Philip 
Joubert de la Ferte, AOC India, 21 June 1938. 
74 Orange, Slessor: Bomber Champion.  The Life of Marshal of the RAF Sir John Slessor, GCB, 
DSO, MC, 35.  The Senior Course’s air lectures, all given by Slessor, were: (i) Air Action in 
relation to Strategy and Major Tactics; (ii) Co-operation between Artillery and Air Force within 
the Corps; and (iii) The Strategical Mobility of Air Forces. 
75 Camberley Army Staff College, "Mountain Warfare III: Employment of All Arms on the NWF", 
Senior Division Directing Staff Lecture Notes  (1933): 3; Army Staff College, Camberley, "Air 
Control", Senior Division Directing Staff Lecture Notes Vol I (1937). 
76 Camberley Army Staff College, "Mountain Warfare Exercise", Senior Division Directing Staff 
Lecture Notes  (1937): 8; ———, "Role of Bomber Transport Aircraft", Senior Division Directing 
Staff Lecture Notes Vol I (1937);  ———, "Notes on Supply Dropping by Parachute", Senior 
Division Directing Staff Lecture Notes Vol I (1937). 
77 For example, Wing Commander A T Harris chose ‘Air Control in Iraq, and Elsewhere’ as the 
subject of his 1929 student presentation.  See Harris, "Air Control in Iraq, and Elsewhere".  
Unfortunately, the Course material for all years apart from 1923, 1929, 1933, 1935, 1937 and 
1938 was destroyed in 1940, precluding a complete survey. 
Chapter 7 – Control and Constraints 
314 
ARMY RELUCTANCE TO PUBLICISE RAF EXPLOITS 
Inter-Service trust was damaged by the perceived reticence of the Army and IO to 
publicise RAF(India)’s exploits.  AOC(India) informed CAS in 1937 that ‘it is difficult to 
realise the extraordinary lack of recognition which has hitherto been extended by the 
Army to the Royal Air Force in respect to its use on the Frontier’.78  One specific 
example was the report of the 1936 Mohmand operation.  The IO’s Military Secretary 
informed DCAS in 1936 that ‘in view of the keen interest taken, in political and public 
circles, regarding air action against tribesmen... the Secretary of State for India thinks 
it better not to publish’ the Mohmand Report.  CAS responded that the use of aircraft 
was humane and that 'It seems to me most important that there should be no 
divergence of view on this matter, particularly at the present time, and I think a small 
interdepartmental committee certainly ought to be convened'.79  The Air Staff was 
concerned that the Indian Armies did not understand that the air blockade tactic was a 
coercive, rather than punitive, technique.  The subsequent ad hoc committee appears 
to have only sat once, in September 1936, and was effectively just a ‘round-table’ 
meeting.80  At the meeting, the IO agreed to write to “India” explaining the air blockade 
methodology.81  There was, however, no assurance that the Mohmand report would 
be published.82  The IO and Air Ministry jointly drafted a letter to C-in-C(India) 
explaining air blockade methodology which, after some inter-Ministry ping-ponging, 
                                                
78 Ludlow-Hewitt, Letter, AOC India to CAS, 5 March 1937, 1. 
79 IOR/L/PS/12/3187, E358, Lieutenant General Sir John Coleridge, Letter, Military Secretary 
to the India Office to Air Vice-Marshal C L Courtney, Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, 9 April 1936. 
80 The attendees were Sir Leonard Wakely (Deputy Under Secretary of State for India), Major 
General Wilson (Military Secretary to the IO), Mr J C Walton (Secretary of the Political 
Department of the IO) and, from the Air Ministry, AVM Courtney (DCAS), Wg Cdr GC Pirie and 
Squadron Leader Darvall (from the Directorate of Operations and Intelligence).  See also 
Chapter 5. 
81 Notes of a Meeting at the India Office, 25 September 1936. 
82 Indeed, the only public reference to this operation by the RAF was the announcement of the 
issue of the India General Service Medal with clasp "North-West Frontier, 1935" ‘to the forces 
which were employed in the Loe Agra operations, on the North-West Frontier of India, between 
23rd February and 13th April, 1935’.82  See "Army Notes - India", JRUSI LXXXI, no. 522  
(1936): 446. 
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read:83 
Provided that the methods and safeguards... are carefully observed the 
Secretary of State [for India] sees no reason why air blockade should be more 
open to criticism on humanitarian grounds than any other form of applied military 
pressure against villages or a territory of a recalcitrant tribe.  It would appear to 
be an effective and humane method of applying such pressure and he is 
accordingly prepared to support the Government of India if occasion arises for 
its use.84 
Nonetheless, criticism concerning ‘frightfulness’ continued sporadically, an example 
being an Opposition Parliamentary Question in June 1938, for which Slessor, then 
Deputy Director of Plans, prepared notes for the Prime Minister’s response.85  
Slessor’s continuing participation emphasises the importance and continuity of 
specific personalities. 
PERSONALITIES AND RELATIONSHIPS 
Personality had a significant role in inter-Service relationships.  In 1931, the IO 
forwarded the Air Ministry’s criticism of the GoI’s latest Instructions Regarding the 
Control of Operations directly to the GoI without comment.86  C-in-C(India), Sir Philip 
Chetwode, went personally to the Viceroy’s residence on a Sunday, ‘very much 
annoyed’, complaining that the Air Staff had not only gone ‘over the head of the 
Commander-in-Chief’ but also queried his competence directly with the GoI.  The 
Viceroy wrote to SoS(Air) explaining that only the CID could advise the GoI;87 a 
                                                
83 IOR/L/PS/12/3187, E277, Air Council, Letter to Under Secretary-of-State, Political 
Department, India Office, 30 November 1936. 
84 IOR/L/PS/12/3187 E274, J C Walton, Letter to Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, 
24 December 1936, with the IO’s amendments in italics. 
85 Slessor, Notes on Police Bombing dated 18 June 1938.  The Question was posed on 16 
June and answered on 21 June 1938. 
86 IOR/L/PS/12/3260, J S Ross, Letter, Principal Assistant Secretary to the Air Ministry to 
Under Secretary of State, India Office, 24 October 1931. 
87 IOR/L/PS/12/3260, Earl of Willingdon, Letter from Viceroy India to Secretary of State for Air, 
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then wrote personally to the Permanent Under Secretary of State for India complaining that 
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See IOR/L/PS/12/3260, Field Marshal Sir Philip Chetwode, Letter, Commander-in-Chief, India, 
to Sir Findlater Stewart, Permanent Under Secretary of State for India, 14 March 1932. 
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statement that even the IO thought went ‘too far’.  Indeed, the IO recognised that 
Chetwode had expressed ‘his entire disagreement with the A.O.C’s, views’, indicating 
that his relationship with Sir John Steel was not constructive.88  In contrast, following 
Ludlow-Hewitt’s arrival as AOC(India) in 1935, in-theatre Service relationships 
improved markedly.  His successor described the situation thus:  
There has been since my arrival out here, and flowing directly from the policy of 
appeasement initiated by Ludlow-Hewitt, a very real improvement in the 
relations between the General Staff and the Air Staff and, consequently, a 
greater readiness to listen to Air advice.89 
Similarly, Slessor’s arrival as OC 3(Indian) Wing in March 1935, fresh from his DS tour 
at Army Staff College, heralded a new era as he laboured at ‘making a nuisance of 
myself to my superiors on the subject of air co-operation in frontier warfare’.90   
Trenchard’s personality was pivotal.  His 1929 swansong was, to quote his 
biographer, ‘explosive’, following on from previous calls for NWF substitution by 
Salmond in 1922 and Ellington in 1925.91  Salmond’s proposal had originally been 
rejected by C-in-C(India) because the principal was ‘pure conjecture’.  However, he 
had caveated that: 
If, as time goes on and the air policy in Iraq and Palestine prove really 
successful, and if our experience in Waziristan justifies in the future more 
confidence than we at present possess in air operations generally, I shall be 
prepared to reconsider my attitude towards this question.92   
The swansong started life as an internal future policy paper within the Air Staff, but 
                                                
88 IOR/L/PS/12/3260, Political Department Secretary, India Office, Letter to General Muspratt, 
Military Secretary, India Office, 23 December 1931. 
89 AIR 23/5388, Air Marshal Sir Philip Joubert de la Ferte, Air Officer Commanding, India, to Air 
Vice-Marshal C L Courtney, 12 December 1938. 
90 Slessor, The Central Blue, 124.  Slessor worked closely with some familiar characters, such 
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Chapter 6. 
92 Trenchard, CP 332 (29), 5.   
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Trenchard suddenly decided to publish it as a Cabinet Paper.93  As Slessor later 
recalled: 
the Air Staff felt that the time of trial and experiment was past and we should 
now cash in on our experience and give air-power the responsibilities which it 
had proven itself capable of fulfilling.94 
However, both Peck and Slessor were apprehensive about this approach, preferring 
to leave it as a policy statement for Trenchard’s successor, Jack Salmond.95  
According to Hyde, Salmond did not agree with all the elements of Trenchard’s 
Cabinet Paper.96  Although both the 1921 Geddes Committee and 1925 Colwyn 
Committee had recommended the extension of aerial substitution on economic 
grounds, Slessor later reflected that:97 
Looking back on it, I have long thought that [Trenchard] made a tactical error...  
There was not the remotest prospect of the policy being accepted by the 
Government of the day...  I feel sure it delayed rather than accelerated the wider 
use of air-power in Imperial Defence.98 
This is a critical observation.  Pushing too hard for change at the wrong time was 
ultimately counterproductive.  As illustrated in Chapter 6, India relied most heavily on 
air power when its Army was over committed, be that during the FWW or containing 
the FoI, and it would have been at these moments of need that ‘India’ would have 
been most receptive to aircraft taking on additional responsibilities.  In contrast, 
Trenchard’s timing was driven by the looming closure of his tenure as CAS, rather 
than strategically opportune circumstances.  It was left to the Air Staff(India) to 
manage the challenge of air power’s potential, ‘India’’s requirements and the 
concomitant opportunities.  The analysis below will show that the backlash from 
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94 Ibid., 70. 
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96 Ibid., 235. 
97 See Ibid., 242 and Slessor, The Central Blue, 70. 
98 Slessor, The Central Blue, 73-74. 
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Trenchard’s swansong probably closed off several potential opportunities and 
retarded the progress of both Indian air power and the doctrine that supported it. 
The normative practice for raising inter-Service ‘political’ issues was via the CID 
or its sub-committee, the COSC.  Trenchard, however, considered the COSC to be 
ineffective and thought it avoided issues of ‘vital differences of opinion’, accusing the 
COSC Secretary, Sir Maurice Hankey, of ‘championing “the inevitability of 
gradualism”’.99  Instead, his swansong was published as a Cabinet Paper with a 
seven-page supplementary memorandum on India, proposing that a committee be set 
up to examine his preliminary proposals.100  The Paper was only circulated to the 
other Service Chiefs a day or so beforehand at Hankey’s urgent request.101  Hoare, 
Trenchard’s SoS(Air), later explained that ‘If he could not have something done in one 
way, he would try improvisation in some other way, even though it was unorthodox’.102 
Hankey’s criticism of Trenchard’s swansong was two-fold: method and timing.  
Firstly, he objected to the circumvention of the COSC and the recommendation of 
setting up an independent committee.  Secondly, he accused Trenchard of having 
‘assembled in this one paper all the most controversial questions’ and ‘launched them 
at the moment of your departure when you could no longer promote or forward them’, 
causing ‘a great deal of irritation’ with the other Service Chiefs.103  Indeed, Hankey 
later told Trenchard that ‘It took me two or three years to get over the damage you did 
to the C.O.S Committee by your Swan Song’.104  However, Hoare’s autobiography 
revealed another perspective: 
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Hugh Trenchard, Draft letter to Colonel Sir Maurice Hankey, 21 February 1936. 
100 The Indian supplement was to be elaborated on ‘in due course’.  See Trenchard, CP 332 
(29), 11. 
101 Trenchard Papers, RAF Museum, MFC 78/23/1, Colonel Sir Maurice Hankey, Personal 
letter to Viscount Trenchard, 26 February 1936, 3. 
102 Templewood, Empire of the Air, 264. 
103 Hankey, Letter to Trenchard, 26 February 1936, 3.  See also Boyle, Trenchard, 579 and 
Hyde, British Air Policy Between the Wars, 232.  
104 Hankey, Letter to Trenchard, December 35. 
Chapter 7 – Control and Constraints 
319 
Trenchard’s constant insistence on substitution made the Navy and Army regard 
him as unco-operative.  In point of fact, he was by nature inclined to co-
operation...  The conditions for co-operation, however... were first, the 
recognition of full equality of status for the Air Force, secondly, the admission of 
its special rôle in national defence, and thirdly, its substitution for the older 
services, wherever the change meant greater economy of efficiency.  If he had 
failed to take this line ..., he would not have represented the basic principle upon 
which alone a separate and independent Air Force could be justified.105 
The swansong left Salmond with the dilemma of either pursuing his predecessor’s 
eleventh-hour proposal under great inter-Service criticism, or dropping it and risking 
criticism from Trenchard’s staff.106  Trenchard might have been trying to force his 
successor’s hand, especially since Trenchard’s replacement was not selected until 
almost the last minute;107 Trenchard may have been trying to bring some certainty to 
an uncertain future, especially if he suspected that his successor was not in full accord 
with his swansong (as was the case with Salmond).108  As events transpired, 
Trenchard probably supported Salmond’s appointment, despite the two officers 
reportedly not being close friends.109  Indeed, Salmond’s biographer noted 
Trenchard’s occasional interference whilst in retirement.110  Nonetheless, the archives 
indicate that Salmond supported Trenchard’s ideas concerning the NWF and pursued 
various initiatives, including the setting up of an enquiry through the CID’s Defence of 
India Sub-Committee;111 this is perhaps not surprising given the views Salmond 
articulated in his 1922 Indian review and that his brother, Geoffrey, was AOC(India) 
from when he was appointed CAS until February 1931.112 
The machinations of the Defence of India Sub-Committee that was established 
to examine the extended use of air power following Trenchard’s swansong reveal 
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Chapter 7 – Control and Constraints 
320 
much about relations between the Services and between the IO and GoI.  The Sub-
Committee was set up on bequest of the Prime Minister in April 1930.113  SoS(Air) 
started the first meeting in June by emphasising that the Air Staff did not desire 
wholesale substitution on the NWF, but merely an investigation into where economies 
could be made without sacrificing efficiency or security.  He also quoted C-in-
C(India)’s rebuff of Salmond’s 1922 India Report that ‘if, as time goes by and the air 
policy in Iraq and Palestine prove really successful... I shall be prepared to reconsider 
my attitude’.  SoS(Air) added that a recent Commission had concluded that ‘Indian 
defence cannot, now or in any future which is within sight, be regarded as a matter of 
purely Indian concern’.  SoS(War) responded that he thought that ‘the Air Ministry 
were inclined to assume responsibilities which they could not adequately discharge’, 
although he wanted to avoid ‘an interminable, and probably unprofitable, controversy’.  
SoS(India) proposed that, as the constitutional position was that the defence of India 
was primarily a matter for the GoI, all the Enquiry’s documentation should be sent to 
the GoI for comment.  Importantly, he emphasised that the growing ‘Indianization’ of 
India’s Legislative Assembly had made India sensitive to anything that could be 
interpreted as dictation from London.  Similarly, he was wary of the NWF’s sensitive 
situation and that any hint of policy changes from London could have ‘unfortunate 
political reactions’.  CIGS reminded the Sub-Committee that the military advisor to HM 
Government on Indian defence was C-in-C(India), while CIGS could only act through 
the IO.114  SoS(Air) protested that any final decision would have to be made in 
                                                
113 CC 24 (30) 9.  The Sub-Committee was chaired by SoS(India), W Wedgewood Benn (who 
had been a RFC/RAF pilot in the FWW and would become a pilot again in the Second World 
War before becoming SoS(Air) in 1945-46), supported by SoS for Foreign Affairs, SoS(War), 
SOS(Air), First Sea Lord, CIGS, CAS (Sir John Salmond), the IO’s Military Secretary, and 
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Air Ministry correspondence for this Sub-Committee over the period 1929-31 is in AIR 8/110. 
114 CAB 16/87, Committee of Imperial Defence: Defence of India Sub-Committee (Enquiry into 
the Extended Use of Air Power), Minutes of the First Meeting (DI(AP) 1st Meeting), 26 June 
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London, a view supported by CAS (Jack Salmond) who observed that any Air Force 
opinions in India would be drowned out by the large number of very senior Army 
officers.  SoS(India) thought these Air Ministry’s fears were ‘perhaps somewhat 
exaggerated’ and decided that the Sub-Committee should only meet again once the 
GoI’s opinion had be received.  He did, however, concede to CAS’s request to send a 
senior RAF officer to India to present the Air Staff’s views.115  However, the Viceroy 
took ‘an unexpectedly strong view against this’, preferring that AOC(India) (CAS’s 
brother, Sir Geoffrey Salmond) alone should advise him, which the Air Council agreed 
to, caveating that AOC(India)’s views should be considered as the official view of the 
Air Staff and that the Air Staff should send Wing Commander Peck to advise him.116  
This concession resulted in an oblique response from the IO which reveals their 
sensitivity over the independence of India’s command chain: 
It will no doubt be recognised that the procedure is somewhat unusual, since in 
the ordinary course the views of the Air Council would be transmitted to the 
Government of India through the Secretary of State [for India], in order that he 
might take the opportunity to consider whether he wished to make any 
comments on them before communicating them for the observation of the 
Government of India.  In the present special case, however, he proposes to 
await the Government of India’s observations...117 
Reading between the lines, the IO were emphasising that AOC(India) reported to C-in-
C(India) and that the Air Staff had no right to discuss policy with him, but should 
instead communicate with the GoI (not AOC(India)) through the IO.  
                                                                                                                                           
from CIGS and the  IO (see AIR 8/110, Air Chief Marshal Sir John Salmond, Letter, Chief of 
the Air Staff to Under-Secretary of State for India, 12 August 1930). 
115 Committee of Imperial Defence: Defence of India Sub-Committee (Enquiry into the 
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Secretary of State for Air, 28 August 1930; CAB 16/87, M P A Hankey, Committee of Imperial 
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Department, India Office (DI(AP) 8), 18 June 1931. 
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CIGS responded to the Sub-Committee in June with what the Air Staff later 
described as ‘sweeping denunciations’ of the whole basis of air control, which CIGS 
accused of being a ‘popular illusion’ created by the Air Ministry which was ‘based on 
the fallacy that the correct employment of the air arm demands the existence of a 
separate service’.118  Indeed, nine of his eleven conclusions criticised air control in 
general.  His commentary revealed that the Army still had a hubric view of the RAF as 
an auxiliary arm to the Army, as the Air Staff:  
... fails to appreciate the fact that the aeroplane is, in the main, one of the 
weapons to be employed by the authorities responsible for the strategical and 
tactical direction of our defence forces.   
CIGS went on to examine the Air Ministry’s proposal to substitute the Army’s NWF 
covering troops with aircraft, leaving the political officers’ ACFs to police the tribes with 
the Air Force’s backing.  He highlighted that experience had demonstrated that the 
ACF’s reliability was dependent on the support of regular troops, and that the RAF 
would not provide ‘the necessary European counterpoise’.  It is apparent from his 
commentary that CIGS still viewed air power as a purely punitive tool, as he compared 
air control with the Close Border policy’s punitive columns, stating that ‘it is a little 
difficult to understand how the Air Staff propose to deal with the general situation, 
unless it is seriously advanced that the necessity for the occasional trans-frontier air 
demonstrations or bombing’.119 
Initially, the GS(India)’s primary argument against substitution was that it was 
illogical to ‘tie up our most mobile arm – the R.A.F. – in a role of local protection... a 
role in which it is an essential and invaluable accessory, but in which, as all 
experience has taught us, it can never play a solo part’, and instead recommended 
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‘utilizing the R.A.F. as a central mobile central reserve’.  They also cited ‘unity of 
command’ to counter calls for AOC(India) to report directly to the GoI, instead calling 
for ‘the re-welding of the two services’.120 
The Air Staff published a supporting memorandum to Trenchard’s swansong 
entitled ‘What Air Control means in War and Peace and what it has Achieved’.121  In 
his detailed response, CGS(India) concluded that: air control would only be effective in 
minor and localised disturbances; aircraft alone could not support the civil forces as 
effectively as the Army; air action was purely punitive and frequently inflicted 
casualties on women and children; the results of air operations were usually less 
enduring than land campaigns; the cost of air operations was ‘extraordinarily high’; 
and air control lacked the civilising, pacifying and economic advantages of the policy 
of the gradual extension of civil administration supported by land forces.122  
CGS(India) considered it a ‘fallacy’ that any commander would only use one arm 
when he had joint forces at his disposal, pointing out that the land operations quoted 
in the memorandum were historical ‘purely punitive’ examples of major expeditions 
from the Modified Close Border era, which were no longer relevant in the 
contemporary Modified Forward policy; air control was itself ‘purely punitive’ and ‘a 
reversion to the discredited “burn and scuttle” policy’.123   
In January 1931, the Air Staff submitted an unsolicited memorandum to the 
impending Tribal Control and Defence Committee, through AOC(India), focusing on 
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the elements of Trenchard’s swansong pertinent to the NWF.124  Although it only 
called for substitution of the Covering Troops, CAS was keen to examine further 
substitution of the Field Army and Internal Security forces, under pressure from the 
Finance Minister of the Council of India to generate further savings.125  The scheme 
caused ‘the most frightful row’ in India, partially because it was submitted to the 
Committee before it had been considered by the GS(India) due to a distribution 
error.126  In particular, C-in-C(India) was ‘indignant at the idea that any outside agency 
should have had the audacity to state in detail what reductions are possible’ because 
‘it was for him and him alone to decide’.127  C-in-C(India), CGS(India) and the Army 
Secretary unsuccessfully attempted to persuade the Viceroy to withdraw the paper.128  
Nevertheless, AOC(India) reassured them that substitution should be implemented 
gradually in confidence-building stages;129 Salmond reflected to the Committee that: 
... far too little account has been taken of the advent of Air Power, and too little 
use has been made of it, to save lives and money, of the new methods which 
aircraft have made possible.  The changes effected by aircraft are nothing less 
than revolutionary, yet the military defence organisation and methods remain 
substantially what they were before aircraft existed.130 
Interestingly, the Committee questioned whether Salmond was presenting the scheme 
as AOC(India) or a representative of the Air Ministry, which was one of the reasons 
                                                
124 Salmond made ‘a good many alterations’ to the Air Staff’s scheme, emphasising that the 
RAF would operate under the Politicals.  However, he was aware that C-in-C(India) was 
emphatic that he could not be responsible for India’s defence if another Service could advise 
the Viceroy, so Salmond removed the recommendation that the AOC should advise the 
Viceroy on the conduct of air operations (see: AIR 8/110, Air Marshal Sir Geoffrey Salmond, 
Personal letter from Air Officer Commanding, India, to Chief of the Air Staff, 7 February 1931, 
1; AIR 8/110, ———, Letter, Air Officer Commanding, India, to Chief of the Air Staff, 8 
December 1930). 
125 AIR 8/110, Air Chief Marshal Sir John Salmond, Personal Letter, Chief of the Air Staff to Air 
Officer Commanding, India, 17 December 1930. 
126 Salmond, AOC(India) to CAS, 7 February 1931, 1-3. 
127 AIR 8/110, Air Marshal Sir Geoffrey Salmond, Letter, Air Officer Commanding, India, to 
Chief of the Air Staff, 13 February 1931. 
128 AIR 8/110, ———, Extract from Letter, AOC India to CAS, No DO 8713/1A/31/Air, 7 
February 1931. 
129 IOR/L/MIL/17/13/39, Air Staff, Air Staff Proposals for the Fuller Employment of Air Power on 
the North-West Frontier of India (Frontier Defence Committee RAF/1), 16 January 1931 (a 
copy is also in AIR 8/110); Salmond, AOC(India) to CAS, 7 February 1931, 3. 
130 AIR 8/110, Air Marshal Sir Geoffrey Salmond, Explanatory Note on Air Staff Proposals, 
January 1931, 2,3. 
Chapter 7 – Control and Constraints 
325 
that CAS had wanted to dispatch a senior Air Ministry officer to India, which the 
Viceroy had vetoed.  Despite Salmond’s initial optimism, the Committee decided that 
they were not competent to deal with the detail of the scheme and referred it back to 
the GoI, confining their Committee comments to examining the general principles.   At 
the time, Salmond predicted that the GoI would instigate another committee to review 
the RAF’s scheme, chaired by an impartial Member of the Indian Council, which he 
was optimistic would find in the RAF’s favour.131 
CGS(India) responded in March, stating that ‘The Air Staff proposals rest frankly 
on the bomb’, emphasising that the RAF could neither ‘prevent large bodies of hostile 
tribesmen entering our territory at will, nor expel them’, citing the 1930 Peshawar 
incursion as an example.132  C-in-C(India)’s comments to the GoI concerning 
Salmond’s report are revealing: 
[AOC(India)] makes statements and suggestions... which, strictly speaking, are 
not his business at all, as he is not responsible in any way for the defence of 
India.... he makes suggestions that are outside his province and on which it is 
the business of the Commander-in-Chief and the General Staff only to give 
advice to the Government of India. 
Notwithstanding this, C-in-C(India) nevertheless recognised: 
... the difficulty of his position, and in view of the fact that he has the right of 
direct access to the Viceroy in other matters... I forward... his report as it stands, 
with the remark that I do not agree with his conclusions in the least.133 
It is apparent that C-in-C(India) felt threatened by both AOC(I) and the Tribal Control 
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and Defence Committee’s recommendation that air forces should be controlled 
politically, as had been the case during the 1930 Peshawar disturbances.  C-in-
C(India) observed that this was ‘not only fundamentally unsound, but positively 
dangerous and prejudicial to my position as supreme commander of the Land and Air 
Forces in India’.134  Indeed, the GS(India) had submitted an amendment to the 
Instructions Regarding the Employment of Aeroplanes on the North-West Frontier 
which transferred control from the Foreign Secretary to C-in-C(India).  The Viceroy 
subsequently gave a more considered response to the Tribal Control and Defence 
Committee’s report  which acknowledged a ‘fundamental divergence in expert 
opinion’.  Nonetheless, he considered that the policy of ‘close and continued 
intercourse with the tribesmen’ was best pursued by the presence of troops as the 
NWF conditions did ‘not afford an exact parallel’ with Iraq and Transjordan, where the 
British mandate was of limited duration and the strategy was one of increasing 
disengagement rather than increasing interaction with the population.135  The Viceroy 
did not want ‘the substitution of an unknown for a known factor’ and considered that 
‘the onus of proving that such a risk is justified must rest on the advocates’.136  In 
December 1931, SoS(India) informed the CID’s Defence of India Sub-Committee that 
the GoI wished their response to the Tribal Control Committee’s report to be regarded 
as their views on the extended use of air power on the NWF, contrary to Salmond’s 
prediction of a further committee of inquiry.137  However, before this ‘intricate and 
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contentious’ issue could be discussed by the CID’s India Sub-Committee, SoS(India) 
postponed further meetings ‘until conditions were more favourable’.138  The Sub-
Committee never met again. 
On face value, it would appear that the GS(India) were not familiar with the 
coercive use of aircraft, insisting that the air method was purely punitive and relied on 
the bomb.139  However, by the same logic, land operations could have been similarly 
described as reliant on ‘the bullet’.  Both analogies are shallow and dogmatic, ignoring 
the secondary coercive, stabilising effects that result from the latent threat of the 
“mailed fist in the velvet glove” that both Services ultimately relied on.140  Similarly, 
both Services could provide a wide range of graduated, non-lethal, capabilities, such 
as logistical and medical resupply, security for the civil authorities, famine relief, etc.  
The Army’s dialogue also falsely characterised the debate as a dichotomy between an 
‘RAF-only’ option and joint operations, whereas both methods relied on policing by 
local irregulars, backed by the potential threat of land or air-based regular forces.  
Furthermore, AOCs had proved themselves adept at understanding the employment 
of combined arms forces, as illustrated by Salmond in the 1923 Kurdistan 
operations.141  The Army’s reaction to Trenchard’s proposals may have been 
normative cultural unfamiliarity, with the Army defaulting to using air power as an 
auxiliary for their own immediate tactical destructive needs, being culturally blind to 
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the more sophisticated methods of employing aircraft.  Conversely, their refusal to 
acknowledge coercive air power may have been a deliberate attempt to undermine 
the Air Staff’s argument.  Against this background of Army criticism about the punitive 
nature of air control, it is interesting that the Army, in the late 1930s, were insisting 
that the RAF’s primary role on the NWF was proscriptive and destructive air action.142 
Trenchard’s swansong soured Air Ministry-Indian Army relations until at least 
1935, when Ludlow-Hewitt replaced Steel as AOC(India).  The Air Staff viewed 
Chetwode as being obstructive towards the independent use of air power during his 
tenure as C-in-C(India).  Chetwode blamed Trenchard’s ‘ill-advised’ swansong for the 
inter-Service friction.143  However, Ludlow-Hewitt’s appeasement was not mirrored by 
the Air Staff: an October 1935 internal paper noted that there was every indication that 
the ‘R.A.F. method’ would never be permitted to be trialled on the NWF, ‘the reason 
for this is largely fear of reductions being made in the land forces of INDIA’.  However, 
the paper suggested that it was ‘a propitious time to re-open the question’ due to the 
strain of the 1935 Mohmand Campaign on the Indian Armies, which might make ‘India’ 
receptive to the extended use of the RAF on the NWF and might allow the air method 
to prove its worth, following which, ‘all the other economies which we originally 
advanced will be the natural sequence’.144  However, there is no evidence that any 
further action was taken.  CAS summarised the Air Ministry’s perspective in a June 
1937 minute to SoS(Air) during operations against the FoI: 
the use of the R.A.F. in India has for many years caused the Air Ministry 
considerable anxiety.  As a result of Lord Trenchard’s swan song in 1929... the 
Indian army, seeing its vested interests threatened, became thoroughly alarmed 
and have pursued, until recently, a policy of preventing the air force from proving 
its power by insisting on the participation of land forces on every occasion.  The 
result of this policy is that at present some 40,000 troops are endeavouring to 
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deal with a situation which probably would not have arisen if, in the early stages 
of trouble, the Air Force had been properly used.145 
MORAL OBJECTIONS TO THE USE OF AIR POWER 
In 1922, Chamier, the Air Ministry’s Deputy Director of Operations and Intelligence, 
tasked the RAF’s Director of Research with a technical assessment of the 
effectiveness of  various ‘forms of annoyance’.  These were designed to control tribal 
behaviour ‘less on the probable destruction of life and property than on affecting their 
morale by making life a burden to them.  In other words we rely on “frightfulness” in a 
more or less severe form’.146  Chamier’s loose use of the emotive term “frightfulness” 
was unfortunate, as the British had adopted this term during the FWW to refer to 
German war crimes.147  During the inter-War period, “frightfulness” became associated 
with “terror bombing” following the 1937 bombing of Guernica.148  Subsequently, the 
term became increasingly associated with aerial bombing of civilian targets, such as 
the London Blitz.  Nonetheless, in 1925, the GoI had reassured SoS(India) that: ‘we 
do not think there is any serious danger of our frontier administration acquiring a 
reputation for the employment of methods of barbarianism’.149 
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Given the changing nature of the term “frightfulness” over time, it is perhaps not 
surprising that Chamier’s 1922 investigations have been the subject of significant 
subsequent criticism by various authors.  Townshend noted that ‘There was no sign of 
discomfort at the adoption of an approach to warfare which had so recently caused 
the Germans to be branded as barbarians’.150  Saint-Amour, analysing Townshend’s 
comments (but not the primary source) concluded that the RAF underwrote these 
‘diabolical weapons and terror techniques – against racially marked bodies in colonial 
spaces remote from the metropole’.151  Headrick used Chamier’s investigation as his 
justification for applying the term “frightfulness” to air control generally.152  None of 
these commentators mentioned that Chamier’s paper was merely a technical 
assessment and only Headrick noted that these weapons were not developed for 
‘both moral and technical reasons’.153  It is clear from the primary source that 
Chamier’s objective was to generate an emotive response through sensory shock or 
general inconvenience (rather than a physical effect) via a variety of novel, largely 
non-lethal, methods; in other words, the weapons were designed to “frighten” rather 
than “kill”, similar to the more recent coercive technique of “shock and awe”.154   While 
these weapons were being contemplated, Chamier had briefed RUSI that punitive 
aerial action against incalcitrant tribes should be ‘relentless and unremitting’ (which, 
as previously noted, an Army officer in the audience described as ‘rather the Hun 
method’).155  Nonetheless, Trenchard’s biographer added that ‘severity was not to be 
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misconstrued as “frightfulness”’.156  However, this punitive policy was swiftly overtaken 
the same year with the publication of CD22, whereafter moral effect was achieved via 
aerial surveillance, with lethal force only being applied when non-lethal measures had 
failed.  Thus, Chamier’s ‘forms of frightfulness’ represent a brief investigation into a 
technique that was discarded and rapidly superseded.   
The Army consistently criticised the air method for its inability to discriminate 
between the guilty and their women and children, stating that it was ‘aimed against the 
whole population’, in contrast to troops whose aim was to bring the fighting men to 
battle in the field, sparing women and children.157  The RAF consistently argued from 
1924 onwards that the aim of the air blockade was not to cause casualties, but to 
dislocate daily life using the minimum force necessary.  Furthermore, warning notices 
minimised the risk of women and children remaining in a village while it was bombed.  
The RAF unswervingly contented that aircraft caused less casualties to both sides 
than land operations.158  The 1931 Tribal Control and Defence Committee reported 
that ‘Experience has shown that, if due warning is given, air action against villages 
ordinarily causes very insignificant loss of life’.159  The Army countered this claim with 
material examples to the contrary;160 CGS(India) opined in 1931 that ‘the bomb... 
never can and never will be accepted by any civilized nation’.161  However, the Air 
Staff considered that claims about indiscriminate casualties were ‘really a political cry 
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raised by those, both tribesmen and others, who are at their wits’ end to find a means 
to counter the effect of air action’.162  Beaumont noted that the Air Council censored 
casualty figures from the Pink’s War despatch in early 1925, indicating that this was a 
sensitive subject in the public forum, both for the RAF and the WO, who supported the 
redaction.163  Based on this, Vincent Orange concluded in 2006 that ‘‘air action" often 
caused significant losses to humans, animals and crops’, inferring that the RAF 
consistently concealed casualty figures throughout the period.164  Similarly, 
Townshend’s secondary-source analysis of Beaumont’s work led him to write that 
there was ‘no doubt that the RAF doctored its reports to make [casualties] look much 
smaller than they were’.165  Similarly, Renfrew concluded in 2015 that ‘Every effort was 
made... to cover up or play down the bombings and their impact’.166  However, with no 
other archival evidence to support these statements, they were, perhaps, dubious 
conclusions to draw from a single event.  Certainly, casualty figures were freely 
discussed between the RAF and Army throughout the period.  Sir Henry Dobbs, a 
senior diplomat who served in Indian, Kabul and Iraq, responded to a critical 1932 
editorial in The Times as follows: 
I have personally watched the employment of both methods on the Indian 
Frontier and in Iraq, and can vouch for the immense superiority of air operations 
in efficiency and humanity.  In the first place, a mere demonstration by 
aeroplanes over disturbed areas, if promptly made before the spark has become 
a blaze, brings insurgents to heel in nine cases out of 10 without dropping a 
single bomb...  In the second place, villages are not bombed until the inhabitants 
have had time and opportunity to clear out, and the destruction of property 
wrought by air-bombs is much less than that wrought on the Indian frontier 
under the old “scuttle and burn” policy by ground troops, when not only were all 
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buildings razed to the ground and grain stores burnt, but even the village fruit-
groves, the result of the labour of generations, were by order destroyed.  This 
was a much more embittering experience for the villagers.167 
However, Dobbs’ lack of intimate knowledge was revealed by his dismissal of the 
RAF’s use of delayed-action bombs in Kurdistan: ‘I cannot believe this is true, as it is 
quite contrary to the traditions of the RAF in Iraq’.168  In fact, the Air Staff endorsed 
their use until at least 1938 and they were only withdrawn on the Army’s insistence.169  
The Air Ministry did not deny that women and children were occasionally killed.170  
However, the situation was complex.  Referring to punitive proscription in 1937, 
Masters wrote: 
Aircraft attacked the sheep and goats surreptitiously sent out to graze, or fired 
on bands of people, sometimes containing women, as they scurried about in 
forbidden territory.  The tribesmen tied out a few useless old women in the hope 
of collecting blood money for them, and sometimes the airmen could not see the 
ropes or the disguise of male clothing, and duly killed them.  Buildings were 
occasionally damaged by accident, though I suspect this was done by the 
tribesmen in the middle of the night with picks and crowbars since, from what I 
saw, the twenty-pound bombs could hardly knock the plaster off those strong 
towers...  Aerial proscription was as sound, humane, and economical a weapon 
as any.171  
Embry revealed that, while on the Air Staff(India), he had no idea about tribal 
casualties and had to invent an answer to a Parliamentary Question on the subject.172  
Overall, the exact number of tribal casualties resulting from air action remains unclear.  
Certainly, the biographies of airmen who served on the NWF indicate that they 
believed air power was more humane than the Army’s alternative.173  However, some 
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Air Ministry files, such as Suggested systems of attack against uncivilised tribes,174 
were not released for 75 years, indicating that methodology and casualties remained 
sensitive subjects.  Conversely, RAF casualties in all overseas territories during the 
period 1920-1932 amounted to only 12 killed and 14 wounded.175  Nonetheless, the air 
method was not completely one-sided.  Masters revealed an infantry perspective: 
At first the Pathans thought aeroplanes were unsporting... By the 1930s  they 
had become adept at shooting down aircraft and no longer thought the use of 
planes unfair.  Sometimes they welcomed their arrival because there is a lot of 
loot in a crashed war-plane and, by Pathan standards, the chance of getting it 
was well worth the price of a few bombs and machine-gun bullets.176 
Many critics only considered proportionality in absolute terms, overlooking that the 
Army’s method also produced casualties.  Matthews contended that the attitude of the 
majority of  British Frontier officers towards tribesmen prior to 1925 was ‘Emphatically 
to kill as many as possible’ and to ‘destroy his villages and stores of food and capture 
his cattle and sheep’.177  Even as late as 1937, Masters recorded that the Army ‘took 
few prisoners at any time, and very few indeed if there was no Political Agent 
about’.178  In 1939, General Hartley, who had commanded Waziristan, told the 
Chatfield Committee that he preferred to use troops when possible, rather than 
aircraft, because the former could inflict more casualties and were more 
discriminative.179 
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TRIBAL RESENTMENT 
The RAF had to withstand consistent Army charges that aircraft generated tribal 
resentment.180  A 1923 GoI enquiry concluded that ‘Air operations... are not in their 
actual effect, inhumane’.181  This was probably a reaction to publicity in England over 
two ‘particularly distressing’ outrages against British women on the NWF which a 
former SoS had attributed to tribal retaliation to bombing, something the Viceroy 
rejected: ‘there is no evidence whatsoever to support this theory... The perpetrators ... 
have never attempted to plead this justification’’.  Interestingly, the Viceroy 
acknowledged the moral effect of bombing on tribesmen: ‘There is no doubt of the 
potency of the fear of becoming subject to air operations’ but that: 
the tribesmen probably dislike land and air operations equally, except the in 
latter his prized inaccessibility is taken from him and his opportunities for hitting 
back are far more limited. 
Nevertheless, the Viceroy acknowledged that air power could be applied so easily that 
it could be misused by political officers, a problem the GoI mitigated by maintaining 
the control of air power ‘almost entirely in our hands’.182  Thus, even at this relatively 
early stage, it is apparent that the GoI understood not only air power’s ability to 
influence, but also the sensitivity of some groups over its application.  Similarly, the 
1931 Tribal Control and Defence Committee, following a survey of Pathans and 
Indians with first-hand knowledge, concluded that ‘it has not been proven that air 
action does cause greater resentment than the use of other kinds of force’.183  
AOC(India) added: ‘I suggest that, once and for all, this charge against the inhumanity 
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and harmful effect of air action should be set at rest’.184  However, CGS(India) 
countered that ‘our recent experience on the frontier compels us to disagree’.185  
Nonetheless, Burt-Andrews, a late 1930s NWF pilot, recorded the villagers’ reaction to 
the targeting of their village: 
I can testify from personal experience, the entire population could be seen sitting 
in grand stand formation on the hills round the area to watch the show... the 
villagers showed no signs of panic or distress as one flew over them.186 
The RAF employed a variety of bombs to achieve different effects.187  Practice 
bombs were used to encourage lingerers to leave their villages during air blockades, 
followed by small, 20-pound bombs to deter tribesmen from returning.  Heavier bombs 
and incendiaries were used in punitive operations to cause physical destruction.188  
The Army often criticised the RAF for not causing sufficient damage.189  Such 
comments miss the point, as the desired effect was often moral, rather than physical.  
Nonetheless, air action could cause considerable damage to buildings when required.  
OC 2(Indian) Wing visited two villages that had suffered punitive destructive air action 
in 1930, finding that, although houses appeared almost intact from the air, the 
precious wooden roof supports had collapsed, making them uninhabitable.190  Despite 
the damage, he reported that the residents ‘seem to bear no animosity to us’.191 
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Village Palli Kala Kalai 
Houses destroyed 25% 35% 
Houses damaged 30% 30% 
Houses undamaged/slightly damaged 45% 35% 
Figure 16 – Battle Damage Report, Waziristan, 1930192 
PUBLIC PRESSURE 
Public opinion also influenced the IO to restrict offensive air action.  Pressure groups 
were predominantly organisations such as the Labour Party, women’s organisations, 
religious and peace groups, who could be expected to adopt an anti-bombing 
position.193  Of the twenty-two letters received by the IO between 1935 and 1937, only 
one was from an individual, indicating that the NWF was not a cause of significant 
concern for the UK population as a whole; opposition could be expected from 
pressure groups and their criticism could be easily dismissed.194  A common 1937 
theme was the perceived hypocrisy of Britain’s criticism of air action by the Italians in 
Abyssinia and fascists in Spain while RAF aircraft bombed tribesmen on the NWF.  
The National Peace Council enquired if the cause of the NWF disturbances were 
economic, urging an investigation into the tribesmen’s human needs, to which the IO’s 
Military Secretary noted: 
I agree that the cause of trouble in the tribal territory is economic.  For yrs the G 
of I have with considerable success been trying to cure this by improving 
communications, by paying the inhabitants for their services & by encouraging 
them to indulge more freely in agriculture...  The present trouble is not with those 
who have fallen in with this programme but with those who, rather than work for 
their living prefer to get it by raiding their neighbours.195 
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Chapter 7 – Control and Constraints 
338 
 
Nonetheless, the IO was certainly sensitive to press criticism of air action.  In a 1937 
minute to SoS(Air), CAS wrote that the IO: 
believe that whenever a bomb is dropped on the Indian Frontier the greater part 
of the population of England hold up their hands in horror and the majority of the 
Members of Parliament put down questions.196 
Press pressure was exemplified by letters published in the 1935 Manchester Times, 
quoting an Army doctor’s eye-witness account: 
When our troops enter a bombed village the pariah dogs are already at work 
eating the corpses of the babies and the old women who have been killed.  
Many suffering from ghastly wounds, especially some of the children, are found 
still alive covered with flies and crying for water.  As all uninjured adults have 
fled, these mutilated women and children must perforce lie unattended.197 
However, Air Staff analysis revealed that the ‘eye witness’ had never visited India and 
had been merely speculating on the effects of bombing.198  Chamier, then  Secretary-
General of the Air League responded, highlighting the significant number of casualties 
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resulting from land operations, ending with ‘the inhumanity of air control on our 
frontiers exists only in the brains of those who have no experience of it’.199  This 
incident illustrates not only the moral argument, but also the image that “police 
bombing” conjured in the public’s mind and the influence of emotive hearsay.   
Not all press reports were critical.  An extensive 1933 two-part article in The 
Times supported the air method, explaining that: 
The influence of air power... seems to depend more on moral effect than on the 
infliction of material damage...  Air power on the Frontier, as these articles have 
shown, is not inhumane.200 
This catalysed five MPs to respond in The Times, stressing the air method’s 
advantages in precision and reach over ‘older methods’.201  The British authorities’ 
sensitivity to press criticism was retrospectively highlighted by the comments of a 
Pakistan Air Force pilot in 1960 who had been involved in targeting tribal villages: ‘of 
course we don’t have the London ”Times” on our necks so there is no nonsense about 
dropping warning leaflets’.202 
DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE 
Air power was also constrained by national and international diplomatic pressure.  For 
example, the British Envoy in Kabul wrote to CAS in October 1932 enquiring if the 
tribes could be coerced without killing non-combatants and if air control was 
compatible with the Modified Forward policy’s progressive civilisation of the tribes.203  
Salmond’s thirteen-page response highlighted how air control in Southern Iraq had 
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resulted in less than six non-combatant casualties in the previous three years.204  
Nonetheless, the IO remained sensitive to the diplomatic ramifications of bombing.  
AOC(India) informed CAS in 1936 that the improving Army-RAF relations in India 
were ‘probably influenced by the [Army’s] reflection that, in view of the strong political 
opposition to the use of air forces in tribal country, they need no longer fear 
competition’.205  When new Instructions Governing the Employment of Armed Forces 
in the Maintenance of Tribal Control on the NWF were re-issued in 1941, SoS(India)’s 
advisor commented that:206 
In my opinion this is a terrible document which I can only hope will never be 
seen by our friends in the U.S.A. and elsewhere or by our enemies who will 
make great capital out of it,207 
illustrating the influence of both Axis anti-colonial propaganda and American idealism.  
Furthermore, as previously described in this Chapter, the GoI being increasingly  
sensitive to the growing ‘Indianization’ of India’s Legislative Assembly during the 
1930s which limited the British Government’s willingness to force decisions on India, 
thereby restricting the influence of the COSC and Air Staff.  Indeed, in 1938 the Chief 
Commissioner of Baluchistan admitted to the Chatfield Committee that ‘there was 
always a disinclination to use air forces on account of the political outcry which is 
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produced’.208  In their evidence to the same Committee, both AOC(India) and his 
Senior Air Staff Officer (SASO), Peck, submitted that political intervention regularly 
occurred that was detrimental to ultimate success, often by junior political officers for 
local reasons; air power was often not used in the manner advocated by AOC(India) 
on political grounds, so the political and military authorities required educating.209  For 
these reasons, Peck and his previous AOC(India), Ludlow-Hewitt, advocated giving 
AOC(India) more access to the GoI, and the Foreign Secretary in particular, to explain 
his needs.210 
The international community also influenced the development and application of 
Indian air policy.  The 1932 World Disarmament Conference at Geneva became a 
highpoint of debate.  Prime Minister Baldwin’s Government generally supported the 
abolition of offensive bombing due to its perceived destructive power, under the 
premise that ‘there is no power on earth that can protect [the UK population] from 
being bombed’.211  Supporters of abolishing aerial bombing feared that aircraft could 
overfly Britain’s historical maritime barrier and devastate its cities and vital shipping.  A 
letter in The Times summarised the argument: 
If bombing is abolished, Great Britain recovers her insular security; ...To 
maintain bombing for the sake of operations against the Pathans is to sacrifice 
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the heart for the finger.212 
The supporters of police bombing asserted that ‘among those who argue for total 
abolition of bombing from the air there will not be found a single one of the men who 
have had past experience of the old Frontier expeditions’.213  Portal described the 
abolitionists as ‘well-meaning but ill-informed’.214  Under military pressure, Britain 
advocated a policy of retaining bombing for Imperial policing purposes, based on its 
‘convenience, cheapness, and effectiveness’.215  Although the Conference collapsed 
when Germany withdrew, it reflected enduring diplomatic concerns over bombing.216 
GESTATION OF THE COMBINED FRONTIER MANUAL 
Chapter 5 discussed the tactics published in the 1939 Combined Frontier Manual.217  
However, the Manual’s gestation, despite occurring at the zenith of Indian inter-
Service collaboration, provides an illustrative vignette of many of the challenges 
previously described. 
In India, a joint GS(India) and Air Staff(India) ‘draft-up committee’, which 
included Auchinleck, Peck and Slessor, produced the draft of the Combined Frontier 
Manual in July 1936.218  In the Air Ministry’s opinion, the Manual ‘for the first time 
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included a fair statement of what air could do in Frontier Operations’, acknowledging 
that ‘a great deal of goodwill must have gone into its production’.219  However, over 
two years’ wrangling followed before it was published.  CAS received an unofficial 
draft copy from Ludlow-Hewitt, in March 1937.  Ellington maintained minor 
reservations about the drawn-out decision-making required to authorise an air 
blockade;220 nonetheless, he informed AOC(India) in April that he had no significant 
comments to make.221   
However, in late May 1937, Ludlow-Hewitt learnt ‘very privately’ that SoS(India) 
was insisting the air blockade chapter be removed and published separately as ‘For 
Official Use Only’ (FOUO), despite the wishes of the GS(India) and Air Staff(India).  
AOC(India) considered the Manual to be a ‘great step forward in co-operation’ and 
that it was ‘most important [that the] air method should have treatment on [an] equal 
basis with [the] Army method’.222  In June 1937, Peck wrote a private, hand-written 
note to DCAS suggesting that C-in-C(India) had persuaded SoS(India) to exclude the 
air blockade chapter.223  Peck’s emotive note, written from the United Service Club in 
Simla and filled with corrections, bore the hallmark of an impulsive outburst.  The Air 
Council was sensitive to recent press criticism concerning air action against the FoI, 
but was confident that the Manual’s public publication would explain, and vindicate, 
                                                                                                                                           
Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, 18 July 1938.  At this time, Slessor was OC 3(Indian) Wing which 
had just moved from Quetta to Chaklala following the 1935 earthquake.  Although the term 
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(AAP-6(2012)), NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (2012). 
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Air Ministry India Office Liaison Officer, to DCAS, 24 March 1937. 
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221 AIR 2/2065, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Edward L Ellington, Letter, Chief of the Air 
Staff to Air Officer Commanding, India, 8 April 1937. 
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the use of air power.224  After internal discussion, the Air Council simply nudged the IO 
about the likely publication date.225  Having received the IO’s non-committal response 
that it was ‘not possible to forecast the date’, the Air Ministry’s IO liaison officer, 
Darvall, met with General Wilson, the IO Military Department Secretary, to be told that 
‘in his view the manual was entirely a matter for the Indian Government and India, and 
that the Air Ministry had no concern in it whatever’; additionally, Wilson had never 
considered consulting the Air Ministry when the question of the non-publication of the 
air chapters was discussed at the IO.  Pressured by Darvall, Wilson admitted that the 
IO had over-ruled C-in-C(India)’s protests supporting the RAF’s position;  the air 
chapter would be removed over concern that its publication would attract press 
criticism.  Wilson added that ‘it was not public policy to describe air methods’ and that, 
as the Army wanted to publish the Manual as an on-sale document for Army 
promotion examinations, the air chapter would be published separately as an FOUO 
document.  However, Wilson was not prepared to communicate this to the AIR 
MINISTRY officially or even demi-officially.  Darvall responded that the IO had 
consulted the Air Ministry ‘most cordially in the early stages’; he convinced Wilson 
that, to avoid an inter-departmental quarrel, he should inform CAS of the IO’s position.  
Darvall’s notes of the meeting concluded that ‘I formed the impression, as a result of 
the meeting, that the chief agent responsible for cutting out the R.A.F. chapters was 
General Wilson himself’.226  If the entire Manual was not published: 
the air portion will not generally be known, and proper co-ordination between the 
Army and the R.A.F. on the Frontier will not be achieved.  Air forces will continue 
                                                
224 AIR 2/2065, Draft letter, Air Council to Under-Secretary of State for India, June 1937. 
225 AIR 2/2065, J M Spaight, Letter, Air Ministry to Secretary, Military Department, India Office, 
10 June 1937. 
226 AIR 2/2065, Major-General Sir Roger C Wilson, Letter from the Secretary, Military 
Department, India Office, to Air Ministry, 15 June 1937; Air 2/2065, Squadron Leader L Darvall, 
Note on Conversation between Major General Sir Roger Wilson, India Office, and Squadron 
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to be mishandled both by Politicals and by the Army.227 
However, Wilson failed to officially inform Ellington of the position.  Having been again 
prompted in writing, he merely responded that CIGS was dealing with the matter.228  
CAS then petitioned SoS(Air), explaining that the IO’s resistance was probably 
because: 
India as a whole is usually fifty years behind the time, and the IO fifty years 
behind India since it is largely staffed by officials who have finished their career 
in India and who adhere to the convictions of their youth.229   
Swinton (SoS(Air)) immediately wrote to SoS(India), lauding the Manual as ‘an 
admirable example of the co-operation which ought to exist between both Services’ 
but complaining that splitting it would ‘defeat the whole purpose of the agreement 
reached’ which was that ‘soldiers and airmen should be equally instructed in the 
functions to be performed by each’.230  SoS(India) replied in early July, stating that ‘I 
certainly do not desire to have any differential treatment for the two sections of the 
manual’, saying he was sending a telegram to India instructing the whole Manual to be 
published as a FOUO document.231  Demonstrating the Air Ministry’s confidence in the 
morality of their tactics, Darvall immediately informed the Air Staff(India), adding ‘Our 
next step will I think be in a year or so’s time to suggest that the manual be 
downgraded as an “on sale” publication, but I think we should be unwise to press for 
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that at this stage’.232  It is of significant interest that, while the RAF wanted the widest 
possible public publication of their tactics to vindicate them, the Army considered that 
‘it was not yet desirable to give this matter public circulation’.233  Nonetheless, the 
Combined Manual remained classified until 1972.234 
This was not the last chapter in the gestation of the Combined Frontier Manual.  
Almost a year later, in June 1938, an updated proof copy was sent from India to 
London for formal approval by the IO, WO and Air Ministry.235  The Air Staff(India) 
swiftly issued proof copies to all its units instructing them to circulate it widely amongst 
RAF officers and use it in place of Air Staff(I)M 1.236  However, Peck had concerns: 
I am afraid that the IO may have another attack of "nerves"... owing to the recent 
debates at home on bombing, and may urge this as a reason for further delay in 
the issue of the manual.237 
This time it was the Air Ministry that wanted to remove elements of the new proof copy 
while the GoI wanted to publish as soon as possible.238  The ensuing discussion 
demonstrates the different perspectives between the Air Ministry and Air Staff(India), 
with the Ministry concerned with the theoretical application of air power, while RAF 
India grappled with its practical application.  The new CAS, Sir Cyril Newall, wanted to 
add additional clarification on several aspects of air blockading: firstly that the swift 
issuance of terms to the tribesmen were essential; that the entire tribe should be 
blockaded on the basis of collective ‘tribal responsibility’; and that the blockade should 
never be paused during negotiations.  However, the Air Staff’s main concern was the 
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inclusion of a new section on ‘punitive’ proscriptive air action, which ‘India’ had 
developed during operations against the FoI because it was ‘liable to be confused with 
air blockade [which was coercive, not punitive] and is, in fact usually so confused’.239  
They informed the IO that its deletion was imperative.240  Peck, however, swiftly 
complained on 4 August that punitive proscription had been invaluable in punishing 
tribes that lacked assets susceptible to destructive air action.  For example, nomadic 
tribesmen could have their grazing areas proscribed, forcing them to hire pasture from 
their neighbours, thereby imposing an indirect financial penalty.241  Slessor, now 
Deputy Director Plans in the Air Staff, advised DCAS, Sir Richard Peirse, in early 
August that ‘with [personal] experience of this proscription method, we should not 
insist on cutting this reference’.242  Peirse, however, ignored Slessor’s advice and 
informed Peck that punitive proscription should be removed because: 
There is no doubt that the Military and the Politicals at the INDIA Office are 
extremely confused in their minds about Proscription and Air Blockade, and they 
cannot at present be relied upon to distinguish clearly between these two forms 
of air action...  the authorities on the Frontier are losing sight of the well-
established principle of tribal responsibility and that Air Proscription allows them 
to burke the issue... The India Office have agreed with these suggestions and I 
hope you will find it possible to accept them.243 
DCAS’s confidence was premature; two days later, on 18 September, General 
Muspratt, who had replaced Wilson as the IO’s Military Secretary, sent a consolidated 
response saying that ‘India’ ‘wish to retain punitive proscription’ and that ‘It is not 
apparent why the Air Ministry should object to its retention’, a statement which reveals 
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the IO’s misunderstanding of the Air Staff’s coercive doctrine.  Muspratt reassured the 
Air Staff that ‘Naturally we should use air blockade if the situation made this 
suitable’.244  Interestingly, the tone and phraseology of the IO’s letter was strikingly 
similar to Peck’s letter of 4 August, raising the likelihood that Air Staff(India) and 
GS(India) were colluding against the Air Ministry on this matter; indeed, the collusion 
was inferred by Muspratt’s use of the collective term ‘India’ in his letter of 18 
September.  A letter from the new AOC(India) to DCAS in early October revealed 
‘India’s’ real motive for needing punitive proscription: 
There are circumstances ... in which air blockade cannot be applied...  For 
example, it is to-day necessary to punish by air action tribal sections guilty of 
harbouring or assisting the Faqir of Ipi who is moving about from one 
inaccessible spot to another, and from one tribal section or tribe to another.  We 
have long been advocating a policy of keeping him on the move by air action, 
and of deterring tribes or sections from assisting him, and at long last this policy 
is being followed and is beginning already to show useful results.245 
Joubert concluded this letter to Peirse with a near threat, which both confirms the 
collusion between the Indian HQs and illustrates the constitutional hierarchy in India:  
I feel quite definitely that we should retain this form of action for use in 
circumstances in which it is applicable; a matter on which it is for me as A.O.C. 
to advise the C.-in-C.246 
AOC(India) did, however, think that the punitive proscription could be more clearly 
explained in the Manual, and suggested the following additional paragraph: 
The purpose of punitive proscription is to deny to a recalcitrant tribe or section 
the use of an area which is of economic value to them, such as, for example, a 
grazing area.  This form of action is suitable in cases where the territory of a 
tribe or section offers no adequate targets for destructive air action, or where the 
degree of punishment authorised does not warrant the use of destructive air 
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action.247 
Now somewhat isolated, the Air Ministry told the IO that ‘we are prepared to agree 
with the new suggested Section’ subject to the deletion of the last half-sentence ‘or 
where the degree of punishment authorised does not warrant the use of destructive air 
action’, presumably because the Air Ministry wanted to limit the occasions where 
punitive proscription could be applied.248  A week later, the IO conceded, requesting 
‘the Air Ministry’s official approval to the manual as now amended’, which it 
received.249   
This examination of the Manual’s gestation is most revealing about the nature of 
inter-Service, inter-Governmental departmental, inter-theatre and inter-personal 
relations.  It illustrates the importance of characters and their inter-personal dynamics.  
Wilson, who was firmly against publishing the Manual’s RAF elements, seems to have 
lacked moral fibre; having initially included the Air Ministry in discussions, he then tried 
to exclude them, yet would not admit his pivotal role, obfuscating the audit trail 
instead, even in written correspondence to CAS.  Peck  wrote pleading, private, hand-
written letters to CAS when needing his support, yet later colluded with the GS(India), 
and possibly encouraged the newly-arrived AOC(India) against the Air Ministry to 
achieve in-theatre objectives.  In contrast, the Air Ministry’s IO liaison officer, Darvall, 
displayed courage in holding the IO’s Military Secretary to account, but was not fully 
conversant with reasoning behind evolving NWF tactics.  Peirse, meanwhile, ignored 
his experienced staff’s advice.  The impact of personalities on inter-Governmental 
relations is also apparent; Wilson’s lack of forthrightness resulted in the need for the 
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matter to be settled at the highest level between the SoSs.  These surprisingly 
personal spats were not conducive to productive inter-Service co-operation and, as 
will be discussed later, left a legacy that may have influenced the initial stages of the 
Second World War.   
The different perspectives of ‘home’ and ‘theatre’ are also evident.  In-theatre 
units strove to develop new tactics to suit local problems, such as the need to contain 
the FoI, while the Air Ministry appeared more concerned with advocating an ethical, 
politically-acceptable ‘pure’ doctrine.  Paradoxically, while the Army advocated the 
early use of lethal force (such as punitive proscription), they were also the most 
reticent about advertising its use; the Army employed Frontier air power pragmatically, 
leaving them vulnerable to ethical criticism.  There is also little doubt that the Army 
was reticent to publish anything that might highlight air power’s independent use, 
given their fear of substitution; GS(India) were unlikely to support anything that 
threatened India’s military status quo.  The Air Staff, in contrast, were more confident 
about what they considered to be an ethical approach to Frontier air power and 
thought that publicising their doctrinally pure tactics would vindicate the use of aircraft 
and gain both public and international acceptance.  Yet, in their oversight of India, the 
Air Staff were less than fully conversant about the ‘messy’, less palatable, in-theatre 
tactics that were required to address local situations. 
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CHAPTER 8 – IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
IMPLICATIONS 
NWF Influence on Strategic Bombing Policy 
Observers have raised the issue of the influence of RAF inter-war air policing on its 
subsequent strategic bombing policy during the Second World War.  Saundby 
observed in 1961 that air control ‘encouraged the specialization of the training and 
equipment of the Royal Air Force along the lines that seriously prejudiced its 
effectiveness in a major war... all British bomber aircraft, bomb-sights, bombs, and the 
training of bomber crews, were specialized for use in air control’.1  Beaumont built on 
this and concluded that inter-War air control generated techniques which were 
inappropriate when employed against enemies with parity in technology and skill; air 
control operated within a permissive, daylight environment without air or ground threat 
which permitted formations of slow aircraft to pick periods of good weather to casually 
bomb into wind, assuring acceptable weapon accuracy from basic equipment.2  Cox, 
in contrast, posited that Iraq was a ‘splendid training ground’ for the RAF.3  This does 
not seem to hold true in India at the tactical level; in 1938, CAS complained to the GoI 
about India’s obsolete aircraft and training framework, which left its pilots unfit to be 
reabsorbed into the Metropolitan air force.4  Embry concurred; referring to his return 
from India to England in 1939, he wrote: 
I felt like Rip Van Winkle awakening from a long sleep... I was an airman of a 
past age, and an officer whose professional knowledge was so lacking as to 
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make me unworthy of my rank.5 
Nonetheless, it appears that India did influence the development of subsequent 
bombing strategy.6  The Air Staff’s enduring theme supporting the effectiveness of 
moral bombing pervades the archives.  Specifically, the strategy employed by an ex-
AOC(India) during a 1933 staff exercise resonated with the inverted blockade’s aim of 
coercion via the disruption of everyday life: 
Our effort must... be directed against the morale of the civil population with the 
object of so disorganizing the normal daily life of the individual that a 
continuance of such conditions becomes intolerable.7 
In 1939, Brooke-Popham suggested retaliating against Germany with a bombing 
policy adapted from ‘dealing with recalcitrant tribesmen’.8  In October 1940, Portal, 
who had just become CAS, offered Churchill a revised bombing policy which would 
change the emphasis from economic to morale bombing ‘to drive the Germans as 
much as possible into their shelters where, we are told, they are apt to spend some of 
the time in criticising their government’.9  A subsequent Air Staff paper written to 
estimate the size of the heavy bomber force required to break German civilian morale, 
stated that this strategy was: 
... an adaption, though on a greatly magnified scale, of the policy of air control 
which has proved so outstandingly successful in recent years in the small wars 
in which the Air Force has been continuously engaged.10 
Pink’s War demonstrated that, by 1925, the RAF in India had developed a 
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sophisticated understanding of how its various weapons could generate a variety of 
effects to coerce tribes of varying natures.  However, the Army-imposed restrictions 
on correspondence betwixt the Air Staff(India) and Air Ministry, limiting it to copies of 
AOC(India)’s official reports to C-in-C(India) and private letters between AOC(India) 
and CAS.11  By their nature, AOC(India)’s reports rarely criticised his superiors, 
leaving the Air Ministry to read between the lines and depriving them of important 
nuances concerning the sensitivity of coercive effects to local conditions.  As Biddle 
observed: 
the cause and effect relationship between bombing and civilian morale were 
complex and not conducive to ready generalization.  The public reaction to 
bombing might vary a great deal according to local circumstances.12 
The Air Staff(India) were aware of this complexity, yet constrained from fully 
articulating it by the Indian command structure.  The Air Staff(India) understood that 
different techniques were required to control the democratic Wazir tribes than the 
dictatorial northern NWF states, so the Air Staff(India) would have recognised that the 
loose leadership of Pink’s War’s highly democratic Mahsuds would be more 
susceptible to popular pressure from the coercion of their subjects than the centralised 
Nazi dictatorship.13  Indeed, Churchill warned Portal in 1940 that: ‘Even if all the towns 
of Germany were rendered largely uninhabitable, it does not follow that the military 
control would be weakened’.14 
Given the apparent success of the few occasions when pure RAF doctrine was 
applied in India, and the difficulty in passing detailed feedback to the Air Ministry, this 
loss of fidelity is perhaps understandable.  The Air Ministry could blame the Army’s 
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lack of adherence to RAF doctrine when air action was inconclusive.  Overall, the 
RAF’s intuitive belief in the efficacy of morale bombing was reinforced by the broad 
lessons gleaned from coercive air operations in India, but restrictions on free 
communication obscured vital nuances.  Nonetheless, the effectiveness of moral 
effect remained largely unverified; its wider employment may have provided evidence 
of the true effectiveness of moral effect.   Notwithstanding this paucity of evidence, 
morale bombing nested comfortably with the RAF’s political aspirations to retain a 
strategic capability that the RAF alone could provide – the ability to directly target the 
enemy population and leadership’s morale.  This reinforced the need for an 
independent air force.  As Saundby reflected in 1961: 
the preservation of the Royal Air Force as a separate Service had resulted in its 
bombing activities becoming specialized along the lines needed for successful 
air control.15 
A strategic bomber force supported an Imperial policy of deterring a European 
war, rather than fighting one.  Furthermore, even within the Indian theatre, the RAF 
apparently viewed strategic bombing as the sine qua non, despite the day-to-day 
focus on tribal control.  Thus, by 1933, the contingency plan if Afghanistan invaded 
India allotted six of RAF India’s eight squadrons to an independent striking force 
against Kabul to seize the initiative and ‘force AFGHANISTAN to sue for peace’.16  
This indicates that the Air Staff(India) understood air power’s role in constraining 
Afghan tribal support; Afghanistan not only offered sanctuary to trans-border tribes, 
but also provided intermittent tribal sponsorship, be it ideological or physical.  The 
RAF’s long-range strike capability (which included bomber-transports, reminiscent of 
Halley’s 1919 raid) provided a deterrent to encourage the Afghans to maintain any 
support below a threshold level, thereby limiting conflict to a low level.  This is an early 
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example of strategic air power being used to stabilise an insurgency by deterring the 
sponsors from escalating the level of warfare.17 
The inter-War focus on morale effect did little to encourage the RAF to improve 
its bombing precision; AP1300 acknowledged the challenges of accurate delivery due 
to the lack of landmarks and the dearth of precise targets presented by ‘semi-civilised’ 
cultures.18  Fortunately, the objective of morale effect was largely cognitive, rather 
than physical.  Due to the close proximity of troops and tribesmen on the battlefield, 
the Army required army co-operation squadrons to deliver weapons accurately to 
avoid fratricide.  This required aircraft to fly lower, increasing their exposure to ground 
fire.19  However, army co-operation effects were instant and visible, if localised, 
providing the Army with instant gratification.  Paradoxically, despite the aircraft being 
the GoI’s fastest weapon, air blockades took longer to generate the necessary effect, 
although their effect was more widespread.  In contrast, Bomber squadrons normally 
bombed from medium level to reduce the aircraft’s vulnerability to ground fire.  The 
concomitant degradation in weapon accuracy was acceptable if the objective was to 
target the enemy’s morale, rather than their buildings, as was the case with air 
blockades; some commentators have failed to understand that, even though a building 
may have been centred in the bomb sight, the aim was to banish the inhabitant from 
his home, rather than destroy it.  Therefore, any analysis based on the amount of 
physical damage inflicted misses the point by more than the bombs did. 
This lack of precision had significant ramifications for subsequent European 
warfare; the RAF struggled to target German infrastructure which required pinpoint 
attack to inflict physical disruption.  Indeed, despite the Air Ministry’s continued belief 
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in the bomber’s ability to break civilian morale, a September 1941 Air Staff paper 
explained that: 
The [bomber] force... is inadequate [in size] to achieve our aims by direct attack 
on morale, and [the COSs] have therefore... selected transportation as the focus 
of attack, combined as far as possible with area attack of important German 
cities.20  
There were other reasons for the RAF’s lack of bombing precision entering the 
Second World War.  Whilst they do not all directly relate solely to India, they are 
worthy of discussion to place India’s influence in perspective.   
Notwithstanding some revisionist opinions, it is generally accepted that both 
civilians and the military during the 1930s feared that massed bomber formations 
could deliver a ‘knock-out blow’ (as it was often referred to at the time) by causing 
widespread damage to both material and the fragile morale of a city’s population; as 
Smith described in 1997, ‘Absenteeism from work, attendant losses of production and 
mass panic would force a government to sue for peace’.21  Indeed, this fear was 
partially the impetus for the 1932 Geneva Disarmament Conference’s theme of 
banning aerial bombardment.  This belief was so widespread that, as late as 1943, 
Disney released the propaganda film Victory Through Air Power, based on Seversky’s 
similarly-named book, which Disney later alleged had convinced Roosevelt to commit 
to long-range bombing.22  Baldwin’s famous 1932 House of Commons speech 
reflected a widely-held fear: 
the bomber will always get through... The only defence is in offence, which 
means that you have to kill more women and children more quickly than the 
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enemy if you want to save yourselves.  I just mention that ... that people may 
realise what is waiting for them when the next war comes.23 
By 1936, the Government viewed the RAF’s role in Trenchardian offensive terms, as 
‘the most terrifying deterrent’ against German aggression, mindful of London’s 
geographic vulnerability to air attack.  This, in the parlance of the day, required ‘parity’ 
of numbers and a credible ‘shop window’.24  However, as Smith reflected in 1977, this 
policy was reinforced by the Treasury’s desire for ‘defence on the cheap’ and the 
resultant bomber force was ‘a politician’s window dressing scheme’: ‘The RAF, though 
unconvinced, had been forced to accept an unreal distinction between a deterrent 
force and a force capable of fighting a war’.25 
By December 1937, mindful of a German airborne knock-out blow, the Cabinet 
decided that the UK’s first defence priority was an increase in home fighter strength.  
Nonetheless, the Air Staff warned that fighters were no sure means of defence; 
instead, an offensive counter-attack was the chief deterrent and defence and the RAF 
should maintain a striking force that could ‘hit [Germany] as hard as they could hit us’.  
Importantly for India, overseas squadrons had to accept a lower priority.26  The Air 
Staff’s vision was massed, unescorted RAF bomber formations operating in daylight, 
fending off hostile fighter aircraft with co-ordinated, overlapping defensive machine 
guns and accurately delivering weapons onto their targets, exactly as Walt Disney 
later depicted in 1943.  Nonetheless, in 1938, the RAF’s Bombing Committee had 
recognised the need for enhanced defensive turrets to defend bombers against 
contemporary German fighters, a complication which raised the issue of co-ordinating 
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fire-control within both the aircraft and its formation.27  Long-range fighter escort was 
perceived by the Air Staff as being impossible for several reasons: such aircraft would 
not hold their own against short-range fighters; the necessary development resources 
were not available; and the bombers would be able to defend themselves effectively.28  
This appears to have been a legacy of Trenchard’s offensive policy; as far back as 
1923, Trenchard had opined that unescorted bombers ‘were able to bear heavy 
casualties better than any likely enemy’.29 
Sticking with the late 1930s vernacular, an impressive ‘shop window’ was vital in 
maintaining an adequate deterrent.  But, if deterrence failed and battle were to be 
joined, the combat effectiveness of the bomber would be critical.  Ludlow-Hewitt was 
appointed AOC-in-C Bomber Command on return from India in 1937; he summarised 
that the RAF’s rapid pre-War expansion had ‘failed to address the crucial issues of 
night flying training, navigational aids, and the vulnerability of bombers to enemy 
fighter attack during daylight raids’, concluding that Bomber Command was ‘entirely 
unprepared for war, unable to operate except in fair weather, and extremely 
vulnerable... in the air’;30   This view has been widely supported.31  Slessor summed up 
the situation in his autobiography: 
A legitimate criticism of the Air Staff before the war is that we paid insufficient 
attention to the technique of bombing.  Our almost passionate faith in the 
efficacy of the bomber offensive as a major war-winning factor was in the long 
run vindicated by results.  But there is no doubt that we did underestimate the 
technical difficulties of modern air bombardment, and might have been more far-
sighted in our efforts to develop the major weapon of air-power, the bomb.32 
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Slessor expanded: 
... our imagination was not sufficiently flexible and our experience too limited to 
comprehend quickly enough the very far-reaching technical requirements of a 
modern striking-force, capable of operating – of finding and hitting its targets – at 
long ranges in bad weather, lacking which capacity an air striking-force is 
virtually useless.33 
The RAF’s most recent experience of intense combat operations, referred to by 
Slessor above, was the NWF, the context and characteristics of which, as has been 
explained in this Thesis, was very different from war against an industrialised peer 
rival such as Germany.  Slessor later reflected: 
We in Plans were too optimistic on many counts... on our ability to bomb 
unescorted by day and hit targets at night; on the bombing accuracy to be 
expected... and on the results both moral and material to be expected  from 
bombing of industrial objectives.  We attached insufficient importance to things 
which afterwards became a commonplace, like bombing and navigation aids, 
signals equipment, D/F homing beacons and blind landing systems.34 
Having briefly examined the strategic theory, it is useful to analyse the factors 
that contributed to the shortfall between theory and reality.  Precision bombing with 
ballistic weapons has four principle components: the aircraft must be able to 
overcome the enemy’s defences; it must navigate with sufficient accuracy for the 
target to fall within the field of view of the weapon aiming system; the aiming system 
must then acquire the target and manoeuvre the aircraft to the weapon release point 
sufficiently accurately for the weapon to fall ballistically to within its lethal radius of the 
target, taking into account the necessary environmental variables; and, finally, the 
weapon must have the desired effect on the target.  The second and third sequential 
processes are known as ‘navigation’ and ‘bomb aiming’, both of which a peer 
opponent will endeavour to disrupt. 
  It is apparent that, until immediately before the Second World War, inter-War 
RAF bomber squadrons were trained for peacetime flying rather than combat 
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operations against a peer opponent, something that was reinforced by the conditions 
experienced in theatres such as India and the Middle East.  This is perhaps 
understandable to an extent; as Ayliffe highlighted in a 1996 seminar: ‘Navigation did 
not seem difficult or important to most RAF pilots, who flew by day and in good 
weather... The approach to navigation was practical and entirely suited to the nature 
of the flying machines of the day’.35  On his return to Britain in 1937, Richardson 
recorded that ‘despite having thumbed my way for four years around some of the 
wilder parts of the Middle East... I scarcely knew anything about the theory of 
navigation and also very little about its proper application’.36  Webster situated the 
RAF’s challenge thus: ‘it was harder to discover in peacetime what were the obstacles 
which had to be overcome [in war]’.37 
A synopsis of the development of air navigation reveals the reasons for the 
RAF’s poor navigation skills entering the Second World War.  During the FWW, the 
RAF had made the non-pilot aircrew specialisation known as ‘air observers’ 
responsible for both navigation and bomb aiming.  However, in 1920 the Air Ministry 
announced that there was to be no provision for observers in the permanent Air Force 
and that pilots would fulfil all necessary airborne duties.  Nonetheless, the RAF 
supplemented the use of pilots in non-flying crew positions by recruiting ground 
tradesmen to be part-time corporal air gunners.  While UK-based air gunners 
underwent a six-week armament and gunnery course, overseas units (including those 
in India) recruited tradesmen from their own establishment who were then trained at 
squadron level without an endorsed syllabus.38  Despite their job title, these part-time 
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air gunners were also employed as wireless operators, photographers and bomb 
aimers, despite receiving no formal tuition and having to also complete their trade’s 
ground duties.  In 1924, it was suggested that the demands of long-range 
reconnaissance and the complexity of bomb sights called for specialist commissioned 
officers, a move that was resisted by the Deputy Director of Manning, Group Captain 
Joubert de la Ferte.  In a 1926 review chaired by Sir Ivo Vesey, Squadron Leader de 
Crespigny (just returned from commanding 60(B) Squadron on the NWF) argued that 
airmen air gunners could be competent at photography and bomb aiming if employed 
on a full-time basis, although their training was more difficult and longer than a pilot’s.  
The same year, Sir John Steel, then AOC Wessex Bombing Area, concurred that air 
gunnery needed to be a full-time role, a move which was ratified the next year, 
although air gunners were not career aviators and still reverted to their previous 
ground trades after their flying tour.  In 1935, these inadequacies were partially 
addressed by re-introducing properly-trained air observers (albeit still part-time 
tradesmen) to gradually replace air gunners, with the ‘flying-O’ observers brevet being 
re-introduced in 1937.  Interestingly, several 1936 papers concluded that bombing 
accuracy was dependent almost entirely on the skill of the air observer in the 
formation leader’s aircraft, reducing the number of observers required and illustrating 
the tactic of massed formation flying.39  In 1937, Ludlow-Hewitt argued to remove part-
time tradesmen and replace them with multi-skilled pilots proficient in all aircrew roles, 
an impractical idea for an expanding force due to the concomitant initial and ongoing 
training burden.40   
Navigation was slightly different in inter-War two-engined bombers which all had 
two pilots, one of whom would be responsible for navigation and bomb aiming, leaving 
their air gunners to their job-titled role.  Limited numbers of pilots had attended the 
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short and long courses at the School of Aerial Navigation and Naval Co-operation 
since 1919, but with few specialist appointments for officers above the rank of flight 
lieutenant, those promoted squandered their navigation skills.41  In 1933, the Air 
Pilotage School was opened to provide a two-week course for all flight commanders to 
enhance their navigate while leading their flights.  However, by 1937 it became 
generally acknowledged that it was unreasonable to expect pilots to navigate while 
‘cloud flying’, so the observer became increasingly responsible for navigation.42  
Nevertheless, even in the Second World War, pilots on Heavy Conversion Units flew 
their first few sorties as navigators, rather than pilots.43 
The lack of focus on inter-War navigation training was mirrored in the RAF’s 
token interest in navigation techniques.  Navigation along featureless Imperial air 
routes was accomplished by following pipelines or furrows ploughed across the 
deserts.44  Similarly, in the UK, pilots often navigated by following railway lines.  In his 
2014 book, Jefford described these techniques as ‘not the answer to navigation so 
much as a substitute for it’.45  ‘Dead reckoning’ was assessed to only be accurate to 
about 50 miles and pre-War attempts to develop astro-navigation were frustrated by 
its complexity and the poor supply of sextants, something which Churchill later took a 
personal interest in.46  It was not until 1940 that the RAF’s navigation manual (AP1234 
Air Pilotage) began to be updated with modern techniques; standardised navigation 
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drills were only instigated in 1942.47  In 1937, Ludlow-Hewitt had contrasted the RAF’s 
lack of navigation aids, homing devices and direction-finding systems with civil 
aviation’s ability to operate over long distances in poor weather.48  The RAF’s pre-War 
lack of focus on ‘cloud flying’ and night flying left the challenges of navigating and 
bombing under these conditions largely unanswered.49  
Turning now to the challenges of weapon aiming, the RAF’s inappropriate 
provision of bomb sights at the outset of the Second World War can be explained by 
examining the development of inter-War bombing.  During the period under 
consideration, bomb sight development was slow, principally because the equipment 
largely met the requirements of operational air policing and UK peacetime practice.  
The Course Setting Bomb Sight (CSBS), designed in 1917, remained the principal 
RAF sight until proven ineffective in the Second World War, the only improvements 
until 1939 being to cater for higher performance aircraft.  The CSBS was a 
complicated geometrical brass instrument that had to be manually adjusted for aircraft 
flight parameters (height above target, speed, etc), the bomb’s ballistic characteristics, 
and environmental conditions (principally, the wind).  The instrument was unstabilised, 
being fixed to the airframe, and only provided a correct sighting solution in ‘steady’ 
straight and level flight; even small excursions outside steady flight would invoke 
significant geometric sighting errors.  The principal corrections required during a 
bomb-run were turns to correct the aircraft’s course towards the bomb release point.  
Because of the geometric sighting errors invoked by banking the aircraft, these turns 
were ideally made using the rudder to generate a ‘flat’ turn.  However, progressive 
inter-War aerodynamic improvements in aircraft design increased the aircraft’s 
directional stability, rendering flat turns impracticable; as a result, any turns had to be 
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estimated before they were commenced and the CSBS re-aligned with the aircraft’s 
compass afterwards.  Furthermore, the CSBS was completely dependent on the 
correct wind being available and set on the sight.  Nevertheless, during peacetime 
daylight practice in fair weather on bombing ranges where the crew were familiar with 
the target (and its range procedures) and with the wind provided by the Range Safety 
Officer on the ground, an accuracy of 50 yards was commonly achieved from 10,000 
feet.  Thus, under the inter-War conditions experienced during air policing and 
peacetime practice camps, the CSBS was largely effective; as the RAF reflected, with 
a steady run-in to the release point and an accurately-determined wind, ‘in practical 
hands, astonishingly accurate results could be obtained’.50  However, as Black 
observed in 2001, ‘Flying conditions in the armament training camps did not reflect in 
any way the operational flying conditions to be anticipated in the coming war’.51 
Allen claimed that, in air policing theatres, bombs were normally released from 
gentle dives and bomb sights were hardly used, resulting in the stagnation of bomb-
aiming techniques.52  On the NWF, this was true for army co-operation squadrons, 
where the proximity of friendly troops required precision weapon delivery that could 
only be achieved by low-level attacks.  However, bomber squadrons, whose targets 
were often distant from Government forces, mostly bombed from medium altitudes in 
level flight to remain above tribal ground fire, albeit at the expense of precision.  In 
these latter cases, the air gunner lay prone in the rear cockpit to use the bomb sight 
through a sliding door in the aircraft’s floor.53  Despite their lack of formal training, 
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some air gunners became very proficient.54  Nonetheless, it is not surprising that, as 
Longmate stated in 1983, the Air Ministry argued for simple bomb sights that the 
average bomb-aimer could use.55 
Looking now at weapons, RAF stocks of general purpose bombs at the outbreak 
of the Second World War were limited almost exclusively to 250 and 500-pound 
variants.56  The RAF’s Air Historical Branch described the period 1919 to 1930 as ‘the 
lean years of armament development’;57 it took from 1929 to 1938 to develop a 
replacement for the FWW 20-pound anti-personal ‘Cooper’ bomb, while a 1924 
requirement for 1,000 and 2,000-pound bombs had been shelved in 1932 due to 
pressure from aircraft designers and lack of Air Staff support.58  Furthermore, the 
existing weapons had been tested in largely unrepresentative conditions, concealing 
their susceptibility to failure when penetrating multi-floored European buildings.59  It 
was not until 1935 that the Ordnance Board instigated a tri-service Aircraft Bomb Sub-
Committee, which decided there was no use for the 120-pound bomb but did instigate 
a new 30 to 50-pound bomb for use against vehicles, houses, billets and parked 
aircraft, indicating the sort of targets envisaged at that time.60  Finally, in 1938, the 
shelved 1000-pound bomb requirement was reinstated for use against dams, railway 
bridges, aqueducts and canals, with the keen avocation of AOC-in-C Bomber 
Command, their large-scale production commencing in December 1939; this indicates 
the changing target set associated with the shift in focus from air policing to European 
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warfare.61  Webster reflected that: 
When it is remembered how much effort was expended to get an aircraft over a 
target to drop a bomb on it, it seems surprising that more was not done to make 
the bomb as effective as possible.62 
As Robinson noted in 1999, the 250 and 500-pound bombs ‘seemed adequate for the 
Imperial policing role’ while Hadaway recorded in 2009 that tribal targets ‘were for the 
most part less solid, and destruction of property was not necessarily the aim’.63  
However, ‘Dizzy’ Allen had pointed out in 1972 that the RAF failed to draw lessons 
concerning the relatively high failure rate of bombs from its air policing experience, 
largely because enough ordnance detonated to achieve the desired effect.64 
The reality of contemporary peer warfare challenged Bomber Command when it 
commenced daylight attacks in September 1939.  As Webster and Frankland 
summarised: 
Bomber Command was confronted with modern high-speed fighters supported 
by radar early warning devices and concentrated anti-aircraft fire.  More was 
learnt about the potentialities and limitations of the day bomber formation in a 
few months of war experience than had been gained from the previous twenty 
years of theorising on the basis of fragmentary and often obsolete evidence’. 
The initial raids as part of Britain’s policy of restrictive bomber against the German 
Navy were of ‘immense significance’.65  On 5 September 1939, six of ten Blenheim 
bombers were lost to anti-aircraft fire during a low-level attack on the Admiral Von 
Scheer off Wilhelmshaven.  To the RAF, this reinforced the necessity for close 
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formation and intercommunication within each aircraft.66  The next significant 
engagement was 14 December, when twelve Wellingtons attempted to attack three 
German destroyers below a very low cloudbase; five Wellingtons were lost to well-co-
ordinated naval anti-aircraft fire and German fighters.  Bottomley, by now SASO 
Bomber Command, doubted that the fighters had shot down any aircraft during the 26-
minute engagement, ascribing this ‘success’ to tight formation flying.  In contrast, 
German pilots claimed to have shot down five Wellingtons and another probable; 
whilst this is clearly an over-estimate, Bottomley’s faith in the self-defending formation 
appears an unjustified dogged attachment to the RAF’s core belief in the self-
defending bomber formation.67  On 18 December, twenty-two Wellingtons tasked 
against naval targets at Wilhelmshaven were engaged at medium level in good 
weather by twenty-five fighters and heavy anti-aircraft fire.  Twelve Wellingtons were 
shot down, the Germans claiming only one to anti-aircraft fire.  The fighters had used 
their longer-range cannons to remain outside the effective range of the bombers’ .303 
machineguns and reported that the formation’s rigid retention of course was of great 
assistance in enabling them to manoeuvre onto beam attacks against the Wellingtons’ 
blind spot.  This caused the temporary cessation of attacks against naval targets and 
the realisation that ‘heavy’ bombers could not economically be used by day.  Although 
Ludlow-Hewitt (amongst others that included Harris), initially attributed the losses to 
poor formation-keeping, by January he expressed doubt to the Air Staff about the 
efficacy of contingent plans to bomb the Ruhr’s industry and population by day.  The 
RAF’s Official History concluded that these initial raids were among the most 
important of the war because ‘the whole conception of the self-defending formation... 
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had been exploded’.68  In contrast to these daylight losses, Whitley bombers had been 
dropping leaflet throughout the period over Germany by night with extremely light 
losses due to a lack of German opposition.69  By May 1940, Bomber Command’s 
‘heavy’ bombers had to operating exclusively by night.70 
Bomber Command had been designed as a precision daylight force.  However, 
daytime operations had demonstrated the vulnerability of unescorted bombers to the 
superior firepower and manoeuvrability of fighters.  The switch to night operations as a 
force protection measure then demonstrated the bomber’s lack of night precision.  As 
the war escalated, Bomber Command was tasked against a variety of targets as 
policy developed, distractive events occurred and experience was gained.71  Despite 
doubts by some senior officers, and the lack of reliable battle damage assessment, 
some crews reported good results.72  One revealing series of raids illustrated what 
Webster and Frankland described as ‘the gulf between assumptions and the reality’;73 
in December 1940, the largest raid of the war so far was launched against the city of 
Mannheim with the objective of causing the maximum damage in retribution for the 
recent German raid on Coventry.  Despite crew reports of success in near-perfect 
conditions, subsequent reconnaissance by the recently-established Photographic 
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Reconnaissance Unit revealed a disappointingly wide scattering of bombs.74  This lack 
of precision became critical when, in January 1941, the Chiefs of Staff directed a 
policy of targeting German synthetic oil plants; these relatively small, but potentially 
vulnerable, targets required precision attack that was reliant on good weather and 
moonlit conditions, which severely limited the opportunities.75 
As described throughout this Thesis, the Air Staff’s primary desired offensive 
effect during air policing was to degrade tribal morale by the disruption of everyday 
life.  There is evidence that the RAF considered morale effect to be a significant factor 
throughout the War.  Even during the 1941 campaign against synthetic oil, the Cabinet 
directed that the secondary aim was the lowering of German morale.76  Peirse, while 
AOC-in-C Bomber Command, told CAS in November 1940 that small, 250-pound 
delayed-action bombs had great value in dislocation and that the Prime Minister 
needed to ‘appreciate the dislocations, political and material, within Germany brought 
about by continuous hammering of industries, communications and populations’.77  
Indeed, in January 1941 he reminded the Prime Minister that, despite the priority of 
German oil, it was still necessary to target industrial towns to cause ‘moral and 
material dislocation.78  In April 1941 Peirse informed CAS that that ‘Every shred of 
evidence emphasises German fears of air attack and their vulnerability.  Why else 
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their feverish activity in camouflage?’.79  In the same month, Portal passed Churchill a 
report from the wife of an American diplomatic in Berlin that stated: 
... she had never seen such panic as existed among the Civil population.  There 
was complete chaos and disorganisation and... it seemed to her to lead to the 
most serious influence on morale.  More attacks of this nature would help 
materially in shortening the war.80   
In July, Portal explained to Churchill that Bomber Command’s first principle was to 
‘repeat our attacks on successive nights to get the maximum moral and material value 
out of them’; he also emphasised ‘the disturbance effect of our bombing’, which has 
strong echoes of the desired effects of the air policing’s ‘air blockade’.81  Later, in 
1943, Harris told Trenchard that ‘I do not believe in panacea targets...The answer is to 
attack the most important industrial-political-morale objectives with all one has’.82 
Bomber Command’s inadequacies were highlighted at the highest level in 
August 1941 by the Butt Report, initiated by Lord Cherwell.  Butt examined 650 bomb-
release photographs taken during 100 raids over 48 nights in June and July 1941.83  It 
revealed that, in a full moon, only one-third of aircraft claiming to have released 
successfully were in fact within five miles of their target; during the new moon, the 
proportion dropped to one-twentieth.  Cherwell told the Prime Minister that the Report 
made ‘depressing reading’, while Churchill told Portal that ‘I await your proposals for 
action’.  Despite acknowledged inaccuracies, Cherwell, CAS and AOC-in-C Bomber 
Command agreed that the Report emphasised ‘the supreme importance of our 
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navigation methods’.84  The Air Staff’s own analysis highlighted the ‘exceptionally bad’ 
weather and that only ten percent of aircraft were equipped with bomb-release 
cameras, which often failed to activate until well after bomb release.  Furthermore, the 
Air Staff considered Butt’s statistics to be in line with German operations against 
Britain.85  However, the Report catalysed action; Portal told Churchill he had instigated 
steps to expand Bomber Command’s Operational Research Section, improve the 
standard of astro-navigation, develop the radio-navigation aid ‘Gee’ and marker 
bombs, and investigate the use of airborne radar to identify built-up areas.86  The most 
important of these was the Operational Research Section, as it underpinned the other 
requirements with critical scientific scrutiny, rather than Air Staff intuition.  Although 
the Air Ministry had established a parallel, offensive committee to Fighter Command’s 
Scientific Survey of Air Defence in 1937, it had proved less effective.87  Nonetheless, 
the Butt Report had undermined the Prime Minister’s previous confidence in the 
bombing offensive; he wrote to Portal in September that: 
It is very disputable whether bombing by itself will be a decisive factor in the 
present war.  On the contrary, all that we have learnt since the war began shows 
that its effects, both physical and moral, are greatly exaggerated. 
Churchill continued that ‘an increase in the accuracy of bombing would in fact raise 
our bombing force to four times its strength’.88  Portal replied reminding Churchill that 
both he and all the Chiefs of Staff had agreed that German morale had to be 
destroyed before victory could be attained and that ‘informed opinion is that German 
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morale is much more vulnerable to bombing than our own’.89  So, the Operational 
Research Section’s potential to increase bombing efficiency was key to regaining the 
Prime Minister’s confidence by increasing Bomber Command’s effectiveness.  Not 
only did Operational Research provide statistical feedback on bombing results, but it 
provided tactical and technical advice that underpinned the development and 
effectiveness of radio navigation aids (such a Gee, Oboe and H2S), ‘Pathfinding’ and 
target marking techniques, defensive techniques (such as massed bomber raids to 
saturate German defences, RAF night fighters and electronic jamming techniques) 
and the required force size to achieve specific aims.  As Webster and Frankland 
concluded, ‘Lord Cherwell had rendered a service to Bomber Command which was 
second to none’.90 
The correspondence between Portal and Harris from 1942 reveals the issues of 
greatest concern.  It had quickly become apparent in 1940 that aircraft could not 
navigate accurately at night and that, even when they did, targets could be difficult to 
acquire due to darkness, haze and searchlight glare, something that was not easily 
resolved.  Less than two months after becoming AOC-in-C Bomber Command in 
February, Harris informed CAS that he was ‘not at all happy about the standard of 
navigation... or the status and prospects of the navigator’ due to the ‘Cinderella-like 
neglect of navigation’; Harris requested the establishment of squadron and station 
navigation officers to improve standards.91  In June, he highlighted a further ‘two very 
urgent matters’.  First, the requirement for the new, stabilised, Mark XIV bomb sight 
because ‘Our present Sights are impracticable junk.  Under prevailing tactical 
conditions they exaggerate errors rather than resolve sighting problems’; the CSBS’s 
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requirement for a steady run towards the target had proved completely impractical 
when weaving to avoid anti-aircraft fire, whereas the new Mark XIV CSBS was a 
stabilised sight that allowed the aircraft to manoeuvre until the last ten seconds before 
weapon release.  Harris’ second point concerned the requirement for dedicated bomb 
aimers as, at this stage of the Second World War, navigators still operated the bomb 
sight: 
At present, T.R. [Gee] Navigators often have to leave their T.R. at the critical 
moment to dash to the bomb sight.  They fail in accurate T.R. as one 
consequence, and, as another, are not night-accustomed when using the Sight.  
Hence, they frequently cannot see a target which would be visible if they were 
night-accustomed. 
Harris continued that ‘Any fool can work a Mark XIV with an hour’s practice.  The old 
types of Sights take weeks or months, and are no good anyhow’.92  This did not quite 
reflect reality.  Wing Commander John Bell, a bomb aimer on 617 Squadron, 
described how, upon first using the Mark XIV on his Wellington Operation Training 
Unit in 1943, his scores were worse than during his previous training on the standard, 
unstabilised, Mark IX CSBS due to the increased complexity of the Mark XIV’s 
operation.  Nonetheless, the Mark XIV could be very accurate with a well-trained crew 
and appropriate maintenance of the equipment, but results were still dependent on an 
accurate wind being available.  For this latter reason, it was known as the ‘area 
sight’.93  Furthermore, the Mark XIV’s technical complexity was challenging for mass 
production.94  Extrapolating this important theme for a moment, the RAF’s ultimate 
Second World War sight was the Mark II Stabilised Automatic Bomb Sight (SABS), 
which was deployed from 1943, but production of this complex instrument was only 
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sufficient for one squadron.95  In contrast to all CSBSs, the SABS was a tachometric 
sight that automatically compensated for the wind by the bomb aimer constantly 
tracking the target.  This greatly increased its accuracy.  However, it required the crew 
to fly very precisely, something which needed significant training and co-ordination; as 
a result, the Squadron dedicated a significant amount of time to bombing practice, 
which reduced its operational availability.96  Reflecting back on the inter-War years, 
the contrast between the SABS and its highly-trained crew and the Wapiti’s CSBS, 
operated by a part-time, locally trained air gunner, is stark.  Yet both systems largely 
fulfilled the requirements of the time. 
As highlighted previously, personalities and their professional backgrounds can 
be critical.  An examination of Harris’ previous experience of air policing during the 
1920s is revealing.  As previously described, while OC 45 Squadron in Iraq from 1922, 
he develop the Vickers Vernon transport into a bomber by local improvisation.  He 
subsequently introduced night bombing as a psychological weapon against Iraqi 
tribesmen, making a point of describing 45 Squadron as ‘Night Bombers’ in his 1929 
Army Staff College lecture.  But he had a legacy of night flying on 39, 44 and 50 
Squadrons during and immediately after the FWW; indeed, when 50 Squadron was 
disbanded, he applied to the School of Navigation for a course of navigation and night 
flying.97  In Iraq, he also developed a makeshift bomb incorporating a Verey flare to be 
dropped by his most expert crew to mark the target for the rest of his Squadron, and 
even attempted night formation practice bombing in late 1924.98  Harris’ biographer, 
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Saward wrote that: 
Even more than laying the keel of the future long-range heavy bomber, Harris 
had already conceived the principle of long-range night bombing, employing 
pathfinding and target marking techniques.99  
During his time commanding 58 Squadron from 1925 to 1928 operating Vickers Vimys 
and Virginias, Harris emphasised not only day and night bombing, but also long-range 
formation navigation, including a ‘raid’ on London;100 he wrote: 
I reckon we did more night flying than all the rest of the air forces in the world 
put together... I had in the back of my mind that the larger and therefore slower 
aircraft... would have better chances of escaping the fighter, and reaching its 
destination, if it could have the cover of darkness.101 
Given this background, it is of no surprise that Harris expressed his disappointment to 
CAS in March 1942 at the RAF’s lack of target marking capability:  
In my view the provision of an efficient "Marker" bomb is still as urgent a 
requirement as ever, and I only hope that you will add your weight to the 
demand for its immediate production.102 
What is superficially more surprising is that Harris objected to an Air Staff proposal to 
form a Target Finding Force in 1942.  Despite the acknowledged necessity to use 
expert crews to identify and mark the target through the haze and glare of searchlights 
to allow the remaining aircraft to concentrate their bombs on the target area, Harris 
preferred to use ‘Raid Leaders’ from each squadron, rather than create a corps d’elite.  
Portal had to persuade him that forming the best crews into a ‘Pathfinding’ force would 
ensure leadership, continuity and the continued development of marking 
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techniques.103  This, perhaps, reveals Harris’ contempt for anything outside his own 
immediate control.   
Harris appears to have been a very determined disciple of Trenchard and his 
offensive policy.104  The two maintained a close relationship throughout the Second 
World War, lunching, dining and spending family weekends together and frequently 
corresponding to the extent that Trenchard appeared to mentor Harris at times, 
tempering some of his more extreme, single-minded views.105  Harris’ letters frequently 
articulated his frustration at any distraction from the strategic offensive.  Indeed, in 
October 1942, Portal had to counsel Harris to ‘take a rather broader view of the 
problems and difficulties confronting the Air Ministry and the other Commands’.106  
Notwithstanding Harris’ inability to place Bomber Command’s campaign within its 
wider perspective, this did not mean he was inflexible.  Ludlow-Hewitt described him 
as having ‘an exceptionally alert, creative and enterprising mind balanced by long 
practical experience’.107  As Wakelam noted in his 2009 study of Bomber Command’s 
Operational Research Section, Harris trusted the Section’s data (presumably because 
it was under his control) but often synthesised their scientific conclusions with his own 
operational intuition.108  Overall, Wakelam’s study underlines Harris’ willingness to 
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innovate and the flexibility of Bomber Command’s headquarters staff.109   
By 1944, Bomber Command had developed into the weapon that had been 
envisaged in the late 1930s, demonstrating the need for actual combat to reveal 
weaknesses and catalyse improvements, something which was largely absent in the 
inter-War years.  As Webster and Frankland commented in 1961, Bomber Command 
was, in 1939, ‘to a certain extent a ‘shop window’ force’.110  In 1941, following the Butt 
Report, Churchill rebuked the Air Staff: ‘Before the war we were greatly misled by the 
pictures they painted of the destruction that would be wrought by Air raids’.111  Slessor 
however, with the benefit of hindsight, reflected in 1956 that: ‘The strategic theory 
ultimately worked out almost exactly according to plan except in point of time; it took 
much longer than we then thought probable’.112 
One interesting contrast, looking back to Chapter 2’s discussion on the morals of 
warfare, is the different approaches that the RAF and United States took towards the 
strategic bombing offensive.  In 1945, the Allies conducted an all-out area attack on 
Berlin (Operation Thunderclap) ‘to influence the minds of the German authorities in 
such a way that they prefer organized surrender to continued resistance’; it was also a 
reprisal for German V-weapon attacks and supported a recent Russian offensive.  It 
was co-ordinated with Allied propaganda directed against the German High 
Command, Army and civilian population.  The raid was in contrast to the by-then 
policy of precision attack on economic and military objectives.113  Doolittle, 
Commander of the US Eighth Air Force, had objected, stating that the raid would: 
... violate the basic American principle of precision bombing of targets of strictly 
military significance for which our tactics were developed and our crews trained 
and indoctrinated.  It is therefore recommended that the area bombing of this 
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target be accomplished by the RAF who are trained and indoctrinated in this 
type of attack.114 
This was an interesting statement, given that the August 1941 (pre-Pearl Harbour) US 
war plan had included a massive strategic bombing campaign against Germany, one 
of the aims of which was the ‘undermining of German morale by air attacks of civil 
concentrations’.   In contrast, Eisenhower had stated in July 1944 that ‘we will 
continue precision bombing and not be deflected to morale bombing’.115  Doolittle’s 
statement about the RAF being ‘indoctrinated’ over area bombing reveals the different 
National perspectives; US cities had never been bombed by the Germans.  
Nonetheless, after much consideration, the raid was eventually executed on 3 
February 1945.  In the same month, the US firebombed Japanese port and urban 
targets; Japan had, of course, bombed the US at Pearl Harbor.  This episode 
illustrates the complexity of National perspectives and strategic cultures, which can 
generate different policies in different theatres. 
Having analysed the reasons for Bomber Command’s unpreparedness at the 
outbreak of the Second World War, it is appropriate to reflect again on the influence of 
air policing, and particularly the NWF, on this situation.  Critically, the archive indicates 
that, from the Air Staff’s perspective, the NWF was the most influential and highest 
profile Imperial theatre in the mid and late-1930s due to the number of squadrons 
deployed, the high tempo of operations and concomitant weapon expenditure 
associated with containing the Fakir of Ipi.  It therefore represented the largest source 
of operational experience.  But, paradoxically, it was also the theatre that was least 
understood by the Air Staff due to India’s command and control relationships.  
Additionally, despite their adaptability, the tribesmen did not rely heavily on 
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technology, so given the asymmetric characteristic of the conflict and India’s financial 
constraints, there was relatively little incentive to develop aviation technology.116 
The RAF’s inter-War levels of navigation skill were adequate for daylight 
operations in the generally clear skies encountered in Imperial theatres policed by air.  
When weather precluded flying, operations could normally be delayed as the British 
authorities generally held the initiative.  As a result, there was little reason to develop 
techniques for accurate navigation in poor weather.  While the morale effect of 
bombing tribes at night was understood and RAF(India) developed a marginal night 
capability, night flying was not sufficiently important to dedicate the necessary 
resources required to properly develop the capability, all the more so because the 
Indian Armies, who controlled the budget, rarely conducted night operations 
themselves. 
Bomb sight technology was influenced even more than navigational techniques 
by the characteristics of air policing.  Firstly, the relatively permissive air environment 
that resulted from the tribesmen’s lack of significant surface-to-air weapons meant that 
aircraft could bomb largely at their leisure from medium level, allowing a relatively 
stable approach to the target.  This masked the advantages of a stabilised bomb sight 
which, within the context of air policing, would have been unnecessarily complicated 
to train and maintain.  Furthermore, the relatively simple CSBS nested comfortably 
with skill levels of the locally-trained air gunners.  As explained in Chapter 4’s analysis 
of AP1300, the lack of vulnerable infrastructure in most semi-civilised theatres meant 
that precision was nugatory, leaving morale effect through the disruption of everyday 
life as one of the few coercive tools; the tribal villages which formed the ideal target for 
NWF bomber squadrons were sufficiently large to match the precision achieved with 
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the early CSBS, especially since the aim of a blockade was not so much to destroy 
buildings but rather to dissuade villagers from returning to their homes.  Furthermore, 
as the desired effect was morale rather than materiel, small bombs were sufficient; 
there was no requirement for absolute precision and no incentive to refine it.  Indeed, 
the doctrine of targeting villages evolved to some extent because they were 
susceptible to the available weapon system technology.  Longmate observed that the 
Air Ministry deliberately constrained bomb sight development to ensure it was simple 
enough for an average crew to use and that: 
the RAF’s success in policing the empire had misled its leaders into vastly 
under-estimating the difficulties in delivering a bomb in poor visibility against 
vigorous opposition.117 
Nonetheless, RAF(India)’s medium level precision was insufficient for the 
requirements of army co-operation tasks where the proximity of friendly troops on the 
battlefield was a significant factor.  As a result, army co-operation squadrons normally 
delivered bombs from low-level shallow dives with the pilot releasing the weapons 
visually without using a bomb sight.  The required precision could be achieved due to 
the aircraft’s relatively slow speed and low release altitude.  Although this made army 
co-operation aircraft vulnerable to Western automatic weapons, the relatively low 
threat posed by tribal rifles resulted in an acceptable level of survivability.   
Probably the most misleading characteristic of air policing was the lack of a 
hostile air threat which created a largely permissive operating environment.  This 
obscured the true vulnerability of the bomber to modern fighters and the need for 
defensive armament, armour and fighter escort.  Starved of practical evidence, the 
myth that ‘the [unescorted] bomber will always get through’ could not be disproven.  
Furthermore, the permissive environment allowed operations to be conducted by day 
which greatly simplified the challenges of both navigation and acquiring the target, 
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allowing the unstabilised CSBS to appear adequate.  In India, the threat from the 
Russian (and potentially Afghan) Air Forces was never perceived to be high enough to 
be worth developing an in-theatre air defence capability; as a result, obsolescent 
aircraft were deemed able to fulfil the everyday task at hand.  On a wider perspective, 
it became convenient to assume that almost all operations would be accomplished by 
day, allowing the complications of night operations to be left largely unaddressed.  As 
Longmate concluded, ‘Most misplaced of all was the assumption that most operations 
would be conducted by day’.118 
On the NWF, despite the Army’s preference for punitive bombing rather than the 
more sophisticated methodology of the coercive air blockade, it is clear from the 
archive that the Air Staff remained wedded to the concept of morale effect and 
dislocation as the primary tactic, despite its infrequent employment.  When it was 
employed, it proved effective; when punitive bombing was used and proved 
ineffective, the Air Staff could opine that an air blockade would have worked.  Sadly, 
the Indian chain of command denuded the quality of information available to the Air 
Staff, prevented them from identifying significant lessons. This allowed the concept of 
morale bombing to remain in the forefront of the Air Staff’s minds into the Second 
World War.  Even the revisionists agree that colonial operations impacted on the 
RAF’s Second World War strategy; to quote Baughen: ‘The colonial ‘air control’ policy 
encouraged the Air Staff to pursue strategic bombing’, which was ‘’air control’ policy 
on a grand scale’.119  Many authors have identified that the RAF’s lack of precision at 
the outset of the Second World War was caused by rudimentary navigation 
techniques and poor bomb sight technology, exacerbated by the defensive move to 
night operations, all of which combined to leave area bombing as the only effective 
strategy.  However, fewer authors have identified the root cause of the low standards 
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of inter-War navigation and bombing, which were set by the standards required for 
daylight air policing in uncontested airspace.  Night air policing was too difficult and 
largely unnecessary.  Given that the general aim of the RAF’s preferred air policing 
technique was to inflict morale effect rather than focused, material damage, the bar of 
precision was set low.120  This beguiled the Air Staff into an inappropriate self-belief 
over the validity of the RAF’s inter-War capability and veiled most incentives for 
improvement until it was too late.  ‘Good enough’ was good enough in the inter-War 
era of tight budgetary constraints.  However, from 1939, the bomber’s daytime 
vulnerability in contested airspace was exposed, forcing a move to night which 
changed the paradigm.  A striking parallel is that RAF small wars doctrine focused on 
morale effect because of the lack of vulnerable targets in semi-civilised theatres; 
when, during the Second World War, the RAF was forced to operate at night alone, it 
was unable to hit the potentially vulnerable industrial point targets and was forced 
instead to try and generate morale effect through area bombing.121 Thus, in both 
theatres, morale bombing was adopted due to the inaccessibility or lack of more 
tangible targets.  The NWF was particularly influential on the Air Staff because it was 
the RAF’s most operationally-focused inter-War Theatre.  Significantly, because NWF 
air power has not previously been examined in detail, India’s influence on pre-Second 
World War bombing strategy has not previously been highlighted. 
British Expeditionary Force, 1940 
The relationship that developed between the Army and RAF in India may have 
had further implications.  Byford has highlighted that the British Expeditionary Force 
(BEF)’s defeat in 1940 was partially due to a lack of empathy between the Army and 
                                                
120 Several authors, without the benefit of a practitioner’s perspective, have focused on the 
material effect achieved by air policing without realising that this was, literally, relatively 
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morale effect, see Chapter 4’s discussion on AP1300. 
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RAF commanders.122  Career background analysis reveals that forty-five percent of 
the BEF’s field-ranking Army officers had previously served in India.123  Additionally, 
the BEF’s Air Component SASO, Air Vice-Marshal Capel, had commanded 5 
Squadron during Pink’s War and subsequently specialised in army co-operation.124  It 
is possible that the Indian Armies’ authoritarian approach to the RAF may have 
coloured these pivotal officers’ expectations of inter-Service co-ordination, something 
which proved inappropriate when conducting complex, fast-moving operations with an 
independent air force in Europe. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Indian Armies’ early enthusiasm for an in-theatre organic air arm indicates that 
they were not opposed to air power per se.  Instead, inter-Service friction focused on 
financial and operational control, particularly the competition over relative force 
structures and the concomitant political influence.  Nonetheless, by the late 1930s, 
inter-Service tactical co-operation was well developed.125  The high-level debate then 
switched to RAF(India)’s wider role as the Second World War loomed, with the 
GS(India) adopting a parochial perspective. 
Churchill’s critical 1919 decision that RAF(India) would be funded by the GoI 
placed Indian air power under the constitutional control of C-in-C(India), sidelining the 
Air Ministry.  India’s critical financial position throughout the period provided a further 
source of friction, especially given the demonstrable economies of air control in Iraq.  
                                                
122 Group Captain Alistair Byford, "The Battle of France, May 1940: Enduring, Combined and 
Joint Lessons", RAF Air Power Review 11, no. 2  (2008): 70. 
123 See Annex 18. 
124 He was captured during Pink’s War and awarded a DSO.  His career is described in Annex 
7. 
125 This has been widely recognised.  See, for example: Major D A L MacKenzie, "Operations 
in the Lower Khaisora Valley, Waziristan, in 1937", JRUSI LXXXII, no. 528  (1937): 822;  Roe, 
"The Troublesome 1930s: General Unrest, Intense Activity and Close Cooperation": 53; 
Coningham, "Air/Ground Cooperation between the RAF and the Indian Army in Waziristan 
1936-37”, 7; ———, "Air-Ground Cooperation between the RAF and the Indian Army in 
Waziristan 1936-37", 131; Moreman, "Development of Frontier Warfare 1914-39". 
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However, the strategic contexts of Iraq and NWF were very different: Britain had 
limited interest in Iraq under its League of Nations mandate and used air control as 
part of a gradual withdrawal policy; the NWF’s Modified Forward Policy, in contrast, 
required ever-increasing commitment and contact with the tribal population.  Issues 
over AOC(India)’s right-of-access to the Viceroy and the Air Staff’s recognition as air 
advisors to the IO were never fully resolved.126  This was exacerbated by the IO’s lack 
of influence over the GoI.127  Consequently, the Air Staff(India) were placed in an 
unenviable position; the Air Ministry provided official RAF doctrine but were outwith 
the Air Staff(India)’s chain of command, with tactics normally dictated by the local 
GOC. 
As Roe highlighted, the introduction of the aircraft ‘had the greatest impact on 
tribal control’.128  The fundamental disagreement between the Army and RAF focused 
on the perceived effectiveness of ‘morale effect’.  To the airmen, this was an intuitive 
‘matter of faith’;129 to the soldier, it was unproven and threatened the status quo.  
Townshend described this as ‘a straightforward opposition of beliefs’.130  Prior to the 
aircraft, the Army had been constrained by short-range weapons, limiting its tactical 
sphere of influence to the range of cavalry reconnaissance; most effects were 
delivered on the battlefield and were visible, and therefore tangible, to the 
commander.  The introduction of the aircraft offered the opportunity to change this 
paradigm.  Airmen quickly developed a sophisticated understanding of the panoply of 
both lethal and non-lethal air effects that could be applied in a variety of different 
contexts to influence specific tribal behaviour.  However, the conservatively-natured 
Indian Armies were slow to recognise the conceptual shift required to fully exploit the 
                                                
126 See, for example, AIR 2/2051, Enclosure 20A, Squadron Leader L Darvall, Note on Meeting 
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127 See The Earl Winterton, Memo to SoS(Air) and CAS.  See Chapter 6. 
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129 See Slessor, The Central Blue, 204. 
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aircraft’s capabilities.  The Army merely employed air power as an auxiliary to 
augment its existing capabilities and deliver traditional effects on the battlefield.  While 
the 1933 Disarmament Conference ultimately came to nothing, it exposed that C-in-
C(India) was content to abolish independent air action, but not army co-operation.131  
Even when the Army began to use aircraft as the main offensive weapon from 1938, 
they were employed akin to punitive columns to swiftly inflict material damage as 
punishment for previous misbehaviour.  This effect was very tangible and, therefore, 
easy to appreciate. 
Early RAF small wars doctrine initially focused on lethality to generate shock 
and moral effect to undermine the will of the recalcitrants.  Villages provided ideal 
targets as they were static, identifiable, susceptible to RAF weapons and generated 
moral effect over a significant proportion of the tribal population; in contrast, lashkars 
in the field quickly learnt to hide and disperse when targeted by aircraft.  However, 
criticism of the legitimacy of bombing non-combatants drove the Air Ministry’s doctrine 
towards ethically-defensible, minimum-force tactics which evolved into the ‘air 
blockade’, whereby notices announced terms and forewarned tribesmen to abandon 
their villages until terms were conceded.   
The air blockade’s coercive mechanism relied on inducing duress via discomfort 
generated by the dislocation of everyday life, achieved by excluding inhabitants from 
their homes.  This relied on the displaced populace having sufficient influence over the 
belligerents to assure their compliance.  Although Islamic clerics had wider trans-tribal 
influence than tribal leaders, the British relied on reinforcing the maliki hierarchy to 
control tribal behaviour; maliks were paid inducements, or were coerced, to secure 
their tribesmen’s compliance.  Under the concept of collective tribal responsibility, the 
maliks were held responsible for the behaviour of their clansmen, irrespective of their 
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true influence.  Aerial coercion was most effective when the tribal leaders had 
instigated and actively directed unrest.  However, the fiercely democratic nature of the 
Wazir tribes meant that this causal chain was often fragile, especially when the 
belligerents were disaffected or fringe tribal elements in deliberate defiance of their 
maliks, who often claimed plausible deniability.  Additionally, the Modified Forward 
Policy gradually broke down the tribal structure, further diminishing the maliks’ 
influence.132  Thus, Pink’s 1925 air action against the Mahsud tribes was decisive, 
whereas the post-1937 low-level guerrilla campaign by the FoI’s disaffected 
renegades proved more enduring. 
The fundamental incompatibility between the independent ‘air method’ and 
military action generated significant friction.  The aircraft’s relative invulnerability 
denied the tribesmen the opportunity to retaliate effectively, and to collect loot, which 
enhanced their feeling of helplessness and frustration.  However, the concurrent 
presence of troops offered the tribesmen an avenue of retaliation and loot, bolstering 
their morale and undermining the blockade’s morale effect.  The Air Ministry charged 
that the Army ensured they were involved in all major operations to deny the RAF 
being able to claim the success of independent air operations, something that 
CGS(India) described in 1938 as ‘absolute bunkem!’.133  Additionally, since a variety of 
coercive economic, air and land mechanisms were often applied simultaneously, it 
was difficult to definitively isolate air power’s decisive role while, conversely, sceptics 
could easily besmirch it. 
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The air blockade differed fundamentally from punitive operations in that the 
tribesmen could concede to terms and stop the discomfort at any stage, thereby 
moderating ongoing tribal behaviour.  In contrast, no terms were associated with 
proscription; the tribesmen simply had to endure the punishment, imposed for ‘past 
misdeeds’, until bombing ceased.134  Nonetheless, punitive destruction was visible and 
measurable, whereas the discomfort of the inverted blockade was less tangible and 
easier to refute.  Importantly, some Politicals disliked dictating terms in advance 
because of the concomitant commitment and potential loss of prestige if they weren’t 
achieved, unlike proscription which could be halted at any time; the vagary of 
proscription provided more latitude than the prescription of the blockade.135 
The Army repeatedly highlighted the injustice of bombing the innocent, 
preferring direct land action.136  Soldiers appeared constrained from understanding the 
blockade’s coercive mechanism (to evacuate, rather than destroy, villages), viewing 
‘the bomb’ in terms of their own punitive paradigm.  The GoI understood that 
tribesmen often exaggerated non-combatant casualties to reduce the fines associated 
with misbehaviour.137  Nevertheless, the RAF investigated various methods of 
‘frightfulness’ to annoy and frighten, rather than kill, something which several 
contemporary observers have chosen to interpret as ‘moral hideousness’ rather than 
its contemporary, non-lethal, meaning.138  Despite the Air Ministry’s attempts to paint 
air action as morally defensible, it’s unacceptability with the public and international 
community influenced the Army and Politicals, eventually leading to the demise of air 
                                                
134 See, for example, AIR 2/2051, Enclosure 16C, Draft Letter from Secretary of State for India 
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control.139 
The soldier’s emotional engagement with the fight also influenced their use of 
punitive air action.  The Army’s frustration during the 1930s over the tribesmen’s 
evasion of a decisive fight, combined with the Pathan’s barbaric treatment of 
Government casualties, resulted in a policy of inflicting maximum casualties.140  This 
undermined the GoI’s legitimacy, consolidating support for India’s nationalist 
movement.  The RAF, in contrast, suffered fewer casualties and were physically 
dislocated from the fight by height, so were less emotively engaged and could retain a 
more objective, minimum-force approach.141 
This generated a conundrum.  RAF(India) Bomber squadrons were consistently 
tasked by the Army with punitive action which was difficult to legitimise and which the 
Army shied from publicising.  The Air Ministry, in contrast, believed its worldwide 
minimum-force doctrine was publicly defensible, but were constrained from applying it 
and frustrated by the GS(India)’s ‘misapplication’ of air power; a 1937 Air Staff paper 
stated ‘we continue to subordinate our new weapons to old tactics’.142  The archive 
reveals contradictions.  The Viceroy had recognised air power’s potential to mitigate 
his garrison’s depleted strength during the FWW.143  However, the Indian Armies 
subsequently denied the effectiveness of ‘the bomb’ when their organisational 
structure and status were threatened by RAF substitution during the inter-War era, 
despite tasking widespread punitive air action during the late-1930s enduring 
insurgency.144  Indeed, the Army could dissociate itself from any unpopular punitive air 
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action by implicating the RAF.145  Furthermore, with air action’s Frontier reputation 
already tainted, differentiating between punitive bombing and the inverted blockade 
required a sophisticated narrative which was beyond easy public or Army 
comprehension.146  Other contradictions included volte-faces by both the Army and 
RAF according to incumbent circumstances.  For example: India was denied 
additional squadrons during the FWW, but reassured it could be reinforced from Egypt 
if necessary; yet, immediately following the War’s cessation, the RAF petitioned the 
GoI to fund a 12-squadron army co-operation and strike force; subsequently, as the 
Second World War loomed, the RAF viewed India as an Imperial air reserve, rather 
than a region to be reinforced.147 
Although early Air Ministry small wars doctrine drew on experience from the 
Third Afghan War and subsequent unrest, it developed in isolation from NWF tactics.  
The RAF was reticent to constrain its core doctrine to accommodate Indian 
requirements because, as Salmond signalled in 1932: 
...policy adopted in India will have to be applied to other countries where R.A.F. 
is employed, and ... the capacity for R.A.F to control semi-civilised countries will 
be jeopardised.148 
As described in Chapter 5, operations on the NWF were under closer scrutiny than 
other areas under air control, such as Iraq, Transjordan and Aden, and were therefore 
politically constrained to a greater degree.  There were several scrutinisers; most of 
India was administered with a highly structured society which included political parties, 
a Legislative Assembly and an active press, all gradually gaining more influence.  
Therefore, the Air Staff were reticent to adapt their core doctrine to accommodate the 
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sensitivities of India if it unnecessarily constrained the application of air power in its 
core areas under air control.  CD22 provided the initial doctrine for air control in Iraq 
which underlined the requirement for an independent air arm.  It emphasised AOC-
controlled independent air action, with military support largely limited to protecting 
airfields.  It advocated targeting villages, while cautioning against the temptation of 
using aircraft to inflict punishment.  While over 25% of the subsequent AP1300 small 
wars chapter was dedicated to direct support or co-operation with land forces, it 
highlighted how troops allowed the enemy to retaliate and capture loot from its 
vulnerable of lines of communication.  Subsequently, AP1300 recommended the 
application of minimum force against habitations to disrupt the tribesmen’s normal life 
until the discomfort became intolerable.   
In contrast, Air Staff(India) doctrine was promulgated by separate pamphlets 
which focused on independent air action that was rarely employed.149 Air action was 
regulated from 1928 by the Army Department’s Instructions and GoI’s Grey Book, 
which ignored independent air action.150  This lack of agreed guidance undermined 
doctrine’s objective of providing mutual inter-Service understanding; it gave great 
latitude to local commanders, but confused the Politicals, who received contrary 
advice from their Army and RAF advisors.  Over time, local Frontier air tactics 
developed, such as punitive proscription, which the Air Ministry refused to recognise.  
In the late 1930s, the mutual respect and willingness to compromise for in-theatre 
purposes by commanders such as Auchinleck, Ludlow-Hewitt, Peck and Slessor 
resulted in the Combined Frontier Manual.  Despite this in-theatre accord, the Manual 
took three years to publish due to high-level inter-Service discord.  The IO’s sensitivity 
to potential press criticism over the air blockade chapter and a desire not to promote 
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independent air action was only resolved by Ministerial intervention.  Similarly, the Air 
Staff(India), GS(India) and IO had to collude to convince the Air Ministry to accept the 
inclusion of punitive proscription, which they deemed necessary to address local 
challenges.  This conflicted with the Air Ministry’s global perspective and its desire for 
a worldwide, ethically-defensible doctrine.151  As the Second World War loomed, the 
Army’s parochial view of the Indian squadrons as a counter-insurgency tool clashed 
with the Air Ministry, who viewed them as an Imperial reserve.  This theme of differing 
perspectives, responsibilities and priorities between ‘home’, ‘in theatre’, the RAF and 
Army was a significant and almost continuous source of friction.  Generally, where 
circumstances and time-critical objectives coincided, the RAF and Army co-operated 
effectively, as the in-theatre forces did during the late-1930s unrest; unsurprisingly, 
where agendas and budgets clashed, there was friction. 
The archive reveals the key role of personality.  Some senior Army personalities 
were fundamentally anti-RAF, due to extreme traditionalism and emotional attachment 
to cavalry, but lacked the strength of their convictions and tried to obfuscate their role 
and blame others.152  Trenchard collided with this trait when he rushed the publication 
of his 1929 ‘swansong’ concerning substitution on the NWF.  This single-Service 
paper poisoned high-level Indian Army-RAF relations for much of the decade; the 
Army’s reluctance to allow the RAF to employ tactics that increased the likelihood of 
substitution curtailed any chance of expanding the use of independent air action.  
Indeed, subsequent C-in-C(India)s, accustomed to demi-official guidance from their 
WO colleagues, became overly defensive to formal Air Ministry technical advice from 
little-known officers concerning the most effective use of what one C-in-C(India) 
described as ‘my air forces’, and attempted to use constitutional protocols to ostracise 
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the Air Ministry.153  A Government-sponsored independent commission would have 
probably found more traction; Tribal Control Committee recommendations to expand 
air power’s Frontier role were beyond the Committee’s remit and so easily dismissed.  
The spectre of substitution was kept alive by Air Ministry zealots such a Darvall, who 
took most opportunities to criticise the Army’s strategy, sometimes erroneously due to 
lack of understanding of the context of NWF operations.  As CGS(India) explained to 
CAS in July 1938: ‘the further one is away from the realities of a situation the more 
liable one is to adopt a distorted view of the “rights and wrongs” of any case’.154  
Within the Air Staff, this context was provided by airmen with recent NWF experience, 
such as Slessor and Embry.  One can only imagine how inter-departmental 
collaboration could have been improved if the Air Staff’s India desk officer had been 
embedded in the IO’s Military Department rather than the Air Ministry.  He would have 
gained a fuller appreciation of Indian issues and, once accepted as part of the team, 
would have been able to educate the IO on air power’s utility and influence its 
application. 
However, Air Staff(India) officers found themselves in an unenviable position, 
balancing the Air Ministry’s formal doctrine against the exigencies of combined air-
land insurgent warfare.  Steel (AOC(India), 1931-35) had to manage Trenchard’s 
‘testament’ and had a poor relationship with C-in-C(India), although he helped 
convince India’s Executive Council to retain independent air action during the 1933 
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Geneva Disarmament Conference.155  Interestingly, Steel was the first ex-Naval 
AOC(India); his lack of soldiery may have restricted his intuitive empathy for, and 
credibility with, the Army.156  His replacement, Ludlow-Hewitt, an ex-Irish Rifleman, 
distanced himself from substitution and developed a more productive relationship. 
While disagreeing with the Army’s NWF strategy, Ludlow-Hewitt, Peck and Slessor 
nevertheless endeavoured to prove air power’s worth within the extant constraints.  
They developed an efficient army co-operation system that ultimately contained the 
1936-39 insurgency, largely by local innovation, rather than top-down, Air Ministry 
direction.  They had the resolve to consistently rebut the Air Staff’s misinterpretation of 
NWF events, yet strived for doctrinal convergence, leading to the Combined Frontier 
Manual.  These Air Staff(India) officers appreciated the Army’s perspective and 
developed close interpersonal relationships and a willingness to compromise to 
achieve pragmatic tactical solutions. 
The 1936-39 Waziristan insurgency was the last significant RAF operation prior 
to the Second World War, underlined by the significant amount of ordnance 
expended, as shown in Annex 2.  As such, its influence on subsequent bombing policy 
is worthy of analysis, especially since it required more Governmental control than the 
rest of the NWFP due to the trans-border tribes’ ability to intervene in Afghan affairs 
and draw Afghans into their own.157  The FoI politicised local issues using religion to 
unify the fiercely independent nang tribes.  However, the FoI lacked the organisation 
of mainstream nationalist movements.  The FoI’s followers suffered disproportionately 
to British conventional all-arms firepower when finally outflanked and surrounded in 
May 1937.  This forced Ipi to withdraw to the Afghan border, where he exploited its 
sanctuary.  GoI stipends to the maliks and Khassadars ultimately incentivised them to 
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remain largely loyal to their sponsors.158  This changed the character of the conflict, 
leaving the FoI reliant on disaffected or outlawed tribesmen outside the influence of 
the GoI’s benefit system, denying him sufficient mass and forcing him into low-level 
insurgent warfare which, nevertheless, required costly, enduring, GoI engagement to 
contain. 
An enduring Frontier issue was the search for the ideal location of the air 
commander during army co-operation operations.  Despite RAF in-theatre efforts, 
ground-to-air and ground-to-ground tactical communications remained fragile and 
immature.  Slessor advocated deploying the air commander with the column, allowing 
him to co-ordinate army co-operation support for the column commander.  While this 
worked well during simple, single-column exercises, it  isolated the air commander 
from his other squadrons during more complicated, theatre-level operations.  Poor 
communications were exacerbated by the reactive nature of army co-operation 
operations; this failure was recognised locally and appropriate mobile communications 
were gradually developed in theatre, rather than by the RAF at large.159   
The theme of local innovation also applied to the bomber-transport.  This aircraft 
could support the Army by aerial re-supply and casualty evacuation, yet its long 
endurance and high payload allowed it to loiter over the battlefield for reactive army 
co-operation tasking or deliver large weapons at long range during independent air 
action.  Nonetheless, despite the Tribal Control Committee recognising these facets, 
the Air Ministry’s enthusiasm appears muted.  It was left to in-theatre personnel to 
develop the necessary bombing capability, such as Harris as OC 45 Squadron in 
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Iraq.160  Had the Air Ministry more actively sponsored this capability, the bomber-
transport’s ability to overcome the enduring logistical challenges that had constrained 
mountain warfare would have been difficult for the Army to deny (as demonstrated by 
the decisive 1937 Iblanke Pass operation) and would have simultaneously introduced 
a potent vehicle for independent air action.  It was, perhaps, the bomber-transport’s 
recognised vulnerability to fighter aircraft which made it only suitable as a bomber in 
undeveloped countries that tempered the Air Staff’s enthusiasm.161 
There is significant evidence that small wars and morale effect influenced the 
development of the RAF’s subsequent strategic bombing doctrine and lack of focus on 
precision.  The Air Staff’s enduring attempts to impose air control on the NWF 
underlines that they recognised India’s political significance.  Indeed, despite the 
apparent success of air control in Iraq and Aden, much of the GS(India)’s objection to 
air control was based upon the potential loss of Service prestige, underlining India’s 
Imperial status.  NWF bombing operations featured far more frequently in the 
contemporary British press and public domain than other RAF-controlled theatres, 
generally because they were often discussed in the Indian press and Legislative 
Assembly.162  Additionally, every CAS up to 1937 had served in India, as had each 
AOC-in-C Bomber Command up until 1945.163  Therefore, small wars, and India in 
particular, are likely to have shaped the intuitive beliefs of these critical Second World 
War leaders.  These factors, combined with the significant magnitude of NWF 
bombing operations during the latter 1930s and the archival records of the Air Staff’s 
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discussions of RAF(India) reports, suggest that India had a strong reinforcing 
influence on the RAF’s adherence to Trenchardian morale effect and therefore, on the 
development of the RAF’s strategic bombing doctrine, even though air control was 
never imposed.  The NWF appears to be a ‘missing link’ in the development of the 
RAF’s strategic bombing doctrine. 
It is currently in vogue to conceptualise strategy in terms of ‘ends’, ‘ways’ and 
‘means’.  In this model, the ‘ends’ are the policy objectives or endstate trying to be 
achieved, the ‘means’ are the resources available, while ‘ways’ are the tactics, 
techniques and procedures used to orchestrate the available assets to achieve the  
required endstate.  Good strategy needs to balance the ends, ways and means; a 
strategy that sets an over-ambitious endstate that cannot be achieved with the 
available resources or methodology is unlikely to be successful.  Using this model, it 
can be seen that the GoI never had an effective frontier strategy for Waziristan.  The 
Modified Forward Policy, which aimed to pacify Waziristan by the garrisoning of troops 
and building of roads, schools and hospitals, was never supported by sufficient 
resources to convince the tribes of the advantages of civilisation.  Against a 
background of financial austerity, the GoI chose to resource the Army, rather than 
develop infrastructure to benefit the tribes, as demonstrated by the lack-lustre 
approach to Mallam’s 1944 five-year plan.  Thus, Frontier strategy fixated on treating 
the symptoms rather than finding a solution.  Indeed, substitution could have released 
the finances required to fund such an enduring solution. 
Although the controversial Modified Forward Policy was predicated on 
anticipated savings from the introduction of air power, Frontier strategy was never 
comprehensively re-assessed in terms of balancing the endstate against the new 
‘means’ available (the aircraft and tank) and the new ‘ways’ these could be employed.  
The Air Staff(India) consistently petitioned for direct political, rather than military, 
control of air forces, as was the case in theatres under formal air control; in 1931, C-
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in-C(India) had to remind AOC(India) that: ‘I, and not a civilian, am in charge of all 
operations... the orders for operations emanate from me, and not from the Foreign 
and Political Department’.164  Indeed, in the early 1930s the Air Staff(India) believed 
that the Politicals handed over control of operations to the Army too freely.165  
Conversely, the WO were against ‘dual control’ in India, with CIGS commenting that 
he was ‘getting rather tired of the interfering attitude of the Air Council’ – a hubric 
comment, given that the WO and Air Ministry had similar formal rights of access to the 
IO and GS(India).166  India’s constitutional command structure allowed the 
conservative Army, haunted by the spectre of substitution, to employ the new ‘means’ 
in their traditional ‘ways’; while most senior RAF commanders of this era had served 
previously in the Army and understood Army tactics, Army commanders lacked an 
appreciation of air power beyond the immediate battlefield.167  Following Partition in 
1947, Pakistan re-appraised Frontier strategy and successfully employed a modified 
close border policy, supported by air power; Pakistan’s low-cost strategy used new 
means (the aircraft) in new ways (politically-controlled independent air action) to 
achieve a different endstate (local self-determination for the tribal areas).168  This 
appeasement strategy was largely successful until 2001 when the lack of governance 
provided a sanctuary for international terrorism to flourish.  In summary, air power’s 
timing was unfortunate.  Whilst a superficial appreciation of air power could conclude 
that its alleged ‘inhumanity’ was inconsistent with the Modified Forward Policy’s 
‘peaceful penetration’, air power would have nested very comfortably with the 
                                                
164 AIR 8/129, Air Vice-Marshal J M Steel, Letter, AOC India to CAS, 24 July 1931. 
165 Steel, Letter, AOC(India) to CAS, 18 September 1933, 1. 
166 WO 32/3526, Thomas Shaw, Letter, Secretary of State for War to Secretary of State for 
India, Wedgewood Benn, 20 May 1931; WO 32/3526, Minute 15, Field Marshal Sir George 
Milne, Minute, Chief of the Imperial General Staff to Secretary of State for War, 14 May 1931. 
167 See Annex 19 and 21. 
168 Slessor noted the irony of Pakistan’s successful policy, claiming the British Army’s 
objections had been due to ‘ignorance and prejudice, not untinged by jealousy’ (see Slessor, 
The Central Blue, 36-37).  Burt-Andrews recorded being told by a young Pakistan Air Force 
pilot in 1960 that it was still occasionally necessary to rocket ‘troublesome’ villages; ‘It soon 
stops the trouble’ (see Burt-Andrews, "Guarding the Mountain Wall": 217). 
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preceding Modified Close Border Policy and was demonstrated to be generally 
effective during Pakistan’s subsequent implementation of Tuker’s close border policy. 
Despite the supposedly ‘sporting’ nature of Frontier conflict, some aspects of 
Pathan behaviour were barbaric.  Although the financial rewards of ‘gooly chits’ meant 
that most captured aircrew were ultimately treated well, captured troops were less 
fortunate.169  When the body of one Highlander was recovered, the top of his skull and 
brain had been removed and his skull filled with earth.  Burnt cigarettes had been 
pushed up his nostrils and his genitals sewn into his mouth.170  Prisoners sometimes 
fared no better; one torture was to stake a captive to the ground with his mouth 
propped open by splints, after which the tribal women would urinate in his mouth until 
he drowned.171  However, the enduring high-level internecine conflict between the 
Imperial land and air forces during the inter-War period was, in some ways, even more 
distasteful and resulted in the squandering of both resources and the invaluable 
opportunity to test independent air power prior to the Second World War. 
 
                                                
169 Slessor noted that ‘as far as I know, there was no case when [captured aircrew] were killed 
or even seriously ill-treated’, a statement that the archives support.  See Slessor, The Central 
Blue, 67-68. 
170 Warren, Waziristan, the Faqir of Ipi, and the Indian Army, 184. 
171 Masters, Bugles and a Tiger, 211. 
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ANNEX 1 - DEFINITIONS 
 
We love our categories and our subcategories. Their invention gives us an illusion of 
intellectual control. 
 
We think we can improve our understanding of a subject as diffuse 
and richly varied as irregular warfare and insurgency by hunting for the most precise 
definition and subdefinitions.1 
AIR BLOCKADE 
The term ‘air blockade’ was first mentioned in Air Ministry correspondence in the early 
1920s.2  By the mid-1930s, the term was common parlance in British aeronautical 
circles; a 1936 article in The Aeroplane described it as ‘the latest method of dealing 
with truculent tribes in the Aden Protectorate’ and was described in RUSI 
presentations.3  The confusion between the tactic of ‘air blockade’ and the control 
system of ‘air control’ was already evident, with the Air Ministry reminding units that 
the term ‘air blockade’ had ‘perhaps unfortunately, come to be confused with what is 
known as air control although it is properly only the method normally used by air force 
commanders when, under an air control system, recourse has to be made to direct 
coercion to enforce the orders of government’.4  Furthermore, the term was also 
confused with ‘proscription’ by IPS Politicals and the Armies in India.  Although the 
technique was described in official doctrine, the term itself was left undefined.  AOC 
Aden in 1936, having been officially chastised for bombing an intransigent tribe rather 
than applying the officially endorsed 'air blockade' doctrine, responded that 'the term 
"air blockade" seems to me to be a very misleading one' and 'is rather a misnomer... 
what I am concerned about is how literally I am to interpret the term'.5 
For the purposes of this Thesis, the term ‘air blockade’ refers to the coercive 
technique of using aircraft to blockade tribes out of their tribal territory until they had 
conceded to terms.  In contrast, no terms were associated with proscriptive air action. 
                                                
1 Colin S Gray, "Irregular Warfare: One Nature, Many Characters", Strategic Studies Quarterly 
1, no. 2  (2007): 40. 
2 Air Staff, Employment of Aircraft on the NWFI, 11-13. 
3 "Operations in the Aden Protectorate".  RUSI presentations include Portal, "Air Force Co-
operation in Policing the Empire", in which he used the term ‘inverted blockade’. 
4 Air Ministry, Air Blockade, 1936. 
5 McClaughry, Letter from Air Officer Commanding, Aden Command, to Air Ministry (Wing 
Commander G C Pirie). 
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AIR CONTROL 
Omissi defined ‘air control’ as the system of control whereby the Air Ministry assumed 
responsibility for the defence or internal security of a particular region of the Empire.6  
This is the definition used in this Thesis.   
Although this system of control was first adopted in 1922, the term ‘air control’ 
was not used in RAF literature until the late 1920s, and did not appear in the official 
doctrine manual, AP 1300, until after the Second World War.  Nevertheless, an Air 
Staff Memo in 1930 stated that ‘the term "air control" implies that control is applied by 
aircraft as the primary arm, usually supplemented by forces on the ground’.7  In a 
1933 lecture, DCAS challenged Sir Henry Dobb’s following air control definition: 
the Royal Air Force shall be considered the predominant arm, and that general 
control of all forces in that region shall lie with the Air Headquarters, in 
consultation with responsible representatives of other forces employed, whether 
naval, military or police.8 
DCAS recounted that he used the term in a broader sense, ‘namely to describe the 
use of air forces for the purpose of maintaining good order and security in certain 
districts irrespective of whether the Commander-in-Chief is an Air officer or an Army 
officer’.9  Thus, the term ‘air control’ was common RAF parlance from at least the very 
early 1930s, but used in a broad sense. 
AIR POLICING 
The term ‘air policing’ did not appear in official RAF doctrine.  However, some 1930s 
articles referred to it in passing.  Rather confusingly, Kingston-McCloughry’s 1937 
article entitled ‘Policing by Air’ actually described air control.10  Amongst the first 
mentions of ‘policing’ in official RAF doctrine was in 1957, when ‘air operations in 
undeveloped Countries’ were described as 'generally of a "police" nature against 
people for whose administration or protection we have some responsibility’.11  The use 
of the term ‘policing’ may have reflected the doctrine of the time which accepted that, 
while air control was an effective and economic way to maintain the internal security of 
an Imperial protectorate, it was far less effective at countering an external threat to the 
                                                
6 Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control, xv. 
7 Air Staff, ASM 46, paragraph 1. 
8 AIR 10/2173, Air Staff Memorandum 52: Air Control: A Lecture by the Deputy Chief of the Air 
Staff at the Imperial Defence College, April, 1933, June 1933, 3. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Kingston-McCloughry, Winged Warfare: Air Problems of Peace and War, 201. 
11 Air Ministry, AP 1300: Royal Air Force War Manual: Operations, 4th ed. (1957), 87. 
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territory.  Indeed, Omissi defined ‘air policing’ as the ‘use of aircraft to uphold the 
internal security of a state’.12  A more recent definition of ‘air policing’, proposed by 
Boehm and based on Kingston-McCloughry’s article, is ‘the use of airpower as the 
primary weight of effort to influence operations, either in the air or on the ground, 
within a permissive air environment’.13  Simpson examined air power as a mechanism 
of repression and the blurring of martial law and aggressive policing in his 2001 
book.14 
AIR SUBSTITUTION 
‘Air substitution’ is a term referring to the replacement of army or naval units used in 
Imperial defence by aircraft.  This happened when, for example, air control was 
imposed and RAF units replaced Army formations.15 
GUERRILLA WARFARE 
The term ‘guerrilla warfare’ is derived from the Spanish phrase for ‘little war’ and was 
first used to describe the tactics used by irregular Spanish forces against Napoleon’s 
army of occupation during the Peninsular War of 1808 to 1814.  It has been 
consistently defined in UK, US and NATO doctrine since 1973 as ‘military and 
paramilitary operations conducted in enemy held or hostile territory by irregular, 
predominantly indigenous forces’.16  Thus, while the historic UK meaning of ‘small 
wars’ could include regular troops invading ‘semi-civilised’ territory, a guerrilla 
campaign is, by definition, always fought by irregular combatants in territory held by 
regular forces. 
IMPERIAL POLICING 
‘Imperial policing’ is a generic and once widely used phrase, although it was not used 
in official RAF doctrine.  In his book ‘Imperial Policing’, Gwynn described it as ‘when 
                                                
12 Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control, xv. 
13 Boehm, ""Air Policing"", 1. 
14 Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the European 
Convention, 71-75. 
15 Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control, xv. 
16 The UK now uses the NATO definition at: NATO Standardization Agency, NATO Glossary of 
Terms and Definitions, AAP-6 (2015).  The US dropped the term ‘guerrilla warfare’ from its 
formal definitions in 2010, but still defines ‘guerrilla force’ in similar terms (see US Joint Staff, 
"Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms", Joint Publication 1-02  (2016)). 
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the normal civil control does not exist, or has broken down to such an extent that the 
Army becomes the main agent for the maintenance of or for the restoration of order’.17  
However, the imposition of air control in some theatres following the FWW resulted in 
the concomitant substitution of Army units by RAF squadrons.  For some, Imperial 
policing became increasingly associated with the use of air power to manage and 
overawe areas of the globe which had hitherto required garrisons.18  This reflects 
Churchill’s 1919 declaration that ‘the first duty of the RAF is to garrison the British 
Empire’.19  In this Thesis, the phrase is used in its broader sense to refer to the use of 
military forces (i.e. Royal Navy, Army or RAF) to uphold the internal security of a state. 
INSURGENCY AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY 
Until recently, Western military use of the term 'insurgency' was remarkably 
consistent, with the UK and US both adhering to the 1980 NATO definition of 'an 
organised movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use 
of subversion and armed conflict'.20  The more recent UK definition widens the 
meaning to the ‘prevention of political control’ rather than ‘overthrow’ of the 
established authority, but unhelpfully replaces ‘movement’ with ‘subversion’, without 
defining the latter.21  The US definition has evolved similarly, using the term ‘seize, 
nullify or challenge’, rather than ‘overthrow’ political control.22  
Yet previous doctrinal definitions of the term have been more descriptive, using 
the phrase ‘political struggle’ instead of ‘movement’ in the current definition.23  During 
the 1980s, the US Central Intelligence Agency used the following definition which 
shied away from the desired effect on the government and instead emphasised the 
required endstate: ‘a protracted political-military activity directed toward completely or 
partially controlling the resources of a country through the use of irregular military 
                                                
17 Gwynn, Imperial Policing, 3. 
18 John Buckley & Richard Holmes. “Imperial Policing”. http://www.answers.com/topic/imperial-
policing (accessed 10 Nov 09). 
19 Pay of the Air Force, col 137. 
20 Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01.1: United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms 
and Definitions, 7th ed. (Shrivenham: Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 2006); US 
Joint Staff, "Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms", Joint Publication 1-02  (2009); NATO 
Standardization Agency, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, AAP-6 (2008). 
21 Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01.1: UK Supplment to the NATO Terminology Database, 8th 
ed. (Shrivenham: Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 2011). 
22 US Joint Staff, "JP 1-02, 2016": 113. 
23 Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20: Military Operations in Low Intensity 
Operations,  (US Department of the Army and the Air Force, 2009), 2-0. 
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forces and illegal political organizations’.24   
The definition of ‘insurgency’ used within the context of this Thesis is of 'an 
organised, protracted movement aimed at obtaining political concessions or the 
overthrow of the constituted government through use of subversion and violence', the 
key words being ‘organised’, ‘protracted’, ‘political’, ‘subversion’ and ‘violence’.  It can 
be seen that, while the term ‘insurgency’ can be used to describe a body of people (a 
‘movement’) or a tactic (subversion and armed conflict), the aim is always political 
change.  There was also multi-national agreement over the even older definition of 
‘counter-insurgency’ from 1973: 'those military, paramilitary, political, economic, 
psychological, and civic actions taken to defeat an insurgency'.  The UK/NATO 
definition has evolved to not only defeat the insurgency, but also to address the 
cause: ‘Comprehensive civilian and military efforts made to defeat an insurgency and 
to address any core grievances’;25 the current US definition is almost identical.26 
INSURRECTION, REBELLION AND UPRISINGS 
‘Insurrection’, ‘rebellion’ and ‘uprising’ are all non-doctrinal, yet commonly used, terms.  
In this Thesis, all three terms are synonymous and refer to an organised and 
significant element of the population who rise in arms or open resistance against the 
established authority or governmental restraint’.27  Note that this is very similar to an 
insurgency, but lacks the subtlety of employing subversion. 
IRREGULAR WARFARE 
The term 'irregular warfare' is a relatively new, overarching term used to encompass a 
large field of conflict.  Irregular warfare has existed for centuries and has at various 
times been labelled as 'low-intensity conflict', 'small wars', 'military operations other 
than war', 'limited warfare', 'unconventional warfare', 'asymmetric warfare' and, most 
                                                
24 Quoted in Daniel Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa 
Monica: RAND, 2001), 4. 
25 NATO Standardization Agency, AAP-6, 2015, 2-C-16. 
26 US Joint Staff, "JP 1-02, 2016": 53. 
27 Exact descriptions from the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 3rd ed. (1973) are: Insurrection: ‘the 
action of rising in arms or open resistance against established authority or governmental 
restraint; an armed rising; an incipient or limited rebellion’; Rebellion: ‘Organised armed 
resistance to the ruler or government of one's country; insurrection; revolt’; Uprising: ‘an 
insurrection’. 
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recently, 'unrestricted warfare'.28  In some ways, irregular warfare is perhaps best, 
albeit somewhat vaguely, described by its antithesis – ‘regular’ warfare.  It can also be 
defined by the legal or political status of the combatants (i.e. 'regular' soldiers who are 
under the direct control of a state, or 'irregular' combatants, who are not) or by the 
tactics employed.29  The latter is a more useful concept within the context of this 
Thesis, as 'irregular combatants' can conduct both 'regular’ (conventional) and 
'irregular' warfare.  Some sources define 'irregulars' as 'not belonging to the 
established army organisation or not forming an organised military force'.30  Other 
sources 'do not limit the participants... to easily identifiable military organizations of a 
nation-state'.31  The terms 'organised' and 'military force' refer to a force's ability to 
mobilize support for its own political interests and its ability to generate violence on a 
scale sufficient to have significant political consequences.32  The UK MOD definition 
‘irregular activity’, used in this Thesis as ‘irregular warfare’, is: 
The use, or threat, of force, by irregular forces, groups or individuals, frequently 
ideologically or criminally motivated, to effect or prevent change as a challenge 
to governance and authority.  It could include a mix of insurgency, terrorism, 
criminality, disorder and illegitimate regimes.33 
PROSCRIPTIVE AIR ACTION 
Proscriptive air action was a local technique not formally recognised by the Air 
Ministry.  There were two forms described in the Combined Frontier Manual:34  
‘Tactical proscription’ involved clearing tribesmen from specific geographic areas for 
the following purposes: 
(i) To stop them visiting hostile leaders;  
(ii)  To disperse lashkars; or  
                                                
28 Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare,  (US Marine Corps Combat Development 
Center & US Special Operations Command Center for Knowledge and Futures, 2006), 7. 
 An even more comprehensive list is provided by M R L Smith, "Guerrillas in the Mist: 
Reassessing Strategy and Low Intensity Warfare", Review of International Studies 29, no. 1  
(2003): 1-2. 
29 'Irregulars' are defined in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary as 'not belonging to the established 
army organisation; not forming an organised military body'.  Neither NATO nor the UK defines 
'irregulars', while the US recently removed its previous definition of  'irregular forces' ('armed 
individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other 
internal security forces') from its official lexicon; compare US Joint Staff, "JP 1-02, 2009",  and 
———, "JP 1-02, 2016". 
30 Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1973). 
31 Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare, 7. 
32 Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 1: Warfighting,  (US Marine Corps, 1997), 3. 
33 JDP 0-01.1, I-4. 
34 Defence Department, Frontier Warfare - India, 30-31. 
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(iii)  To protect troops.   
In contrast, ‘punitive proscription’ aimed to punish a recalcitrant tribe by denying them 
access to an area of economic value, such as grazing grounds.  In both cases, 
evacuation warnings were issued; anyone remaining in the area could be considered 
hostile and could be targeted.  The important distinction between the air blockade and 
proscription was that terms of compliance for the cessation of air action were never 
declared.  Thus, proscription was not coercive, as there were no terms to comply with.  
The IPS Politicals often preferred proscription over the air blockade because they 
burked from declaring terms in advance; proscription, in contrast, could be 
discontinued at any stage without loss of prestige at any stage. 
SMALL WARS 
The term 'small wars' became common in the 1890s to describe the UK's 
contemporary use of military forces in policing the British Empire.  It remains in use as 
an occasional, 'quaint' term which serves to highlight the antiquity of irregular 
warfare.35  In his seminal book 'Small Wars', Callwell admitted that the term was 
'somewhat difficult to define' but that it 'has in reality no particular connection with the 
scale on which any campaign may be carried out; it is simply used to denote... 
operations of regular armies against irregular, or comparatively speaking irregular, 
forces' (with obvious parallels to some modern interpretations of the term ‘irregular 
warfare’).36  The expression remained in widespread doctrinal use in the UK into the 
20th Century; by 1939, Gwynn was defining small wars as 'deliberate campaigns with 
a definite military objective, but undertaken with the ultimate object of establishing civil 
control'.37  In the US, the term was interpreted slightly differently.  The 1940 US 
Marine Corps manual 'Small Wars' admitted that the term is 'a vague name for any 
one of a great variety of military operations' but that for the US 'small wars are 
operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined 
with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose 
government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory'.38 
                                                
35 For example, there is the Small Wars and Insurgencies Journal as well as the on-line Small 
Wars Journal (http://smallwarsjournal.com/). 
36 Colonel Charles  E Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principle and Practice, 3rd ed. (London: 
HMSO, 1906), 21. 
37 Gwynn, Imperial Policing, 3. 
38 Small Wars Manual,  (US Marine Corps, 1940), 1. 
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SUBVERSION 
Subversion is an implicit element of an insurgency.  It has been claimed that the term 
is so vague and subjective as to be meaningless.39  The term has often been used in 
a self-righteous manner to describe underhanded tactics only employed by an 
adversary.  Thus, the UK Security Services described ‘subversion’ during the Cold 
War as ‘overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or 
violent means’.40  Both Moscow and Washington publicly denied using subversion 
during the Cold War, although such statements were aimed at shaping domestic, 
diplomatic, and political perceptions; in reality, all sides used the technique.41  In 1952, 
Selznick described subversion as ‘non-violent terrorism’, making a very useful 
distinction.42  In 1971, Kitson defined subversion as ‘all illegal measures short of the 
use of armed force taken by one section of the people of a country to overthrow those 
governing the country at the time’.43  He also claimed, unjustifiably, that subversion 
has been employed on its own to effect regime change.44  The non-violent definition of 
subversion is in accord with the current doctrinal definition for an insurgency, i.e. 
‘subversion and armed conflict'.  Thus, subversion can be used in the early stages of 
an insurgency to undermine the legitimacy of a government, while armed conflict can 
be used later to undermine a government’s credibility (by showing their inability to 
subdue violence).  Certainly, subversion can be used to foment riots, bridging the gap 
between non-violent and violent conflict.  The current UK/NATO doctrinal definition of 
subversion is: 
action or a coordinated set of actions of any nature intended to weaken the 
military, economic or political strength of an established authority by 
undermining the morale, loyalty or reliability of its members.45 
The US Department of Defence (DOD) definition is more descriptive, adding 
‘psychological’ to the list of undermined strengths.46   
                                                
39 Charles Townshend, Making the Peace: Public Order and Public Security in Modern Britain 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 1993), 116. 
40 William Rosenau, Subversion and Insurgency (Santa Monica: RAND, 2007), 4. 
41 Ibid.  
42 P Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1952), 238. 
43 General Sir Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency & 
Peacekeeping (London: Faber and Faber, 1971), 3. 
44 Ibid., 83.  See also Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of 
Malaya and Vietnam (St Petersburg: Hailer Publishing, 1966). 
45 NATO Standardization Agency, AAP-6, 2015, 2-S-13. 
46 US Joint Staff, "JP 1-02, 2016": 228. 
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The US definition (‘action designed to undermine the military, economic, 
psychological, or political strength or morale of a regime’) is used in this Thesis. 
TERRORISM 
The term ‘terrorism’ carries significant emotional and political baggage which makes a 
precise definition difficult.  The phrase ‘one person’s terrorist is another person’s 
freedom fighter’ emphasises the differing perspectives of the participants.  Over a 
hundred different definitions have been identified.47  Terrorism and insurgencies share 
some similar features, both involving illegal violence by sub-state actors to achieve 
political ends.  However, most definitions infer that terrorism is a tactic or action, while 
an insurgency is a political-military strategy.48  Nonetheless, the divide between 
terrorism and insurgency can appear to be blurred, as insurgents often employ 
terrorism as a tactic.  However, terrorist groups tend to be smaller than insurgency 
movements (hence their need to produce a psychological effect out of proportion to 
their numbers) and often have to target the vulnerable, innocent civil population.  
Unlike insurgents, few terrorists groups employ subversion, probably because they 
lack the personnel to achieve any substantial subversive effect.49  Terrorist action is 
normally used to highlight a political grievance, but rarely results, on its own, in the 
overthrow of the government.  Importantly, terrorism has been described as a 
‘monstrous trap’ to provoke a government into over-reacting, undermining its own 
principles and losing its legitimacy.50  States normally categorise terrorism as an 
‘unlawful’ criminal act in order to undermine the legitimacy of the perpetrators.  
Terrorists do not generally consider themselves to be criminals; they recognise neither 
the legitimacy of the government nor its authority to impose laws.  The UK Terrorism 
Act 2000 defined terrorism as ‘the use or threat of action… designed to influence the 
government or to intimidate the public… for the purpose of advancing a political, 
religious or ideological cause’.51  The UK and US doctrinal definitions are effectively 
                                                
47 … according to surveys by both Schmid (see A Schmid and A Jongman, Political Terrorism: 
A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature (Amsterdam: North-
Holland Publishing, 1988) and Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms 
of Mass Destruction (Oxford University Press, 1999), 6. 
48 Rosenau, Subversion and Insurgency, 2. 
49 Ibid., 5. 
50 Parker, "Terrorism 101". 
51 UK Terrorism Act 2000, Chapter 11, Part 1, Section 1, Subsection 1, downloaded from 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/pdfs/ukpga_20000011_en.pdf (accessed 21 April 
2016). 
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the same as this.52  However, the US Federal Criminal Code, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency and State Department all have their own 
definitions.53  All these definitions are valid within their organisational contexts.   
This Thesis uses the UK doctrinal definition, ‘the unlawful use or threatened use 
of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate 
governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives’. 
 
 
                                                
52 UK/NATO doctrine defines terrorism as ‘the unlawful use or threatened use of force or 
violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or 
societies to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives’, while the DOD currently 
defines it as: ‘The unlawful use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, 
political, or other ideological beliefs, to instil fear and coerce governments or societies in 
pursuit of goals that are usually political’.  See NATO Standardization Agency, AAP-6, 2015, 2-
T-5 and US Joint Staff, "JP 1-02, 2016": 241. 
53 See G Martin, Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues, 3rd ed. (Los 
Angeles: Sage Publications, 2009), 44. 
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ANNEX 2 - RAF WEAPON EXPENDITURE OF VARIOUS NWF 
OPERATIONS, WAZIRISTAN, 1932-1939 
Notes: 
1.  The decode on the right refers to the weight of the individual variety of bomb. 
2.  Baby Incendiary Bombs (BIBs) were dropped in containers of either 198 or 272 
bombs.1  These were gradually replaced by 25-lb incendiary bombs in 1939.2 
3.  230-lb bombs were replaced by 250-lb bombs in 1937. 
Chitral Relief, 1932 – Destructive Phase (17 to 23 September)3 
 
Chitral Relief, 1932 – Harassment Phase (24 September to 16 October)4 
 
                                                
1 See Air Vice-Marshal Peter Dye, "RFC Bombs & Bombing 1912-1918", Journal of the Royal 
Air Force Historical Society 45 (2009): 13.  For more details of the BIB, see Air Ministry, Details 
of Aerial Bombs (1918), Leaflets 12, 12A and 12B. 
2 Hadaway, "The Development of RAF Bombs": 19.  See also RAF Air Historical Branch, 
SD719, 73-74. 
3 AOC RAF India, Summary of Work No 167, 1; Donald, Memo, OC 1(Indian) Group to 
AOC(India) dated April 1935, 1. 
4 AOC RAF India, Summary of Work No 167, 1-2. 
Annex 2 - RAF Weapon Expenditure, Waziristan, 1932-1939 
410 
Second Khaisora Operation – Up to 21 December 19365 
 
Punitive Destruction of Arsal Kot (Fakir of Ipi’s Residence) – 31 December 1936 
to 1 January 19376 
 
                                                
5 ———, Summary of Work No 217, 4. 
6 Ibid., 5-6. 
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Wana Column Support – 17 February 19377 
 
Third Khaisora Operation – 29 April 19378 
 
                                                
7 AIR 5/1335, ———, RAF India Monthly General Summary of Work No 219: February 1937, 
3-4. 
8 ———, Summary of Work No 221, 8. 
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Punitive Bombing of Bhitanni Villages (Raghzai Kile, Bara Kile and Lowazhi) – 1 to 
2 June 19379 
 
Punitive Bombing of Razin– 8 to 11 July 193710 
 
                                                
9 ———, Summary of Work No 223, 5. 
10 ———, Summary of Work No 224, 4-5. 
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Army Co-operation by 3(Indian) Wing – September 193711 
 
Madda Khel Punitive Bombing – 5-8 March 193812 
 
                                                
11 ———, Summary of Work No 226, 4, 10; Darvall, Minute to Summary of Work No 227, 7. 
12 AOC RAF India, Summary of Work No 232, 6-7; Darvall, Minute to Summary of Work No 
231. 
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Dargai Sar Emergency Air Support – 14 April 193813 
 
Madda Khel Proscription and Progressive Destruction of 6 Villages – May 193814 
 
                                                
13 AOC RAF India, Summary of Work No 234, 11; ———, Summary of Work No 233, 6. 
14 AOC RAF India, Summary of Work No 234, 6-7; ———, Summary of Work No 235, 5-6. 
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Punitive Action against Madda Khel Villages – 21 to 24 August 193815 
 
Punitive Destruction of Tamora – 5 to 9 January 193916 
 
                                                
15 AOC RAF India, Summary of Work No 237, 7. 
16 AIR 5/1337, ———, RAF India Monthly General Summary of Work No 242: January 1939, 8-
9. 
Annex 2 - RAF Weapon Expenditure, Waziristan, 1932-1939 
416 
Punitive Air Proscription of Karesta Algad – 23 January to 22 June 193917 
 
                                                
17 ———, Summary of Work No 241, 8; ———, Summary of Work No 242, 8; ———, 
Summary of Work No 247, 5. 
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Madda Khel Air Blockade – 26 February to 10 April 193918 
 
Tori Khel Punitive Air Proscription – 11 October 38 to 14 May 3919 
 
                                                
18 AOC RAF India, Summary of Work No 245, 8-9. 
19 ———, Summary of Work No 240, 5; ———, Summary of Work No 246, 7. 
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Razmak Road Proscription – 5 to 11 July 193920 
 
Proscription of Fakir of Ipi at Kharre – August 193921 
 
                                                
20 AOC RAF India, Summary of Work No 248, 3, 6. 
21 ———, Summary of Work No 249, 7. 
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Proscription of Fakir of Ipi at Kharre – 15 to 17 September 193922 
 
                                                
22  Ibid.; ———, Summary of Work No 250, 8. 
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ANNEX 3 – TRANSCRIPT FROM ‘BIRDS OF DEATH’ TV 
DOCUMENTARY – NWF EXCERPTS1 
 
NWF Tribesman #1 
 
‘Some people were told by the government ...that the bombing was taking place.  Only 
a few people – the head men of the area... were told about the bombing.  That was 
one of the reasons why we took the brunt of it.  Many people were killed in the 
mountains because they hadn't been told’. 
 
NWF Tribesman #2 
 
‘Not everyone knew about the bombing. We were scattered over a large area.  The 
three villages of [Bhitanni] were bombed because the [Bhitannis] were resisting the 
British.  And so they were the ones who were bombed.  In our area there was a village 
called Darklay.  A man there - a stranger to our land - was killed by a bomb.  In our 
village, when the bombs came between 60 and 80 sheep were killed by machine 
guns.  The bombing also killed some calves and our camel.  During the raid, a bomb 
hit our house and my mother died’. 
 
NWF Tribesman #3 
 
‘I was on my way from Sharin ...when about 11 shots were fired at me from the air I 
was hit three times in the back.  They were also bombing in the area in Mazdek.  A 
piece of shrapnel flew past me.  It was a near miss’. 
 
NWF Tribesman #2 (again) 
 
‘When they saw five or six people in a group ...the government used to order its 
planes to shoot them.  It was assumed they were rebels and they would bomb them’. 
 
NWF Tribesman #4 
 
‘When we saw the aeroplanes appear without warning in the sky... ...we would hide in 
caves, gorges, in the undergrowth and wherever we could find shelter.  Some dug 
trenches and hid in them’. 
 
‘When we heard the noise of the plane... ...we rushed into these caves to take shelter.  
We sat at the mouth of the cave, a gun in our hands, watching the plane.  We aimed 
at it, and fired’. 
 
NWF Tribesman #5 
 
‘The bombings took place in winter.  That was hard.  There was snow, and our 
families suffered from the severe cold.  We were forced to leave our villages ...and 
                                                
1 George Case, “Birds of Death”, (UK: Channel 4, 1996).  The transcript is available at: ----, 
1996, “Birds of Death”, Channel 4, 
http://www.cambridgeclarion.org/birds_of_death/transcript.html (accessed 26 April 2016).  The 
programme is available to watch at:  ----, 1996, “Birds of Death”, Channel 4, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y4g5pFggpVQ (accessed 26 April 2016). 
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spend the night in the forest.  You can imagine how difficult it was for us and our 
families’. 
 
NWF Tribesman #6 
 
‘We had to leave most of the food behind in the villages.  Many people died of hunger.  
People had to leave their homes at night... and that wasn't easy.  Especially for the 
elderly, the women and children, some of them died on the way to the mountains.  
Many children died... ...due to the cold and the harsh weather.  People faced many 
difficulties.  Hunger was a big problem.  The food we had was only enough to last us 
for two or three days.  The children suffered the most.  The difficulties were limitless 
for everyone.  The hardship went on for years’. 
 
NWF Tribesman #1 (again) 
 
‘To understand what we had to put up with ...think of Kuwait and the problems they 
faced.  Their oil was burned.  Our livestock was killed, our homes and our crops 
destroyed.  When you don't have a home... how can you farm and look after your 
livestock?’ 
 
NWF Tribesman #3 (again) 
 
‘We have faith in God.  He gives us patience.  At a time of fighting... ...it is important 
for us Pathans to be strong Pathans.  Never cry, not like Punjabis or people from other 
tribes.  The more you irritate a Pathan, the angrier he becomes.  The bombing didn't 
frighten us.  A Pathan is strong in times of difficulty... ...has patience and is never 
driven to despair’. 
 
NWF Tribesman #7 – referring to Shahur Tangi ambush, 9 April 19372 
 
‘We decided we should take revenge... on behalf of our two boys killed in the 
bombing.  Then another person was killed on this road... not by a bomb... but by an 
army truck.  After this incident, we moved with our families to Shoga in [Bhitanni] and 
then to Massoud in Waziristan’. 
 
‘When we saw the trucks, we shouted to our men to roll stones on the road.  They did 
this and managed to stop the leading truck.  At the same time we started firing.  
Nobody was left alive’. 
 
NWF Tribesman #6 (again) 
 
‘We resent it to this day.  Our livestock was destroyed.  Our children our women were 
killed.  The British never did anything good for us.  They only created havoc and 
distress.  How can we say it was good?  It was the worst thing the British could have 
done to us’. 
 
                                                
2 See Chapter 6. 
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ANNEX 4 - RAF STAFF COLLEGE PRE-COURSE READING 
LIST, 19331 
 
 
                                                
1 Air Ministry, "Regulations for the Entry of Students to the R.A.F Staff College", Air Ministry 
Order (Admin) 212  (1933). 
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ANNEX 5 - RAF STAFF COLLEGE SMALL WARS SYLLABUS, 1922-19381 
 
Cse 
No Year Lecture Title Presenter Type of Presenter 
1 1922-23 Organisation of the Army in India Col Villiers Stewart External 
    British Policy in India Lord Meston External 
    Palestine Gp Capt Joubert/Wg Cdr Freeman DS 
    Army Co-operation Sqn Ldr Portal Student 
    Small Wars Gp Capt Joubert de la Ferte DS 
    Topography & meteorology of the NWF of India and Afghanistan Sqn Ldr MacLean Student? 
    Imperial Strategy Air Cdre Clark Hall Dep Commandant 
    Iraq Gp Capt Joubert de la Ferte DS 
    Fighting on the N W Frontier of India Lt Col Macleod External? 
    CD22 (chapter by chapter) Various DS 
 
Cse 
No Year Lecture Title Presenter Type of Presenter 
2 1923-24 Palestine Campaign Gp Capt Freeman/Air Cdre Borton DS/External 
    Imperial Strategy Air Cdre Clark Hall Dep Commandant 
    The Campaign in Mesopotamia Gp Capt Freeman DS 
    Small Wars Wg Cdr Edmonds DS 
    Fighting on the N W Frontier of India Capt Braide Student? 
    The Army in India Maj Moss Student? 
    The RAF in Somaliland and the Caspian Gp Capt Bowhill External 
    The RAF in Iraq since 1918 Flt Lt Thomas Student? 
    The RAF in Ireland Flt Lt Harris Student? 
    The RAF in India AVM Game - ex-AOC RAF India External 
 
Key Flt Lt Flight Lieutenant Air Cdre Air Commodore Capt Captain Maj Gen Major General 
 Sqn Ldr Squadron Leader AVM Air Vice-Marshal Maj Major Dep Deputy 
 Wg Cdr Wing Commander AM Air Marshal Lt Col Lieutenant Colonel DS Directing Staff 
 Gp Capt Group Captain    Col Colonel 
                                                 
1 All information from AIR 69 files. 
Annex 5 - RAF Staff College Small Wars Syllabus, 1922-1938 
424 
 
Cse 
No Year Lecture Title Presenter Type of Presenter 
3 1924-25 Palestine Campaign Gp Capt Freeman DS 
    The Darfur operations 1916 Sqn Ldr Slessor Student 
    Some problems of Iraq AM Sir J Salmond External 
    The operations in Kurdistan 1922 Sqn Ldr Collishaw Student 
    Small Wars Maj Ismay Student 
    The NWF of India Maj Ismay/Capt Ellis Students 
    The RAF in Baluchistan 1918-20 Flt Lt Hollinghurst Student 
    The RAF on the NWF of India Flt Lt Dearlove Student 
    Imperial Strategy Wg Cdr Sutton DS? 
 
Cse 
No Year Lecture Title Presenter Type of Presenter 
4 1925-26 Army Co-operation Wg Cdrs Evill & Leigh-Mallory DS/Student 
    Mesopotamia Gp Capt Courtney DS 
    Palestine Wg Cdr Evill DS 
    Air operations Palestine & Syria 1919-20 Sqn Ldr Medhurst Student 
    Small Wars Maj Pim & Wg Cdr Evill Student/DS 
    NWF Maj Pim Student 
    Army Co-operation in India Flt Lt Thompson Student 
    Air Operations on the NWF of India Flt Lt Foster Student 
    The Sudan Flt Lt Whitham Student 
    Palestine & Transjordan, 1920-25 Flt Lt Blackford Student 
    Imperial Strategic Wg Cdr Sutton DS? 
 
 
NB: Course 5 programme of work destroyed 
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Cse 
No Year Lecture Title Presenter Type of Presenter 
6 1927-28 Army Co-operation Wg Cdr Leigh-Mallory External 
    Afghanistan and its problems Maj Parminter Student 
    The Army in India Maj Maltby (Indian Army) Student 
    Mesopotamia Gp Capt Courtney DS 
    Palestine Wg Cdr Evill DS 
    Aircraft in Palestine Campaign Sqn Ldr Hanmer Student 
    RAF in the Middle East Flt Lt Blackford Student 
    The military aspect of Small Wars Maj Maltby (Indian Army) Student 
    Small Wars Wg Cdr Evill DS 
    The rebellion of Shaikh Mahmoud Flt Lt MacGregor Student 
    Imperial Strategy Sqn Ldr Graham DS 
 
Cse 
No Year Lecture Title Presenter Type of Presenter 
7 1928-29 Mesopotamia Wg Cdr Tedder DS 
    Palestine Col Wavell/AVM Borton External 
    Imperial Strategy 
Maj Gen Bartholemew/ 
Sqn Ldr Graham External/DS 
    India Capt Free (Indian Army) Student 
    Air Control of Uncivilised Countries Flt Lt Crowe Student 
    Small Wars Capt Free/Wg Cdr Murray Student/DS 
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Cse 
No Year Lecture Title Presenter Type of Presenter 
8 1929-30 Aden Sqn Ldr Cochrane DS 
    Palestine Sqn Ldr Pirie DS 
    India Maj Bird (Indian Army) Student 
    Small Wars Sqn Ldr Pirie DS 
    Small Wars - Sudan Wg Cdr Reid Student 
    Small Wars - Iraq Flt Lt Bussell Student 
    Mountain Warfare Maj Bird (Indian Army) Student 
    RAF on NWF Flt Lt Davidson Student 
    Imperial Strategy Maj Gen Maurice/Commandant External/DS 
    Mesopotamia Wg Cdr Tedder DS 
 
Cse 
No Year Lecture Title Presenter Type of Presenter 
9 1930-31 Army Co-operation Sqn Ldr Medhurst DS 
    India Capt Webb Student 
    Palestine Campaign Sqn Ldr Pirie DS 
    Small Wars Sqn Ldr Pirie DS 
    Sudan Lt Col Nosworthy/Wg Cdr Reid External 
    Kurdistan Sqn Ldr Mackay DS 
    Iraqi Operations in Southern Desert Sqn Ldr Lock Student 
    Operations on the NWF Flt Lt Baker Student 
    Aden Sqn Ldr Cochrane DS 
    Mesopotamia Gp Capt Tedder DS 
    Imperial Defence AM Brooke-Popham/Commandant External/DS 
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Cse 
No Year Lecture Title Presenter Type of Presenter 
10 1931-32 Small wars: the military problems of the Sudan Col B T Wilson External 
    The air aspects of the military problems of the Sudan Gp Capt W S Douglas External 
    Small wars: Iraq Flt Lt Rankin Student 
    Small wars: the RAF and the NWF of India Flt Lt Darvall Student 
    Small wars: Aden Sqn Ldr Vachell DS 
    Some notes on the NWF of India Air Cdre Joubert de la Ferte Commandant 
NB: Course programme of work destroyed; recreated from partial evidence 
 
Cse 
No Year Lecture Title Presenter Type of Presenter 
11 1932-33 Army Co-operation Wg Cdr Medhurst DS 
    Empire Defence AVM Joubert de la Ferte Commandant 
    Palestine Wg Cdr Medhurst DS 
    India Capt Goode (Indian Army) Student 
    Aircraft in Small Wars Wg Cdr Bottomley DS 
    Air operations on the NWF Flt Lt Russell Student 
    A NWF problem Flt Lt McKeever Student 
    Air operations in Iraq Flt Lt Brookes Student 
    Indian affairs Rt Hon Lord Lloyd External 
    Air operations in Aden Flt Lt Elliott Student 
    Air operations in the Sudan Flt Lt Bowen-Buscarlet Student 
    Mesopotamia Sqn Ldr Fiddament DS 
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Cse 
No Year Lecture Title Presenter Type of Presenter 
12 1933-34 Operations on the NWF of India, February to September 1930 Flt Lt MacDonald Student 
    Small wars: Iraq Flt Lt Guest Student 
    
The operations against Shaikh Ahmed of Barzan, Kurdistan, 
1931/1932 Flt Lt Combe Student 
    Small wars: Aden Flt Lt Harris Student 
    Defence problems of India Capt Reynolds (Indian Army) Student 
    Small wars: summing up  Wg Cdr Saundby DS 
NB: Course programme of work destroyed; recreated from partial evidence 
 
Cse 
No Year Lecture Title Presenter Type of Presenter 
13 1934-35 Small Wars - Air control in undeveloped countries Wg Cdr Saundby DS 
    Air operations at Aden Flt Lt Davies Student 
    Air operations at in Somaliland Flt Lt Barnes Student 
    Air operations on NWF of India Flt Lt Collingwood Student 
    Small wars: summing up  Wg Cdr Saundby DS 
    Palestine Wg Cdr Colyer DS 
    Defence problems of India Capt Angus (Indian Army) Student 
    Mesopotamia Wg Cdr Hollinghurst DS 
    Developments in co-operation between the RAF and Army Air Cdre Le Brock External 
    Persia Flt Lt Harris Student 
 
Cse 
No Year Lecture Title Presenter Type of Presenter 
14 1935-36 The Sudan Flt Lt Allinson Student 
    Air operations in the Aden Protectorate Flt Lt Boyle Student 
    Air operations in Iraq I Sqn Ldr Inglis Student 
    Air operations in Iraq II Sqn Ldr Pelly Student 
    Air operations on the NWF of India Flt Lt Atcherley Student 
NB: Course Programme of work destroyed; reconstructed from partial records 
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Cse 
No Year Lecture Title Presenter Type of Presenter 
15 1936-37 Army Co-operation Wg Cdr Hollinghurst DS 
    Air participation in Small Wars Wg Cdr Hollinghurst DS 
    India and its defence problems Maj Forman (Indian Army) Student 
    Air operations - India Sqn Ldr Hancock Student 
    Air operations - Aden Sqn Ldr Montgomery Student 
    Air operations - Iraq Sqn Ldr Macfadyen Student 
    Palestine Wg Cdr Harris DS 
    Mesopotamia Wg Cdr Hollinghurst DS 
    
Small wars: Ethiopia; air operations, Italo-Ethiopian Campaign 
1935-6 Wg Cdr Hollinghurst DS 
    Control of the NWFP Col Sir Ralph Griffith External 
NB: Reconstructed from partial records 
 
Cse 
No Year Lecture Title Presenter Type of Presenter 
16 1937-38 India and its defence problems Maj Stephenson (Indian Army) Student 
    Air participation in small wars Wg Cdr Ellwood DS 
    Air operations on the NWF of India 
Gp Capt Bottomley - OC No 1 
(Indian) Gp External 
    Air operations in the Aden Protectorate Sqn Ldr Wheeler Student 
    Air operations in Iraq Flt Lt Casey Student 
    Mesopotamia I Wg Cdr Ellwood DS 
NB: Course Programme of work destroyed; reconstructed from partial records 
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ANNEX 6 – CLASSIFICATION OF TARGETS – AP13001 
 
Type of Bomb Target for which suitable 
Heavy-weight H.E. bombs designed for 
penetration 
Armoured ships and specially 
constructed concrete works. 
General purposes heavy and medium-
weight bombs 
Strong constructions of a permanent 
nature, machinery and mechanical 
apparatus such as power stations, 
machine shops, loading and unloading 
equipment, rolling stock, engine sheds, 
and unarmoured or lightly armoured 
ships. 
General purposes light weight bombs Unprotected or lightly protected targets 
such as hutments, billets, personnel and 
transport 
Light cased high charge-weight ratio 
bombs 
Submarines 
Baby incendiary Combustible targets such as stores of 
coal, gas or oil factories producing 
certain chemicals, explosives or other 
inflammable produce, dumps or buildings 
which have been opened up by H.E. 
 
In AP1300, targets were grouped roughly into the five classes according to their 
susceptibility to different types of bomb, as shown in the table above. 
 
 
                                                
1 From Air Ministry, AP 1300, Ch VIII, para 36. 
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ANNEX 7 - KEY PERSONALITY BIOGRAPHIES 
 
Postings which impact on Thesis highlighted in blue 
 
Biography - Air Chief Marshal Sir Norman Bottomley1 
1914 August Officer, 3rd Battalion, East Yorkshire Regiment  
1915 December U/T Pilot, 6 Reserve Squadron RFC 
1915 December U/T Pilot, 15 Reserve Squadron RFC  
1916 April 47 Squadron RFC (Beverley) 
1917 January Instructor, 50 Reserve Squadron RFC 
1917 April Instructor, British Flying School, Vendome 
1917 August Flight Commander, British Flying School, Vendome 
1919 August Awarded Permanent Commission as a Captain  
1919 November Staff Officer 2nd Class, HQ Northern Area 
1919 October Reverted to Aeroplane Officer from Staff Officer 
1920 April Staff Officer, HQ No 1 Group 
1921 March Air Staff, HQ Middle East Area 
1921 May Staff Officer, HQ Egyptian Group 
1921 November Staff Officer, HQ Middle East Area 
1922 December No 4 FTS 
1924 May Attended RAF Staff College 
1925 May Staff, Directorate of Operations and Intelligence 
1928 October Officer Commanding, 4 Squadron (Farnborough)  
1930 January Attended Imperial Defence College 
1930  December Directing Staff, RAF Staff College 
1934 Officer Commanding, Aircraft Park, Lahore 
1934 October Officer Commanding, No 1 (Indian) Group 
1938 February SASO, HQ Bomber Command 
1940 November AOC, No 5 Group - Bomber Command 
1941 June Deputy Chief of the Air Staff/ Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Ops) 
1945 September AOC-in-C, Bomber Command 
1947 January Inspector-General of the RAF 
                                                
1 http://www.rafweb.org/Biographies/Bottomley.htm. 
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Air Commodore Charles Beresford Eaton Burt-Andrews2 
1936 May Pilot, 2 Squadron, RAF Hawkinge (Audax)  
1937 March Pilot, 28 Squadron, Ambala (Audax)  
1937-1941 ? 
1941 June Air Staff, HQ Air Forces in India  
1942 December Officer Commanding, No 613 Squadron (Mustang I) 
1943 Served on Special Operations 
1945August Air Attaché, Warsaw 
1948 Attended RAF Staff College 
1951 January Director of Administration, HQ Air Forces Western Europe 
1951 January Secretary-General, HQ Allied Air Forces Central Europe 
1953 Directing Staff, RAF Staff College, Bracknell  
1955 Head of Far East Defence Secretariat 
1958 June Officer Commanding, RAF Bridgnorth 
1958 October Commandant, Royal Pakistan Air Force Staff College 
1962 January UK National Military Representative, SHAPE 
1965 April Deputy Commandant, RAF Staff College 
 
 
                                                
2 http://www.rafweb.org/Biographies/Burt-Andrews.htm. 
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Biography - Air Vice-Marshal A J Capel3 
1914 November Officer, Somerset Light Infantry 
1915 November Observer, 4 Squadron RFC 
1916 April Flight Commander, ? Squadron RFC 
1917 Flight Commander, 1 Squadron RFC (Western Front) 
1917 July Officer Commanding, 94 Squadron RFC 
1919 February Officer Commanding, 92 Squadron (Germany)  
1919 August Officer Commanding, 43 Squadron (Germany/Spittlegate)  
1919 December Staff, Ground Wing, RAF (Cadet) College 
1922 April Adjutant, HQ RAF Cranwell 
1923 January Instructor, RAF (Cadet) College 
1923 November Officer Commanding, 5 Squadron (Bristol F2B, India) 
1925 ‘Pink’s War’; captured by tribesmen and awarded DSO 
1929 March Senior Administrative Officer, School of Army Co-operation 
1931 January Attended Army Staff College, Camberley 
1933 January Staff, HQ 22 Group 
1934 December Directing Staff, Army Staff College, Camberley 
1936 July Commandant, School of Army Co-operation/OC, RAF Old Sarum  
1939 January Attended Imperial Defence College 
1939 Senior Air Staff Officer, HQ Air Component, British Expeditionary 
Force 
1940 June Director of Operational Training  
1941 March AOC, 20 (Training) Group 
1941 July Air Officer, Training, HQ Bomber Command 
 
                                                 
3 http://www.rafweb.org/Biographies/Capel.htm; see Imperial War Museum interviews at 
http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/80003152. 
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Biography - Air Commodore Sir John Chamier4 
1902 August Commissioned into Indian Staff Corps 
1904 January Officer, 33rd Punjabi Regiment, Indian Army 
1915 August Flying Officer, RFC 
1915 December Flight Commander, No 34 Sqn RFC? 
1916 January Officer Commanding, No 34 Sqn RFC, (BE2c/BE2e/RE8) 
1917 April Commandant, Wireless & Observation School 
1917 October Officer Commanding, Artillery and Infantry Co-operation School 
1919 August Staff Officer, Directorate of Operations and Intelligence 
1921 January Deputy Director of Operations and Intelligence 
1921-22 British delegate at Washington Disarmament Conference   
1922 Accompanied Sir John Salmond on Review of RAF in India 
1923 February Chief Staff Officer, HQ RAF India 
1927 May Deputy Director of Technical Development 
1927 December Director of Technical Development 
1928-32 Director on board of Vickers (Aviation) Ltd 
 Secretary, Air League of the British Empire 
1938 Commandant, Air Defence Cadet Corps  
1939 September HQ Balloon Command 
1941 February Commandant, Air Training Corps 
1943-44 Inspector of the Air Training Corps 
                                                
4 http://www.rafweb.org/Biographies/Chamier.htm. 
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Biography - Air Vice-Marshal Hugh Vivian Champion de Crespigny5 
1915 July Pilot, 11 Squadron RFC (Western Front)  
1916 January Flight Commander, 11 Squadron RFC (Western Front)  
1917 March Flight Commander, 60 Squadron RFC 
1917March Officer Commanding, 29 Squadron RFC (Western Front)  
1917 July Officer Commanding, 32 Training Depot Station 
1917 October Officer Commanding, 29 Squadron RFC (Western Front)  
1918June Officer Commanding, 65 Squadron (Western Front) 
1918 December Officer Commanding 65 Wing  
1919 January Officer Commanding 65 Wing 
1920 January Flight Commander, 97 (renumbered 60) Squadron (DH10, 
Risalpur)  
1922 March Officer Commanding, 60 Squadron (DH10, DH9, Risalpur)  
1924 February Staff/Instructor, 3 School of Technical Training 
1925 January Officer Commanding, 39 Squadron (DH9A, Wapiti, Spittlegate/ 
Risalpur)  
1930 January Officer Commanding, 2 (Indian) Wing Station, Risalpur  
1934 March Air Staff, HQ Inland Area 
1936 January Officer Commanding, 8 FTS  
1939 February AOC, 25 (Armament) Group 
1942 February AOC, Air HQ Iraq  
1943 January AOC, Air HQ Iraq and Persia 
1943 October AOC, 21 (Training) Group 
 
                                                 
5 http://www.rafweb.org/Biographies/Champion.htm. 
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Biography - Air Marshal Sir Lawrence ‘Johnny’ Darvall6 
1916 August Officer, The Green Howards.  
1916 November  Attached to 14th King's (Liverpool) Regiment (Salonika) 
1917 November Seconded to RFC (Macedonia) 
1919 December Supernumerary (Flying Duties), HQ RAF Halton 
1920 May Administrative Officer, HQ RAF Halton 
1921 November Granted Permanent RAF Commission 
1924 February Pilot, 20 Sqn (DH9A, Quetta, Peshawar, Kohat) 
1927 April QFI, 2 FTS 
1930 June Pilot/QFI, 504 Squadron 
1931 July Pilot/QFI, 500 Squadron 
1932 January RAF Staff College 
1933 January Air Staff, HQ Iraq Command 
1935 May Air Staff, Deputy Directorate of Operations (FO5, India) 
1939 April Officer Commanding, RAF Hawkinge 
1940 January Air Staff, Directorate of Plans 
1940 September Officer Commanding, 2 Flying Instructors School, RAFC Cranwell 
1942 March Deputy SASO, HQ Air Forces in India 
1943 Director of Air Transport Policy and Operations 
1944 September AOC, 46 Group 
1945 June AOC, 216 Group 
1946 July AOC, AHQ Italy 
1947 March AOC, 3 Group 
1949 January AOA, HQ Flying Training Command 
1950 February AOC, 23 Group 
1951 Commandant, Joint Services Staff College 
1953 November Commandant, NATO Defence College, Paris 
                                                
6 http://www.rafweb.org/Biographies/Darvall.htm. 
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Biography - Marshal of the RAF Sir Edward L Ellington7 
1897 September Commissioned, Royal Field Artillery 
1908 Attended War College, Portsmouth 
1909 August Staff  Capt, War Office 
1910 August GSO 3, War Office 
1912 November Secretary to the Air Committee 
1913 May GSO 2, Directorate of Military Aeronautics 
1913 December Attended Central Flying School  
1914 October Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, HQ BEF, France 
1915 March Assistant Adjutant & Quartermaster-General, 2nd Cavalry 
Division 
1915 July GSO 1, 2nd Army, BEF 
1916 February GSO 1, Department of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff 
1917 January General Staff, VIII Corps, France 
1917 November Deputy Director-General of Military Aeronautics 
1918 January Director-General of Military Aeronautics 
1918 April Acting Controller-General of Equipment 
1918 August Controller-General of Equipment 
1919 April Director-General of Supply and Research 
1919 August Awarded Permanent Commission as a Major-General  
1922 March AOC, Middle East 
1923 November AOC, RAF India 
1926 November AOC, Iraq Command 
1928 November Supernumerary, HQ Iraq Command 
1929 February AOC-in-C, Air Defence of Great Britain 
1931 September Air Member for Personnel 
1933 May Chief of the Air Staff 
1937 September Inspector-General of the RAF 
                                                
7 http://www.rafweb.org/Biographies/Ellington.htm. 
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Biography - Air Chief Marshal Sir Basil Embry8 
1921 March U/T pilot, No 1 FTS 
1922 May Pilot, 4 Squadron, Farnborough 
1922 September Pilot, 45 Squadron, Iraq 
1925 December Pilot, 30 Squadron, Iraq 
1927 December QFI, No 1 FTS 
1929 May 'D' Flight Commander, Central Flying School 
1932 January Air Staff, HQ No 23 Group 
1933 January RAF Staff College, Andover 
1934 February Staff, No 1 (Indian) Wing, Kohat 
1936 March  Air Staff, HQ RAF India 
1937 November Officer Commanding, No 20 Squadron, Peshawar/Miranshah 
1938 September HQ RAF India (training Indian officers for the IAF) 
1939 April Air Staff,  Deputy Directorate of Operations (Overseas) 
1939 September Officer Commanding, 107 Squadron, Wattisham 
1940 May Evading  capture 
1940 September SOA, HQ No 6 Group 
1940 October Air Staff, HQ Fighter Command 
1940 October Officer Commanding, Nightfighter Wing, Rochford 
1940 December  Officer Commanding, RAF Wittering 
1941 October Seconded on Special Duty to Middle East 
1941 December  Senior Air Staff Officer,  HQ Desert Air Force 
1942 January Officer Commanding, RAF Wittering & Sector 
1942 November Staff Officer - Night Fighter Operations, HQ Fighter Command 
1943 Senior Air Staff Officer, HQ No 10 Group 
1943 June AOC, No 2 Group 
1945 October Director-General of Training 
1947 January ACAS (Training) 
1949 April AOC-in-C, Fighter Command 
1953 July C-in-C, Allied Air Forces Central Europe  
                                                
8 http://www.rafweb.org/Biographies/Embry.htm; Jefford, RAF Squadrons: A Comprehensive 
Record of the Movement and Equipment of all RAF Squadrons and their Antecedents since 
1912. 
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Biography - Air Vice-Marshal Sir Philip Game9 
1895 November Officer, Royal Artillery 
1902 July Adjutant, Royal Artillery 
1908 January Attended Army Staff College 
1908 October Staff Captain Royal Artillery, 4th Division, Eastern Command 
1910 December General Staff Officer, War Office 
1913 September General Staff Officer, Directorate of Military Training  
1914 November General Staff Officer, HQ 4th Army Corps  
1915 July General Staff Officer, HQ 46th Division 
1916 March General Staff Officer, HQ RFC in the Field   
1916 October General Staff Officer, General Staff 
 Senior Staff Officer, HQ RFC in the Field   
1918 April Senior Staff Officer, HQ RAF in the Field  
1918 October GOC, South Western Area 
1919 March Director of Training and Organisation 
1922 December AOC, RAF India 
1923 November Air Member for Personnel 
 
                                                
9 http://www.rafweb.org/Biographies/Game.htm. 
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Biography - Marshal of the RAF Sir Arthur Harris10 
1914 October Bugler, 1st Rhodesian Regiment (South-West Africa)  
1916 January Pilot, 11 Reserve Squadron RFC 
1916 February Pilot, 19 Reserve Squadron RFC (Northolt)  
1916 March Flight Commander, 39 Squadron RFC (Hornchurch)  
1916 July Officer Commanding, 38 Squadron RFC (Castle Bromwich)  
1916 September Flight Commander, 70 Squadron RFC (Western Front)  
1917 March Flight Commander, 51 Squadron RFC (Hingham)  
1917 June Flight Commander, 45 Squadron RFC (Western Front)  
1917 August Officer Commanding (acting), 45 Squadron RFC 
1917 September Flight Commander, Pilot's Pool, Joyce Green 
1917 November Officer Commanding, 191 Squadron RFC/RAF (Marham)    
1918 June Officer Commanding, 44 Squadron (Hainault Farm)  
1918 December Officer Commanding, 50 Squadron (Harrietsham/Bekesbourne) 
1919 Officer Commanding, Brooklands 
1919 August Awarded Permanent Commission as a Major  
1920 April Officer Commanding, No 3 FTS, RAF Scopwick 
1921 January Officer Commanding, 31 Squadron (NWF India)  
1922 July Supernumerary, HQ RAF Iraq 
1922 November Officer Commanding, No 45 Squadron (Hinaidi)  
1924 October Supernumerary, RAF Depot  
1925 May Officer Commanding, No 58 Squadron (Worthy Down)  
1928 January Attended Army Staff College, Camberley 
1930 January Senior Staff Officer to AOC, Middle East Command 
1932 August Supernumerary, RAF Depot 
1932 October Flying Boat Pilot's Course, RAF Base Calshot 
1933 March Officer Commanding, RAF Pembroke Dock/No 210 Squadron 
1933 August Deputy Director of Operations and Intelligence 
1934 April Deputy Director of Plans 
1937 April Officer Commanding, No 4 Group 
1937 June AOC, No 4 Group  
1938 July AOC, Palestine and Transjordan 
1939 September AOC, No 5 Group, Bomber Command 
1940 November     Deputy Chief of the Air Staff 
1941 May Head of RAF Delegation to the USA 
1942 February AOC-in-C, Bomber Command 
                                                
10 http://www.rafweb.org/Biographies/Harris.htm. 
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Biography - Air Chief Marshal Sir Philip Joubert de la Ferte11 
1907 July Officer, Royal Field Artillery 
1913 March Appointed Flying Officer, RFC 
1913 April Pilot, No 2 Squadron RFC (Montrose)  
1913 June Pilot, No 3 Squadron RFC (Netheravon)  
1914 August Flight Commander, Squadron RFC. (Western Front)  
1915 May Officer Commanding, 15 Squadron RFC. (Hounslow/Dover)  
1915 August Officer Commanding, 1 Squadron RFC (Western Front)  
1916 January Officer Commanding, 33 Squadron RFC (Filton/Midlands/Yorkshire) 
1916 July Officer Commanding, 5th Wing RFC (Middle East)  
1917 Officer Commanding, 21st Wing RFC (Western Front?)  
1917 Officer Commanding, 14th (Army) Wing RFC (Western Front/Italy)  
1918 March Officer Commanding, RAF in Italy (No 6 Group?) 
1919 June Officer Commanding, No 2 (Training) Group 
1920 January Attended Army Staff College, Camberley 
1921 March Officer Commanding, MT Repair Depot, Harlescott 
1922 April Directing Staff, RAF Staff College 
1921 December Staff, Air Pilotage School 
1923 April Deputy Director of Personnel  
1924 May Deputy Director of Manning 
1926 May Chief Staff Officer, HQ Fighting Area 
1926 September Directing Staff, Imperial Defence College 
1929 December AOC, No 23 Group 
1930 September Commandant, RAF Staff College 
1934 January AOC, Fighting Area 
1936 July AOC, No 11 (Fighter) Group 
1936 September AOC-in-C, Coastal Command 
1937 September AOC, RAF India  
1938 December AOC, Air Forces in India 
1940 Air Adviser on Combined Operations 
1940 Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Radio) 
1941 June AOC-in-C, Coastal Command.  
1943 February Inspector-General of the RAF 
1943 November Deputy Chief of Staff (Information and Civil Affairs), SEAC  
1945 November Retired List 
1946-47 Director of Public Relation 
                                                
11 http://www.rafweb.org/Biographies/Joubert.htm. 
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Biography - Air Vice-Marshal E J Kingston-McClaughry12 
1915 Officer, Australian Engineers 
1916 December Pilot, 23 Squadron RFC 
1917 Flying Instructor 
1918 Flight Commander, 4 Squadron, Australia Flying Corps 
1922 December Student, School of Naval Co-operation 
1923 September Staff, School of Naval Co-operation 
1925 September Staff, Directorate of Scientific Research and Technical 
Development 
1927 September Attended RAF Staff College 
1929 April Air Staff, HQ RAF India 
1932 March Flight Commander, 20 Squadron 
1934 January Attended Army Staff College, Camberley 
1936 January Officer Commanding, 4 Squadron 
1937 March Chief Ground Instructor, RAF College 
1938 January Assistant Commandant, RAF College 
1939 January Staff, Deputy Directorate of War Organisation 
? Staff Officer, South Africa? 
1941 June Officer Commanding, Overseas Air Maintenance Control Unit? 
1941 August AOC, No 44 Group 
1943 December Chairman, Allied Expeditionary Air Force Bombing Committee 
1944 June Liaison Officer to Field Marshal Montgomery 
1944 October Air Staff, India 
1945 Air Member, Tuker Frontier Committee  
1946 April SASO, India 
1947 January AOC, No 18 Group 
1948 January SASO, HQ Fighter Command 
1950 January AOC, No 38 Group 
1951 Chief Air Defence Officer, MoD 
 
                                                
12 http://www.rafweb.org/Biographies/Kingston-McClaughry.htm; 
http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/mccloughry-edgar-james-7788. 
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Biography - Air Chief Marshal Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt13 
1905 August Officer, 1st Battalion Royal Irish Rifles  
1914 August U/T Pilot, Central Flying School 
1914 September Flying Officer, RFC 
1914 November Flight Commander, 1 Sqn RFC (Farnborough/Western Front)  
1915 September Officer Commanding, 15 Sqn RFC (Western Front)  
1915 November Officer Commanding, 3 Sqn RFC (Western Front)  
1916 February Officer Commanding, 3rd (Corps) Wing RFC 
1917 October Brigadier-General Commanding, ? Brigade 
1917 November Inspector of Training, HQ Training Division  
1918 April GOC, Training Division 
1918 May GOC, X Brigade  
1918 Chief Staff Officer, HQ RAF in France 
1919 June Deputy Director of Training 
1919 August Awarded Permanent Commission as a Lieutenant Colonel 
1921 July Air ADC to The King 
1922 February Air Secretary to the Secretary of State for Air 
1923 October President of the Aerodrome Board 
1925 October Attended RN Staff College 
1926 March Commandant, RAF Staff College  
1930 September Placed on half pay list 
1930 October AOC, Iraq Command 
1932 September Supernumerary, RAF Depot 
1932 December Placed on half pay list 
1933 February Director of Operations and Intelligence/DCAS  
1935 February Placed on half pay list 
1935 March AOC, RAF in India 
1937 September AOC-in-C, Bomber Command 
1940 April Inspector-General of the RAF 
                                                
13 http://www.rafweb.org/Biographies/Ludlow-Hewitt.htm. 
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Biography - Air Vice-Marshal Sir Norman McEwen14 
1901 March Princess Louise's (Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders)  
 Station Staff Officer, Transvaal & Cape Colony 
1909 August Adjutant, 6th (Renfrewshire) Battalion, Princess Louise's (Argyll 
and Sutherland Highlanders) 
1915 August ADC, GOC Southern Command 
1916 February Seconded to RFC 
1916 April Adjutant, Central Flying School 
1916 August Deputy Assistant Director of Aeronautics    
1917 April Chief of Staff, RFC Middle East  
1918 April Colonel (Administration), HQ South-Eastern Area 
1918 August Brigadier-General (Administration), HQ South-Eastern Area 
1919 May GOC, RAF in Afghanistan 
1919 OC, RAF India 
1920 May Commandant, Flying Instructors School 
1920 April Commandant, Central Flying School 
1923 April Officer Commanding, RAF Transjordan 
1926 May Deputy Director of Training 
1929 April AOC, 22 Group  
1931 October AOC, HQ RAF Halton 
1935 Commandant, Central Flying School 
1939 September AOC, 22 Group 
1941- 43 Regional Air Liaison Officer (Retd) 
 
                                                
14http://www.rafweb.org/Biographies/MacEwen_NDK.htm. 
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Biography - General Sir Sydney Frederick Muspratt 
1898 Commissioned into Indian Staff Corps 
1900 April  12th Cavalry, India 
1906 June Staff Captain Intelligence, Army HQ, India 
1908 Mohmand and Zakka Khel expeditions 
1914 September General Staff Officer, France and Belgium 
1920 November Deputy Director (Intelligence), Army HQ, India 
1920 December 12th Cavalry, India 
1922 February Staff Officer, War Office 
1925 November Brigade Commander, 4th Indian Infantry Brigade 
1927 November Director of Military Operations, Indian Army HQ 
1929 December Deputy CGS(India) and Director of Staff Duties, Indian Army HQ 
1931 Military Secretary to the India Office 
1933 November GOC Peshawar District 
1935 Mohmands Campaign 
1937-41 Military Secretary to the India Office 
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Biography - Air Marshal Sir Richard Peck15 
1914 December Officer, 11th Battalion, East Surrey Regiment 
1915 November Appointed Flying Officer, RFC 
1916 June Flight Commander, ? Squadron RFC 
1917 August Officer Commanding, ? Squadron RFC 
1918 March Officer Commanding, 117 Squadron RFC/RAF 
1918 December School of Wireless Telegraphy 
1919 July CFI, Netheravon Flying Training School 
1919 August Awarded Permanent Commission as a Major 
1919 December CFI, 1 FTS 
1922 May Air Staff, HQ Iraq Command  
1924 May Officer Commanding, No 84 Squadron (DH9A, Shaibah)  
1926 January Attended Army Staff College, Camberley 
1927 November Air Staff, Deputy Director of Plans 
1930 December Supernumerary, HQ Coastal Area (attached from DD Plans) 
1931 August Air Staff, Directorate of Operations and Intelligence 
1932 January Officer Commanding, 3 FTS 
1933 January Attended Imperial Defence College 
1934 January Deputy Director of Operations and Intelligence  
1936 January SASO, HQ RAF India 
 Acting AOC, RAF India 
1939 March Director of Operations 
1939 September Director-General of Operations 
1940 February Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (General) 
 
During most of the last war he was the anonymous "Air Ministry spokesman" who 
gave information on RAF affairs to members of the Press. 
 
                                                
15 http://www.rafweb.org/Biographies/Peck.htm; 
https://www.flightglobal.com/FlightPDFArchive/1952/1952%20-%202755.PDF. 
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Biography - Air Chief Marshal Sir George Pirie16 
1916 May Flying Officer (Observer), RFC 
1916 September Transferred to Machine Gun Corps; seconded to RFC 
1917 April  Flight Commander, 34 Squadron RFC (RE8, Italy)  
1918 March Squadron Commander, RFC 
1918 July Officer Commanding, 6 Squadron (RE8, Western Front)  
1920 June HQ Mesopotamian Wing 
1921 May Staff, Inspector of Recruiting 
1922 March Attended School of Army Co-operation 
1922 May Flight Commander, 4 Squadron (F2B, RAF Farnborough) 
1922 September Air Staff duties, HQ Inland Area 
1924 May Attended RAF Staff College 
1925 April Air Staff, Directorate of Operations and Intelligence 
1926 December Attended Imperial Defence College 
1928 January Air Staff - Intelligence, HQ Iraq Command 
1929 May Officer Commanding, 10 Squadron (Hinaidi, RAF Upper Heyford)  
1930 January Directing Staff, RAF Staff College 
1933 June Officer Commanding, RAF Tangmere 
1936 September Deputy Director of Operations 
1937 October Air Attaché, Washington    
1941 August AOC, RAF in Northern Ireland  
1941 September AOA, HQ Middle East Command 
1943 April Director of War Organisation 
1943 July Director-General of Organisation 
1945 July Deputy Air C-in-C, Air Command South East Asia  
1946 April AOC-in-C, Air Command South East Asia  
1946 November AOC-in-C, Air Command Far East  
1948 January Inspector-General of the RAF 
1948 September Air Member for Supply and Organisation  
1950 March Head of RAF Staff, British Joint Services Mission – Washington 
 
                                                
16 http://www.rafweb.org/Biographies/Pirie.htm; Jefford, RAF Squadrons: A Comprehensive 
Record of the Movement and Equipment of all RAF Squadrons and their Antecedents since 
1912. 
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Biography - Marshal of the RAF Sir John Salmond17 
1901 March Officer, King's Own Royal Lancashire Regiment (South Africa) 
1903 November Officer, West African Frontier Force 
1904 April Seconded to Colonial Office 
1907 April Territorial Battalion of Royal Lancashire Regiment 
1912 August Wings Course, Central Flying School 
1912 November D Flight Commander, Central Flying School 
1913 May Squadron Commander, Central Flying School 
1914 May Officer Commanding, 7 Squadron (Farnborough)  
1914 August Officer Commanding, 3 Squadron (Western Front)  
1915 April Officer Commanding, Administrative Wing, Farnborough 
1915 Officer Commanding, Advanced Wing/2nd Wing RFC  
1916 February Brigadier-General Commanding, II then V Brigade RFC  
1916 March Brigadier-General Commanding, VI Brigade RFC  
1916 July Brigadier-General Commanding, Training Brigade RFC  
1917 August GOC, Training Division  
1917 October Director-General of Military Aeronautics, War Office 
1918 January GOC, RFC in the Field 
1918 April GOC, RAF in the Field 
1919 May Officer Commanding, Rhine HQ 
1919 August Awarded Permanent Commission as a Major-General  
1919 August AOC, South-Eastern Area?  
1919 September AOC, Southern Area 
1920 April AOC, Inland Area 
1922 May Special Duties, India 
1922 October GOC/AOC, Iraq Command 
1924 October Placed on half pay list 
1925 January AOC-in-C, Air Defence of Great Britain 
1928 May Loaned to Australian Government 
1929 January Air Member for Personnel  
1930 January Chief of the Air Staff  
1933 April Relinquished his appointment as CAS 
1933 April Additional (temporary) member of the Air Council 
1933 May Relinquished appointment as additional (temporary) member of 
the Air Council 
 
                                                
17 http://www.rafweb.org/Biographies/SalmondJ.htm. 
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Biography - Air Chief Marshal Sir W Geoffrey H Salmond18 
1898 June Officer, Royal Artillery (South Africa - 1899-1902)  
1900 November Seconded for service in China (Boxer Rebellion)  
1907 July Supernumerary Captain, Royal Field Artillery 
1908 February Adjutant, Royal Field Artillery 
1911 January Attended Army Staff College, Camberley 
1913 April – 1914 August RFC Reserve 
1913 July General Staff Officer, War Office 
1913 August General Staff Officer, Directorate of Military Aeronautics 
1914 August General Staff Officer, HQ RFC - France 
1915 January Officer Commanding, 1 Squadron RFC 
1915 November Officer Commanding, 5th Wing RFC, Middle East 
1916 July Brigadier-General Commanding, Middle East Brigade, 
RFC 
1917 October GOC, HQ RFC Middle East/Palestine Brigade 
1917 November Recalled to England  
1918 January GOC, RFC Middle East  
1918 April GOC/AOC,  Middle East Area 
1919 August Awarded Permanent Commission as a Major-General  
1922 February Director-General of Supply and Research 
1923 Air Member for Supply and Research 
1926 December AOC, RAF India 
1931 February Supernumerary, HQ RAF India 
1931 September AOC-in-C, Air Defence of Great Britain 
1933 April Chief of the Air Staff 
 
                                                
18 http://www.rafweb.org/Biographies/SalmondW.htm. 
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Biography - Marshal of the RAF Sir John Slessor19 
1915 June Pilot training, Brooklands  
1915 July Pilot, 14 Squadron, RFC (Shoreham)  
1915 September Pilot, 23 Squadron, RFC (Gosport)  
1915 December Pilot, 17 Squadron RFC (BE2c, Egypt/Sudan)  
1916 December Flight Commander, 58 Squadron RFC (Cramlington)  
1917 April Flight Commander, 5 Squadron RFC (BE2, RE8, Western Front)  
1918 February Artillery and Infantry Co-operation Officer, HQ No 28 Wing 
1918 July Officer Commanding, 'A' Squadron - Central Flying School 
1918 August Assistant/Acting Commandant, Central Flying School 
1919 Station Commander, Druid's Lodge  
1919 Officer Commanding, 14 (Training) Squadron 
1919 Officer Commanding, 201 Squadron 
1920 February Flight Commander, No 1 Flying Training School 
1921 May Flight Commander, 20 Squadron (F2B, Parachinar/Ambala)  
1923 February Staff, Directorate of Training and Staff Duties 
1924 May Attended RAF Staff College 
1925 April Officer Commanding, No 4 Squadron (F2B, Farnborough)  
1928 Oct Air Staff - Plans, Directorate of Operations and Intelligence 
1930 October Staff, School of Army Co-operation 
1931 January Attended Army Staff College, Camberley 
1932 January Directing Staff, Army Staff College, Camberley 
1935 March Officer Commanding No 3 (Indian) Wing, Quetta 
1937 May Air Staff, Deputy Director of Plans 
1938 December Air Staff, Director of Plans 
1941 May AOC, No 5 Group - Bomber Command 
1942 April Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Policy) 
1943 February AOC-in-C Coastal Command 
1944 January Deputy Air C-in-C, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces/                    
C-in-C, RAF Mediterranean and Middle East 
1945 April Air Member for Personnel  
1948 January Commandant, Imperial Defence College 
1950-53 January Chief of the Air Staff 
                                                
19 http://www.rafweb.org/Biographies/Slessor.htm. 
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Biography - Air Chief Marshal Sir John Steel20 
1897 Officer, Royal Navy 
1912 Officer, Grand Fleet 
1914 February 2 i/c, HMS Conqueror (Battle of Jutland)  
1917 February Officer Commanding, RNAS Eastchurch 
1918 Officer Commanding, No 58 Wing - Eastchurch 
1918 April GOC, No 8 Group 
1918 November Officer Commanding, No 29 Group 
1919 Director of Air Division, Admiralty 
1919 August Awarded Permanent Commission as a Colonel  
1919 September Director of Operations and Intelligence 
1920 January Awarded Permanent Commission in RAF  
1926 April AOC, Wessex Bombing Area 
1931 February AOC, RAF India 
1935 July Half pay list 
1935 August AOC-in-C, Air Defence of Great Britain 
1936 July AOC-in-C, Bomber Command 
1937 September Retired List  
1939 August AOC, Reserve Command 
1940 May Retired List 
1941 April Controller-General of Economy, Air Ministry 
1945 September Retired List 
                                                
20 http://www.rafweb.org/Biographies/Steel.htm. 
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Biography – General (Air Vice-Marshal) Sir Ivo Vesey21 
1897 February Officer, The Queen's (Royal West Surrey Regiment) 
1899-1902 Served during Second Boer War 
1909 January Attended Staff College, Camberley 
1911 June The Queen's (Royal West Surrey Regiment) 
1911 August Brigade Major, 18th Brigade, Northern Command 
1913 October General Staff Officer, Directorate of Staff Duties 
1914 November Assistant Military Secretary 
1917 May Assistant Adjutant-General, War Office 
1917 Dec Deputy Director of Organisation (War Office) 
1919 June Director of Recruiting and Organisation (War Office) 
1923 June Colonel on the Staff i/c Admin 
1923 August Temporarily commission as Air Vice-Marshal22 
1923 August Director of Organisation and Staff Duties (Air Ministry) 
1928 September Reverted to the Army 
1930 April GOC, 48th South Midland Division, Territorial Army 
1931 June Director of Staff Duties (War Office) 
1935 June GOC in C, Western Command, India 
1936 March GOC in C, Southern Command, India 
1937-39 Chief of the General Staff, Indian Army 
1939-45 Colonel, 2nd (The Queen's Royal) Regiment of Foot 
 Battalion Commander, Home Guard  
 
 
                                                
21 http://www.rafweb.org/Biographies/Vesey.htm. 
22 For the background of Vesey’s secondment to the Air Ministry, see Hyde, British Air Policy 
Between the Wars, 141. 
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Biography - Air Vice-Marshal Sir Tom Webb-Bowen23 
1899 May Officer, Bedfordshire Regiment 
1906 November Adjutant, Madras Volunteer Corps 
1908 Supernumerary Captain, The Bedfordshire Regiment 
1909 February Reinstated to the establishment of The Bedfordshire Regiment 
1909 April Adjutant, The Bedfordshire Regiment 
1912 April Attended 'Wings' Course, CFS 
1912 December Flight Commander, 4 Squadron RFC 
1913 June Instructor, Central Flying School 
1914 August Assistant Commandant, CFS 
1915 March Officer Commanding, 2 Squadron RFC (Western Front)  
1915 May Officer Commanding, No 3 Wing RFC 
1916 February Brigadier-General Commanding, II Brigade RFC 
1917 November Brigadier-General Commanding, VII Brigade RFC (Italy)  
1918 April Brigadier-General Commanding, II Brigade 
1919 February GOC/AOC, South Eastern Area  
1919 September AOC India 
1923 April AOC, No 3 Group 
1924 March AOC Inland Area 
1926 November AOC Middle East 
1930 January Air Member for Personnel 
1931 September AOC, Wessex Bombing Area 
1933-1938 Retired 
1938 Commandant, Cambridge District, RAF Volunteer Reserve 
1939 October Duty Air Commodore, Ops Room, HQ Fighter Command 
 
                                                
23 http://www.rafweb.org/Biographies/Webb-Bowen.htm. 
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Biography - General Sir Roger Wilson 
1901 Commissioned, Cheshire Regiment 
1904 Transferred to 117th Mahrattas 
1904-1926 ? 
1926 Commander, Wana Brigade 
1931 Commandant, Staff College, Quetta 
1934 GOC Rawalpindi District 
1936 Military Secretary to the India Office 
1937 Adjutant-General, Indian Army 
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ANNEX 8 - GROUND-TO-AIR ‘DIRECTION ARROW’1 
 
                                                 
1 Army Staff College, "Mountain Warfare Ex, 1933": 76. 
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ANNEX 9 – DEVELOPMENT OF ARMY STAFF COLLEGE 
MOUNTAIN WARFARE EXERCISE AIR COMMENTS 
 
1929 – Lieutenant Colonel B H Matheson1 
 
 
1933 – Lieutenant Colonel J G Smyth2 
 
 
1935 – Lieutenant Colonel W J Slim 3 
 
 
1937 – Lieutenant Colonel H R Swinburn4 
 
Names refer to Indian Army Directing Staff responsible for writing the Exercise. 
                                                 
1 ———, "Mountain Warfare Ex, 1929": 25. 
2 ———, "Mountain Warfare Ex, 1933": 27. 
3 Camberley Army Staff College, "Mountain Warfare Exercise", Senior Division Directing Staff 
Lecture Notes  (1935): 27. 
4 Army Staff College, "Mountain Warfare Ex, 1937": 35. 
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ANNEX 10 – PINK’S WAR OPERATIONAL STATISTICS – MARCH-APRIL 1925 
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ANNEX 11 - EXAMINATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE RAF AS A SEPARATE SERVICE 
BETWEEN 1917 AND 19291 
 
NO INVESTIGATING BODY DATE OF FINDING/DECISION 
1 Committee on Air Organisation July 1917 
2 War Cabinet August 1917 
3 Lord Balfour’s Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence July 1921 
4 Committee on National Expenditure (‘Geddes Committee’) December 1921 
5 Cabinet of the Day (following a detailed examination by a special Cabinet Sub-Committee) March 1922 
6 Committee on the Amalgamation of Services common to the Navy, Army and Air Force January 1923 
7 Cabinet of the Day March 1923 
8 Sub-Committee of National and Imperial Defence July 1923 
9 Cabinet of the Day July 1923 
10 Committee of the Navy, Army and Air Force Expenditure (‘Colwyn Committee’) December 1925 
 
 
                                                 
1 From Secretary of State for Air, CP 365(29). 
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ANNEX 12 - MADDA KHEL WARNING NOTICE, FEBRUARY 
19391 
 
 
                                                
1 AOC RAF India, Summary of Work No 243, 18. 
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ANNEX 13 – EXTRACTS FROM 1928 ‘INSTRUCTIONS 
REGARDING THE EMPLOYMENT OF AEROPLANES ON THE 
NORTH-WEST FRONTIER OF INDIA’1 
 
 
‘Paragraph 2.  Definition of “air action” – The various forms that “air action” may take are 
defined as follows:- 
 
(a)  Reconnaissance. – This does not include any offensive action nor does it commit the 
Government of India in any way to offensive action.  It is merely a protective measure 
taken when the situation demands as an insurance against surprise. 
 
(b)  Demonstration. – This is not offensive action nor does it commit Government to such 
action, but its employment is a question of policy and is not dictated by the immediate 
military requirements of the troops or other Government forces. 
 
(c)  Local air offensive. – Action taken in this category is purely of an emergency nature for 
the immediate protection of troops or other Government forces. 
 
(d)  Warning. – This is quite distinct from a “demonstration” and although it does not include 
offensive action, it definitely commits the Government of India to such action if the 
warning is ignored or is not considered to have achieved its object. 
 
(e)  General air offensive. – Such action definitely commits the Government of India to a 
war of a major or minor character. 
 
Paragraph 3.  Air action which does not require the previous sanction of the Government of 
India – 
 
(a)  Air Reconnaissance. – When political or military information indicates that bodies of 
tribesmen are on the move or collecting with hostile intent so as to constitute an 
immediate threat to military or civil forces, air reconnaissance may be called for by 
any of the civil or military forces specified in Appendix A without reference to higher 
authority. 
 
(b)  Air Demonstrations. – These can be ordered by the civil officials mentioned in Appendix 
B on whom will rest the responsibility for calling out aeroplanes for this purpose. 
 
(c)  Local Air offensive action. – This can be taken under the following circumstances: -  
 
(i)  In all cases where tribesmen are sniping or offering active opposition to any body of 
regular troops.  In such cases aeroplanes may act offensively against such 
tribesmen without reference to Army Headquarters.  It must, however, be 
understood that action in such cases is to be confined to the tribesmen actually 
engaged.  Responsibility for employing aeroplanes offensively on such occasions 
rests on the general Officer Commanding District concerned who may delegate this 
responsibility to selected subordinate Commanders. 
 
(ii)  Similarly, where scouts, militia or Frontier Constabulary are seriously engaged by 
hostile tribesmen, the responsibility for employing aeroplanes on such occasions 
rests with the Political authorities under whom the civil forces are acting.  As in the 
case of regular troops, action is to be confined to the tribesmen actually engaged. 
 
Paragraph 4.  Air action which requires the previous sanction of the Government of India. – 
 
                                                
1  Army Department, Instructions Regarding the Employment of Aeroplanes on the NWF, 1928. 
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Warnings and offensive air action. – When land operations are not in progress, warnings of 
offensive action or general offensive action [as opposed to local offensive air action 
as already defined...] requires the previous sanction of the Government of India...’. 
 
Paragraph 6.  Use of Bombs. – In all cases in which offensive action is authorised under these 
orders or is authorised by the Government of India, such action includes bombing and is 
not confined to the fire of automatic or other weapons. 
 
 
 APPENDIX A 
 
List of authorities who may call for air reconnaissance without reference to higher authority. 
1.  Military –  
GOC-in-C, Northern Command. 
GOC-in-C, Western Command. 
GOC, Peshawar District. 
GOC, Kohat District. 
GOC, Waziristan District. 
2.  GOC-in-C, Northern Command and GOC-in-C, Western Command may, at their 
discretion, delegate their authority to any selected subordinate Commanders. 
3.  Civil – 
Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province. 
Resident in Waziristan. 
Agent to the Governor General, Baluchistan. 
And such Deputy Commissioners and Political Agents as the above officials may wish to 
delegate this authority to. 
4.  Whenever possible, the ordinary channels of communication will be adhered to and 
every opportunity will be taken for consultation between the civil, military and Royal Air 
Force authorities concerned.  The sanction to dispense with reference to higher authority is 
accorded solely to avoid delay in an emergency. 
 
 
APPENDIX B 
 
Air Demonstration can only be called for by :- 
Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province. 
Resident in Waziristan. 
Agent to the Governor General, Baluchistan. 
ANNEX 14 – 1931 NWF Instructions 
462 
ANNEX 14 – EXTRACTS FROM 1931 ‘PROVISIONAL 
INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING THE CONTROL OF OPERATIONS 
INCLUDING THE EMPLOYMENT OF AIR FORCES ON THE 
NORTH-WEST FRONTIER OF INDIA’1 
 
 
‘4.  In applying these principles in times of peace the following procedure which does not 
require the previous sanction of the Government of India will be followed :- 
 
(a) Civil Armed Forces. – The normal watch and ward duties of the civil armed forces will 
continue to be controlled by the Political authorities as heretofore including the 
rounding up of outlaws, laying ambushes for raiders or un-runners, intercepting 
raiding gangs and baramta[2] against hostile tribes. 
      Such activities of these forces are not operations within the definition of paragraph 5 
below. 
 
(b) Air Reconnaissance. – This does not include any offensive action nor does it commit the 
Government of India in any way to offensive action. 
It is merely a protective measure, taken when the situation demands, as an insurance 
against surprise.  The military or civil authorities mentioned below may call for an air 
reconnaissance without reference to higher authority :- 
(i) Civil – 
Chief Commissioner, N.W.F.P. 
Resident in Waziristan. 
Agent to the Governor General, Baluchistan, 
and such Deputy Commissioners and Political Agents as the above officials may 
wish to delegate this authority to. 
(ii) Military – 
General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Northern Command. 
General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Command. 
General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Peshawar District. 
General Officer Commanding, Kohat District. 
General Officer Commanding, Waziristan District. 
(iii) General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Northern Command and General Officer 
Commanding-in-Chief, Western Command, may, at their discretion, delegate their 
authority to any selected subordinate Commander. 
(iv) Air reconnaissance shall not be called for by any military authority except after 
consultation with the political officer concerned. 
(v) Whenever possible, the ordinary channels of communication will be adhered to and 
every opportunity will be taken for consultation between the civil, military and Royal 
Air Force authorities concerned.  The sanction to dispense with reference to higher 
authority is accorded solely to avoid delay in an emergency. 
                                                
1 Ibid. 
2 The Pashtun word baramta refers to the recovery or restitution of property, etc.  Under 
baramta, hostages are held to ransom till the accused returns the claimed property. 
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(c) Air Demonstration. – This is not offensive action nor does it commit Government to such 
action. 
Its employment is a question of policy and is not dictated by the immediate military 
requirements of the troops or other Government forces. 
It can be ordered by the undermentioned civil officials on whom will rest the responsibility 
for calling out aeroplanes for this purpose :- 
Chief Commissioner, N.W.F.P. 
Resident in Waziristan. 
Agent to the Governor General, Baluchistan, 
(d) Should any unforeseen emergency arise such as the sniping of or the offering of active 
opposition to any force, whether irregular or regular, by the tribesmen, the authority 
under whom the civil forces are acting or in the case of a regular force the District 
Commander may call for air assistance without reference to higher authority.  In such 
cases aeroplanes may take offensive action provided such action is confined to the 
tribesmen actually engaged. 
For the above purpose calls for air assistance will be made to the nearest Wing 
Commander, Royal Air Force, or to the Officer Commanding, squadron or 
detachment, Royal Air Force, if the nearest Royal Air Force unit is a detached 
squadron or portion of a squadron.  Such calls will be repeated through the usual 
channels to superior authority, political, military and Royal Air Force[...] 
(f) Retaliation against rifle fire from the ground. – When aeroplanes carrying out any of the 
duties described above are subjected to deliberate and definitely hostile fire from the 
ground and the individuals responsible for such firing can be clearly discerned, they 
may, in the absence of specific instructions to the contrary issued beforehand by 
competent authority, retaliate in their own defence with machine gun fire or bombs 
against such individuals.  This action must not be taken indiscriminately and is never 
to be used against villages. 
5.  When a more serious situation arises involving offensive action not provided for in 
paragraph 4 such action will be classified as “an operation” and will require the orders of the 
Government of India as soon as they can be obtained. 
6.  Operations fall into two classes :- 
(1)  those which are deliberately undertaken against the tribes, 
(2)  those which are forced upon the local officers by tribal action. 
7.  In dealing with operations forced upon them by tribal action local officers of all services, 
political, military and air will – 
(a)  consult together as fully as circumstances allow, 
(b)  make the best arrangements that the means at their disposal admit, 
(c)  report the facts and submit their recommendations to higher authority as fully and 
promptly as they can. 
8.  In such cases or where the deliberate initiation of operations is advocated, the 
Government of India, on receipt of a recommendation from the Chief Commissioner, North-
West Frontier Province or Agent to the Governor General, Baluchistan which is made in the 
manner prescribed in paragraph 9 below, will decide whether operations are to be undertaken, 
or continued if they are already in progress, and specify the general objective. 
9.  The following procedure will be observed :- 
(i) Whenever the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province or Agent to the 
Governor General, Baluchistan, either on receipt of a report from an officer 
subordinate to him or of his own motion, is of opinion that operations whether by 
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land, or air or both should be undertaken against a tribal enemy in the area for 
which he is responsible, he shall after consultation with the appropriate military and 
air Commander, forward his recommendation by telegram to the Secretary to the 
Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, repeating to the 
Secretary to the Government of India in the Army Department. 
(ii) The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department on 
receipt of such recommendations will at once bring it to the notice of the 
Government of India and the Secretary to the Government of India in the Army 
Department will similarly bring it to the notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-
Chief and inform the General and Air Staffs. 
(iii) When the Government of India have decided that operations are to be undertaken, 
control of those operations vests automatically in His Excellency the Commander-
in-Chief who has power to delegate control of operations to such officer as he may 
select. 
(iv) “Control” of operations includes the selection of local objectives with the concurrence 
of the political authorities, the initial framing of the plan, the selection of the forces 
required to carry out that plan, the dispositions of these forces both in the initial 
stage and subsequently in order to deal with developments as they arise, and the 
allocation of tasks to the several components of the force. 
(v) Such delegation of control does not transfer to the officer selected either the 
executive command of units of another service or give him power to interfere with 
the methods adopted by executive commanders of such units to carry out the tasks 
assigned to them. 
(vi) Should the operation entail offensive action of land forces, whether regular or 
irregular, with or without the co-operation of aircraft His Excellency the 
Commander-in-Chief will normally delegate the control of such operations to a 
Military Commander. 
(vii) Should an objective be beyond the reach of land forces and necessitate air action, 
His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief will normally delegate the control of such 
operations to the Air Officer Commanding with whom the military forces will co-
operate as required. 
10.  Air Action against villages must never be undertaken except after due warning as in 
paragraph 11 below and with the previous sanction of the Government of India. 
11.  Warnings. – These are quite distinct from “demonstrations” [paragraph 4 (c)] and 
although they do not include offensive action, they definitely commit the Government of India to 
such action if the warning is ignored or is not considered to have achieved its object.  These 
require the previous sanction of the Government of India.  The normal minimum  period of a 
warning is 24 hours. 
12.  In order that the fullest use may be made of the air arm, to act rapidly in any direction 
that may be required, central control is necessary, and the control of squadrons, other than 
those detailed to co-operate with the land forces, will not normally be delegated except for a 
definite and limited operation. 
13.  Prohibited Flying Zone During Operations. - ... 
Unless a state of war with Afghanistan exists or unless the Government of India’s sanction 
has been accorded in a special emergency, no tribal air operation justifies the violation or the 
risk of violation of the Afghan Frontier.  The serious political consequences which are liable to 
result from such infringement should be strongly impressed on all concerned and in no 
circumstances may the prohibited zone be entered by aircraft without the special permission of 
the Government of India.’ 
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ANNEX 15 - RAF INDIA MONTHLY SUMMARY STATISTICS - WAZIRISTAN OPERATIONS – 1937-391 
 
 
Percentage of body of text of RAF India monthly General Summaries of Work dedicated to operations in Waziristan 
Number of pages of RAF India monthly General Summaries of Work dedicated to operations in Waziristan 
                                                 
1 Graph of Waziristan flying hours from AOC RAF India, Summary of Work No 247, 9.  Additional data from Summaries of Work, 1936 to 1939. 
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ANNEX 16 - AIR STAFF ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE FORMS OF 
‘FRIGHTFULNESS’ - 19221 
 
The Air Staff believed as early as 1922 that the pacification of the trans-Frontier 
tribes depended less on destruction than on affecting their morale via aerial-delivered 
coercive effects.  Following his report on the RAF in India in August 1922,2 AVM Sir 
John Salmond believed that the effect would be enhanced by employing a variety of 
methods (of varying lethality) to maintain the impact of novelty for as long as 
possible.3  The Deputy Director of Operations and Intelligence, Group Captain John 
Chamier, prepared a list of possible ‘forms of annoyance’ for DCAS (Air Commodore 
John Steel).4  These were passed to the Director of Research (D of R) for a technical 
(rather than ethical) assessment.5   
 
The methods described below were considered during the 1922 study.  The 
information was deemed sufficiently sensitive that the file was closed for 75 years. 
 
Long Delay Bombs.  With a delay of several hours, long delay bombs were intended 
to deter villagers from returning to their homes at night when night bombing was 
impossible.6  Eighteen-hour delays were being trialed in Iraq.7 
 
Phosphorus Bombs.  It was thought that time-fused phosphorus bombs, which 
produced a 200-yard ‘umbrella’ of burning pellets should produce great moral results if 
used sparingly.  However, the bombs were considered to be too dangerous to handle 
or carry on aircraft due to the risk of fire, especially during crash landings.8  
Additionally, there were technical difficulties in developing the required time fuses to 
detonate the bomb at a given height above the ground, whatever the release height, 
allowing 80% of the phosphorous to be expended before it landed.  Deployed in this 
manner, they were assessed to cause little physical damage and were very much a 
‘show bomb’.9  The D of R assessed that it might take up to a year to develop an 
acceptable bomb, but overall did not favour them.10 
 
War Rockets.  Multi-rocket salvos were thought to be useful for searching scrub and 
for making tribesmen move.11  However, ensuring simultaneous ignition was 
complicated and difficult.  Additionally, it was thought that the novelty of shock might 
not last long.12  The D of R thought rockets would be impractical to employ, ‘In other 
words, are they worth while?’13 
 
                                                
1 Suggested Systems of Attack Against Uncivilised Tribes. 
2 Salmond, 1922 Report on RAF India. 
3 AIR 5/264, Group Captain J A Chamier, Minute, Deputy Director, Operations and Intelligence, 
to Deputy Chief of the Air Staff 1922. 
4 Chamier became Senior Air Staff Officer at HQ RAF India in 1923.  See his biography in 
Annex 7. 
5 AIR 5/264, Group Captain J A Chamier, Minute, Deputy Director, Operations and Intelligence, 
to Director of Research, 18 December 1922; Chamier, DD Ops & Intel to DCAS, 1922. 
6 Chamier, Forms of "Frightfulness". 
7 AIR 5/264, Forms of Frightfulness: Enclosure 2(A),  1922. 
8 ———, Forms of "Frightfulness". 
9 Forms of Frightfulness: Enclosure 2(A). 
10 Bagnall-Wild, Minute, D of R to DDOI, 18 December 1922. 
11 Chamier, Forms of "Frightfulness". 
12 Forms of Frightfulness: Enclosure 2(A). 
13 Bagnall-Wild, Minute, D of R to DDOI, 18 December 1922. 
Annex 16 - Air Staff Analysis of Possible Forms of ‘Frightfulness’ - 1922 
467 
Crow’s Feet.  Also known as “cal throps”, these lightweight, four-pointed metal spikes 
were originally designed for making fords impassable for cavalry, but were thought to 
be able to lame cattle if dropped in thousands on hillside paths.14 
 
Aerial Darts.  Although aerial darts were trialed but discarded during the FWW, 
Chamier nevertheless proposed that a single aircraft could carry 10,000 ‘whistling’ 
darts would have a significant moral and physical effect against tribesmen hiding in 
nullahs and scrub.15  However, the technical assessment was that releasing thirty 20-
pound Cooper bombs (which weighed the same as 10,000 darts) would be more 
effective.16  The D of R pointed out that FWW experience had found them ineffective 
and they had been superseded by bombs.17 
 
Stink Cartridges.  Of a harmless nature, these were thought to keep tribesmen on 
the move and annoy them when hiding in caves, but could only be delivered by low-
altitude attacks.18  However, the lachrymatory ingredient was deemed to be a category 
of chemical warfare and the technical assessment was that, if chemical warfare was to 
be sanctioned (which was ‘an open question’), Mustard gas would be more effective, 
as it would persist for weeks, denying tribesmen use of their villages (although there 
was no mention about the challenges on decontaminating an area once a tribe had 
capitulated). Work on stink bombs had been halted after the 1921-22 Washington 
Conference and further development would be required before they could be deployed 
to India.19  The D of R commented that ‘There is not the slightest doubt in my mind 
that mustard gas is the most satisfactory, if we are going to use any form of stink or 
gas’.20 
 
Throwdowns.  A large number of 4-oz versions of schoolboys’ crackers could be 
used, mixed with high-explosive bombs, to generate an significantly enhanced moral 
effect and give the impression of a much larger bombing raid.21  However, the 
technical assessment was that they were too unstable and dangerous for use in 
aircraft.22 
 
Liquid Fire.  The desired effect was to drop ignited oil drums where, on impact. 
Chamier thought that the burning liquid would flow rapidly down hillsides until if found 
level areas where, often, crops and houses would be located.23  However, the 
technical assessment was that only small quantities of oil could be carried by aircraft 
which would rapidly be absorbed by the ground on impact.24  The D of R thought that 
the weight of oil would prohibit this method’s practicality.25 
 
Crude Oil.  Chamier wanted to spread oil over ponds to inconvenience tribesmen by 
making them travel further to source drinking water for their livestock and 
                                                
14 Chamier, Forms of "Frightfulness". 
15 Ibid. 
16 Forms of Frightfulness: Enclosure 2(A). 
17 Bagnall-Wild, Minute, D of R to DDOI, 18 December 1922. 
18 Chamier, Forms of "Frightfulness". 
19 Forms of Frightfulness: Enclosure 2(A). 
20 Bagnall-Wild, Minute, D of R to DDOI, 18 December 1922. 
21 Chamier, Forms of "Frightfulness". 
22 Forms of Frightfulness: Enclosure 2(A). 
23 ———, Forms of "Frightfulness". 
24 Forms of Frightfulness: Enclosure 2(A). 
25 Bagnall-Wild, Minute, D of R to DDOI, 18 December 1922. 
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themselves.26  However, it was assessed that oil would not make the water 
undrinkable (only tainted) and that it would be difficult to deploy effectively against a 
collection of small pools.27 
 
Man Killing Shrapnel Bombs.  Smaller shrapnel bombs were thought to be valuable, 
as the 20-lb bomb was considered too heavy and ineffective.28  Development was 
proceeding, but the limited funds available and staffing process had slowed 
progress.29  The D of R reported that they were being developed as fast as possible. 
 
Gliding Bombs.  These were thought to be potentially useful for targeting hillside 
caves due to their low angle of impact.30  However, the technical assessment pointed 
out that glide bombs had previously been rejected by the Air Staff and caves were 
likely to present too small a target given their likely accuracy.  Instead, low-altitude 
bombing was recommended.31 
 
Smoke Bombs.  Against small targets, it was often necessary to attack at low altitude 
to positively identify the target.  However, DH9A bombers were considered too 
unmanoeuvrable for low-altitude bombing inside steep-sided valleys.  It was thought 
that more manoeuvrable Bristol Fighters could precision-drop smoke bombs from low 
level on small targets, after which DH9As could bomb the indicated target from a 
convenient height with their accurate bomb sight.32  Smoke bombs were in the 
process of being developed, but progress had been slow.33 
 
Tracer Ammunition.  Tracer was thought to have  a greater moral effect than plain 
ammunition.34  Large quantities of deteriorating stock were available from the FWW 
which could be deployed to India.35 
 
In-Service Weapons.  Both these types of bombs were already in service and would 
continue to be employed.  The Baby Incendiary had ‘a very great moral as well as 
material effect’.36 
 
Overall, the D of R considered high explosive or shrapnel bombs to be the most 
effective weapon for a given weight although, if acceptable in ‘savage warfare’, 
‘mustard gas should prove more efficient than any other known form of frightfulness’.37 
 
 
                                                
26 Chamier, Forms of "Frightfulness". 
27 Forms of Frightfulness: Enclosure 2(A). 
28 ———, Forms of "Frightfulness". 
29 Forms of Frightfulness: Enclosure 2(A). 
30 ———, Forms of "Frightfulness". 
31 Forms of Frightfulness: Enclosure 2(A). 
32 ———, Forms of "Frightfulness". 
33 Forms of Frightfulness: Enclosure 2(A). 
34 ———, Forms of "Frightfulness". 
35 Forms of Frightfulness: Enclosure 2(A). 
36 ———, Forms of "Frightfulness". 
37 Bagnall-Wild, Minute, D of R to DDOI, 18 December 1922. 
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ANNEX 17 - CORRESPONDENCE TO INDIA OFFICE FROM THE PUBLIC REGARDING POLICY 
(INCLUDING AIR ACTION) ON THE NWF – 1935 TO 19381 
 
DATE ORIGINATOR THEME 
05 Oct 38 Selfridge & Co Enquiry if there was a factual basis that bombing policy maintains order. 
20 Jul 38 The editor of 'The Aeroplane', C G Grey, 
addressed to Capt A Evans MP 
Anti-bombing theme.  Enquires if there any alternatives existed. 
26 Aug 38 Article in 'The Friend' (London) entitled 'Bombing 
in India'2 
Anti- bombing theme.  Quotes Dr Khan Sahib (PM of NWFP) saying "I am 
convinced that the whole system of air-bombing defenceless villages is immoral.. . I 
can assure you the first warning they get is the first bomb'. 
12 Aug 38 Article in 'Christian Science Monitor' (Boston, 
USA) entitled 'Police Bombing in India' by C F 
Andrews  
Contrasts Britain's objections to 'recent events in Spain and China' about 'the 
bombing of open towns' with bombing on NWF. 
28Jun 38 Preston Branch of Women's Intl League for 
Peace and Freedom3 
Resolution by members to cease the use of aerial bombing for police purposes on 
NWF. 
25 Jun 38 Acton Labour Party Resolution by members to cease the use of aerial bombing for police purposes on 
NWF. 
20 Apr 38 Pamphlet published by Carl Heath, Friends' 
Peace Literature Committee, 'The North-West 
Frontier of India' 
Letter extolling pacifism. 
                                                
1 Collated from letters in IOR/L/PS/12/3251, Policy: Correspondence with Members of the Public Regarding Policy (including Air Action) on the NWF,  
1935-42. 
2 The Friend was a Quaker magazine. 
3 The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom was founded in 1915 when 1200 women from a diversity of cultures and languages came 
together in The Hague during the First World War to study, inform and eliminate the causes of war. 
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DATE ORIGINATOR THEME 
07 Sep 37 Manchester Guardian 'The North-West Frontier - 
India's Problem’ by 'ECH' 
Article précis of C F Andrews' book recommending alternative solutions to bombing 
policy.4  This book questioned the necessity for a large army on the Frontier and 
condemned aerial bombing, urging greater expenditure on ‘constructive methods of 
peace’. 
03 Jun 37 National Peace Council Request to discuss NWF policy with SoS(India) (Marquess of Zetland). 
04 Jun 37 Peace Committee of the Society of Friends, 
London 
Resolution against bombing of Guernica & NWF. 
18 May 37 Letter from Miss Agatha Harrison, London  Demanding an enquiry into NWF policy as suggested by various Peace Societies. 
24 May 37 East Fulham Divisional Labour Party Resolution protesting at action against natives on the NWF. 
26 Apr 37 Edinburgh University Socialist Society Informing that a motion was unanimously passed: 'This Society protests against the 
continued bombing of the NWFI, and the invasion of the territory of independant 
[sic] tribes for militaristic purposes'. 
20 May 37 Cambridge Daily News, letter from Exec 
Committee of the Women's International League 
(Cambridge Branch) 
Protest about methods used on NWFI, highlighting the UK’s hypocritical criticism of 
Spanish aerial bombing.  Identically worded to Women’s International League letter 
dated 6 May 37. 
11 May 37 Women's International League (Brighton & Hove 
Branch) 
Protest about methods used on NWFI, highlighting the UK’s hypocritical criticism of 
Spanish aerial bombing.  Identically worded to Women’s International League letter 
dated 6 May 37. 
14 May 37 Synod of Newcastle upon Tyne District 
Methodist Church 
Expressed abhorrence at continued use of bombing on the NWFI. 
06 May 37 British Section of Women International League 
for Peace & Freedom 
Protest about methods used on NWFI, highlighting the UK’s hypocritical criticism of 
Spanish aerial bombing 
                                                
4 Andrews, The Challenge of the North-West Frontier: A Contribution to World Peace. 
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DATE ORIGINATOR THEME 
26 Apr 37 National Peace Council Stated that the cause of the NWF disturbances are economic and urged an 
investigation into the human needs of the NWF tribesmen.  General Wilson 
(Secretary of the Military Department of the IO) responded in a memo that  'I agree 
that the cause of trouble in the tribal territory is economic.  For yrs the GofI [sic] 
have with considerable success been trying to cure this by improving 
communications, by paying the inhabitants for their services & by encouraging them 
to indulge more freely in agriculture.  The Present trouble is not with those who 
have fallen in with this programme but with those who, rather than work for their 
living prefer to get it by raiding their neighbours'. 
17 Mar 36 British Section of Women International League 
for Peace & Freedom 
Informed that a resolution had been passed: 'This Annual Council meeting of the 
Women's Intl League deprecates the dual policy of the Government of India on the 
NWFI which, while seeking to bring civilisation to the disturbed areas by road-
making and other means, yet continues the method of military expeditions, and 
especially the use of aeroplanes...'. 
17 Dec 35 British Section of Women International League 
for Peace & Freedom 
Highlights an article in Manchester Guardian, drawing an analogy with Italian 
bombing in Abyssinia, asking for alternative methods to be explored. 
14 Oct 35 Geoffrey Hithersay Shakespeare, MP for 
Norwich, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry 
of Health 
Shakespeare's election competitor (Archibald Fenner Brockway, Labour pacifist) 
had written a critical article about NWF policy in the 'New Leader' [27 Sep 35; 
'Britain's Abyssinia'], alleging 6000 bombs dropped in a day.  Shakespeare 
requested the facts. 
 
 
Annex 18 - BEF 1* Career Backgrouds 
472 
ANNEX 18 - BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 1* CAREER BACKGROUNDS1 
 
General Headquarters  
  
 
  
  
 
Post Name Indian Service  Source 
 
Commander-in-Chief General The Viscount Gort (Late Foot Guards) Director of Military Training, India, 1932-36 S 
 
Chief of the General Staff Lieutenant General H.R. Pownall (Late RA) NWF, 1930-31 Chairman, Pownall Committee (see Chapter 6) S 
 
Vice Chief of General Staff 
(From 12 May) 
Major General T.R. Eastwood (Late Infantry) 
(Commanded Rustyforce, 24-26 May) ?  
 
Deputy Chief of General Staff (From 
12 May) Brigadier Sir Oliver W H Leese, Bt. Chief Instructor, Quetta, 1938-40 S 
 
Director of Military Intelligence 
Major General F.N. Mason-Macfarlane  
(Late RA) (Commanded Macforce, 17-25 
May) 
Afghanistan, 1919 
Staff College Quetta, 1920 
AHQ, 1922-26 
RA Training Centre, Muttra, 1926-28 
Staff Officer, Eastern Command, 1928-30 
S 
 
Adjutant-General Lieutenant General Sir W Douglas S Brownrigg (Late Infantry) NIS AL 
 
Quartermaster-General Lieutenant General W.G. Lindsell (Late RA) NIS AL 
 
Military Secretary  Brigadier Sir Colin Jardine, Bt. Northern Command, India, 1920-23 7th Indian Brigade, Razmak, 1926-27 S 
 
Major General Royal Artillery  Major General S.R. Wason Staff Officer, AHQ, 1933-35 S 
 
Major General Anti-Aircraft Artillery  Major General H.G. Martin 
Afghanistan, 1919 
India, 1922-27 
Directing Staff, Staff College, Quetta, 1928-31 
S 
 
Engineer-in-Chief Major General R.P. Pakenham-Walsh NIS AL 
 
Signals Officer-in-Chief Brigadier R. Chenevix-Trench Chief Signals Officer, India, 1927-31 AL 
 
Armoured Fighting Vehicles 
(Adviser) Brigadier V.V. Pope NIS AL 
 
Director of Supply and Transport  Brigadier G.K. Archibald NIS AL 
 
Director of Medical Services  Major General J.W.L. Scott NIS AL 
 
Key overleaf  
                                                   
1 Order of Battle and staff list derived from: Gregory Blaxland, Destination Dunk irk: The Story of Gort's Army (London: William Kimber, 1973), 398-403. 
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Key 
    
  
 
Description of Indian service 
   
 
No Indian Service (NIS) 
   
 
AHQ - Army HQ 
   
 
GSO - General Staff Officer    
 
S -  Smart, Nick. Biographical Dictionary of British Generals of the Second World War. Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2005 
 
 
AL - Army List for appropriate years  
  
 
WWW - Who Was Who for appropriate years 
   
 
GHQ Troops - Royal Armoured Corps 
  
     
 
Post Name Indian Service  Source 
 
1st Light Armoured Reconnaissance 
Brigade Brigadier C.W. Norman Indian service S 
 
2nd Light Armoured Reconnaissance 
Brigade Brigadier A.J. Clifton Armoured Vehicles, 1918-25 AL 
 
1st Army Tank Brigade Brigadier D.H. Pratt  NIS AL 
 
  
  
 
  
  GHQ Troops - Royal Artillery  
  
 
  
  
 
1st Anti-Aircraft Brigade Brigadier E.D. Milligan NIS AL 
 
2nd Anti-Aircraft Brigade Brigadier E.W. Chadwick  NIS AL 
 
4th Anti-Aircraft Brigade Brigadier J .N. Slater NWF, 1919 S, AL 
 
5th Searchlight Brigade Brigadier E. Rait -Kerr NIS AL 
 
I Corps    
     
 
GOC Lieutenant General M.G.H. Barker (Late Infantry) 
GSO2 India, 1920-21 
Instructor, Senior Officers' School, India, 1921-24 
AL 
 
BGS Brigadier W.C. Holden NIS AL 
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I Corps - 1st Division (with II Corps from 18-23 May) 
  
 
  
  
 
Post Name Indian Service  Source 
 
Divisional Commander Major General The Hon H.R.L.G. Alexander  (Late Foot Guards) OC Nowshera Brigade, NWF, 1935-37 S, AL 
 
1st Guards Brigade Brigadier M.B. Beckwith-Smith OC Lahore Brigade, 1938-39 S, AL 
 
2nd Brigade Brigadier C.E. Hudson NIS AL 
 
3rd Brigade Brigadier T.N.F. Wilson NIS AL 
     
     I Corps - 2nd Division (with Rustyforce from 24-26 May, with III Corps from 26 May) 
  
     
 
Divisional Commander Major General H.C. Lloyd (Late Foot Guards)  (To 16 May) NIS AL 
 
  Brigadier F.H.N. Davidson (Late RA)  (Acting from 16-20 May) 
Staff College, Quetta, 1924 
GSO2, AHQ, 1925-27 
Brigade Major, 12th Indian Infantry Brigade, 1927-
29 
S, AL 
 
  Major General N.M.S. Irwin (Late-Infantry)  (From 20 May) GSO2, Border Regiment, India, 1929-33 S, AL 
 
4th Brigade Brigadier E.G. Warren NWFI, 1936-37 AL 
 
5th Brigade Brigadier G. I. Gartlan NIS AL 
 
6th Brigade Brigadier N.M.S. Irwin (To 20 May) Previously mentioned above  
 
6th Brigade Brigadier D.W. Furlong (From 20 May) Waziristan Ops, 1921-24 AL 
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I Corps - 48th (South Midland) Division, TA (under GHQ from 25 May) 
  
 
  
  
 
Post Name Indian Service  Source 
 
Divisional Commander Major General A.F.A.N. Thorne (Late Foot Guards) NIS AL 
 
143rd Brigade Brigadier J. Muirhead  (With 5th Division from 26 May) NWF, 1930-31 AL 
 
144th Brigade Brigadier J .M. Hamilton NIS AL 
 
145th Brigade Brigadier A.C. Hughes (To 15 May) ?  
 
145th Brigade Brigadier The Hon N.F. Somerset  (From 15 May) 
Afghanistan & NWF, 1919 
Staff Captain Auxiliary & Territorial Force, India, 
1925-26 
Assistant Military Secretary India, 1926-29 
AL 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
II CORPS  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
GOC Lieutenant General A.F. Brooke (Late RA) India, 06-14 S 
 
BGS Brigadier N.M. Ritchie SO Northern Command, 30-34 
GSO2 India, 33-37 
S, AL 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
II CORPS - 3rd Division  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Divisional Commander Major General B.L. Montgomery  (Late Infantry) 
NWF & Bombay, 1908-12? 
1st Battalion, Royal Warwicks, 1931-33? 
Chief Instructor (GSO1), Staff College, Quetta, 
1934-37 
S, AL, 
M 
 
7th Guards Brigade Brigadier J.A.C. Whitaker NIS AL 
 
8th Brigade Brigadier C.G. Woolner GSO2 India, 1930-32 
Brigade Major, India, 1932-34 
S, AL 
 
9th Brigade Brigadier W. Robb 
2nd Battalion, King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, 
India, 1922-25 
GSO3 India, 1926-30 
S, AL 
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II Corps - 4th Division (with III Corps from 18-23 May) 
  
 
  
  
 
Post Name Indian Service  Source 
 
Divisional Commander Major General D.G. Johnson (Late Infantry ) Brigade Commander, India, 1933-36 AL 
 
10th Brigade Brigadier E.H. Barker NIS AL 
 
11th Brigade Brigadier K.A.N. Anderson NWF, 1930-31 
GSO1 India, 1936-37 
AL 
 
12th Brigade Brigadier J.L.I. Hawkesworth NIS AL 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
II CORPS - 50th (Northumbrian) Division TA (with Frankforce 20-24 May, with III Corps 24-26 May)  
 
  
 
 
 
Divisional Commander Major General G. le Q. Martel (Late RE and RTC) Instructor (GSO2) Quetta, 1930-34 AL 
 
150th Brigade Brigadier C.W. Haydon NIS AL 
 
151st Brigade Brigadier J .A. Churchill  GSO2 India, 1929-32 AL 
 
25th Brigade (With 2nd Division 
from 24 May) Brigadier W.H.C. Ramsden  
Commissioned into West India Regt, 1910 
Regimental duties, India, early 1920s 
Senior Officers School, India, 1926-30 
NWF, 1936-37 
S, AL 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
III Corps  
 
 
     
 
GOC Lieutenant General Sir Ronald F Adam, Bt. (Late RA) (To 26 May) Early career in India S 
 
GOC Major General S.R. Wason  (Acting from 26 May) GSO2, AHQ, India, 1933-35 S, AL 
 
BGS Brigadier D.G. Watson 
Special Employment, India, 1936-37 
Commandant, Senior Officers' School, India, 
1937-39 
S, AL 
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III Corps - 42nd (East Lancashire) Division TA (with I Corps from 19 May) 
  
     
 
Post Name Indian Service  Source 
 
Divisional Commander Major General W.G. Holmes (Late Infantry) NWF, 1919-24 S, AL 
 
125th Brigade Brigadier G.W. Sutton NIS WWW 
 
126th Brigade Brigadier E.G. Miles  NIS AL 
 
127th Brigade (With Macforce from 
17-21 May) Brigadier J .G. Smyth VC 
Commissioned 15th Sikh Regiment, 1912 
Brigade Major, India, 1918-19 
Afghanistan 1919 
Brigade Major, Waziristan Force, 1919-20 
GSO3 India, 1922 
GSO2 India, 1925-29 
Indian Army Instructor, Camberley, 1931-34 
Commandant, 45th Rattray Sikh Regiment, 1936-
39 
S, AL 
 
  
 
 
III CORPS - 44th (Home Counties) Division - TA 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Divisional Commander Major General E.A. Osborne  (Late Royal Signals) NIS AL 
 
131st Brigade Brigadier J .E. Utterson-Kelso NIS AL 
 
132nd Brigade Brigadier J .S. Steele Staff Captain, India, 1919-20 S, AL 
 
133rd Brigade Brigadier N.I. Whitty NIS AL 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
5th Division (with I Corps 16-19 May, with Frankforce 20-24 May, with III Corps 24-25 May, with II Corps from 25 May)  
 
  
 
 
 
Divisional Commander Major General H.E. Franklyn (Late Infantry)  (Also commanded Frankforce, May 20-24) 
Inspector General, West Indian Land Forces, 
1930 
S 
 
13th Brigade Brigadier M.C. Dempsey NIS AL 
 
17th Brigade Brigadier M.G.N. Stopford NIS AL 
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23rd (Northumbrian) Division (with Petreforce 18-21 May, subsequently with Rustyforce and III Corps) 
 
     
 
Post Name Indian Service  Source 
 
Divisional Commander Major General W.N. Herbert (Late Infantry) 
GSO1 Rawalpindi District, 1920-21 
Asst Dir Auxiliary & Territorial Forces, India, 1922-
24 
S, AL 
 
69th Brigade Brigadier The Viscount Downe NIS WWW 
 
70th Brigade Brigadier P. Kirkup NIS WWW 
 
  
 
 
46th (North Midland and West Riding) Division TA (with Polforce, Rustyforce, and III Corps, 20-30 May, with I Corps from 30 May)  
 
  
 
 
 
Divisional Commander Major General H.O. Curtis (Late Infantry) (Also commanded Polforce, 20-24 May) Staff College, Quetta, 1920 S, AL 
 
137th Brigade Brigadier J.B. Gawthorpe NIS WWW 
 
138th Brigade Brigadier E.J. Grinling  (With Macforce, 19-25 May) NIS WWW 
 
139th Brigade Brigadier H.A.F. Crewdson (To 22 May) ?  
 
139th Brigade Brigadier R.C. Chichester-Constable  (From 22 May) NIS WWW 
     12th (Eastern) Division    
     
 
Divisional Commander Major General R.L. Petre (Late Infantry) (Commanded Petreforce, 18-24 May) 
Afghanistan, 1919 
GSO2 India, 1919-20 S, AL 
 
35th Brigade Lieutenant Colonel A.F.F. Young  (Acting to 13 May) ?  
 
35th Brigade Brigadier V.L. de Cordova (From 13 May) Staff Capt India, 1924-28 AL 
 
36th Brigade (With Petreforce, 
19-20 May) Brigadier G.R.P. Roupell  NIS AL 
 
37th Brigade Brigadier R. J .P. Wyatt ?  
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From England    
     
 
Post Name Indian Service  Source 
 
20th Guards Brigade Brigadier W.A.F.L. Fox-Pitt NIS AL 
 
30th Brigade Brigadier C.N. Nicholson NIS AL 
     
     1st Armoured Division (began to arrive 20 May, under French command from 25 May) 
  
     
 
Divisional Commander Major General R. Evans (Late Cavalry) Brigade General Staff, India, 1935-38 S, AL 
 
2nd Armoured Brigade Brigadier R.L. McCreery  NIS AL 
 
3rd Armoured Brigade Brigadier J .G. Crocker NIS AL 
 
1st Support Group Brigadier F.E. Morgan 
Staff College, Quetta, 1927-28 
Staff Officer Royal Artillery, India, 1931-32 
GSO2, India, 1932-35 
S, AL 
     
     51st (Highland) Division TA (in Maginot Line, 1-23 May, with French Tenth Army from 1 June)  
     
 
Divisional Commander Major General V.M. Fortune (Late Infantry) NIS AL 
 
152nd Brigade Brigadier H.W.V. Stewart  (Until wounded, 6 June) NIS AL 
 
152nd Brigade Lieutenant Colonel I.C. Barclay  (Acting from 6 June) 
Air Ministry, 1918-19 
Waziristan, 1921-24 
NWF, 1930-31 
AL 
 
153rd Brigade Brigadier G.T. Burney NIS AL 
 
154th Brigade Brigadier A.C.L. Stanley Clarke NIS AL 
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Lines of Communication    
 
  
  
 
Post Name Indian Service  Source 
 
  Major General P. de Fonblanque (Late RE)  (Until 23 May and from 13-17 June) 
Commander Royal Engineers, India, 1930-32 & 
1933 
AL 
 
  Lieutenant General Sir Henry Karslake (Late RA) (From 23 May to 13 June) 
GSO1 India, 1920-23 
Brigadier Royal Artillery, Western Command, 
India, 1928-31 
Major General Royal Artillery, AHQ, 1931-33 
Commander Baluchistan District, 1933-35 
Lieutenant General, Quetta reconstruction 
S, AL 
 
3rd Anti-Aircraft Brigade Brigadier W. R. Shilstone NIS AL 
     Beauman Division (formed 31 May)    
     
 
Divisional Commander Major General A.B. Beauman (Late Infantry) GSO2 India, 1921-25 AL 
 
A Brigade  
(with 51st Division from 6 June) Brigadier M.A. Green NIS AL 
 
B Brigade Brigadier A.L. Kent-Lemon NIS AL 
 
C Brigade Lieutenant Colonel L.W. Diggle (To 12 June) ?  
 
C Brigade Lieutenant Colonel F.G. Brittorous, Light Infantry (From 23 June) Staff Captain India, 1922-26  AL 
 
  
 
 
With the advanced Air Striking Force 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
12th Anti-Airc raft Brigade Brigadier W.T.O. Crewdson NWF, 1915 AL 
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Arrived during the Final Phase   
  
 
  
  
 
Post Name Indian Service  Source 
 
Acting Commander-in-Chief  
(From 13-17 June) Lieutenant General Sir Alan Brooke Previously mentioned above  
 
Chief of Staff Major General T.R. Eastwood Previously mentioned above  
 
52nd (Lowland) Division (TA) Major General J .S. Drew (Light Infantry) NIS AL 
 
155th Brigade Brigadier T. Grainger-Stewart (TA) NIS AL 
 
156th Brigade Brigadier J .S.N. Fitzgerald NIS AL 
 
157th Brigade Brigadier Sir John Laurie, Bt. NIS AL 
     Missions at Allied Headquarters    
     
 
At GHQ French Army Major General Sir Richard Howard-Vyse NIS AL 
 
At GHQ North-East Theatre Brigadier J.G. des Reaux Swayne ADC GOC-in-C Western Command, India, 1921-23 S, AL 
 
At GHQ Belgian Army Major General H. Needham District Commander India, 1931-? AL 
 
At HQ French Tenth Army (From 29 
May) 
Lieutenant General J.H. Marshall-Cornwall 
(Commanded Normanforce from June 15) NIS AL 
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ANNEX 19 - CHIEFS OF THE AIR STAFF - AIR CONTROL AND MILITARY EXPERIENCE 
 
Year CAS Tours involving Air Policing Pre-RAF Military Experience 
1918 Sir Hugh Trenchard Nil Royal Scots Fusiliers, Punjab 
1918 Sir Frederick Sykes Intelligence Staff, Simla, India (1905) Staff College, Quetta (1908-10?) 
15th Hussars 
West African Regiment 
1919 Sir Hugh Trenchard Nil Royal Scots Fusiliers, Punjab 
1930 Sir John Salmond India Review (1922) AOC Iraq (1922-24) King's Own Royal Lancashire Regiment 
1933 Sir Geoffrey Salmond OC/GOC/AOC Middle East (1915-18) AOC India (1926-31) Royal Artillery 
1933 Sir John Salmond India Review (1922) AOC Iraq (1922-24) King's Own Royal Lancashire Regiment 
1933 Sir Edward Ellington 
AOC Middle East (1922-23) 
AOC India (1923-26) 
AOC Iraq (1926-28) 
Royal Field Artillery 
1937 Sir Cyril Newall AOC Middle East (1931-35) 2nd Gurkha Rifles, Indian Army 
1940 Lord Portal OC Aden Command (1934-35) Royal Engineers 
1946 Sir Arthur Tedder OC 38th Wing, Egypt (1918) Dorset Regiment 
1950 Sir John Slessor 
17 Squadron, Egypt/Sudan (1915-16) 
20 Squadron, NWF (1921-22) 
OC 3 (Indian) Wing (1935-37) 
Nil.  But served as Directing Staff at Army 
Staff College, Camberley, 1931-34 
1953 Sir William Dickson RAF Kohat (1929) HQ RAF India (1930-34) RN Air Service 
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ANNEX 20 - AIR OFFICER COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF, BOMBER COMMAND 
 - AIR CONTROL AND MILITARY EXPERIENCE 
 
 
Year AOC-in-C Bomber Command Tours involving Air Policing Pre-RAF Military Experience 
1936 ACM Sir John Steel AOC India (1931-35) RN 
1937 ACM Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt 
AOC, Iraq Command (1930-32) 
AOC India (1935-37) Royal Irish Rifles  
1940 AM Sir Charles Portal OC Aden Command (1934-35) Royal Engineers 
1940 AM Sir Richard Peirse 
HQ RAF Middle East (1928-29) 
OC RAF Heliopolis (1929-30) 
AOC Palestine Transjordan (1933-36) 
AOC India/South-East Asia (1942-44) 
RN Volunteer Reserve 
1942 
AVM Jack Baldwin  
(Acting AOC-in-C) 
HQ RAF Middle East (1923-28) 
Deputy AOC India (1942-43) 
King's Royal Irish Hussars 
1942 ACM Sir Arthur Harris 
OC 31 Squadron, NWF (1921-22) 
OC 45 Squadron, Iraq (1922-24) 
SASO, Middle East Command (1930-32) 
AOC Palestine and Transjordan 
1st Rhodesian Regiment  
1945 AM Sir Norman Bottomley 
HQ Middle East Area 
OC Aircraft Park, Lahore 
OC No 1 (Indian) Group 
East Yorkshire Regiment  
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ANNEX 21 – AIR OFFICER COMMANDING, RAF INDIA - AIR CONTROL AND MILITARY EXPERIENCE 
 
Year AOC(India) Post Pre-RAF Military Experience 
1919 Brig-Gen Norman D K McEwen OC RAF India Princess Louise's (Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders) 
1919 Air Cdre Tom I Webb-Bowen 
AOC India Group, then  AOC 
RAF India 
The Bedfordshire Regiment 
Madras Volunteer Corps 
1922 AVM Philip W Game 
AOC RAF India  
Royal Artillery 
General Staff Officer, War Office 
General Staff Officer, HQ 4th Army Corps & HQ 46th Division 
1923 AVM Edward L Ellington 
General Staff Officer, War Office 
Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, HQ BEF 
Assistant Adjutant & Quartermaster-General, 2nd Cavalry Div 
General Staff Officer, 2nd Army, British Expeditionary Force 
General Staff, VIII Corps, France 
1926 AVM W Geoffrey H Salmond 
Royal Artillery 
General Staff Officer, War Office 
1931 AVM/AM Sir John Steel Royal Navy 
1935 AM Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt  1st Battalion Royal Irish Rifles 
1937 AM Sir Philip Joubert de la Ferte  Royal Field Artillery 
1940 AM Sir Patrick Playfair AOC-in-C, Air Forces in India Royal Field Artillery 
1942 ACM Sir Richard Pierse  C-in-C Air Command SE Asia Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve 
1943 
AM Sir Alfred Guy Roland 
Garrod 
Acting C-in-C Air Command 
South East Asia 3rd Battalion Leicester Regiment  
1944 AVM Meredith Thomas AOC, AHQ India 
The Queen’s Westminster Rifles 
The  Welsh Regiment 
1945 AM Sir Roderick Carr AOC-in-C, RAF India Royal Naval Air Service 
1946 AM Sir Hugh Walmsley AOC-in-C, RAF India Royal North Lancashire Regiment 
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ANNEX 22 - GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF MILITARY AIRFIELDS IN INDIA, 1918-19391 
 
                                      
 
                                                
1 Data taken from The Monthly Air Force List, 1920-1938. 
1 
3 
2 
4 
24 
6 
11 
25 
26 
19 
18 
17 
16 
14 
13 
15 
  9 
12 
11 
  5 
  7 
  6 
  8 
  4 
10 
1 
3 
2 
Major RAF Station 
Landing ground/temporary Station 
Durand Line/Frontier 
Administrative Border 
District/Agency border 
  9 
1 
1 Kohat 8 Sorarogha 15 Nowshera 22 Karachi 
2 Peshawar 9 Mianwali 16 Hassani Abdel 23 Lahore 
3 Risalpur 10 Bannu 17 Chaklala 24 Ambala 
4 Ft Sandeman 11 Miranshah 18 Murree 25 Cawnpore 
5 Dera Ismail Khan 12 Dardoni 19 Gilgit 26 Mhow   
6 Tank 13 Arawali 20 Loralai 
7 Manzai 14 Parachinar 21 Quetta 
20 
21 
22 
23 
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ANNEX 23 - RAF STATIONS AND SQUADRONS IN INDIA, 1920-19381 
 
  RAF STATIONS 
Year Lahore (23) 
Karachi 
(22) 
Peshawar 
(2) 
Manzai 
(7) 
Bannu 
(10) 
Kohat 
(1) 
Quetta 
(21) 
Chaklala 
(17) 
Risalpur 
(3) 
Nowshera 
(15) 
Parachinar 
(14) 
Dardoni 
(12) 
Ambala 
(24) 
Mhow 
(26) 
Cawnpore 
(25) 
1920 Ac Depot Ac Factory 
Ac Depot 
Detachment 
1 Indian Wg 
HQ 
  20 Sqn   
5 Sqn 
  
1 Sqn 
27 Sqn 
60 Sqn 
      
2 Indian Wg HQ 
3 Sqn 
28 Sqn 
31 
Sqn   
1921 
Ac Park 
Ac Depot 
Ac Factory 
1 Indian Wg 
Advanced HQ       
27 Sqn 
60 Sqn 
  20 Sqn   
2 Indian Wg HQ  
28 Sqn 
RAF School (3 
Sqn) 
  31 Sqn 
1922 
Ac Depot 
1 Indian Wg 
HQ 
31 Sqn 
          28 Sqn   
2 Indian Wg HQ  
20 Sqn 
RAF School 
    
1923 
1 Indian Wg 
HQ 
28 Sqn 
      
3 India Wg HQ 
20 Sqn 
        31 Sqn 5 Sqn     
1924 
1 Indian Wg 
HQ 
28 (AC) Sqn 
5 (AC) Sqn 
        2 Indian Wg HQ 
27 (B) Sqn 
60 (B) Sqn 
  5 Sqn 
31 (AC) Sqn 
    
1925 
1 Indian Wg 
HQ 
20 (AC) Sqn 
    1 Indian Wg Stn 5 (AC) Sqn 3 India Wg HQ 
28 (AC) Sqn 
          
1926     
1 Indian Wg Stn 
60 (B) Sqn 
  
2 Indian Wg HQ 
27 (B) Sqn 
5 (AC) Sqn 
        
1927     3 India Wg HQ 
31 (AC) Sqn 
      
28 (AC) Sqn 
    
1928               
1929 
1 (Indian) Gp 
HQ 
20 (AC) Sqn 
    
1 (Indian Wg) Stn 
27 (B) Sqn 
60 (B) Sqn 
3 (Indian) Wg 
HQ 
5 (AC) Sqn 
31 (AC) Sqn 
  
2 (Indian Wg) Stn 
11 (B) Sqn 
39 (B) Sqn 
          
1930                 
1931                 
1932 
Ac Park, 
Heavy 
Transport 
Flt 
                
1933 
Ac Park, 
BTF 
                
1934                 
1935                 
1936 Ac Depot 
31(AC) Sqn 
    (Earthquake) 3 (Indian) 
Wg HQ 
5 (AC) Sqn 
          
1937                 
1938 
Ac Depot 
31(AC) Sqn 
1 Sqn IAF 
        
2 (Indian) Wg Stn 
5 (AC) Sqn 
11 (B) Sqn 
39 (B) Sqn 
      30 (AC) Sqn     
                Key: (AC) Sqn Army Co-operation Squadron 
(B) Sqn Bomber Squadron 
BTF Bomber Transport Flight 
Airfield (1) Airfield (number refers to Annex 22 maps) 
 NWF Station  Station outside NWF Note: Detachments to advanced airfields not shown. 
                                                 
1 Data from Ibid.,   
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ANNEX 24 - RAF STATIONS, AIRFIELDS, SQUADRONS AND DETACHMENTS ON NWF, 1914-19391 
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Annex 
22 Ref 20 21 4 5 6 7 8 11 12 10 13 14 1 2 3 15 9 16 19 18 
Years 1919-22 1917-39+ 1927-42 
1917-
20 1917-25 1925-39+ 1919 1923-41+ 1920-24 1917-20 1923-39+ 
1919-
22 1919-49+ 1921-39+ 1916-46 1915 1919-1923 1923-36 1929-39 1916 
1914                               31 
BE2C  
        
1915                     
1916               
31 (A+B Flts)  
      BE2C     31 BE2C 
1917  114 det  
31 det 
 BE2E 
31 det BE2E     31 det       BE2E 
    31 BE2E      
1918  114               
1919 
48 det 
  F2b 
114 det 
  BE2C/E 
48 F2b 
114 BE2C/E  
20 det F2b 
31 det F2b  
20 det 
F2b   
20 F2b 
31 det BE2E 
114 det  
    BE2C/E 
 
20 
F2b 
114 det  
BE2C/E+F27  
20 F2b 
31 BE2E+F2b 
97 det DH10  
97 det DH10 
99 det DH9A    
1920 5 det F2b 
48/5 F2b (48 
became 5 
Sqn)  
20 F2b (1 flt) 
31 det F2b 
60 det DH10    
27 det  
    DH9A 
60 det  
    DH10 
20 F2b 
31 det BE2E    
1 SE5A? + Snipe 
27 DH9A+F2b 
60 DH10/10A 
97 DH10 
 
27 DH9A 
60 det DH10/10A 
99 det DH9A    
1921 
 
 
 
 
5 F2b 
48 F2b   
28 det F2B 
31 det F2b 
60 det DH10    
27 det 
    DH9A 
28 det  
    F2B 
31 det  
    F2b 
60 det  
    DH10 
  
28 F2b 31 F2b 27 DH9A 60 DH10/10A 
 
60 det DH10/10A 
   
1922 20 det      F2b 
5 FE2B 
20 F2b   
27 det DH9A 
28 det F2B 
31 det F2b 
60 det DH10 
   
27 det 
    DH9A 
28 F2b 
31 det  
     F2b 
60 det  
     DH10 
  
28 
F2b     
1923  
20 F2b 
60 det DH9A   
28 F2B 
31 det F2b 
60 det DH10   
27 det DH9A 
60 det DH9A  
27 det DH9A 
60 det DH9A 
  
28 F2b 
31 F2b 
27 DH9A 
60 DH9A 
 
28 det F2b 
60 det DH9A 
  
1924  
20 F2b 
31 det F2b 
60 det DH9A   
28 det F2B   60 det DH9A 
5 FE2B 
27 
    DH9A 
28 det  
     F2B 
60 det  
     DH10 
   28 F2b     
1925  
5 det F2b 
20 det F2b 
28 F2b 
31 det F2b 
60 det DH9A 
  5 det FE2B 
20 det F2b 
 
5 det FE2b 
20 det F2b 
27 det DH9A 
60 det DH9A 
   
5 F2b 
20 F2b 
60 DH9A 
20 F2b 
27 DH9A 
60 DH9A 
5 F2b 
27 DH9A 
60 DH9A   
5 det F2b 
20 det F2b 
60 det DH9A 
  
1926 31 det      F2b     5 det FE2b 
20 det F2b 
27 det DH9A 
28 det F2b 
60 det DH9A 
  
60 det DH9A 
 60 DH9A 
20 F2b 
5 F2b 
27 DH9A 
60 det DH9A 
    
1927  5 det FE2B 
20 det F2b 
31 F2b 
60 det DH9A 
31 det 
    F2b 
          
1928        
27 DH9A 
60 DH9A     
                     
        Key: Station with permanent squadron 
Airfield with squadron 
detachments 
Squadron Number 
‘det’ – detachment  
Aircraft type 
 
      
                                                 
1 Jefford, RAF Squadrons: A Comprehensive Record of the Movement and Equipment of all RAF Squadrons and their Antecedents since 1912. 
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1929  
5 det FE2B 
20 det F2b 
31 F2b 
60 det DH9A 
31 det F2b   20 det F2b  
11 det Wapiti 
20 det F2b 
28 det F2b 
39 det DH9A 
60 det DH9A 
  
11 det Wapiti 
60 det DH9A  
27 DH9A 
60 DH9A 
20 F2b 
39 det DH9A 
5 det F2b 
11 Wapiti 
39 DH9A/Wapiti 
60 det DH9A 
  
20 det F2b 
60 det DH9A 
11 det 
     Wapiti 
39 det 
     DH9A 
 
1930  
60 det DH9A 
20 det F2b 
31 F2b 
31 det F2b   
20 det F2b 
27 det Wapiti 
60 det Wapiti 
 
5 det FE2b 
11 det Wapiti 
20 det F2b 
27 det Wapiti 
28 det F2b 
60 det Wapiti 
  
11 det Wapiti 
27 det Wapiti 
60 det DH9A 
 
5 F2b ftr 
27 Wapiti 
60 Wapiti 
20 F2b 
28 det F2b 
5 det F2b 
11 Wapiti 
28 F2b 
39 Wapiti 
60 det DH9A 
  
20 det F2b 
11 det Wapiti 
27 det Wapiti 
60 det Wapiti  
1931  
5 FE2B/Wapiti 
20 det F2b 
31 Wapiti 
5 det Wapiti 
31 det Wapiti 
   
11 det Wapiti 
20 det F2b 
27 det Wapiti 
39 det Hart 
60 det Wapiti 
   
27 Wapiti 
60 Wapiti 
11 Wapiti 
39 Wapiti+Hart   
11 det Wapiti 
27 det Wapiti 
39 det Hart 
60 det Wapiti 
 
1932  
5 Wapiti 
31 Wapiti 
  
27 det Wapiti 
60 det Wapiti 
 
20 det F2b 
27 det Wapiti 
39 det Hart 
60 det Wapiti 
   
20 Wapiti 11 Hart 39 Hart 
  
11 det Wapiti 
27 det Wapiti 
60 det Wapiti  
1933     27 det Wapiti 
39 det Hart 
60 det Wapiti 
  
27 det Wapiti 
60 det DH9A 
    
27 det Wapiti 
60 det Wapiti 
 
1934            
1935  Earthquake    
5 det Wapiti 
27 det Wapiti 
39 det Hart 
60 det Wapiti 
   
5 det Wapiti 
27 Wapiti 
60 Wapiti 
20 Audax 
11 Hart 
31 det Wapiti 
39 Hart     
1936  
31 det Wapiti 
31 det Wapiti 
  
27 det Wapiti 
60 det Wapiti  
5 det Wapiti 
20 Audax 
27 det Wapiti 
39 det Hart 
60 det Wapiti 
  
20 det Audax 
27 det Wapiti 
60 det DH9A  
5 det Wapiti 
11 Hart 
20 det Audax 
31 det Wapiti 
39 Hart 
  20 det Audax  
1937    
27 det Wapiti 
28 Audax 
60 det Wapiti  
5 Wapiti 
20 Audax 
27 det Wapiti 
39 det Hart 
60 det Wapiti 
  
27 det Wapiti 
60 det DH9A  
11 Hart 
31 det Wapiti 
39 Hart     
1938  
5 det Wapiti 
31 det Wapiti   
27 det Wapiti 
60 det Wapiti  
5 det Wapiti 
20 Audax 
27 det Wapiti 
28 det Audax 
39 det Hart 
60 det Wapiti 
  
5 det Wapiti 
27 det Wapiti 
60 det DH9A  
5 det Wapiti 
27 Wapiti 
28 Audax 
60 Wapiti 
5 Wapiti 
11 Hart 
31 det Wapiti 
39 Hart  
A Flt, 1 Sqn IAF 
    
1939  
5 det Wapiti 
28 det Audax 
5 Wapiti 
28 det Audax   
20 det Audax 
27 det Wapiti 
28 det Audax 
60 det Wapiti 
   
5 det Wapiti 
27 det Wapiti 
28 det Audax 
20 det 
Audax 
5 det Wapiti 
20 Audax 
27 Wapiti 
28 Audax 
60 Wapiti 
20 Audax 
28 det Audax 
31 Wapiti 
60 det 
  Blenheim I 
5 Wapiti 
11 Hart/Blenheim I 
27 Tiger Moth 
      +Hart 
28 det Audax 
31 det Wapiti 
39 Hart/Blenheim I 
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ANNEX 25 – SENIOR APPOINTMENTS, 1914-1940 
  SoS(Air) CAS CIGS SoS(India) Mil Sec, India Office Viceroy 
Chief 
Commissioner/ 
Governor, 
NWFP 
C-in-C India CGS India AOC India Senior Air Staff Officer, India 
1914   
  Gen Sir Charles  
Douglas 
Lt-Gen Sir James  
Wolfe-Murray 
Marquess of 
Crewe 
Gen Sir Edmund  
Barrow 
Lord  
Hardinge 
Sir John  
Donald  
(acting) 
Gen Sir 
Beauchamp 
Duff 
Lt-Gen Sir Percy 
Lake 
    
1915     Gen Sir Archibald  Murray Austen  
Chamberlain 
Sir George  
Roos-Keppel 
    
1916      Gen Sir William  
Robertson 
Lord  
Chelmsford 
Gen Sir Charles  
Monro 
Lt-Gen Sir George 
Kirkpatrick 
    
1917 Lord Rothermere   
Edwin Samuel  
Montagu 
Lt-Gen Sir Herbert  
Cox 
    
1918 Lord Weir 
Sir Hugh Trenchard 
 
Sir Frederick Sykes 
FM Sir Henry  
Wilson 
    
1919 J E B Seely 
Sir Hugh Trenchard 
Brig-Gen Norman 
McEwan   
Winston Churchill Sir Hamilton  Grant Air Cdre Tom I  
Webb-Bowen 
  
1920 
Lt-Gen Sir 
Alexander 
Cobbe 
Gen Henry  
Rawlinson 
Gen Sir Claud  
Jacob 
Wg Cdr Reginald 
Mills 
1921 Frederick Guest 
Earl of  
Reading 
Sir John Maffey  
(Lord Rugby) 1922 
Sir Samuel Hoare 
FM Rudolph  
Lambart 
The Viscount Peel 
AVM Philip W 
Game 
1923 
Sir Norman  
Bolton AVM Edward L  
Ellington Gp Capt John Chamier 
1924 Lord Thomson 
  The Lord Olivier 
Gen Sir Andrew  
Skeen 
1925 
Sir Samuel Hoare 
Earl of 
Birkenhead 
Sir William  
Keen (acting) 
Gen Sir Claud  
Jacob 
1926 
FM Sir George  
Milne 
FM Sir Claud  
Jacob Lord  
Irwin 
Sir Norman  
Bolton 
FM Sir William 
Birdwood AVM W Geoffrey H  
Salmond 
1927 
Gp Capt/Air Cdre 
Reginald  
Mills 
1928 The Viscount Peel Gen Sir Philip  
Chetwode 1929 Lord Thomson William 
Wedgwood  
Benn 1930 Lord Amulree 
Sir John Salmond 
Gen Sir Alexander  
Cobbe 
Sir Stuart  
Pearks 
FM Sir Philip 
Chetwode 
Lt-Gen Sir Cyril  
Deverell 
1931 
Marquess of  
Londonderry 
Sir Samuel  
Hoare 
Maj-Gen Sydney  
Muspratt 
Earl of  
Willingdon Sir Ralph  
Griffith 
Gen Sir Kenneth  
Wigram AVM/AM Sir John  
Steel 
1932 Air Cdre Patrick Playfair 
1933 
Sir Geoffrey 
Salmond 
Sir John  
Salmond FM Sir Archibald  Montgomery-
Massingberd 
Lt-Gen Sir John  
Coleridge 
Air Cdre Arthur 
Barratt 
1934 
Sir Edward 
Ellington 
Gen Sir William 
Bartholomew 
1935 
Viscount Swinton 
Marquess of  
Zetland 
Gen Sir Robert 
Cassels 
AM Sir Edgar  
Ludlow-Hewitt 
Air Cdre Bertie 
Sutton 
1936 FM Sir Cyril  Deverell 
Maj-Gen Sir Roger  
Wilson 
Marquess of  
Linlithgow 
Air Cdre Richard 
Peck 1937 
Sir Cyril Newall 
Gen Viscount 
 Gort 
Maj-Gen Sydney  
Muspratt 
Sir George  
Cunningham 
Gen Sir Ivo  
Vesey 
AM Sir Philip  
Joubert de la 
Ferte 1938 
Sir Kingsley Wood 
1939 Gen Sir Edmund  Ironside Gen Sir Eric  
de Burgh 
AM Sir John  
Higgins 
Gp Capt H  
Whistler 
1940 Sir Samuel Hoare 
Sir Archibald 
Sinclair 
Sir Charles Portal FM Sir John  Dill Leo Amery 
Sir Arthur  
Parsons 
AM Sir Patrick  
Playfair  
Gp Capt A 
Wright 
See Annex 7 for biographies of personalities in blue. 
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